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ABSTRACT
COMMUNITY BUILDING IN ETHNICALLY RESTRUCTURED STATES:
THE BALTICS
Do vile Budryte
Old Dominion University, 2000
Director: Dr. Regina C. Karp

Drawing on democratic theory, this dissertation explores a thesis that the
experience of ethnic restructuring significantly effects the ability of a democratizing state
to successfully consolidate its emerging democracy. Ethnically restructured states, it is
hypothesized, have an especially hard time creating inclusive democratic political
communities, which is a necessary prerequisite for a consolidated democracy.
To test the thesis, the comparative case study method is applied to the ethnically
restructured states o f Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The goal of the case studies is to
examine the approaches that the Baltic states used to reduce polarization. The historical
background to the case studies includes an analysis o f recently released archival
documents and historical studies conducted in the Baltic states that deal with the
demographic history o f the Baltic states.
One of the most important findings of the three case studies is that the shape of
political communities and the political arrangements devised to accommodate ethnic
differences in the Baltic states were conditioned by the historical memory of deportations
and planned migration. Consequently, successful approaches to community building
should be responsive to both the historical sensitivities of autochthonous ethnic groups and
the need of the immigrants to have a say in community building and everyday affairs.
Such approaches are likely to be implemented at the local (sub-state) level. They are
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likely to be process-oriented and capable of incorporating flexible forms of political
organization.
International actors interested in helping stales to reduce ethnic polarization should
focus their efforts at the local level. Using political conditionality from “above” for this
purpose is likely to have some negative consequences, such as intensifying the activities of
nationalist groups and prompting searches for new ways to preserve what is perceived as
an endangered ethnic identity.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

It is widely recognized in the literature on democratization and democratic
consolidation that the existence o f different ethnic groups within the same polity may
become a challenge to successful democratization and democratic consolidation. A
respectable body of scholarship subscribes to the view of John Stuart Mill who argued that
democracy and multiethnicity are, in fact, incompatible, and that democracy is quite often
a luxury to be enjoyed by ethnically homogenous (or ethnically cleansed) states.1 Stephen
Van Evera has summarized this perspective in one of his hypotheses on the relationship
between nationalism and stability. He hypothesizes that “the more closely the boundaries
o f emerging nationstates follow ethnic boundaries, the smaller the risk of war.”2 A logical
extension of this hypothesis is that multiethnic states have fewer chances than ethnically
homogenous states to establish sustainable democracies because they are more prone to
ethnic wars.
The ideas expressed by this school of thought are generally embraced by orthodox
liberals who believe in individual rights, a free market economy and modernization. The
representatives o f this school of thought, such as Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, argue

The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements o f The Chicago M anual
o f Style, 14th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

'For a summ ary of this debate, see Walker Connor, “Self Determination: The New
Phase,” World Politics 20, no. 1 (October 1967): 32.
2Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and W ar,” International
Security 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 8.
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that the creation and sustainability of democracy in multiethnic entities may be facilitated
by inclusive democratic institutions and extending rights to minorities.3 Many
representatives of this school are engaged in a search for the model that could insure
stability and democracy in multiethnic areas. The emerging consensus within this school
of thought has been that multiethnic or multireligious societies can become stable
democracies if they adopt the right kind of inclusive political institutions, such as
representation of minorities in decision-making processes and power sharing
mechanisms.4 Since this group of scholars believes that the right kind o f inclusive
institutions exist, they are often in favor of political conditionality. This means that they
are in favor of linking economic and political aid to emerging democracies to prescribed
policies regarding ethnic minorities, such as rights and representation in decision making
processes.
Their critics, led by Charles Taylor, argue that instead of trying to come up with a
model that is universally applicable, scholars should recognize that there are different
ways of sharing what Taylor calls the “identity space.” The political arrangements in
multiethnic states should be context-related and sensitive to historical factors.5 Other
critics of the orthodox liberal perspective suggest that the existence o f different ethnic
groups may help to initiate and sustain democratization by providing alternative foci of

3Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 33.
4For a review, see Mark Peceny, “The Social Construction of Democracy,”
International Studies Review l,n o . 1 (Spring 1999): 95-102.
5Charles Taylor, “Democratic Exclusion (and Its Remedies?),” in Citizenship,
Diversity, and Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Alan C. Caim s,
John C. Courtney, Peter MacKinnon, Hans J. Michelmann, and David E. Smith
(Montreal: McGill University Press, 1999), 281-86.
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power to the authoritarian regime. Instead of being an obstacle to democratic
consolidation, multiethnicity may, in fact, be a sustaining factor.6
The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to this debate by tracing democratic
community building processes in multiethnic states burdened by historical memories. This
dissertation is interested in two themes. First, it explores the long term effects of ethnic
restructuring on the ability of a state to create a cohesive democratic community. Second,
it examines whether the approaches to community building advocated by the two schools
of thought help to reduce ethnic polarization within such states.
Chapter II describes the methodological framework that will be used in the
dissertation. The first section discusses the thesis of the dissertation, which is that the
experience o f ethnic restructuring critically affects the ability of a state to consolidate its
emerging democracy. The second section describes the methodology— case studies— used
in the dissertation. The final section discusses rival propositions, drawn from other
theoretical schools.
Chapter in reviews the research that has already been done on the impact that
ethnic restructuring has on democratic processes. It divides the literature into four
conceptually and thematically distinguishable areas. The first part reviews historical
approaches that pay attention to the specific historical experiences of national and ethnic
groups. These approaches suggest that the experience o f ethnic restructuring can become a
source of ethnic nationalism, which can threaten stability and democracy. The second part
reviews theories on ethnic mobilization, which argue that ethnic groups can be mobilized
within a nationstate in order to oppose or retaliate against various national political

6E.g.. see Lord A cton's argument in Connor. 33.
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projects, such as forced assimilation, genocide, or national self-determination.
M obilization along ethnic lines can lead to ethnic conflict, which threatens stability and
democracy. The third part discusses modernization theories, pioneered by Karl Deutch.
Ethnic segmentation, which can be a product o f previous ethnic restructuring, is conceived
as an obstacle to the creation o f a “com m unications community” or nation. A nation is a
requirement for democracy. Therefore, ethnic restructuring can be an obstacle to
successful democratization. The fourth part reviews theories of ethnopolitics that try to
establish a link between the presence of different ethnic groups within a nationstate and
the transition to democracy.
Chapter IV joins a m ajor debate within this body of literature on whether the
presence o f different ethnic groups (a product o f previous ethnic restructuring) within one
nationstate hinders or helps democratic processes. This chapter puts forward a theoretical
argument which can be summarized as follows. M ultiethnicity in and of itself does not
constitute a danger, and in fact may be helpful toward the creation of a sustainable
democratic community, especially in the beginning stages of democratization. By voicing
demands for cultural rights, ethnic com m unities can form an opposition to nondemocratic
polities or strengthen nascent civil societies in em erging democracies.
However, ethnic polarization does present a challenge. The legacy o f ethnic
restructuring can lead to polarization. Polarization is the presence of ethnopolitical groups
actively opposed to the state and to the dom inant ethnic group (and/or the presence of
ethnopolitical groups actively opposed to the inclusion of minorities within an emerging
nationstate.) Such condition may prompt ethnic groups to take revenge for wrongs
inflicted in the past or in the present. This chapter concludes by arguing that in order to
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understand how to bring about the consolidation of democracy in multiethnic states further
empirical research will be needed. (Namely, it is needed in order to identify ways of
reducing polarization.)
The goal of Chapter V is twofold. First, it documents the extent and impact of the
ethnic restructuring that was carried out by the Soviet Union in the Baltic states. Second,
it explores whether the experience o f ethnic restructuring has induced ethnic polarization
in the Baltic states. Ethnic restructuring is defined as the sudden alteration of the ethnic
make-up of a geographically specific population involving (1) the physical removal of a
large number of the members of an ethnic group or groups by the members of another
ethnic group (or groups) and/or (2) the introduction o f a large number of settlers belonging
to one or more ethnic groups.
To achieve the first goal, C hapter V draws on recently released documents. The
USSR never released official statistics on population movements. Therefore, recently
released archival documents and historical studies conducted in the Baltic states help to fill
in a grey area in the demographic history of the Baltic states. In addition, Chapter V sheds
light on some o f the lesser known aspects of ethnic restructuring, such as postwar
population exchanges and the attitude o f the Soviet state towards non-territorial
nationalities residing in the Baltic states.
To achieve the second goal. Chapter V traces the response of the local population
to the deportations and to the subsequent influx of settlers. Since there were no reliable
public opinion polls in the USSR prior to 1988, the analysis of memoirs and letters helps
to evaluate this response. This chapter concludes by tracing the emergence of
ethnopolitical groups with concrete political demands, some of whom were opposed to the
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emergence of the Baltic republics as independent nationstates. This development is
characterized as “polarization."
The following three chapters are case studies o f community building in the Baltic
states. The goal of Chapter VI is to trace the approaches that the Estonian state used to
reduce polarization and thus to legitimatize its power toward minorities that were opposed
to the state. This case study consists of four parts. First, it traces the attitudes o f Estonia’s
minorities towards the state during the initial stage o f political community building. Many
Russians living in Estonia were opposed to the emergence o f Estonia as an independent
nationstate. There was even a movement in the Narva region that called for secession
from the state.
Second, this chapter traces political community building “from above.” This
means that the chapter discusses the policies that were adopted by the Estonian state
toward its minorities. The state adopted a citizenship law which disenfranchised Estonia’s
Russians. One of the main factors present during the debate about the citizenship law was
the historical memory o f the deportations carried out by the Soviet Union.
Third, the chapter traces political community building “from below.” It examines
ethnic relations at the level of local governments, exploring whether Estonia’s Russians
were allowed to use the state as a “service station” (i.e., whether they received full
economic and social rights as permanent residents o f Estonia), and looks at the ways that
the two communities handled their different historical memories. This chapter concludes
by exploring the level o f polarization in Estonia in the late nineties. It argues that giving
Russians the right to vote at the local level and extending to them full social and economic
rights were the most successful approaches employed by the Estonian state to reduce
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polarization.
The goal of Chapter VII is to trace the approaches that the Latvian state used to
reduce polarization and thus to legitimatize its power towards minorities who were
opposed to the state. The structure of this case study is the same as the one used for
Estonia in Chapter VI. First, it traces the attitudes of Latvia’s m inorities toward the state
during the initial stage of political community building. Although fewer Russians were
opposed to the emerging nationstate in Latvia than in Estonia, there was still widespread
distrust. In addition, there were several active ethnopolitical movements opposed to the
state.
Second, Chapter VII traces political community building “from above.” This
means that the chapter discusses the policies that were adopted by the Latvian state toward
its minorities. Similarly to Estonia, the state adopted a citizenship law which
disenfranchised Latvia’s Russians. One of the main factors present during the discussions
about the citizenship law was the historical memory o f the deportations that were carried
out by the Soviet Union.
Third, Chapter VII traces political community building “from below.” It examines
ethnic relations at the level of local governments, exploring whether Latvia’s Russians
were allowed to use the state as a “service station” and looks at the ways that the two
communities handled their different historical memories. Unlike Estonia, Latvia did not
extend rights of participation at the local level. It did, however, give full social and
economic rights to all people residing in its territory. This chapter concludes by exploring
the level o f polarization in Latvia in the late nineties. It argues that the most successful
approach used by the Latvian state to reduce polarization was the extension of full social
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and economic rights to Latvia’s Russians.
Similarly to the previous two chapters, the goal of Chapter VIII is to analyze the
approaches employed by the Lithuanian state to legitimatize its power vis-a-vis ethnic
minority groups who initially opposed the existence of an independent Lithuanian state.
To analyze the approaches used by the Lithuanian state, the chapter takes three steps.
First, it evidences the existence o f polarization between the state and ethnopolitical groups
opposed to the existence o f Lithuania as an independent state and who claimed to
represent Lithuania’s Slavic ethnic groups (Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and
ethnic Poles) during the initial stage of political community building. To do that, the first
part of the case study analyzes the results of public opinion surveys taken during that
period. In addition, this part outlines the platforms of these ethnopolitical movements.
The second and the third parts of Chapter V1U trace the process of political
community building “from above” and “from below” under the circumstances (i.e.,
polarization) described in the first part. The second part explores the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the law on citizenship and other laws affecting the status of
minorities. It also documents the response o f Lithuania’s ethnic minorities and their
“mother states” (i.e., Russia and Poland) to these policies.
The third part of Chapter VIII focuses on developments within civil society (i.e.,
“below”)— the creation of local governments, the ability o f Lithuania’s minorities to use
the state as a “service station” and the impact o f different historical experiences on inter
ethnic relations. The chapter concludes by arguing that the more than 180 liberal laws
defining the status of Lithuania’s minorities were not enough to reduce ethnic polarization.
A

lack of funds at the local level, as well as the interference of the central government in
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local politics caused dissent among Lithuania’s ethnic minorities.
The dissertation concludes by relating the findings of the case studies to the on
going debate on democracy building in multiethnic areas (which was outlined earlier in the
introduction). The first part puts forward a theory of political community, which
conceptualizes the “demos” as an entity with two dimensions. The vertical dimension
refers to the basis o f legitimacy for state power. The legitimacy of this power is based on
an on-going association o f people loyal to the state who possess the citizenship of the
state. This on-going association implies a common history, shared historical memory and
a common identity. In most nationstates, these three aspects are the basis of a common
identity that keeps the nationstate together. Consequently, the question o f the relationship
between the vertical and the horizontal axes is the question of nation building and the
attitude of the nationstate toward its immigrants and ethnic minorities. Drawing on the
material covered in the three case studies, the concluding chapter applies this theory to
ethnically restructured states.
One of the most important findings of the three case studies is that the shape of
political communities and the political arrangements devised to accommodate ethnic
differences in the Baltic states were conditioned by the historical memory o f deportations,
displacement and forced population transfers. Consequently, successful approaches to
community building should be responsive to both the historical sensitivities of
autochthonous ethnic groups and the need of the immigrants to have a say in community
building and everyday affairs. Such approaches are likely to be implemented at the local
level, or “below.” They are likely to be process-oriented and capable of incorporating
flexible forms o f political organization. Thus, the case studies show support for the beliefs

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

10
of the second school o f thought that argues for flexible arrangements. In states inhabited
by ethnic groups with different historical memories, there is no one model to reduce
polarization. However, states are capable of implementing such approaches if (1) they
have a stable economy and (2) if they have a strongly established “ vertical” axis.
International actors interested in helping states to reduce ethnic polarization should
focus their efforts at the local level. Using political conditionality from “above” for this
purpose is likely to have some negative consequences, such as intensifying the activities of
nationalist groups and prompting searches for new ways to preserve what is perceived as
an endangered ethnic identity. Such by-products o f political conditionality hinder the
creation o f tolerant political culture that is necessary for democratic consolidation in
multiethnic areas tom by different historical memories.
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CHAPTER D
RESEA RCH DESIGN

The goal of this chapter is to describe the methodological framework that will be
used in the dissertation. The first section discusses the thesis of the dissertation, which is
that the experience o f ethnic restructuring critically affects the ability of a state to
consolidate its emerging democracy. It points out the independent, dependent, and
intervening variables in it. Furthermore, it puts forward definitions of the main
concepts—ethnic restructuring and dem ocratic consolidation— on which the hypothesis is
built.
The second section describes the methodology— case studies— that is used in the
dissertation. It outlines the structure o f the case studies and identifies the major sources
used. The final section discusses rival propositions, drawn from other theoretical schools.
These hypotheses offer alternative explanations for changes in the dependent
variable—the consolidation of dem ocracy in an ethnically restructured state— when
compared to the main hypothesis.

THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS AND ITS VARIABLES

Hypothesis

This dissertation explores the relationship between a state’s experience of ethnic
restructuring and the ability of that state to consolidate democracy. This hypothesis is
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drawn from democratic studies that are interested in exploring ways in which to support
emerging democracies.
This proposition is limited to the analysis of ethnically restructured states which
have retained ethnic heterogeneity after having experienced deportations, expulsions, and
other forms of forceful population transfers. The further discussion of "multiethnic states"
or ethnically segmented states refers to ethnically restructured multiethnic states.

The Variables

Ethnic Restructuring. Ethnic restructuring is conceptualized as an independent
variable. The forcibly changed domestic ethnic structure of a country— which is likely to
give rise to political and societal ethnic groups that are opposed to inclusive minority
policies and that reject the state outright— is an intervening variable. International actors
exercising political conditionality is another intervening variable. (See Figure 1.)
The term “ethnic restructuring” refers to the sudden alteration of the ethnic make
up of a geographically-specific population involving (1) the physical removal of a large
number of the members o f an ethnic group (or groups) by the members of another ethnic
group (or groups) and/or (2) the introduction of a large number o f settlers belonging to one
or more ethnic groups. Ethnicity is defined as a historically-specific construct which may
become the basis for the activity of political groups.1

‘For a more elaborate definition of ethnicity and its relation with the concept of a
“nation.” see Chapter III.
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Figure 1. The Variables
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In practice, ethnic restructuring involves the forcible removal of large groups of
people through deportation, expulsion, or resettlement. Ethnic restructuring is not just a
state-supported policy vis-a-vis a national group: it is something that is experienced
collectively by the members of the affected group. It often leads to the emergence of
political groups among the members of the affected party who are resisting the policy.
Examples of ethnic restructuring include forced m igration, genocide, politicide, ethnic
conflict, expulsion, and deportation.
It is believed that states which have undergone ethnic restructuring (and have
remained ethnically heterogenous) are more likely than other multiethnic or monoethnic
states to be sensitive to issues of ethnicity. Historical experiences, such as discrimination,
deportations, or expulsions, create distance between ethnic groups. Thus, often
differences between the groups are perceived as irreconcilable.2 In societies that are

2Staffan Zetterholm, “Why is Cultural D iversity a Political Problem?” in National
Cultures and European Integration: Exploratory E ssays on Cultural Diversity and
Common Policies, ed. Staffan Zetterholm (Oxford: Berg, 1994), 70.
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extremely polarized, ethnic identity becomes the only politically relevant identity.
This is especially true of states in which ethnic restructuring has occurred within
one generation. Most importantly, such states are likely to contain politically influential
groups who define their interests, first and foremost, in terms of identity. This condition,
known as ethnic polarization, makes dem ocratic political negotiation, which is necessary
for every dem ocratic polity, more difficult.3 Consequently, the presence o f ethnic
polarization m ay endanger the process o f dem ocratic consolidation.
D em ocratic Consolidation. Democratic consolidation is the dependent variable in
the hypothesis. This dissertation builds on the concept of democratic consolidation
devised by Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz who argue that it is "a political situation in
which, in a phrase, democracy has become ‘the only game in tow n.”' Pivotal to this
theoretical notion is acceptance of the fact that not all states that engage in the process of
democratization will complete the transition.4
The definition of democratic consolidation put forward by Linz and Stepan implies
that there are no significant political groups attempting to secede from the state or to

3Albert F. Reiterer, “Reducing Ethnic Conflicts: Contemporary Approaches to
Conflict Resolution in Western Europe,” in Ethnic Conflicts and Civil Society: Proposals
fo r a New Era in Eastern Europe, ed. Andreus Klinke, Ortwin Reur, and Jean Paul
Lehners (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1997), 54.
4Karen Dawisha,“Democratization and Political Participation: Research Concepts
and M ethodologies,” in The Consolidation o f Democracy in East Central Europe, ed.
Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 43.
This concept has been criticized for failing to identify the point at which democratic
consolidation is completed. See Guillermo O ’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,”
in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner,
Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997),
40-57, or Giuseppe Di Palma, An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1990), 138-53. One answ er to this critique is that one indicator for
democratic consolidation in multiethnic states is the absence o f strong movements
opposed to the state.
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overthrow the democratic regime; the majority of the public accepts the institutions of the
state as the most appropriate way to govern collective life; and throughout the territory of
the state governmental and non-govemmental forces agree to solve conflict within the
laws of the state.5 In other words, the majority of a state’s citizens accept the legitimacy of
state power. The degree to which the residents of a territory accept the political unit in
which they live as the appropriate entity to make legitimate decisions, or the legitimacy of
a state’s power in the eyes of the governed, is a key variable for dem ocratic theory.6
Thus, following this definition, in order to become a consolidated democracy, a
state must create a sense o f "we-ness," a sense o f cohesiveness that makes collective
decision-making possible. On the other hand, the residents must accept the legitimacy of
the state’s power by embracing state institutions as the most appropriate way to solve
conflict. A political situation when the two conditions, outlined above, are met, is a
criterion indicating that the democratic regime has become consolidated.
Creating cohesiveness within a state is a two-way process. In the case of
multiethnic states, the policies o f the state toward its minorities m ust be endorsed by the
minorities them selves.7 The minorities must recognize that the rules and institutions
created by the state provide enough political space to safeguard their interests. The degree

sLinz and Stepan, 5-6.
6Ibid„ 27.
7This is an important criterion for determining the success o f democratic
institutions within multiethnic entities. Sir George Otto Trevelyan captured the essence
of the problem: ‘T h e truth is that even the most genuine and established democratic way
o f life is exceedingly difficult to apply when you are dealing with a minority that does not
want to live under your rule. W e know very well that we ourselves were never able to
apply democracy to our own attempt to govern the Irish.” Cited in Charles Ingrao,
“Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe: A Historical Perspective,”
Nationalities Papers (June 1999); PROQUEST.
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to which a minority accepts the power of the state which they inhabit is reflected by the
activities of ethnically based political groups and the attitude of that minority. For
example, a minority can exhibit extreme disloyalty to the slate by attempting to secede
from the state. Such a state, its minority policies and successful development in other
areas notwithstanding, cannot be considered a consolidated democracy.8
In sum, the absence o f one or both of these characteristics (cohesiveness and
legitimacy of state power) implies that a democratizing multiethnic state has not yet
become a consolidated democracy. If a state has failed to develop a sense of cohesiveness
among its residents (i.e., if the majority o f people living within the state do not feel that it
is "their" state) it means that the state is prone to disintegration. In the absence o f a
cohesive identity uniting the residents within a multiethnic state, there is the possibility o f
ethnic conflict emanating from within the state or o f separatism among disloyal minorities.
Such developments present a threat to the survival o f the stale, and, needless to say, to the
consolidation of democracy within a state. The sense of "we-ness" (cohesive identity) is,
therefore, a constitutive aspect of a consolidated democracy. In this dissertation, this
aspect is referred to as democratic community.
Democratic Community. The cohesiveness within a state that makes democratic
decision making possible is often referred to as demos or “political community” in the
literature on the subject.9 It is a constitutive aspect o f democratic consolidation. The

8One exception to this statement are so-called “velvet divorces,” when two groups
within a state decide to split peacefully. However, such divorces are rather rare, and
usually they are a result o f democratic arrangements, such as referendums. More often,
secessionism and ethnic tensions are followed by widespread violence.
^ .g ., see Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1989), 116-31; Christopher J. Berry, The Idea o f a Democratic
Community (New York: St. M artin’s, 1989), 100-4; or Alfonso J. Damico, Individuality
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terms demos and “political community," meaning the entity underneath the state that
makes democratic decision-making possible, are used interchangeably. Theoretically,
political community is defined as an arena in which society “constitutes itself politically
to select and monitor democratic government,”10 or, in other words, in which society
participates in political process: elections, political parties, and electoral alliances. The
civility which makes such participation possible is learned in free associational networks,
such as economic interest groups, corporations, or religious associations.11 Therefore,
democratic political community is impossible without a functioning civil society— the
entity in which self-organizing groups and individuals, relatively independent from the
state and often outside o f the political process, advance their interests. The relationship
between political com m unity and civil society should not be understood in terms o f the
opposition of civil society to political community. It can be seen as a dialectic between
these two axes.12
The main hypothesis implies that the development of an inclusive political
community, which is a necessary condition for a functioning consolidated democratic
regime, is most likely to be thwarted by the legacy of ethnic restructuring. Consequently,
creating successful institutional arrangements and adopting policies that promote

and Community: The Social and Political Thought o f John Dewey (Gainesville, Fla.:
University Presses of Florida, 1978), 104—18.
10Linz and Stepan, 8. Others have underlined the fact that most political
communities are, first and foremost, systems of inclusion and exclusion. See Andrew
Linklater, The Transformation o f Political Community: Ethical Foundations o f the PostWestphalian Era (Columbia, S. C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 2.
"Michael W alzer, ‘T h e Concept o f Civil Society,” in Toward a Global Civil
Society, ed. Michael W alzer (Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books, 1995), 24.
l2Michael Buchowski, “Civil and Civic Society in Poland,” in Civil Society:
Challenging Western M odels, ed. Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn (New York: Routledge,
1996), 82.
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cohesiveness among the residents of a state are a crucial aspect of democratic
consolidation. In multiethnic states that have rebellious ethnic minorities such
arrangements could help to reduce alienation and polarization. These arrangements are
necessary for the peaceful coexistence o f different ethnic groups.13
The success of the arrangements and policies a state uses to reduce polarization
and to promote cohesiveness can be assessed using several criteria. The first criterion of
success is the behavior o f ethnopolitical groups opposed to the state and the amount of
public support that they enjoy. If the activities of such ethnopolitical groups diminishes
after the adoption of strategies to reduce polarization, and if public support for such
ethnopolitical groups declines, then ethnic polarization has decreased. If a causal link
between polarization-reducing policies and a decline in anti-state activities and feelings
can be established, it means that the policies have achieved their goal.
The second criterion o f success for policies designed to reduce polarization is a
change in public opinion. Public opinion surveys, especially when supported by mass
media content analysis, reflect changes in the attitudes o f different groups within the
society toward the state and toward other ethnic groups. Once again, if a causal link
between polarization-reducing policies and a change in public opinion (showing a
decrease in polarization) can be established, then the policies can be regarded as
successful. The section that follows describes the methodology that is used to analyze and
assess the polarization-reducing policies of a state.

l3This process of interaction does not imply that different ethnic groups can meet
halfway for a compromise, and thus consolidate a democratic regime. A regime is
consolidated when the two conditions, outlined above, are met.
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TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS: METHOD AND CASE SELECTION

The proposition that the legacy of ethnic restructuring significantly affects a state’s
ability to consolidate democracy suggests a two-step empirical testing method. First,
nations that have experienced a high degree of ethnic restructuring must be selected.
Second, the ethnic polarization within those states and the methods that have been used to
reduce this polarization must be documented. In addition, a causal relationship between
the legacy of ethnic restructuring and ethnic polarization must be demonstrated.
Structured case studies is the most appropriate methodology to achieve the above
goals. Case studies yield research that is both historically interpretive and causally
analytic. Such research gathers evidence “in a m anner sensitive to historical chronology”
and offers limited historical generalizations that are sensitive to context.14 These
characteristics of the method are especially relevant to the major goals of the
dissertation— to understand the long term effects o f ethnic restructuring and to learn
whether ethnic restructuring affects the ability of a state to create a cohesive community.
Case-oriented research allows a small num ber of cases to be examined
intensively, but its inherent problem is that it contributes less to building theory than
studies which include multiple cases or studies which search for associations between and
among variables.15 One way to overcome this problem is to use case-oriented research

l4Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative M ethod: Moving Beyond Qualitative and
Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of C alifornia Press, 1987), 35.
l5This particular merit o f case-oriented research and its inherent problem were
identified by Arend Lijphart in his scheme “Situating the Comparative Method,”
reproduced by David Collier, ‘T h e Comparative M ethod” in Theory, Case, and Method
in Comparative Politics, ed. Nikolaos Zahariadis (Fort Worth, Tex.: Harcourt, 1997). 36.
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deductively by building on an existing theory (which is based on previously conducted
empirical investigations). An existing theory provides guidance as to what variables
should be examined m ore closely and what variables do not deserve sustained attention.16
Relying on previous theories puts the chosen empirical studies into broader perspective
and allows one to identify generalizable trends (e.g., under what conditions the previously
made theoretical arguments hold true).
In order to be able to make generalizations and thus contribute to theory building,
this dissertation uses a deductive case study method. Prior to applying the case study
method to empirical data, it draws on previous theorizing about the im pact o f ethnic
restructuring on the processes of community building to construct its own theoretical
argument. Consequently, Chapter IH is devoted to the exam ination o f previous theory
about the impact o f ethnic restructuring and multiethnicity on the processes of community
building. Having identified the variables that need further exam ination, the dissertation
proceeds to construct its own theoretical argument about the impact o f ethnic restructuring
on community building and the ways to deal with the legacy of ethnic restructuring. The
theoretical argument is tested against empirical evidence from several ethnically
restructured states.

Case Selection

One criterion for case selection is variance in the key variable: forced changes in

I6NikoIaos Zahariadis, ‘Theoretical Notes on M ethod and Substance,” in Theory,
Case, and Method in Comparative Politics, ed. Nikolaos Zahariadis (Fort W orth, Tex.:
Harcourt, 1997), 18.
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the ethnic structure of a country. Domestic ethnopolitical groups, whose emergence is
prompted by drastic changes in the ethnic make-up of a country, are a potential source of
resistance to the state. The central proposition of this dissertation implies that the higher
the level o f ethnic restructuring experienced in the past, the stronger the resistance to
inclusive policies regarding minorities will be. In such a context, an agreem ent about
minority policies and their status is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In addition to
the first criterion, other criteria for case selection are: 1) forced resettlements pursued by a
non-democratic regime in the past and an influx of residents belonging to different
national groups from other territories (the experience o f ethnic restructuring), and 2)
attempts to democratize within an ethnically restructured state.
Using these criteria, the three Baltic states are selected. They share one major
characteristic: ethnic restructuring in these three states was pursued according to the same
plan and at the same tim e.17 All three states experienced an influx of residents from other
parts of the USSR after the Second World War. M ajor repressions, including mass
deportations, ended at the same time in all three states.
The three cases have variance in the key variable: the changed domestic ethnic
structure. The demographic legacy of ethnic restructuring within the three states is
different: by 1997, Latvia and Estonia had sizable (32.5% and 28.7%) Russian minorities.
(This com pares with 8.8% and 8.2% before World W ar II.) The most homogenous of the
three, Lithuania, has fewer Russians (9%) and an active Polish-speaking minority (8%).

17The plan is reflected by the document signed by Serov prior to 19 M ay 1941.
This docum ent is reproduced in Mokslo ir enciklopedijij leidykla, Lietuvos kovij ir kanciy
istorija. Lietuvos gyventojif treniimai 1941, 1945—1952 m. [A History of Lithuania’s
Fights and Ordeals. Deportations of People Living in Lithuania in 1941, 1945-1952]
(Vilnius: M okslo ir enciklopedijij leidykla, 1994), 14—20.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e cop y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e rm is s io n .

22
(This compares with 2.5% Russians in 1923.)18 In addition to ethnically-based political
groups, there have been a number of international actors (e.g., the OSCE (the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in Latvia and Estonia, and the EU (the European
Union) in all three states) involved in community building processes within the three
states. Russia and Poland, the minority “mother” states, have also attempted to propagate
minority policies and thus influence the process of community crafting in the Baltic states.

Historical Background to the Case Studies

To document the degree o f ethnic restructuring experienced by the Baltic states, a
historical account of the population movements carried out by the Soviet state will be
made. The sources used for this account are archival materials, private records of former
deportees, and previously written historical studies. Specifically, the chapter draws on the
instructions issued by the Soviet Secret Police on how to conduct deportations and
resettlements (available in Lithuania’s Special Archive), similar materials from the
Occupation Museum in Riga, and various Russian archives.
In addition, the historical account will be enriched by the personal narratives of
former deportees. The publications of the Genocide and Resistance Research Center of
Lithuania (LGGRTC, or Lietuvos Gyventojif Genocido ir Rezistencijos Tyrimo Centras)
include memoirs of former deportees and resistance fighters. Analyzing memoirs and
other documents (e.g., letters written during the time when ethnic restructuring took place,

l8The ethnic composition of the three states in 1997 is from Dzintra Bungs, The
Baltic States: Problems and Prospects o f Membership in the European Union (BadenBaden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgessellschaft, 1998), 69.
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the partisans’ press, etc.) that record the actions of resistance groups within the Baltic
states will help to assess the populations’ response to ethnic restructuring.
The goal o f this dissertation is not simply to document the extent of the
demographic changes, but also to establish a link between this policy and the beginning
stages of democratization. To do that, the dissertation will examine periodicals from the
Baltic states that were published during the beginning stage o f democratization, the
narratives of Baltic resistance leaders, and sociological studies of public opinion. The
news reports and press releases of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty will be used to trace
the actions o f ethnopolitical groups. Using these sources will help to establish whether
there was ethnic polarization in the Baltic states prior to the first stage of community
building.

The Structure o f the Case Studies

The goal o f the case studies is to trace the approaches that the Baltic states used to
reduce polarization. Each case study is structured around three themes. The first part of
each case study explores the attitudes of ethnic minorities toward the state during the
initial stage of community building. By drawing on public opinion surveys, mass media
reports and the accounts of political leaders, this part documents the ethnic polarization
that was present during the first stage of community building.
The position o f ethnic minorities toward the state can be established by making a
content analysis o f mass media publications geared towards a minority audience
(M olodezh' Estonii and Narvskaya gazeta in Estonia, Druzhba in Lithuania, SM-Segodnya
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and the Russian edition of Diena in Latvia) and sociological surveys conducted by the
Baltic Data House. The actions o f ethnopolitical groups will be traced from the news
reports and press releases o f Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and local newspapers such
as Lietuvos Rytas, Lietuvos Aidas, Eesti Paehvaleht, and Postimees.
The second theme o f each case study is tracing the process o f community building
from “above” and from “below.” Tracing community building from “above” identifies the
approaches of each of the Baltic state to the issues of citizenship and minorities’ rights,
such as the right of the members o f a minority community to be educated in their own
language. The main sources for this analysis are official legal docum ents defining the
status of minorities and mass m edia reports describing the circumstances under which the
laws were adopted. Describing the circumstances will make it possible to discern the role
of international actors (such as m inority mother states and international institutions).
These actors exercised political conditionality to push for what they saw as the relevant
laws affecting the status of m inorities.
Each case study will identify the response of ethnic minorities to the newly adopted
or discussed laws and regulations. A minority’s reaction to a state’s policies reflects the
degree to which a minority accepts the power of the state in which it lives. Tracing a
minority's reaction will help us to make an assessment of the effectiveness of policies
defined by the laws.
At the sub-state level, the decisions taken by the elites may be challenged (or
approved) by local political groups, including ethnically-based parties. These groups have
a vested interest in the minority policies pursued by the state. In democratizing states with
weak enforcement mechanisms, som e laws and regulations may never be fully
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implemented. Therefore, tracing developments and policies within the sub-state sphere (or
civil society)— the actions of local governments in areas with a significant number of
ethnic minorities, the functioning of the state as a “service station,” and the ways that
ethnic groups have addressed their different collective memories— represents an equally
important source o f ways that can be used to reduce polarization.
The final part o f the case studies will reflect on the results of the policies that the
Baltic states adopted to reduce polarization. Using public opinion polls and mass media
reports, this part will help to establish whether the policies described in the previous
sections helped to reduce ethnic polarization. Comparing the findings from the case
studies will help to identify whether the Baltic states adopted and implemented the liberal
universalist policies advised by international actors, and whether these policies or other
policies helped to reduce polarization. In other words, the case studies will help to
establish whether there is one “right” way to create a cohesive society and thus consolidate
an emerging democratic regime.

ALTERNATIVE PROPOSITIONS

The main proposition of this dissertation explores the impact of historical
experiences on democratic community building. This thesis fits into the domestic level of
analysis within international relations theory.19 O ther theories exploring the relationship
between the variables analyzed by this dissertation are reviewed in Chapter IH. The main

l9Kenneth N. W altz was the author of the idea of the systemic, domestic, and
individual levels. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical
Analysis (New York: Colum bia University Press, 1954).
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alternative propositions to the main thesis are situated within the systemic, or structural
level of analysis of International Relations theory.20
Structure can be defined as a set of relatively stable constraints on the behavior of a
nationstate. Structuralist theories focus on the impact of structural factors, such as power
distribution within a region, globalization and related global trends, on the behavior of a
nationstate and processes within a nationstate. They assume that the system (or structure)
of world politics provides the architecture and the incentives that affect the actions of its
component units— i.e., the nationstates.

The Geostrategic Hypothesis

The first alternative proposition, drawn from the Neorealist scholarship which
focuses on power distribution, is that previous ethnic restructuring and consequent ethnic
segmentation have little if anything to do with the consolidation of democracy. This
hypothesis suggests that in order to consolidate democracies within multiethnic states, a
secure environment (a “security umbrella”) should be established to insure democratic
development. In other words, a security umbrella is a necessary condition for a democracy
to be consolidated.21

20Another big group of theories fits into the individual level. However, while
tracing the process whereby a feeling of “we-ness” is created, this dissertation takes
individuals (the leaders of ethnopolitical groups) and their beliefs into account.
2iE.g., see Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, “Democratization in Eastern Europe: The
External Dimension,” in Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International
Dimensions, ed. Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen (London: Routledge, 1994),
220-52: and East European Security Reconsidered, ed. John R. Lampe and Daniel N.
Nelson (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1993). Richard J. Krickus makes a
similar argument to support the incorporation of the Baltic states into NATO. See
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This hypothesis emphasizes geostrategic factors, or the external dimension of
democratic transitions. It is popular among those who study East Central Europe. It
suggests that a favorable or supportive geostrategic environment is essential, even crucial,
to the success of democratic transitions in a given region. The proponents of this
hypothesis point out the fact that the international dimension has been a decisive factor for
the emerging democracies in East Central Europe." Those states that were not part o f the
“zone” of Western influence (e.g., Moldova, the Caucasus or the former Yugoslavia)
exploded into ethnic conflict. Those that were under the patronage of Western powers
(e.g.. Central European states) have been stable. Therefore, states that are under the
patronage of the W est are likely to consolidate their emerging democracies.
This explanation is based on the assumption that a security vacuum in a region is
capable of “unleashing long-suppressed national animosities”23 in multiethnic states.
Following this school o f thought, one scenario could be as follows. In the absence of
stabilizing outside powers, ethnic minorities living within a multiethnic state mobilize.
Their leaders press for secession. If one region secedes, then an ethnic minority left in that
region is going to feel threatened and may ask for protection from its mother state. This
may lead to endless intrastate and interstate wars.24 The presence of outside powers can

Richard J. Krickus, ‘T h e Case for Including the Baltics in NATO,” Problems o f PostCommunism 45, no. 1 (January/February 1998): 3—9.
"G eoffrey Pridham, ‘T h e International Dimension of Democratization: Theory,
Practice, and Inter-regional Comparisons,” in Building Democracy? The International
Dimension o f Democratization in Eastern Europe, ed. Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring,
and George Sanford (New York: St. M artin’s, 1994), 7-9.
23Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, The International Politics o f East Central Europe
(Manchester: M anchester University Press, 1996), 223.
24Barry Posen refers to a “window of opportunity” seen by ethnic leaders in
unstable multiethnic regions. These leaders press for full sovereignty for their ethnic
group. The basis of his argument is that the perceived “window o f opportunity” triggers
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prevent such scenarios. This presence can be established through the presence o f NATO
and the EU.25 These two international organizations can do the job o f stabilizing the
region because they are supported by important powers— the United States and Germ any.26
Therefore, such institutions can become the pillars of the security architecture that is
necessary to preserve the stability and security of emerging democracies.
The intellectual roots o f such arguments can be traced to the Realist and Neorealist
schools of thought in International Relations. These schools of thought emphasize the
importance and autonomous existence of material structure. The Neorealist school of
thought emphasizes the distribution of material capabilities (that is, the military and
economic power of the nationstates). “Power vacuum” refers to the absence o f a strong
military and economic power. This condition is the main reason for the outbreak o f wars
and, subsequently, for the fall o f democratic regimes.
Pioneered by Hans M orgenthau, the Realist and Neorealist perspectives rely
heavily on the concepts of power, rationality, and balance of power. W orld politics is seen
as a constant struggle for pow er because the international realm is seen as a competitive,

ethnic mobilization. Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival
35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 27^17.
■^here is an ongoing debate between Realists, Neorealists, and Institutionalists
about the role and influence o f international institutions in maintaining security. The
classical Realist view o f institutions considers the interests of states to be crucial to the
success of institutions in m aintaining stability. Neorealists dwell on power distribution
and security architecture. M argarita Balmaceda, “Institutions, Alliances and Stability:
Thinking Theoretically About International Relations in Central East Europe,” European
Security 6, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 86-87. See also John Mearsheimer, “The False
Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19. no. 3 (Winter
1994/1995): 5 ^ 9 .
26For a sim ilar argument for integration of East Central Europe into transatlantic
structures, see Stephen F. Larrabee, East European Security After the Cold War (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993): 170-72.
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anarchical field and also because human nature is seen as constantly lusting for power.27
Neorealism, more so than Realism, is preoccupied with balance of power28 and
international structures as a way of preserving stability. Consequently, as many critics of
Neorealism have already pointed out, it is likely to overlook both history and human
subjectivity.29 Neorealism cannot theorize about the emergence or evolution of the state
nor can it theorize about when and how “ethnic hatreds” will be released. The argument
that a security vacuum leads to the “unleashing of ancient hatreds” embraces a simplified
idea of ethnicity. There are cases when ethnic tensions and ethnic conflict persist even in
stable states that are within a security community. The existence of security guarantees is
not sufficient to predict the future o f ethnic relations and thus to hypothesize about the
future fate of domestic political systems. Arguments based on the Neorealist school of
thought do not identify possible sources of change within the system.
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the perspectives that focus on geostrategic
factors identify one necessary condition for democratic consolidation. This condition is
regional stability and the absence of interstate wars. It is true that many democratic
regimes were strangled by outside intervention. Furthermore, the proponents of this
hypothesis draw attention to the considerable influence of international actors on
democratic processes. Consequently, the research design em braced by this dissertation has

27For further description and critique of the Realist and Neorealist paradigm in
International Relations, see Robert O. Keohane, “Neorealism and World Politics,” in
Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1986), 10-25.
28Balance of power can be understood as an equilibrium of relative strength of the
nationstates through which stability can be achieved.
29E.g., see Richard K. Ashley, ‘T h e Poverty of Neorealism” in Neorealism and Its
Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 255-300.
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incorporated the influence of international actors as an intervening variable.

The Constructivist Hypothesis

A second alternative proposition can be drawn from Constructivist (also known as
Structuralist) scholarship in international relations, which argues that states can change
their identities and acquire new interests while interacting at the international level.30
Identities of the states, in other words, are shaped by international structures (i.e., from
“outside”)- Therefore, past policies o f ethnic restructuring have little to do with present
difficulties in creating an inclusive democratic regime. The real problem is that there is
not enough international involvement, which, according to this proposition, would help to
reconstruct the identity of the state and even make it more open to inclusive minority
policies.
The Constructivist hypothesis emerged as a critique of Realist and Neorealist
approaches to International Relations. Alexander Wendt, who has pioneered a new
Constructivist paradigm, has identified a major assumption shared by Realist and
Neorealist theorists. These two perspectives take self-interested actors as constant and
exogenously given. Wendt argued that states can develop new collective identities
through interaction in the international system, and this relationship should be theorized as
“structuration.” This theory implies that agents (e.g., nationstates) and structures are
mutually constitutive yet distinct entities. Thus, the investigation o f change in worlds

30For an introduction to this hypothesis, see Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity
Formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 2
(June 1994): 384-96.
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politics should focus on how the international structure affects the identities of
nationstates, and how nationstates transform the international structure.31
The hallmark of the Constructivist hypothesis is its focus on the role of ideational
factors, such as norms, identities, idealogies, and aspirations in international relations.
The representatives o f this school of thought argue that given the prevalence of the Realist
and Neorealist schools of thought, ideational factors have been ignored in world politics.32
According to the Constructivist argument meaningful behavior between states is possible
only within an intersubjective social context. States, just like any other actors studied in
the social sciences, develop their relations with others through norms and practices. In the
absence of norms and mutually understood and endorsed rules, the exercise of power
would be meaningless.33 Structure is meaningless without intersubjective norms and
practices; or, in Alexander W endt’s words, “anarchy (the major assumption of the Realist
and Neorealist schools of thought) is what states m ake of it.”34
Consequently, if the behavior of states is affected by intersubjective international
structures, then democratic states must have a way o f understanding each other and
establishing certain socio-international practices that are different from dictatorships.35
This is an emerging Constructivist take on the democratic peace theory. Socio

3‘Alexander Wendt, ‘T h e Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations
Theory,” International Organization 41, no. 3 (Fall 1987); 335-70.
32John G. Ruggie, “W hat Makes the W orld Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism
and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn
1998): 855.
j3Ted Hopf, ‘T h e Promise o f Constructivism in International Relations Theory,”
International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 172-73.
^A lexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction
of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.
35Hopf, 192.
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international practices include conforming to rules founded upon similar expectations and
coordinated sanctions against defectors.
Furthermore, Constructivists believe that well-established democratic states can
socialize weak o r young states. This can happen though the process of learning when
norms and democratic rules are transmitted from one party to another. Material or
political encouragement is one way to transfer these norms.36
When referring to the attractiveness of Western international institutions (such as
the European Union and NATO) to nationstates in East Central Europe, Institutional
Constructivists conclude that they have had an “overspill” effect. International institutions
work as magnets, constantly attracting new non-members, and in the process change their
identities. N on-m em ber states are hypothesized to be ready to change some aspects of
their domestic politics and accept new policy choices in order to be accepted into these
institutions.
Financial aid and/or membership in international institutions can indeed affect the
identity of a state. However, the line between material or political encouragement of
“correct” behavior during the process of socialization (which, according to the
Constructivist hypothesis creates new interests) and the agreement by aspiring members to
adopt norms and other requirements to fulfill their existing interests, such as the need for
security, is not clear.

36Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, “Structure, Strategy, and Institutional
Roles,” in A fter the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe,
1989-1991, ed. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffman (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993): 395—401. This article refers to the process of
democratization in East Central Europe as “socialization,” or the transmission of
democratic norms from established democracies.
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This observation points to one of the major drawbacks of the Constructivist
proposition. This theory has not yet established criteria that can be used to identify which
interests and which aspects o f the identities of nationstates are established during
international interactions, and which aspects and interests are constructed from “within”
(domestically). W ithout this distinction, it is difficult to determine whether international
interaction indeed is such an influential variable.
Nevertheless, the Constructivist hypothesis points to a very influential variable
affecting the identities of states and their political systems— international institutions.
Furthermore, by hypothesizing that international institutions are capable o f transforming
the identity of a state, this proposition reminds us about political and economic
conditionality— the strategy that has been increasingly used by international actors to
promote and consolidate democratic regimes. Empirical data shows that at the level of the
international system, many types of interaction between established democracies and
newly independent democratizing states include conditionality.37 Examples of such
interaction include criteria for membership in international organizations (e.g., respect for
democratic norms, a market economy, respect for the rights of minorities) and
international financial aid. The latter includes liberalization of prices and economic
activity, privatization, structural reform, debt management, and other sim ilar
requirements.38

3'Karen Dawisha and Michael Turner, ‘T h e Interaction Between Internal and
External Agency in Post-Communist Transitions,” in The International Dimension o f
Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States o f Eurasia, ed. Karen Dawisha
(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 407.
38This is especially true when it comes to receiving IMF credits and financial
support for development from the World Bank. See Dawisha and Turner, 407.
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The questions o f w hether and how to use political conditionality are closely related
to the debate outlined in the Introduction on whether there is one “right” way, one
“correct” model to consolidate democracies and to monitor political community building.
Consequently, tracing the processes of political community building in ethnically
restructured states must take the influence of international actors and their use of political
and material encouragement and conditionality into account. In this way, this dissertation
will take into account the Constructivist question about the ability of international actors to
reconstruct the identities o f nationstates.

The Globalist Hypothesis

The third alternative proposition is that globalization (usually understood as an
“inter-connectedness” caused by the expansion of the global capitalist system)39 critically
affects the ability o f a nationstate to establish and to consolidate a democratic regime. The
proponents of this thesis point out that since the mid-1970s the percentage of authoritarian
states has fallen dramatically. They argue that worldwide democratization is a
characteristic o f globalization.40 Increased trade, new technologies, foreign investment,

39The concept o f “globalization” emphasizes the level o f interdependence
between nationstates. It is a term that describes the rapid acceleration o f the world
economy in the last fifty years. M ost scholars and practitioners would agree that
globalization is “about much m ore than trade or capital flows. It is about a world linked
together by information, knowledge, and ideas as well.” Renato Ruggiero (World Trade
Organization Director-General), “A New Partnership fo ra New Century: Sustainable
Global Development in a G lobal Age,” speech at the Bellerive/Globe International
Conference “Policing the G lobal Economy,” 23 March 1998. Available from
http://www. wto. org/wto/speeches/; INTERNET.
“ David Held, “D em ocracy and Globalization,” Global Governance 3, no. 3
(September/December 1997): 251.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

35
and expanding media have fueled economic growth. This makes the eradication of
poverty a real possibility. One of the main requirements for democratic consolidation is a
well-functioning economy. Therefore, globalization offers great potential for the creation
of capitalist democracies.41
This group of scholars and practitioners embraces a rather optim istic view of the
effects o f globalization, hoping that global technological breakthroughs and the trend
toward democratization offer great potential for human advancement and the
establishment of democratic regimes worldwide. Some point to the possibility of the
emergence o f a global civil society due to the rapidity and ease of com m unication.42
Globalization implies a “pattern of society where social relationships are conducted across
great distances.”43
Not every one within the “globalist” camp agrees with this optim istic assessment
of globalization. Many fear that emerging democracies are increasingly challenged by
regional and global problems, such as the increasing gap between rich and poor countries,
the spread o f AIDS, and the unpredictability o f the flow of financial resources. Some fear
that the social institutions o f the state, a hallmark o f consolidated democratic regimes, are

41For an optimistic argument emphasizing the role of a country’s economy in the
consolidation of a democratic regime, see Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose
Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, “W hat M akes Democracies Endure?” in
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yunhan Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997),
295-311. Przeworski et a l.’s main finding is that economic factors are crucial for the
endurance of democracy.
42Ronnie Lipschutz, “Reconstructing W orld Politics: The Emergence of Global
Civil Society,” Millennium 21, no. 3 (W inter 1992): 389—420.
43Anthony Giddens’ spatial logic, interpreted by Robin Brown, “Globalization and
the End o f the National Project,” in Boundaries in Question: New Directions in
International Relations, ed. John M acmiiland and Andrew Linklater (London: Pinter,
1995), 55-56.
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likely to be threatened by global market forces. Others wonder what kind of control
citizens can have over multinational corporations, and how democratic institutions can
control the new international market forces.-14
Furthermore, others point to the growing gap between rich and poor countries.
According to the 1999 UN Human Development Report, in 1997, the richest countries of
the world (20% of the world population) had 86% o f world GDP, while the bottom fifth
had just 1%. Similar distribution of wealth is present in other sectors, such as trade and
communications.45 Poor countries are plagued by ethnic and civil wars, unstable or non
existent state institutions and widespread corruption at the highest levels of government.46
The intensification of ethnic hostilities after 1989— a development that coincides
with globalization— is also presented as a serious challenge to the consolidation of
democratic regimes. Even though contemporary debates on the impact of globalization
have identified contradictory implications for ethnonational conflicts, some case studies
try to establish a link between globalization and ethnonationalism. For example, it is

44E.g., during his 2000 New Year speech on Czech television, Vaclav Havel
hypothesized that globalization is leading to the “reckless destruction of the planet” and
to the spread o f a “civilization based on pseudo-values, the swelling of organized crime
and terrorism, and a short-sighted form of market economy that abuses poorer countries.”
He went on to say that “it cannot be right when the total value of assets in the hands of
the three richest persons in the world exceeds the GDP of developing countries with a
total population o f 600 million.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (4 January,
2000 ).
45Thus, the richest fifth had 82% of world export markets, and the bottom fifth
just 1%. The richest fifth had 74% of world telephone lines; the bottom fifth— only
1.5%. UN, Human Development Report 1999: Globalization With a Human Face.
Available from http://www.undp.org-, INTERNET.
46In April 2000, the United Nations issued a report putting a lot of blame for
poverty on bad government. “Good governance” has been made the top priority in
poverty-fighting by the UN Development program. Barbara Crosette, “UN Says Bad
Government Is Often the Cause o f Poverty,” New York Times (5 April, 2000).
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argued that globalization enables ethnic minorities that were relatively isolated in the past
to mobilize their resources and challenge the state with its political order.47 This line of
reasoning suggests a hypothesis that globalization may become an obstacle to the
processes of democratization and democratic consolidation, especially in the poorest
countries o f the world.
This proposition is emphatically embraced by the second group o f “globalists” (the
pessimists) who focus on the power struggles and conflicts that are believed to be caused
by globalization. Some envision worldwide clashes between different cultural groups,
fierce fights over resources, or the spread of politico-economic crises rooted in bad
political leadership and triggered by the sudden withdrawal of capital by foreign
investors.48 The shift from national to another allegiance, which some analysts believe is
happening, may become “a cultural and political earthquake,” a worldwide conflict,
triggered by what is seen as the diffusion of power away from nationstates.49 Immanuel
Wallerstein, one of the most prominent representatives of world system theory and a
leading “globalist,” warns of a high level war-proneness around 2050, as the long period
of global economic growth is likely to come to an end.50 Such pessimistic scenarios spell

47James Anderson and Liam O ’Dowd, “Contested Borders: Globalization and
Ethno-national Conflict in Ireland,” Regional Studies 33, no. 1 (October 1999),
INFOTRAC.
48For a theory about the clash of civilizations, see Samuel P. Huntington, ‘T h e
Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-A9. For a
proposition that environmental disasters may become the causes of conflict, see Robert D.
Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic M onthly (February 1994): 44—76.
49JessicaT . Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (January/February
1997): 50-66.
50lmmanuel W allerstein, “The Capitalist W orld Economy: M iddle-Run
Prospects,” in Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the M odem World System, ed.
Immanuel Wallerstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 123—36.
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gloomy prospects for the establishment and sustainability of dem ocratic regimes.
Given the richness and diversity of the literature on globalization and its effects,
little agreement exists about even a specific definition of “globalization.” Consequently, it
is difficult to identify an underlying theoretical concept unifying these works. The
optim istic group o f “globalists” (the ones who believe that cosmopolitan worldwide
democracy is possible), trace their intellectual roots to Immanuel K ant and liberal
economic theory pioneered by Adam Smith and David Ricardo.
Those critics o f globalization who focus on the growing gap between rich and poor
trace their intellectual roots to Karl Marx and his dependency theory, according to which
the world system is seen as divided between industrialized “core” countries (rich
established democracies) and underdeveloped “periphery” countries (poor conflict ridden
states). A branch of this school of thought, world system analysis, focuses on the
interaction o f the units within the world system and not the constitution and/or functioning
of the units (such as nationstates) themselves. During this interaction, different social,
political and economic forms emerge within different regions of the world. These
phenomena become the basis o f the “developmental pulse” of these regions. Nationstates
and even regions are incapable of controlling these phenomena. Consequently, the future
o f the political and economic system within each country is affected (or even determined)
by this “developmental pulse” and not by the actions of individual states.51
Such globalist perspectives suffer from a high degree of determinism.
Furthermore, Marxist and many post-M arxist perspectives that are based on historical

51For a review of this literature, see Robert A. Denemark, “W orld System History:
From Traditional International Politics to the Study of Global Relations,” International
Studies Review 1, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 51-53.
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materialism have been widely criticized for their failure to consider various forms of
domination in world politics that are not reducible to “haves” and “have-nots.” Ethnic and
gender domination are often cited as domains that are ignored by M arxists.52 These critics
have included postmodernists, critical theorists, and feminists who do not see the
emerging global order and transnational society as a single homogenous entity. They think
of global society as a complex and diverse social system, and have continued to argue for a
major restructuring of International Relations theory, which, many o f them believe, cannot
adequately explain the changes associated with globalization. T heir view o f global society
and of nationstates is one o f a field in which differences and pow er struggles are
constantly played out.53
A major challenge faced by globalist perspectives, given their focus on the
complex and often chaotic nature o f global issues, is their inability to link “micro”
conditions within individual nationstates with macro-outcomes at the global level. As a
result, many globalist accounts of world politics suffer from incom pleteness and over
generalization. This makes it difficult to come up with credible hypotheses at the systemic
level about the prospects of dem ocracy and democratic consolidation within specific
nationstates.
In spite of this shortcoming, globalist perspectives draw our attention to the

52Andrew Linklater, ‘T h e Question of the Next Stage in International Relations
Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point o f View,” Millennium 21, no. 1 (Spring 1992):
79-80.
53Mike Featherstone uses these two characteristics to describe “global culture.”
Mike Featherstone, Undoing Culture: Globalization, Postmodernism, and Identity
(London: SAGE, 1995), 14. For a discussion of post-positivist approaches, see V. Spike
Peterson, ‘Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, G ender and International
Relations,” Millennium 21, no. 2 (Sum m er 1992): 183-206.
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importance of economic factors, such as a market economy, free trade, and growing
economic interdependence between nationstates. This dissertation relates these insights to
the concept of the “state as a service station.” A state that can function effectively as a
service station has established functioning economic institutions and is capable of adapting
to growing economic interdependence. Such a state is also capable of providing basic
goods to its citizens and residents. Its political power has a strong economic foundation.
Furthermore, such a state can create the conditions that are necessary for the growth of
civil society, which, in tum , is a necessary condition for a sustainable democratic regime.
In sum, this dissertation does not dismiss alternative hypotheses as being irrelevant
to its line of inquiry. Alternative hypotheses point to important variables that must be
included in order to produce a credible account of community building in the post-CoId
War world. In the words o f Andrew Linklater:
“No sociology of community will proceed very far if it neglects state-building,
geopolitics and war. [These are the variables examined by geostrategists.] No
account will succeed if it overlooks the effects of commerce or production at the
domestic and international levels. [These are the variables examined by
globalists.] No account will reach far enough if it neglects the cultural dimensions
of international relations which shape domestic and international order and
structure images o f the self and the other. [This dimension is the focus of
Constructivist analyses.]”54
This dissertation has incorporated the main insights of other leading schools of
thought into its research design. To be more specific, it will assess the role of
international actors and their use of conditionality during the process o f community
building as “intervening variables.” Furthermore, it will address the ability of
democratizing multiethnic states to become effective “service stations.”

54Linklater, “The Question of the Next Stage,” 94.
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The following chapter reviews related bodies of literature that focus on the
domestic and individual levels of analysis. It identifies the major bodies of literature on
which the main thesis o f this dissertation is based and points to areas in need of theoretical
refinement and further empirical research.
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CHAPTER ED

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON MULTIETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY

This review consists of four parts which divide the previous literature into
conceptually and thematically distinguishable areas. One goal o f this chapter is to identify
the main bodies o f literature from which the main hypothesis about the impact of ethnic
restructuring on democratic consolidation is drawn. Another goal o f the chapter is to
identify which o f the debated areas of the existing theoretical approaches are in need of
conceptual refinement and further empirical research.
To demonstrate the conceptual differences between previous works, the chapter
employs a chart with two intersecting lines, representing two concepts— the nation and
ethnicity (see Figure 2). The vertical line is the “nation” line. The area to the right is
marked as “nation as a construct,” and the area to the left is marked “nation as an actor.”
The term “nation as a construct” implies that the theories on the right side of the chart
conceptualize the nation as a historically specific construct, capable of change with each
generation. Such a nation may permit the entry of new members through membership in
civil society and the state. The opposing theoretical view embraces a more static and, in
some cases, even primordial view of the nation. The nation in this view is a community
with a distinct language and history.1

‘Don M aclver, “Introduction: States and Ethnic Pluralism,” in The Politics o f
Multinational States, ed. Don M aclver (New York: St. M artin’s, 1999). 3.
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Figure 2. Theories Categorized According to Their Understanding of Ethnicity and Nation
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The horizontal line is the “ethnic groups” line. The area on top is marked “ethnic
groups as a construct.” The area on the bottom “ethnic groups as actors.” Similarly to the
previously described definition of the “nation,” the theories which fall into the area on top
conceptualize ethnicity as a historically specific concept, emphasizing the different
historical experiences o f each ethnic group. Some of these theories maintain that ethnic
identities are primarily activated by group elites with particular purposes in mind. The
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opposing theories embrace a more static, primordial view of ethnicity, treating ethnic
groups as givens in domestic and international politics. They maintain that ethnic
identities are deeply rooted in historical origins, which define the nature of an ethnic
group.2 The chart divides the theoretical approaches to the subject into four quadrants,
reflecting the differing definitions of “nation” and “ethnicity” that each embraces.

THE FIRST QUADRANT: HISTORICAL APPROACHES

The Experience o f Ethnic Restructuring as a Source o f Minority-unfriendly Nationalism

The theories which fall into the first quadrant conceptualize ethnicity and nation as
historically specific constructs. They encourage us to pay attention to the specific
historical experiences of national and ethnic groups. The differences in historic
experiences are the basis for perceiving oneself as a member of an ethnic or national
community. No theoretical distinction between ethnic and national collectivities is made,
incorporating them instead into the term “identity.”3
The best known representative of this quadrant is Rogers Brubaker’s study
Nationalism Reframed: Nations and N ationhood in the New Europe * Arguing that nation

:MacIver, 6.
3“I am deliberately avoiding the term ‘ethnicity’,” writes Peter Burke, “which
raises more problems than it solves, and replacing it with the term ‘identity’ . . .” Peter
Burke, “French Historians and Their Cultural Identities,” in History and Ethnicity, ed.
Elizabeth Tonkin, Malcolm Chapman, and M aryon McDonald (London: Routledge,
1989), 159. For a discussion of the term “ethnicity” and its limitations, see Malcolm
Chapman, Maryon McDonald, and Elizabeth Tonkin, “Introduction,” ibid., 11-17.
4Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nations and Nationhood in the New
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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must be conceptualized as a historically specific construct, Brubaker’s ground-breaking
study constructs an elegant “Minority-Nationalizing State-Minority M other State” triangle
for the study o f European nationalities. An example o f this triangle is the situation of the
Russian minority in post-Soviet states. The Russians are subjected to the “nationalizing”
policies of post-Soviet states, but at the same time they are “protected” by their ethnic
patron— Russia. Such triangles are usually the products of the disintegration o f empires,
when their multiethnic populations “unmix” into separate nationstates. In the case of the
former Soviet Union, the triangles are the legacy of Soviet nationalities policy, which
involved ethnic restructuring (i.e., planned migration and deportations whereby large
numbers of Russian speakers were moved into the Soviet republics, and some of the local
inhabitants of the republics were deported).5
A thesis put forward by the study is that the legacy of Soviet nationalities policy
has become a source of minority-unfriendly nationalism in the Soviet successor states.
Brubaker argues that in almost all new post-Soviet states the ethno-culturally defined,
“state-owning” core nation is sharply distinct from other residents of the state. The core
nation has been represented by its elites as weakened and underdeveloped as the result of
previous discrimination and repression (i.e., ethnic restructuring). To compensate for
previous injustices, the new state is seen as having the responsibility to protect and
promote the interests of the core nation by adopting strict language laws or even expelling
the minorities. Due to this reason post-Soviet states are unlikely to adopt the democratic

5For a well-written, rich historical accounts about the ethnic changes in the former
Soviet Union, putting them into the context of ethnic changes in 20th century Europe, see
Eugene M. Kulischer, Europe on the Move: Population Changes 1917-1947 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1947) and Joseph B. Schechtman, European Population
Transfers 1939—1945 (1946; reprint. New York: Russell and Russell, 1971).
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models, such as binational, multinational or civic, that are advocated by the proponents of
democratic policies in multiethnic states. Brubaker hypothesizes that the prospects of the
minority rights model, according to which minorities are endowed with special cultural
rights and autonomy, seem better because international institutions, such as the Council of
Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the
European Union (EU) push these new states to adopt this model.
Gerhard Simon puts forward a similar thesis about the im pact o f Soviet
nationalities policy: that it resulted in a surge of nationalism in the Soviet republics.6
Simon argues that even during Soviet times deportations and russification resulted in the
emergence of small and, in some cases, large resistance groups that rejected nationalities
policy either in part or completely. These groups, such as civil rights, re-emigration
movements (e.g., the deported Crimean Tatars demanding a right to go back to their
homeland), or national opposition movements, made concrete demands. Having
researched the responses to this policy within the Soviet republics, Simon concludes that
the processes o f decolonization, which meant the development of the new (or re-newed)
nationstates, began to take place even before the collapse of the Soviet Union (although
they were less obvious than in other empires).
Vieda Skultans’ study The Testimony o f Lives: Narrative an d Memory in PostSoviet Latvia, which is based on anthropological and historical research conducted in postCommunist Latvia, underlines one o f the most important aspects o f Soviet nationalities
policy— the deportations.7 Skultans argues that in Latvia “they (i.e., postwar events,

6Gerhard Sim on, Nationalism and Policy Toward Nationalities in the Soviet
Union (Boulder, Colo.: W estview, 1991).
7Vieda Skultans, The Testimony o f Lives: Narrative and M em ory in Post-Soviet
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including deportations and resistance) have come to play a central role in defining national
identity”8 because they are vividly remembered by the former victims and assert
themselves in public commemorative practices.
Svetlana Aliyeva’s thesis is similar to that of Skultans’.9 She also argues that the
experience of deportations has played a central role in the construction of post-Soviet
identities. Furthermore, Aliyeva suggests that past deportations and repressions have
become a source o f conflict in several former republics, thus becoming an obstacle to
democratization. Aliyeva’s book covers the first post-Soviet discussions about
deportations in the Soviet Union and relates them to the conflict in North Ossetia and
Checheno-Ingushetia.
Valery Tishkov, a former Russian nationalities minister, makes a similar argument.
Tishkov attempts to trace the influence that Soviet deportations have had on the
construction of post-Soviet identities by the Ingush and the Chechens and the eruption of
conflict in that area o f the former USSR.10 In the same vein, recent studies by Nikolai F.
Bougai, a Russian historian, also maintain that the deportations carried out by the Soviets
have, in the long run, engendered ethnic conflicts in the territory of Russia. This is
especially true about the conflicts in the Caucasus."

Latvia (London: Routledge, 1998).
8Ibid., xi. Skultans argues that public commemorative practices to remember the
deportations carried out in the postwar period did not contrast with the personal memories
of the respondents.
9SvetIana Aliyeva, Tak eto bylo: natsional’nye repressii v SSSR 1919-1952 gody
[That’s How It Happened: National Repressions in the USSR, 1919-1952] (Moscow:
Insan, 1995).
l0VaIery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet
Union: The M ind Aflam e (London: SAGE, 1997).
"See the introduction to Nikolai F. Bougai and Askarbi M. Gonov, Kavkaz:
narody v eshelonakh ( 1920-1960-ye gody) [The Caucasus: The Nations in Railway Cars
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The most pessimistic thesis regarding the prospects for democratization in states
with a troubled history can be drawn from a survey of East Central European political
history by Joseph Rotschild. In Return to Diversity: A Political History o f East Central
Europe Since World War II Rotschild argues that the region has suffered from
“fundamental weaknesses.” These weaknesses, which include multiethnicity, the
instability of institutions, and irresponsible governments, explain why countries in this
region lost their independence in the past and why they have remained underdeveloped
and non-democratized when compared to countries in Western Europe.12 Like most
historical perspectives on ethnic issues, this survey is successful in identifying broader
trends and the persistence o f crises in the history of post-Communist Europe. However, it
does little to theorize the link between multiethnicity and democratic processes.
In general, despite the visibility of nationalism in post-Communist politics in the
early nineties, less new theoretical ground has been broken than might be expected from
the multitude of case studies researched. W hat is probably one of the most important
conceptual breakthroughs was achieved by Rogers Brubaker who distinguishes between
civic and ethnic forms o f nationalism.13 In the case of civic nationalism, the members o f a

(1920-1960s)] (Moscow': Insan, 1998), 8-52, and Nikolai F. Bougai, “Postsovetskaya
Rossiya: problema reabilitatsii narodov v premlomlenii obshchestvennogo soznaniya”
[Post-Soviet Russia: the Problem of the Rehabilitation of Nations during the Tim e of
Transition], a paper presented at the Conference “Im Jahrhundert der Fliichtlinge:
Umsiedlung and V ertreibung im Gedachtnis der Europaischen Volker” [The Century o f
Refugees: Resettlement and Expulsion in the Memory of European Nations] on 28 May
1999 at Europa-Universitat Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany.
l2Joseph Rotschild, Return to Diversity: A Political History o f East Central
Europe Since World W ar II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
l3For a discussion of this idea, see Raymond Taras. “From M atrioshka
Nationalism to National Interests,” in New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet
Nations, ed. Ian Brem m er and Ray Taras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 685.
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particular group identify first and foremost with the nation and the state in which they live
(territorial identification), and not with a particular ethnic group within the state (“blood”
identification). Ethnic nationalism is minority-unfriendly nationalism. In his article
“Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States,” Brubaker argues that the politics of
citizenship in Soviet successor states are shaped by the claims of politicized ethnicity, or
by ethnic nationalism, which is more exclusive and more irreconcilable with democracy
than civic nationalism .14 This argument suggests that in ethnically restructured states the
logic of democracy and the logic of nation building may be incompatible.
With the exception o f Brubaker’s works, the approaches within the first quadrant
do not go beyond the description of identity construction. They fail to identify the
conditions when the legacy o f ethnic restructuring interferes with democratization and
democratic consolidation within states. Besides, these approaches do not explore why
some multiethnic states get involved in the creation o f democratic institutions to
accommodate the needs o f minorities. N or do they explain why some agree on power
sharing arrangements, decentralization, or the extension o f minority rights (instead of
succumbing to non-democratic ways, such as expulsion or ethnic cleansing). A recurrent
theme among the approaches located in the first quadrant is that a previous experience of
ethnic restructuring does matter. It may become a source of minority-unfriendly
nationalism and, consequently, an im pedim ent to successful democratization and
democratic consolidation in multiethnic states.

14Rogers Brubaker, “Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States,”
International Migration Review 26, no. 2 (Summ er 1992): 269—89.
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THE SECOND QUADRANT: THEORIES ON ETHNIC MOBILIZATION

Previous Ethnic Restructuring as a Potential fo r Mobilization

The second quadrant (“nations as actors; ethnic groups as constructs”) contains
those theories that define nations as “actors” in domestic and world politics. Ethnic
groups are normally invisible, but ethnicity can be mobilized in order to oppose or to take
revenge for various national political projects, forced assimilation, genocide, and selfdetermination.15 This approach is popular in the political science literature on ethnic
relations, which has tried to identify the circumstances (e.g., a sense o f deprivation vis-avis another ethnic group) that accompany conflicts between ethnic groups and thus make
ethnic groups “visible” within nations.16 These theories have, for the most part, examined
competition between different ethnic groups.
The main thesis drawn from this quadrant about the impact o f past ethnic
restructuring is that it often becomes a potential for ethnic mobilization by the group
which was previously oppressed or is currently oppressed by another ethnic group. Ted
Robert Gurr, author of M inorities at Risk: A Global View o f Ethnopolitical Conflict and
Donald L. Horowitz, the editor o f Ethnic Groups in Conflict, are the pioneers of this

l5Richard Davies, “Ethnicity: Inside Out or Outside In?” in Identities in
International Relations, ed. Jill Krause and Neil Renwick (New York: St. M artin’s,
1996), 87-88.
16E.g., Donald L. Horowitz, ed.. Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1985). Horowitz underlines the sense of deprivation and its
importance for ethnic conflict. Also see David B. Carment, ‘T h e Interstate Dimensions
of Secession and Irredenta: A Crisis-Based Approach,” a paper presented at the
International Studies Association’s Annual M eeting in San Diego. California (16-20
April 1996).
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approach.17
Drawing on psychology. Vamik D. Volkan pursues a sim ilar line of inquiry. He is
primarily interested in why ethnic groups mobilize themselves to get revenge for past
wrongs, or, in his words, “what happens to a group’s ‘we-ness’, its distinction from others,
to become so deadly?” 18 Drawing on evidence from the former Yugoslavia, Cyprus, the
Baltic states, and Palestine, the author defines and analyzes identities as “emotionally
bonded large groups.” 19 He uses the analogy o f a tent to explore large-group psychology
and ethnic mobilization. Personal identity is the first layer, and it fits well. Ethnic identity
is the second layer. It is a “loose” layer, and it embraces many other members under an
ethnic “tent.” The ethnic tent is held up by a tent pole (a leader), and it provides a sense of
security to those who are under the canvas. People may rally around the pole o f the tent
when they feel threatened. Efforts to secure the tent and to straighten out the canvas may
lead to violent mass behavior. M ourning over past losses may induce feelings of anger
and prompt mobilization.
Ernest G ellner and Charles C. Ragin have developed a theoretical “reactive
ethnicity” perspective.20 According to this perspective, the infiltration of a sub-national
area (e.g., a Soviet republic) by the members of a dominant cultural group (e.g., Russians)
causes an “ethnic backlash” against the dominant cultural group by the inhabitants of the
effected sub-national area. According Charles Ragin, in such situations, the dominant

l7Ted Robert Gurr, M inorities at Risk: A Global View o f Elhnopolitical Conflict
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993).
18Vamik D. Volkan, Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview, 1997), 17.
19Ibid., 18.
:oSee Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1969). and Ragin.
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strata (e.g., Russians) come to be seen as alien by the lower strata (e.g., the inhabitants of a
Soviet republic). On the other hand, the people from the lower strata are stereotyped as
inferior by those in the dominant strata. An “ethnic backlash” on the part of the lower
strata may involve mobilization along ethnic lines for forceful political action.
Raymond Taras has applied this perspective to post-Soviet nationalities. He argues
that this perspective explains the Baltic peoples’ sense of insecurity about having been
infiltrated by large numbers of Russians.21 Graham Smith and Andrew Wilson applied the
theory of ethnic mobilization to the Russian diaspora in W estern Ukraine and Northeastern
Estonia.22 They found that Estonia’s citizenship policy imposed limits on the political
activities of the Russian diaspora, thus limiting the possibility of “an ethnic backlash”
occurring, but Ukraine has left the “political opportunity” for its Russians open. The
authors hypothesized that, given the relative passivity of Russia— the ethnic patron of
these minorities— and the lack of an influential leadership to lead a movement, the
likelihood of an “ethnic backlash” on the part of the Russians was unlikely in the two
states.
The approaches in this quadrant hypothesize that an “ethnic backlash” may lead to
separatist movements, which, in turn, would threaten the existence of a multiethnic state.
Such situations can present an obstacle to democratic consolidation. This hypothesis is
sim ilar to the one put forward by the theoretical approaches in the first quadrant. The
theories in both quadrants agree that the experience o f ethnic restructuring may become a

2lTaras, 689.
"Graham Smith and Andrew W ilson, “Rethinking Russia’s Post-Soviet Diaspora:
The Potential for Political M obilization in Western Ukraine and Northeastern Estonia,”
Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 5 (1997): 845-64.
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stimulus for identity-based movements.
H ow ever the theories in the second quadrant go one step beyond those in the first
quadrant. Rather than assuming that grievance by itself leads to collective action (ethnic
movements), these approaches explore the ways in which states can reduce the likelihood
of an “ethnic backlash” occurring. States can control access to political participation by
introducing restrictive laws; they can make deals with influential allies of the ethnic
groups; or they can control the material resources available for mobilization. They may,
on the other hand, choose to extend economic, minority rights and other civic rights to the
minorities in order to ensure their loyalty.23 The theories in this quadrant excel in
exploring those “ethnic backlashes” that are provoked by material factors (e.g., the
economic deprivation of one ethnic group as compared to another), but they are less
productive in exploring the influence of nonmaterial factors, such as previous ethnic
restructuring, on the coexistence of several ethnic groups within a nation.

23E.g., see Douglas McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, Comparative
Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and
Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Donald L. Horowitz
has argued that the disposition to secede, or an “ethnic backlash,” varies by regional
position (i.e.. whether the region inhabited by a minority group is economically backward
or not) and the relative position of the group (i.e., whether the group is well-off when
compared to other national groups). Therefore, multiethnic states should pay a lot of
attention to the economic situation of their ethnic minorities. See Donald L. Horowitz,
“Patterns of Ethnic Separation,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, no. 2
(April 1981): 165-95.
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THE THIRD QUADRANT: MODERNIZATION THEORIES

Elhnic Restructuring As an Obstacle to the Creation o f a ‘'Communications Community’’

The third quadrant ("nations as constructs, and ethnic groups as actors”) represents
the theory of nations pioneered by Karl Deutsch who argued that nations are constructs of
historical, industrial, and communicative (the invention o f mass media, print, the spread of
ideas) developments.24 In this theoretical perspective, ethnic groups are conceptualized as
intervening variables. They are actors that can hinder the creation of "communications
communities” in the territory o f a state. An integrated community is the "end-state” of the
integrationist project. It is "a unified homogenous political and social unit which authority
securely and democratically centralized.”25 One of the significant contributions of this
theoretical approach, despite its Marxist linear view of the nation, is the finding that most
democratic states contain a functioning sub-state community, which is the product of
multiple transactions and interactions among the people living in those states.26

24“The community which permits a common history to be experienced as
common, is a community of complementary habits and facilities of communication. . . .
A larger group o f persons linked by such complementary habits and facilities of
communication we may call a people,” wrote Karl W. Deutsch in Nationalism and Social
Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations o f Nationality (London: Chapman and
Hall. Ltd.. 1953), 70. A similar definition o f a nation was put forward by E. J.
Hobsbawm, N ations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality Since 1780
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
25This definition was put forward by Stephanie G. Neuman, Small Stales and
Segmented Societies: National Political Integration in a Global Environment (New York:
Praeger, 1976), 14.
26Benedict Anderson defines the nation as an “imagined political community.” He
writes: “The members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow
members. . . . It is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality
and exploitation that prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal
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Drawing on the tenets of this perspective, one could hypothesize that previous
ethnic restructuring can impede the creation of a communications community, which is
necessary for a functioning democratic state. This can happen if ethnic restructuring
produces a situation when large ethnic groups, who have not shared the same transactions
and interactions in the past and who do not want to get engaged in the communications
community’s functions in the future, are placed into it.
After the end of the Cold War, the modernist theory was criticized for being
flawed. This critique was based on evidence from the former Soviet Union. Some argued
that not only did this theory “link the process o f modernization to the emergence of
nations,” but that it suggested that nations were going to be transcended by supranational
social and political integration.27 Many critics argued that the emergence of multiple nonRussian ethnic identities after the demise of the USSR has proved these theoretical
approaches wrong.
Recently, however, the theories in the third quadrant have made a comeback.
Drawing on the assumptions of these theories, some students of post-Soviet nationalities
began to focus on the importance o f the socioeconomic factors and common state
functions that unite the residents o f ethnically restructured states. According to this
perspective, ethnically restructured states are engaged in the process o f nation building.
The arguments usually consist o f the following elements: First, socioeconomic factors are
considered to be pivotal to the current national integration processes in post-Soviet states.
It is argued that these states are undergoing the processes of nation building and

comradeship.” Benedict Anderson, Im agined Communities: Reflections on the Origin
and Spread o f Nationalism (London: Verso, 1996), 6—7.
27Simon, 7.
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socioeconomic transformation simultaneously. Second, if there is a difference between the
level of prosperity in a state in which a minority lives and its “m other” state, then this is an
incentive for the minority to stay. Hence, the continuing presence of Russian minorities in
post-Soviet states is often characterized as one of “passive perseverance” and not one of
“active integration.”28 This suggests that those theoretical approaches which emphasize
the importance o f economics and functional integration still em brace a linear, materialist
view of nations as integrated “communications communities.”
The “competitive assim ilation” theoretical game model developed by David Laitin
includes elements of the theories located in the third quadrant. U sing data on Russians in
the Baltic states, Laitin hypothesized that the ability of a nation to assimilate different
ethnic actors depends on its econom ic performance.29 Therefore, according to Laitin’s
model, given the relatively good econom ic performance of the Baltic states, and despite
the restrictive language laws and citizenship policies of Latvia and Estonia, Baltic
Russians should assimilate linguistically into the Baltic nations. In other words, he
suggested that in order to do well economically, this ethnic group would have to learn the
state language and thus eventually become a part of the “titular” nation. The scarce data
that exists, however, on the linguistic assimilation of Latvia’s and Estonia’s Russians since

28The tenets of this approach were identified by Wim van M eurs in his essay
“Social Citizenship and Non-M igration: The Immobility of the Russian Diaspora in the
Baltics,” in Diasporas and Ethnic M igrants in 20th Century E urope, ed. Rainer Milnz,
Rainer Ohliger, and W illiam Safran (Newbury Park, UK: Frank Cass, forthcoming). Also
see Wim van Meurs, Die Transform ation in den baltischen Staaten. Baltische Wirtschafi
und russische Diaspora [The Transition in the Baltic States: Baltic Economics and the
Russian Diaspora] (Cologne. Germ any: Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschaftliche und
intemationale Studien, 1999).
29David Laitin, “National Revival and Competitive Assim ilation in Estonia,” and
“Language and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Republics,” Post Soviet Affairs 12. no. 1
(1996): 4-2 4 , and ibid., 25-39.
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independence suggests ju st the opposite.30
In Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad,
Laitin concludes that economic factors do not fully account for the behavior of Russianspeaking populations in the Baltic states.31 He attempts to save the model by calling for
the addition o f other variables that reflect the social and political status of Russian
speakers. Treating “cultural identity shift” as the main dependent variable, Laitin
conducted a series of surveys and interviews to determine whether there is a potential for
ethnic violence in Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine. According to Laitin, the
Russian-speaking populations in Latvia and Estonia could easily be transformed into
Russian-speaking nationalist movements because the Russians share one culture and past
grievances about alleged discrimination during the initial stage of nation building. The
only thing missing to speed up mobilization is an econom ic incentive to rebel.32

30Russian is the most popular language of communication in both Latvia and
Estonia (96% and 83%, respectively, 1996 data). In Lithuania, however,the most popular
language is Lithuanian (used by 97% of respondents). The questions asked were the
following: “Which Languages Can You Speak Well Enough to Take Part in a
Conversation, Including Your Mother Tongue?” Central and Eastern Eurobarometer
(March 1996), Annex Figure 44. Approximately 50% of Estonia’s ethnically Russian
physicians do not know Estonian, even though they are required to know the state
language to practice medicine. In Narva, the Russian ethnic enclave, Estonian is rarely
ever spoken. “Polovina russkikh vrachei v Estonii ne vladeyut gosudarstvennym
vazykom” [Half of the Russian Medical Doctors Do Not Know Estonian] and “V
Narvu— integrirovat’sya” [Integration in Narva], Narvskava Gazeta (7 January, 1999),
15.
3lDavid Laitin. Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the
Near Abroad (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).
32Laitin, Identity in Formation, 359.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p ro d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e rm is s io n .

58
THE FOURTH QUADRANT: THEORIES OF ETHNOPOUTICS AND DEMOCRACY

Ethnic Restructuring and Polarized Ethnicity as Obstacles to Political Community

The fourth quadrant (“nations and ethnic groups as actors”) contains theories of
ethnopolitics, which conceptualize ethnic and national groups as political groups engaged
in a search for power.33 No conceptual difference between nationhood and ethnicity is
made. The term “ethnicity” is often used to refer to “a highly inclusive (and relatively
large-scale) group identity based on some notion of common origin, recruited primarily by
kinship, and typically manifesting some measure of cultural distinctiveness.”34
Conceptualized in this manner, “ethnicity” may embrace groups differentiated by
language, religion, or race.
Building on the insights of the theories from the previously reviewed three
quadrants, the ethnopolitical approach focuses on the translation of ethnicity into political
arenas and encourages the identification o f the power constellations behind each ethnic
group. Joseph Rotschild, the author o f Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, is
considered to be the pioneer of this approach. There are two groups of theories within this
quadrant. The theories in the first group take an essentialist, stable view of ethnicity and
nation. The theories in the second group consider ethnic and national identities as
historical constructs, yet they argue that such identities can become “petrified” and thus

33See Rotschild, Ethnopolitics, or Rasma Karklins, Ethnopolitics and Transition
to Democracy (Washington, D.C.: W oodrow Wilson Center, 1994), 4—5.
?4Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, “Introduction,” in Nationalism, Ethnic
Conflict, and Democracy, ed. Larry D iam ond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1994), xvii.
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become “relatively constant elements to be reckoned w ith.”35
The essentialists tend to see identity as “a fundamental empirical fact of social
reality” and emphasize the stability of ethnic and national communities.36 Conceptually,
they draw the definition of ethnicity and nationhood from Anthony D. Smith who defines
the “ethnie” (a feeling o f kinship) as the core around which nations are built. According to
Smith, “national sentiment is no construct. It has a real, tangible mass base. At its root is
a feeling of kinship, o f the extended family, that distinguishes the nation from every other
kind of sentiment.”37 Smith, like many other primordialists, embraces a view o f the nation
as an enduring community o f “history and culture, possessing a unified territory, economy,
mass education system and common legal rights.”38 He encourages the identification of
those conditions under which the ethnie is transformed into a nation. The study of the
impact of ethnic restructuring, following these theoretical perspectives, is a study of the
interaction between two or more ethnic groups with different historical experiences and
different interests.
Rasma Karklins, the author of Ethnopolitics and Transition to Democracy, has
applied the theory of ethnopolitics to the study of relations between ethnic Latvians and
Russians in democratizing Latvia. Similarly to the theorists in the first and the second
quadrants, she argues that Soviet nationalities policy, which included ethnic restructuring
and was geared to promote internationalism, had the opposite effect from the one intended.

35Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework fo r
Analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 205.
36KarkIins, 5.
37Anthony D. Smith, “The Origins o f Nations,” in Becoming National: A Reader,
ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 107.
38Ibid.
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Collective identities were activated by the presence of strangers and competitors within the
state, and ethnic tensions emerged. However, unlike the majority o f the theorists within
the first quadrant, Karklins does not see the activity of ethnic groups as a threat to
democratization, especially its initial stages. She argues that the existence of a cohesive
Latvian collectivity actually helped to foster change in the regime.
A similar argument is put forward by Ghia Nodia, who argues that “clinging to
nationhood” in fact favors the development of democracy and the protection of individual
rights.39 Nationalism, according to Nodia, is the only effective unifying force for a
community trying to restore itself from the atomized societies left behind by a totalitarian
state. Nodia’s argument is supported by Francis Fukuyama, who views nationalism as a
“transitional strategy” for getting to liberal democracy in the postcom m unist world.40
These perspectives suggest that ethnic restructuring may impede the initial stages of
democratization if it weakens the nation, which is conceptualized as community
underneath the state, necessary for a transition to democracy.
The concept of ethnopolitics encourages the exploration o f a whole spectrum of
political arrangements involving different ethnic groups. Democracy in Plural Societies: a
Comparative Exploration, a classical study by Arend Lijphart, explores consociational
democracy, a particular form of democracy. The study outlines the possibilities of power
sharing arrangements in multiethnic states.41 The main thesis of the book is that it may be

39Ghia Nodia, “Nationhood and Self-Recollection: Ways to Democracy after
Communism,” in Towards a New Community: Culture and Politics in Post-Totalitarian
Europe, ed. Peter J. S. Duncan and Martyn Rady (Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 1993).
40See the collection of essays in Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy, ed.
Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
4'Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).
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difficult, but not impossible, to achieve and maintain democratic government in a “plural
society.” A plural society, as defined by Lijphart. is a society with “segmental cleavages,”
which may be linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, ethnic, or religious.42
The most important element of consociational democracy is government by a grand
coalition of political leaders representing all significant segments o f a plural society.
Lijphart criticizes modernization theories by arguing that the replacement of segmented
loyalties by a “national allegiance,” which is implied by the linear concept of the nation,
may have grave consequences in practice. Such a replacement seems to be envisioned by
the third quadrant theories as a goal for political development. Lijphart argues that
identities are first and foremost primordial, and any effort to eradicate “segmental
loyalties” may in fact foster ethnic tensions. That is why power arrangements allowing
ethnic groups to cling to their “primordial loyalties” are better solutions in practice.
The central aspect of Lijphart’s argument was that leaders should not wait for
reconciliation within societies and instead try to achieve peace from above. A similar
argument was put forward by Eric A. Nordlinger, Milton J. Esman and other
“consociationalists” who focused on deriving models of “balanced pluralism,” which were
supposed to alleviate the consolidation of democracy in ethnically divided states.43 These
approaches, like most of the approaches in the first group, assume that each ethnic and/or
national group has a cohesive identity and a unitary leadership capable of negotiating inter
ethnic agreements. The “consociationalists” consider ethnic parties to be the building

42Ibid„ 3.
4'For a summary and a critique of the arguments put forward by Eric A.
Nordlinger and Milton Esman about the power arrangements which are supposed to help
democracy building in ethnically segmented states, see Ethnic Groups in Conflict, ed.
Horowitz. 570-72.
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blocks o f democratic coalitions. However, as multiple case studies show, even if the
leaders of ethnic groups may be inclined to cooperate, their actions are likely to be
questioned by the rest o f the group. Therefore, the intention to cooperate shown from
“above” may, in fact, lead to more ethnic conflict emanating from “below.”44
With several exceptions, such as Arend Lijphart, democratic theory has been, by
and large, silent on the issues of ethnicity and its role in democratizing states. The
theorists working within this paradigm have operated with the models o f a homogenous
demos, which resembled and were built on the empirical evidence from states in Western
Europe and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. Only after the disintegration o f the Soviet
Union did issues of ethnicity again become salient to democratic theory. Concepts such as
“minority rights” were revisited. Will Kymlicka’s M ulticultural Citizenship: A Liberal
Theory o f M inority Rights has become a widely discussed book by scholars studying
democratic processes in multiethnic entities.45 Kymlicka touches upon democracy in
multiethnic states, which is still a grey area in democratic theory. He attempts to construct
what he calls a “liberal approach to minority rights.” Kymlicka’s argument is different
from that embraced by m any democratic theorists who oppose the concept of collective
rights arguing that in the states where individual rights are protected there is no need for
collective rights. Kymlicka suggests that minority rights can be helpful and need not
contradict individual freedom. He argues that multiethnic states may extend “external
protection” to the minorities living in the state in order to lim it the economic or political
power exercised by the larger national group. Extending national rights to minorities may

"Ibid., 574.
45Will Kymlicka, M ulticultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f M inority Rights
(Oxford. UK: Clarendon, 1995).
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be a first step toward reconciliation in multiethnic states.
Kymlicka’s view of minority rights assumes the existence of a functioning state.
Tam ara J. Resler has applied this perspective to the study of Lithuania, Russia, and
Ukraine— all o f which are democratizing multiethnic states.46 Based on the evidence from
these case studies, she argues that extending minority rights has helped to redress the
wrongs o f Soviet nationalities policy. In other words, she argues for the use of collective
rights as a form o f restitution related to the wrongs committed by the previous regime.
Unlike Kymlicka and Resler, Bam ett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (Post-Soviet
Political Order: Conflict and State Building) do not assume the existence of functioning
states in the post-Soviet area.47 Their collection o f essays traces the process of institution
building in that area by interpreting the conflicts in the post-Soviet space as the
“unm ixing” o f the Soviet Union into separate nationstates. This process has transformed
the post-Soviet state into “normal instability,” which means that the likelihood of conflict
has been greatly reduced.48 The main thesis o f the book is that the key problem in the
region is state and nation building. The authors argue that the processes of
democratization are dependent on successful state and nation. They hypothesize that in
those places where effective state institutions are lacking, increased popular participation
in politics is likely to trigger civil and even international conflict.
Works with a democratic perspective that embrace a static view of ethnicity

46Tamara J. Resler. “Dilemmas of Democratization: Safeguarding Minorities in
Russia. Ukraine and Lithuania,” Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 1 (1997): 89—107.
4'Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building, ed. Bamett R. Rubin
and Jack Snyder, (London: Routledge, 1998).
4!iBamett R. Rubin, “Conclusion: M anaging Normal Instability,” in Post-Soviet
Political Order: Conflict and State Building, ed. Bam ett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder
(London: Routledge, 1998), 165.
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sometimes read like cookbooks, offering an array of recipes on what democratizing states
should do with their ethnic groups. Theorists who embrace a static view of ethnicity do
not believe that minority ethnic groups can adapt to a state ruled by another ethnic group.
Instead, the state should adapt to minority ethnic groups by developing different
institutional frameworks. States are advised to extend special rights to their minorities, to
arrange power sharing arrangements with them, or to offer them autonomy. Some
theorists even develop taxonomies of different modes to “regulate ethnic communities,”
which, they argue, may help to avoid ethnic conflict.49 However, one significant aspect
has been missing from these analyses. It is an analysis o f the responses of the ethnic
groups to the initiatives undertaken by the states.
The second group of approaches attempted to address this question. This group
focuses on the actions of ethnic and national groups.50 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan's
study Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South
America, and Post-Communist Europe puts forward the concept of a consolidated
democracy, which requires an understanding not only the actions of the state, but also of
the acceptance of the power of the state by the people who live in that state. For Linz and

49E.g., see Brendan O ’Leary and John McGarry, “Regulating Nations and Ethnic
Communities,” in Nationalism and Rationality, ed. Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti,
Pierre Salmon, and Ronald W introbe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995),
245-89.
5°Defining identities as flexible means that identities are constructed and sustained
through social practices. This does not mean that identities are malleable or somehow
more peaceful. On the contrary, this means that the changes in identities may, in fact, be
a cause of a conflict. For an argument that changes in identities may cause ethnic
conflict, see Badredine Arfi, “Ethnic Fear: The Social Construction of Insecurity.”
Security Studies 8, no. 1 (Autumn 1998): 151—203. The fact that identities are
increasingly defined as flexible suggests that the borders between the fourth and the first
quadrant are becoming more permeable. In other words, theorists of ethnopolitics and
democracy are becoming more open to the insights of historical perspectives.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

65
Stepan, democracy is a two-way process: the state is ready to be responsive to the needs of
its citizens, and the latter "accept the political unit in which they live as an appropriate
entity to make legitimate decisions.”51
In this model, democratic consolidation is a political situation when dem ocracy has
become the “only game in town.” It requires five supporting arenas. They are: a lively
civil society (i.e., an entity with interest groups that are relatively independent from the
state), a political community (a demos), the rule o f law, a set o f institutions to insure the
functioning o f the state, and an economic society (a state-mediated market economy).
Linz and Stepan argue that non-democratic experiences in the past critically affects the
path that a democratizing state takes and the challenges that it faces on its w ay to
democratic consolidation.
The last statement suggests that similarly to the authors within the first three
quadrants, Linz and Stepan’s theory suggests that the legacy o f ethnic restructuring matters
if it impedes the development of the supporting arenas of a consolidated democracy. By
pointing out the importance o f a political com m unity and civil society that transcends the
lines o f ethnic division (the first two supporting arenas), Linz and Stepan’s model provides
a space for the insights o f the theories in the second quadrant, which warn of the dangers
that ethnic mobilization poses to democratization. By arguing that the capability o f a state
to perform economic, bureaucratic, and “rule o f law” institutional functions is necessary
for the emergence of a consolidated democracy, their model allows the insights of the
modernization theories in the third quadrant, which underline the importance o f creating
“communications com m unities,” to be incorporated. In addition, this work m akes an

5lLinz and Stepan, 27.
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attempt to theorize the relationship between state, nation and dem ocratization.52
In this model, the main variable explaining the ability of a multiethnic state to
successfully democratize is the prevalence of other nations beside the titular nation within
a state. Thus, if there is no other nation in the territory of a state and there is little cultural
and ethnic differentiation, then that state can be both a nationstate and a democratic state.
If there is another nation present in a state and if it is “awakened” or militant, then conflict
is a very real possibility and democratization becomes very difficult. However, if there is
no group which has sufficient cohesion and identity to be a nation builder, then no state is
possible, so democracy is impossible. The model, therefore, yields tw o propositions about
the impact of ethnic restructuring on democratizing states. First, the experience o f ethnic
restructuring can affect the ability of a state to successfully dem ocratize because it can
produce a bi-national polity, in which one national group is mobilized. Second, this
experience can have an analogous effect because it could “kill a nation”— i.e., prevent a
group from having sufficient cohesion and identity to become a demos.
However, this model suffers from several flaws. By putting emphasis on the
numerical ethnic variation in a state (i.e., the larger a minority’s ethnic or national
presence, the greater the danger to democracy), this model cannot register the sharpness of
the cleavages within societies.53 Besides, by ignoring the activities of a potentially active
and aggressive m inorities’ “mother state,” which may become involved in the mobilization
of minorities or exploit the issue in its relationship with the host state, it does not explain

52Ibid., 36.
53The term “the depth of sharpness of sub-cultural cleavages” was used by Robert
A . Dahl in Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven. Conn.: Yale University
Press. 1971), 109.
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when or why a national group might become “awakened.” Previously developed models
which ignore these factors suffer from similar flaws.54
Robert A. Dahl, the author of Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, views the
existence o f polarized (or “awakened”) antagonistic groups within a state as an obstacle to
successful democratization. He argues that polarization between ethnic groups (which
may be a legacy of previous ethnic restructuring) is a crucial variable. In fact, some case
studies have shown that multiethnicity or ethnic pluralism per se, without polarization,
may in fact be beneficial to “ polyarchy” (or democracy) because it prevents any single
unified group from having a monopoly of political resources.55
In his article “Some Thoughts on the Victory and Future of Democracy,” Juan J.
Linz returns to the typology of state, nation, and democracy-building strategies in
multiethnic polities.56 He argues that if demos and nation are different, then states have
two options on how to combine nation and democratic state building. The first option is
for a state to alienate its minorities by adopting exclusionary citizenship and minorities’
laws and become an ethnic democracy. The second option is to make a “major effort to
accommodate minorities by crafting a series of political and civil arrangements which
recognize minority rights,” thus creating an inclusive democratic regime. The second

54E.g., see Marie R. Haug, “Social and Cultural Pluralism as a Concept in Social
System Analysis,” American Journal o f Sociology 73. no. 3 (November 1967): 294—304.
55In Polyarchy, Dahl refers to a debate about the impact of multiethnicity on
democratic processes. The debate took place in the late sixties. The supporters of John
Stuart Mill put forward the thesis that multiethnicity per se is a danger to democracy.
Their opponents argued that multiethnic pluralism is a counteragent to despotism and is
not a danger to democracy. Dahl, Polyarchy. 108.
56Juan J. Linz, “Some Thoughts on the Victory' and Future of Democracy” in
Democracy's Victory and Crisis, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997). 404-26.
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option holds more promise for democratic consolidation in the long run.
A collection of essays by Graham Smith et al. entitled Nation-building in the PostSoviet Borderlands has begun to focus on the sources of polarization between different
ethnic groups in post-Soviet states, referring to them as “the construction of group
boundaries.”57 Arguing that “a politics defined in relation to a particular national
community may not in itself be incompatible with processes of democratization,” the
authors suggest that many post-Soviet entities are, in fact, embracing the broader and more
inclusive view of a multiethnic political community.58 By exploring the role of myths,
historical memory, political discourses and language policies, the authors begin to break
the boundaries between the fourth quadrant, which focuses on the actions of ethnic groups,
and the first quadrant, which dwells on the role of history. W ith the exception of the
chapter on the Baltic states,59 this volume, however, focuses on the nationalizing policies
of states and the creation of national identities instead of the processes of democratization.
A serious drawback of many of the approaches within democratic theory, including
the one devised by Linz and Stepan, is that they do not explain why some states, especially
those that have experienced ethnic restructuring and other injustices in the past, decide to
adopt inclusive and minority-friendly strategies, especially if those strategies are unpopular
domestically. Questions about the influence that a minorities’ mother state and other
international actors might have and whether they impede or help democratic consolidation
in such troubled areas are left unanswered. The problem of outside influence, together

57Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, and Edward
Allw’orth, Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics o f National
Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
58Ibid., 1.
5,,Ibid.. 93-119.
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with questions about a states’ choice of policies to accommodate polarized ethnic
differences, has become the topic of an ongoing debate within democratic theory.

CONCLUSION: ACKNOWLEDGING THE “GREY” AREAS, IDENTIFYING TH E
RELEVANT DEBATES

This review suggests the following conclusions. Most works reviewed agree that
minority issues can become an obstacle to successful democratization and democratic
consolidation in states that have experienced ethnic restructuring in the past. This
observation is supported by extensive empirical tests which suggest that there is a
correlation between ethnic pluralism and failed dem ocratic regimes.60 Two reasons are
specified: the rise of minority-unfriendly political groups which contribute to ethnic
tensions (quadrants one, two, and four) and the possibility that ethnic restructuring resulted
in the absence of a group with sufficient cohesion and identity to become a dem os in the
democratizing state (quadrants three and four). Som e works reviewed, however, suggest
that multiethnicity per se is an impediment to dem ocratic processes (e.g., Rotschild within
quadrant one and some democratic theorists within quadrant four).
Three important questions remain unanswered. First, the theorists do not clarify
what aspect of the legacy of ethnic restructuring— multiethnicity per se, or only polarized
ethnicity— may become an obstacle to successful dem ocratic processes. This

“ For multi-country empirical studies that exam ine the correlation between a
successful, peaceful democratic regime and m ultiethnicity see Arthur S. Banks and
Robert B. Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge: M.I.T.. 1963) and Ted Robert Gurr,
“Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Com m unal Mobilization and Conflict
since 1945.” International Political Science Review 14 (1993): 161-201.
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disagreement is part of a larger debate within democratic theory on whether multiethnicity
is a danger to the viability o f representative democratic institutions in democratizing
states.61
The theorists in the first quadrant (who define ethnic and national identity as a
historically specific construct) and the democratic theorists in the fourth quadrant (who
embrace a flexible view of ethnic identity) are inclined to believe that polarization, and not
multiethnicity per se, is the crucial variable. Polarization is likely to be the product of
historical experiences, such as expulsion, deportation, and planned migration.
On the other hand, the theorists (e.g., the first group within quadrant four and
quadrant two) who take a primordial view of ethnicity are inclined to believe that
multiethnicity per se, especially in the absence o f a cohesive national group, is an obstacle
to the creation o f a functioning democratic regime. Ethnic differences (which is defined as
division along linguistic, religious, or other sim ilar lines) are often regarded as a major
danger to the creation of a functioning democratic regime.
Second, the differences in the conceptualization of ethnicity (outlined in Figure 2)
are central to the debate over which arrangements democratizing states should use to solve
ethnic tensions.62 Those who embrace a flexible view of ethnicity tend to believe that

6lFor a summary of this debate see Dahl, Polyarchy, 108—21. Many case studies
and multiple-variable schemes suggest that ethnic cleavages and a failure in
democratization are often related. For a review of this research see Larry Diamond and
Marc F. Plattner, “Introduction: Divided Societies,” in Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and
Democracy, ed. Larry Diam ond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1994), xvii—xxii.
62For a review of this debate see Multiculturalisnt: Examining the Politics o f
Recognition, ed. Amy Gutm ann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Charles
Taylor is probably one o f the best known proponents of a communitarian perspective.
His opponents (e.g., Jurgen Habermas, K. Anthony Appiah) base their arguments on a
Kantian perspective, arguing for a democratic state with equal rights for all citizens.
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including all residents of a state into collective decision-making is the key to establishing a
functioning political community within a multiethnic state. This inclusion takes place at
the individual level, as a state extends the right to vote to the majority of its residents and
includes ethnic minorities into its power structures. This, in turn, is a step towards a
consolidated democracy. Another group of scholars that embraces a rather flexible view
of identity argues that multiethnic democratizing states should try to alleviate ethnic
tensions by decentralizing their power, by involving antagonistic ethnic groups in local
institutions, and by making flexible power sharing arrangements. This will make co
existence among different ethnic groups easier.
On the other hand, those who embrace a more primordial view of ethnicity are
likely to argue that “primordial loyalties” need special accommodation. They put more
emphasis on special collective minority rights, including territorial autonomy and even
secession.
These disagreements point to a debated area within democratic theory: the crafting
of a political community in multiethnic states.63 Central to this issue is the question: How
do ethnically heterogenous states legitimatize their power vis-a-vis their minorities? Do
they extend special group rights and create power sharing arrangements? Questions about
the legitimacy of the state have been neglected in democratic theory. As Linz and Stepan
point out. this is unfortunate because it is of fundamental importance to democracy.64
The third question is the involvement of international actors in the process of

63This question is also central to the debate over who should be included in the
demos. Giovanni Sartori wrote that there is a tendency in democratic theory to talk a
great deal about the people “without actually looking at them.” Giovanni Sartori, The
Theory o f Democracy Revisited (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1987), 25.
wLinz and Stepan, 27.
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political community building in multiethnic polities. As Brubaker's triangle theory
suggests, a minority “mother” state may in fact become an active actor in this process,
coercing the democratizing state to extend rights and privileges to its minorities. It even
may use other international bodies, such as international institutions, to pursue its goals.
In addition, given their interest in conflict prevention and spreading democratic norms,
international institutions may get involved in the process of community building in
multiethnic states.
This last observation points to the third debated area in democratic theory: the role
of international actors in m ultiethnic community building.65 The proponents of
international involvement in demos building argue that international actors can help in the
crafting of political com m unities in ethnically restructured states by pushing states to
accept inclusive policies and/or extending minority rights. W ithout this international
encouragement, it is argued, states themselves are unlikely to accept such policies— which
are necessary for the well-being o f minorities and successful dem ocratic consolidation.66
The opponents of this opinion respond that by pushing norms and
recommendations, instead o f prom oting civic concord in multiethnic states, international
actors are in fact polarizing ethnic differences even further. This m akes the process of

65For an attempt to synthesize the possible effects of international actors on
domestic actors see Dawisha and Turner, 398-424.
“ E.g., see Hyde-Price, “Democratization in Eastern Europe,” 220-52. Hyde-Price
argues that the postcom m unist states in Eastern Europe can be affected by the example of
liberal Western democratic states. Larry Diamond lists different ways in which foreign
actors can assist in the crafting o f civil societies and political com m unities in
democratizing states. Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors,
Instruments, and Issues,” in D em ocracy’s Victory and Crisis, ed. Axel Hadenius
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 311-70.
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political community building more difficult.6'
These three debated questions suggest that political community building within
multiethnic entities— a requirement for a consolidated democratic regime— is an area in
need of theoretical and empirical refinement. The factors which may obstruct or facilitate
this process need to be identified. The goal of the research that follows is to fill in this
gap.

67E.g.. Joseph V. M ontville writes, “the ultimate irony is that internal conflicts
such as ethnic disputes are more difficult to mediate than international disputes, because
any would-be conciliator from outside has little standing. In domestic disputes,
mediation is m eddling.” Joseph V. M ontville, “Negotiations and Prenegotiations in
Ethnic Conflict: The Beginning, the M iddle, and the Ends,” in Conflict and Peacemaking
in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph V. M ontville (Lexington, KY: Lexington Books,
1990), 530-31. He suggests fostering domestic private agencies, who can act without
challenging state sovereignty, to work as “dispute resolution-marriage counselors.” Also
see Ronald R. Krebs, “Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict,”
International Organization 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 343-77. Krebs argues that
international institutions are sometim es capable of fostering conflict between states.
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CHAPTER IV
CRAFTING POLITICAL COMMUNITIES IN MULTIETHNIC STATES:
WHICH ACTORS, W HAT INSTITUTIONS?

The aim of this chapter is to identify the factors which may help or hinder political
community building in multiethnic states. To do that, it will build on the three themes
identified by the previous chapter. First, it will address theoretical relationships between
multiethnicity and political community by exploring the question of whether
multiethnicity presents a challenge to sustainable democratic political community. This
question requires a re-investigation of the assumptions underlying the concept of
"political community.” Consequently, in the First two segments, this chapter outlines the
individualist and the pluralist perspectives on community building and the institutions that
are suggested by these perspectives to create and maintain a democratic political
community in multiethnic states and societies. Second, it puts forward a critique of the
dominant approaches by identifying conditions in multiethnic entities that are often
ignored by the dominant approaches. This chapter concludes by introducing a corrective
to the dominant approaches and by identifying a set of factors which are particularly
salient to political community building.
The answers to the questions considered in this chapter will be drawn from three
major strands of democratic theory on political community building: individualism,
pluralism, and perspectives on civil society.1 The First two theories, individualism and

‘Usually, three prevailing theoretical models are identified: Individualist, Pluralist
Political, and Holistic Socialism, or Econom ic Democracy. See Carol C. Gould,
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pluralism, represent a continuum. At one end is the democratic individual version of
community (the first perspective), while the pluralist version of political community can
be found at the other end (the second perspective).2 According to the first perspective, an
individual in pursuit of his or her individual interest is the major agency in politics. The
second perspective views political groups as the most important actors. The identity of an
individual is inseparable from that of a social or political group. The third perspective
focuses on sub-state societal processes necessary for a functioning political community.
The three perspectives outline both supportive and unfavorable conditions for
sustainable democratic communities. In its conclusions, this chapter relates the insights
provided by these theories to the relevant debates within the field of democracy studies
outlined in the previous chapter.

POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND MULTIETHNIC ITY. TW O THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES

The Individualist Perspective

The individualist perspective on political com m unity building is based on the
writings of Aristotle. Its central thesis is that the main function of a political community is

Rethinking Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 92-113. This
dissertation focuses on the first two, arguing that they suggest similar conclusions about
the relationship between multiethnicity and democracy. The hypothesis drawn from the
economic democratic model is presented in Chapter II as an alternative thesis.
:A similar continuum was represented by Christopher J. Berry in his discussion of
Sandel’s conception of political communities. See Berry, 102.
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to provide a good life for its citizens— i.e., the individual members of a polity. However,
even if the goal of the demos is to cater to individual interests, the community itself cannot
be just a sum o f separate individuals.3 According to this view, political community is a
partnership o f citizens in a constitution: the members o f the community create the laws of
the state. Participation in political life (i.e., the creation of laws) is, therefore, the most
important aspect of membership in a political community. In short, the essence of a
political community is that the members of demos are subject to the laws in which they
have a part in making.4 This perspective later became the basis for arguments that a purely
political solution (e.g., the inclusion of minorities in the political life of a democratic state
by extending equal rights of citizenship) can be found to the problem of cohesion within
multiethnic entities.5
Political community, as conceived by the individualist model, is well equipped to
handle the differences and disagreements o f its members within its borders.6 The

^The intimacy of the ties connecting the individuals is a debated issue. In
Aristotle’s writings, it is a tightly knit community. Later Jean Jacques Rousseau and John
Stuart Mill equated the com munity with the nation, romanticizing the links between
individuals. In the twentieth century, the com m unity was replaced by the “public.” Yet
most theorists still would agree that the “public,” or the political community in modem
democracies, is more than just a simple aggregation o f individuals. For a discussion of
this issue in the context of John D ewey’s thought, see Damico, 104-18.
4Aristotle, Politics: Books / and II, trans. Trevor J. Saunders (Oxford, UK:
Clarendon, 1995), 22.
sE.g., Bhikhu Parekh argues that “the modem liberal state itse lf’ can be a source
of cohesion for different ethnic groups within a state. The state can provide a variety of
different services, and it can serve as a “service station” to citizens belonging to different
ethnic groups. Margaret Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar, 1996), 84-86.
fiAristotle writes, “Again, the state, as com posed o f the unlikes, may be compared
to the living being: as the first elem ents into which a living being is resolved are soul and
body, as soul is made as a rational principle and appetite, the family of husband and wife,
property of m aster and slave, so all these, as well as other dissim ilar elements, the state is
composed; and therefore the excellence o f all citizens cannot possibly be the same, any
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members handle their disagreements through dialogue and persuasion in the political
sphere o f the demos. In fact, the differences and disagreements between the members of
the community are among the factors which help to keep political life within the public
sphere of democratic com m unity alive.
However, an individualist democratic community is much worse equipped to
handle differences and disagreements emanating from outside its borders. When the
community is overrun by another antagonistic polity, it is likely to cease to exist. As a
matter of fact, if ethnic restructuring is understood as the organized motion of actors other
than community members, pursued by one side (see Chapter II), then, according to
Aristotle’s model, such an incident is likely to mark the end o f the independent political
community. In such a case, the members o f Aristotle’s community can expect to be
enslaved if they want to rem ain alive. Alternatively, if Aristotle’s community overran
another state, the captured members of the other community would be likely to end up in
the “private realm” of A ristotle’s community together with other slaves and women.7 If
the level of community restructuring is significant (i.e., if the community acquires a
significant number of slaves after its interaction with another polity), then mobilization
and a consequent revolt o f the enslaved newcomers may also eventually spell the end of
democratic community.8
The gist o f A ristotle’s theoretical perspective is that a democratic regime can be
best sustained within the borders of one community, and that the members o f this

more than the excellence o f the leader of a chorus is the same as that of a performer who
stands by his side.” Aristotle: The Politics and Constitutions o f Athens, ed. Stephen
Everson (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1996), 66.
7Ibid., 73-82.
8Ibid„ 122.
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community are united by their participation in the political process. If multiethnicity is
understood as differences along linguistic or other similar lines, then it does not present a
danger to a functioning political community as long as it is exhibited by the members of
the clemos.9 However, violent interaction between several communities and the continued
coexistence o f these communities within the same territory may be dangerous to the
democratic polity. This is the case unless the members of the other community are
absorbed into the demos or placed “underneath" it (i.e., banished to the private sphere of
the demos).

Tfie Pluralist Perspective

The pluralist theoretical perspective focuses upon the aggregation of individual
interests as group interests.10 The goal of a political community is to provide an arena for

9The idea that the members of a community should be connected by close national
links was introduced by Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill. In their writings,
the idea of a political community became equated with that of a nation. Drawing on the
logic of Aristotle’s theoretical perspective, John Stuart Mill argued that democracy is next
to impossible in states containing multiple nationalities. See John Stuart Mill,
Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1951).
This view was challenged by Lord Acton, who thought that multiethnicity is beneficial
for democratic regimes. Acton argued that democratic states should not identify with a
single idea of the polity (whether nation or class). If the state absolutizes the will o f the
demos (or the “popular” will), then the values of other particular communities within the
state are marginalized. The existence of multiple communities, he argued, may provide a
shield against authoritarian tendencies within the state. See John Emerich Edward
Dahlberg-Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power, selected by Gertrude Himmelfarb
(Boston: Beacon, 1949). A cton’s view is consistent with the main postulates of the
second (pluralist) perspective.
l0Philosophically, this perspective owes to the writings o f John Dewey, who
introduced the pluralistic conception of the state. He wrote: “Most states, after they have
been brought into being, react upon the primary groupings. . . . Our doctrine of plural
norms is a statement of a fact: that there exists a plurality of social groupings, good, bad.
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interaction between different groups, which express the interests o f individuals. Group
interests, which are often conflicting, are represented in the political process by parties,
voting groups, or social organizations. These interests influence political decisions made
by the government and thus legitimate the power o f the state. Ethnicity becomes relevant
to this perspective when ethnic divisions begin to build solidarities affecting political
thinking and action."
The essence o f this perspective is captured by Dahl’s term “ polyarchy,” which
means competitive politics, public contestation, and public opposition.12 Political
community is consolidated when polyarchy becomes the “only gam e in town;” in other
words, when the state and its residents agree on institutionalized management o f their
conflicting interests through the political process.
The existence of an opposition to the strongest actor is a necessary condition for
the “democratic gam e” to take place because the concentration of pow er in the hands of
one actor indicates the end of a democratic game. This game must always be played by
more than one player. Therefore, following this logic, the existence of diverse ethnic or
national groups may be a positive factor, challenging the authority o f the authoritarian
pow er.13 Consolidated ethnic groups may become centers of opposition to nondemocratic

and indifferent.” John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (1927; reprint, Denver: Alan
Swallow, 1954), 71.
"Jyotirindra das Gupta, “Ethnicity, Language Demands, and National
Development in India,” in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, ed. Nathan Glazer and
Daniel P. Moynihan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 468.
"Dahl, Polyarchy, 4.
"E.g., Rajni Kothari argues that different ethnic groups form ed an opposition to
the upper-class, English-educated ruling class o f India. Rajni Kothari, “India:
Oppositions in a Consensual Polity,” in Regimes and Opposition, ed. Robert A. Dahl
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), 305-40.
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rulers. Thus, multiethnicity may in fact help to initiate the democratic game instead of
impeding its start.
After the democratic game is initiated, politically active ethnic groups can join the
government or remain in the opposition, i.e., be a political minority. Being a minority in
the political community means having less power than the group that is currently
associated with the government. By accepting the position of a minority, a politically
active group has certain expectations. First and foremost, it expects to have a chance to be
in the majority position. If a politically active minority defines itself solely in identity
terms (i.e., language, race, or nationality) instead of interests, it may be impossible to be in
the majority position in a multiethnic community without a certain level of assimilation or
coercion.14 It is quite likely that m ultiethnic polities containing such politically active and
influential minorities will have a hard tim e achieving consensus on official language
policy and other, sim ilar matters.15
A smoothly functioning pluralist community requires that its members have
multiple, flexible identities. In political arenas, the ethnic identities of the members
should be intertwined with their identities as citizens, entrepreneurs, etc. In other words,
ethnic differences should alternate and compete with class, religious, or regional
differences.16 If this is the case, then multiethnicity per se does not present a danger to a
democratic regime.

l4Reiterer, 54-55.
15Don M aclver argues that such polities are likely to disagree not only over
language policies, but also over the basic laws of the state, the composition of the
government, recruitment to public service, and prioritization of groups and regions in the
allocation of resources. Maclver, 14.
l0Horowitz, “Ethnic Policy,” 572.
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The logic o f the pluralist perspective is similar to the individualist: both
approaches argue that the inclusion of ethnic or national minorities (either as separate
members or as politically active groups) into the political process is central to a
functioning political community within multiethnic entities. They recommend institutions
which could help to achieve this goal.

INSTITUTIONS W HICH HELP TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN POLITICAL
COMMUNITY IN A MULTIETHNIC STATE

Top-Down Approaches

The two main theoretical perspectives, outlined above, are referred to as “topdown” approaches because they underline the importance of the state and its institutions to
democratic community building. These approaches range from assimilationist strategies to
arrangements endorsing relative ethnic separation, which allow minorities to have special
territorial or cultural arrangements within the state (see Figure 3).17

17In addition to the political arrangements outlined by the diagram, nation-states
have used expulsions or population exchanges to “manage” ethnic enmities. In the past,
such practices were even considered legitimate internationally. For example, the massive
population exchanges that occurred between European nation-states after World War II
were endorsed by international bodies. The underlying assumption of population
transfers was that ethnic nationality should serve as the basis not only for cultural life, but
also for political organization. Forced resettlements of members o f a certain ethnic group
or groups have been a compulsory operation. Ethnic groups were moved without any
regard for individual wishes. For a critique of population exchanges, see Eugene M.
Kulischer, “Population Transfer,” South Atlantic Quarterly 65, no. 4 (October 1946):
403-14. For an argument that ethnic separation may help democratization, see Raymond
M. Basch, ‘T h e Effects o f Ethnic Separation on Democratization: A Comparative Study.”
East European Quarterly 32, no. 2 (June 1998): 221-42. In Ethnic Cleansing (New
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The individualist perspective, built on the insights of Aristotle, suggests that
creating a strong centralized inclusive state is the optimal solution in order to achieve the
necessary cohesion within the demos. This also holds true for a multiethnic setting. Such
a state adopts ethnically neutral executive, legislative, and administrative decision making
mechanisms and pursues ethnicity-blind public policies. It thus embodies the individualist
values of Aristotle’s demos', the goal of the neutral liberal state is to cater to individual
citizens, regardless of their ethnic attachments. According to this perspective, special
cultural rights or any other arrangements favoring the identity of a certain group will result
in the creation of divisions among the citizens (in other words, they will result in the
construction of “cultural ghettoes”). Assimilationist language policies (i.e., promoting the
major language of the state) are deemed as normal and even necessary in such state: they
enable the interaction among the members of the political community.
The individualist perspective puts a lot of faith in the political process. It is
believed that by extending equal rights of participation to the majority of its residents, the
state opens political spaces in which the citizens can actualize their problems or voice their
grievances through social or political movements.18 This is the way in which citizens
belonging to different ethnic groups can express their needs, and that is why special
political arrangements to satisfy the needs of minorities are deemed unnecessary.
However, in states that contain ethnic comm unities with group-based demands
(e.g.. the calls of ethnic minorities for quotas in political elections or even political

York: St. M artin’s, 1996), Andrew Bell-Fialkoff argues that outsiders can physically
move endangered groups and thus help to resolve ethnic conflict.
l8Jurgen Habermas, “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional
Slate,” in M ulticuhuralism. ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1994). 113.
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autonomy), the individualist suggestions to create an integrative state are likely to
engender resistance from politically active ethnic and national groups. Under such
conditions, recognition of group rights and power sharing arrangem ents between ethnic
and national groups may be necessary to avoid conflict or even the breakup of the polity.
The pluralist perspective outlines such arrangements, which range from extending group
rights to minorities within the polity to the territorial autonomy of ethnically distinct
regions or even their peaceful secession from the state.19 The first pluralist policy (see
Figure 3) dwells on minority rights— i.e., the rights of minorities to “receive equal
treatment, to practice their culture, religion and language, and to participate fully in the
political and econom ic life of the state.”20
This policy is often viewed as the one which avoids the extrem es of a centralized
state and ethnic separation. The first pluralist policy is a “m iddle o f the road” strategy,
combining the insights of individualists and pluralists. Individual members of ethnic
groups are encouraged to be involved in the political activities of the state in addition to
being active in their own ethnic communities.
The second policy— m ultiethnic coalitions within a political party system— refers
to cooperation am ong political parties based on ethnic foundations. Driven by similar
interests (e.g., to form a government), several ethnically-based parties can form a
“coalition of convenience.”

l9For a detailed review o f pow er sharing mechanisms in multiethnic states, see
Timothy D. Sisk, Pow er Sharing and International M ediation in Ethnic Conflicts
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996).
20Hugh M iall, “Introduction,” in Minority Rights in Europe: The Scope fo r a
Transnational Regim e, ed. Hugh M iall (London: Pinter, 1994), 2.
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Figure 3. Institutions to Maintain a Political Community in Multiethnic States

Assimilation
A
Individualist perspective:

An inclusive, centralized, unitary state

Pluralist perspective: 1: Special minority (group) rights
2: Multiethnic coalitions, consociationalism
3: Territorial or communal autonomy
4: Secession

V
Separation

Such coalitions are often formed after election and they disintegrate if the benefits
of cooperation begin to decline. On the other hand, ethnic parties can form a more
permanent alliance prior to the elections. The parties agree on their positions regarding
ethnic issues prior to forming the government. Such coalitions, therefore, usually last
longer than coalitions o f convenience.21
The working principles of multiethnic coalitions, which can be described as “joint
consensual rule” o f several ethnic communities, include proportional representation in the
government, the cooperation of elites, and mutual veto.22 The durability and success of

:iHorowitz, “M ultiethnic Coalitions,” in Ethnic Groups in Conflict, ed. Donald L.
Horowitz (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1985), 366-67.
"These working principles are definitely different from the majoritarian
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similar arrangements depends upon numerous factors, such as the ability of political
leaders to convince the electorate of the necessity of such institutions, the internal
cohesion of the parties, and the attitudes of the broader public regarding interethnic
cooperation.
The third policy— territorial or communal autonomy— requires delegating
considerable authority to local elites. The goal of this policy is to cater to the needs of
regionally concentrated ethnic groups. It is quite possible that even nondemocratic
regimes, such as multiethnic empires, were able to obtain obedience and gain some
legitimacy in the eyes o f the peoples living under their rule by allowing a high level of
local self-govemance.23
The main difference between federalist institutions (e.g., decentralized, regional
government) and consociational power sharing agreements, such as multiethnic coalitions,
is that the former exhibits a territorial power sharing dimension (i.e., each ethnic or
national group has power of governance over the territorial unit in which it lives), while
consociational institutions refer to non-territorial power sharing. Yet all pluralist
institutions are united by their goal: they aspire to accommodate the demands of ethnic
groups within the existing political borders of the state. It is widely believed that
territorial border changes can engender ethnic violence. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the fourth policy— secession— is regarded by pluralists as the least desirable approach.

democratic principle. For a comparison of the two, see Sartori, 238-40.
23Emest Gellner, “The Importance of Being Modular,” in Civil Society: Theory,
History. Comparison, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995), 32-33. The
Habsburg empire is often quoted as an example.
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A Critique o f Top-down Approaches

By suggesting that there are purely political solutions to the problem of cohesion
within multiethnic states, top-down perspectives are assuming two conditions. First, they
presume the existence of a well functioning state. In polities with serious ethnic problems,
state institutions usually are weak and underdeveloped, unable to secure minority rights,
even if they proclaim them legally.24
Second, the individualist and the pluralist perspectives assume that the members of
the demos have agreed to initiate a political process in which the representatives of
different ethnic groups are included. These perspectives do not take into consideration the
possibility that the actors— either individual members of the demos or political and social
groups— might not be w illing to start the political game— a game that is crucial for the
sustainability o f the political community. Such a situation can be referred to as
polarization. In a multiethnic setting, polarization may crystallize along ethnic lines. In its
extreme form, ethnic polarization implies that ethnic groups are preoccupied by mutual
mistrust and perceive themselves, first and foremost, in antagonistic identity terms. In
such a context, polarized ethnicity becomes the only politically relevant identity.25
A potential cause for polarization is relative econom ic or political deprivation

24Or, in some cases, the states dominated by one ethnic group may initiate a
violent action against their own minorities. See Kumar Rupesinghe, “Theories of Ethnic
Conflict and Their Applicability to Protracted Ethnic Conflicts,” in Ethnic Conflict and
Human Rights, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994),
44.
25For a further discussion of ethnicity as the only politically relevant identity, see
V. P. Gagnon Jr., “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,”
International Security 19, no. 3 (W inter 1994/95): 136.
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experienced by one ethnic group vis-a-vis other ethnic groups. Even though it is relatively
difficult to bridge such ethnic differences in the short term, economic development
policies, coupled with power sharing arrangements could provide a long term solution to
such polarization. However, the issue o f polarization becomes much more complicated if
the dividing line is drawn between the ethnic groups, one of which associates itself with
the former victims and sees the other ethnic group(s) as former perpetrators. This may
generate a phenomenon known as “ethnic fear”: once an ethnic group has been terrorized
by a neighboring ethnic group in the past, it becomes fearful of the possibility that the
same thing might happen again in the future.26
Given similar conditions, an ethnic group that sees itself as having been victimized
in the past is more likely to opt for an authoritarian regime with the members of its own
kin than to be open to the norms of dem ocratic inclusiveness, especially if “inclusiveness”
means embracing an ethnic group that is associated with the perpetrators of past evils.
Ethnic affiliations provide a sense of security for the members of both ethnic groups, and
they offer protection of on e’s interests vis-a-vis the members of the other ethnic group.27
Under conditions o f ethnic fear, the existence of a minority’s “mother state” ready
to defend its minority against the m ajority ethnic group is a significant obstacle towards

26The concept “ethnic fear” is discussed by M ontville, 538, and Arfi, 151-203.
Wendy Bracewell portrays how ethnic fear emerged in Serbian-Croatian relations in
1990s. The Serbs publicly remembered the crimes com m itted by the Ustasa during
W orld War D and claimed that they were again threatened with genocide as the newly
recreated Croatian state adopted the sam e national symbols that had been used by the
Ustasa. Wendy Bracewell, “National Identities among Serbs and Croats,” in National
Histories and European H istory, ed. M ary Fulbrook (London: University College London
Press. 1993), 157.
27Donald L. Horowitz, “Dem ocracy in Divided Societies,” in Nationalism, Ethnic
Conflict, and D em ocracy, ed. Larry D iam ond and M arc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1994), 49.
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the establishment of an interethnic dialogue. According to the logic of a pluralist
democratic community, the political game within a demos must be played only by its
members, and it must be relatively free from outside influence. Therefore, an outside
actor— especially if seen as a former perpetrator— who is anxious to get involved in a
com m unity's political game may negatively affect the dynamics o f interaction between
ethnic groups.
Ethnic fear, coupled with an active "mother state.” is likely to be a legacy of
previous ethnic restructuring. The combination o f these tw'o factors— the inability of the
members of a community to play an independent political game and the lack of trust
between the members of such a community— makes demos building under such conditions
very difficult. The suggestions of the individualist and pluralist perspectives to include the
"others" in the political process in order to create a functioning political community are
therefore likely to be politically unthinkable. If different ethnic groups are not able to
overcome the mistrust underlying their relations, then interethnic coalitions and alliances,
propagated by the pluralist perspective, are likely to be short-term and tom by internal
conflicts over basic ethnic issues (e.g., language). Extensive empirical research confirms
the fragility o f such political arrangements in different multiethnic settings, even though
ethnic groups might have shared a variety of interests.28 Within such a climate, past
experiences of ethnic restructuring or other injustices are likely to become politicized in
order to legitimatize the power of an ethnopolitical party.29

28Ibid.. 45-51. and Horowitz. "Multiethnic Coalitions,” 366-67.
29For a discussion on how' ethnic or national identity can be used as a mode of
power legitimation, see Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge.
UK: Polity. 1997), 44-50 and 282-83.
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One outcome from a situation in which ethnicity has become a source of
polarization is ethnic democracy.30 It is a political system within which full participation
in the political process is limited to the members of a particular ethnic group, yet some
civil and political rights are enjoyed by others as well. The members of other ethnic
groups are prevented from taking part in this process by state-created barriers, such as
limited access to organizational resources or deprivation of rights o f political participation,
yet at the same time, they can enjoy some other rights, such as cultural rights or the right to
enjoy the economic goods produced by the state.31
Such a situation is similar to that described by Aristotle in his Politics: members
from the “other” community are banished to the private sphere o f the demos, thus
excluding them from the political process. However, the greater the number of the
unsatisfied “others” within the private sphere, the greater the latent danger facing the
demos from a potential revolt. Thus, theoretically, even though ethnic democracy tries to
achieve ethnopolitical stability by taking the contradictions and tensions inherent in such a
system into account, endowing the “others” with a status different from that of the
members of the demos does not constitute a long term solution for a sustainable political
community within a multiethnic state.
Yet what can be done, if anything, to relieve ethnic polarization in order to start

30For a definition o f ethnic democracy and its etym ology in political science
literature, see Velio Pettai, “Emerging Ethnic Democracy in Estonia and Latvia,” in
Managing Diversity in Plural Societies. Minorities, M igration and Nation-Building in
Post-Communist Europe, ed. Magda Opalski (Ottawa: Forum Eastern Europe, 1998),
15-16.
3lFor a description of ethnic democracy, see Graham Smith, Aadne Aasland and
Richard Mole, “Statehood, Ethnic Relations, and Citizenship,” in The Baltic States: The
National Self-Determination o f Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, ed. Graham Smith (New
York: St. M artin’s, 1994), 189-90.
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and to sustain a political process within multiethnic entities? The two leading democratic
theories on political com m unity do not provide a satisfactory answer to this question. The
strategies on how to reduce ethnic polarization fall into the realm of theories on civil
society, or “bottom-up” approaches. These approaches focus on the cultivation of
associations within the sub-state sphere. They suggest a proposition that such sub-state
associations, bridging individuals belonging to different ethnic groups or establishing links
between different ethnic groups may help to overcome polarization, the most dangerous
condition for a sustainable political community.32

Bottom-Up Approaches

One o f the main prem ises of “bottom-up” approaches researching the development
of civil society is that social and political cohesion within the state is not guaranteed by the
interaction o f its “units”— either individuals, sub-state communities, or political parties.33
For a democratic political process to take place, a certain level of societal unity must be
present. This societal unity is sustained by integrative processes which are reflected by
trust-generating social relationships, such as business groups, environmental groups,

3:This is a conclusion reached by Leo Kuper. He also argues that the development
of civil society may preclude future instances of genocide. See Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its
Political Use in the 20th Century (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981).
j3For an account of the debates within several disciplines over the meaning of civil
society, see Chris Hann, “Introduction: Political Society and Civil Anthropology,” in
Civil Society: Challenging Western Models, ed. Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn (New
York: Routledge, 1996), 1-7. T his section does not intend to suggest that different and
often conflicting approaches have reached some kind of agreement on the meaning and
the roles of civil society. It still rem ains a debated concept. However, most approaches
underline the existence o f free associations among the residents of the state as one of the
defining aspects o f civil society.
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church groups, etc. The sub-state actors joined by such relationships are capable of
challenging state power, especially when this power is perceived as threatening to their
associations.
A functioning civil society within a democratic state entails more than a collection
of strong and autonomous groups capable of balancing the state. Individual membership
in these autonomous groups must be both voluntary and overlapping.34 Societal unity, a
characteristic of civil society, describes a situation in which individuals belong to different
political and social groups, but at the same tim e they retain their individual choice to
escape from these groups. The identities of the members of these groups are multi-layered
because the individuals conceive o f themselves not only as members of ethnic groups, but
also as members of the political community and other organizations within civil society.
Under such conditions, violence among them becomes unthinkable.
However, how is it possible to create a sustainable civil society within a polarized
multiethnic state? Based on previous case studies, “bottom-up” approaches suggest the
following strategies: first, fostering civil concord could begin with catering to basic
individual human needs, such as food, shelter, money, etc. Even during times o f severe
ethnic polarization, it has been possible to sustain a certain level of order and cooperation
within multiethnic entities in this way.35 This strategy— building civil society on the

?4John A. Hall, “In Search of Civil Society,” in Civil Society: Theory, History,
Comparison, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995), 15. In his words, the
creation of a functioning civil society entails the ability of individual members to “escape
any particular cage” (i.e., any social or political group).
35Andreus Klinke and Ortwin Reur, “Ethnic Cooperation and Coexistence:
International M ediation, International Governance, and Civil Society for Ethnically Plural
States,” in Ethnic Conflicts and Civil Society: Proposals fo r a New Era in Eastern
Europe, ed. Andreus Klinke, Ortwin Reur, and Jean Paul Lehners (Aldershot, UK:
Ashgate, 1997), 253-54.
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egoistic interests of individuals and households expressed through private
business— eventually translates into voluntary collective organizations. As “economic’'
civil society becomes stronger, individuals become engaged in well-established trust-based
relationships which transgress ethnic boundaries.36
The latter observation points to the importance of a functioning local government,
a second strategy often dwelt on by civil society approaches.37 Creating an autonomous
local public body, such as a town council, is one of the ways in which individual citizens
achieve their immediate interests and at the same time maintain independence from the
state.38 Not only basic human interests, but also potentially explosive ethnic issues, such
as language, the distribution o f resources, and education, also often fall within the sphere
of local government influence. This suggests that more attention should be paid to the
ways in which multiethnic states allocate power to local governments and the ways in
which the latter handle ethnically sensitive issues, such as language laws, and conduct
community building on the local level.
The third approach focuses on the least explored area of civil society: social and

36A similar view, according to which private business horizontally integrates civil
society, and the latter then becomes a balancing force vis-a-vis the state, has been referred
to as an “East European view of civil society.” See David L. Wank, “Civil Society in
Communist China?” in Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, ed. John A. Hall
(Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995), 60-62.
37These approaches overlap with the third strategy proposed by the top-down
approaches. In addition to paying attention to local governments as a form o f political
governance, civil society approaches also study the formation of social associations
among people o f a community prompted by the existence of such governments. Scott A.
Bo!lens, “Urban Policy in Ethnically Polarized Societies,” International Political Science
Review 19, no. 2 (April 1998): 187-215.
3sChristopher G. A. Bryant, “Civic Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion,” in Civil
Society: Theory, History, Com parison, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995),
143.
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psychological aspects of trust building among different ethnic groups. In a well
functioning civil society, different ethnic and national groups are free to write their
histories without fear: to publicly remem ber and mourn their dead, etc.39
Under nondemocratic rule, sim ilar social relationships which so clearly manifest
themselves in the public sphere, are usually suppressed because they are seen as a source
of opposition to the state. Histories challenging the official narrative of the state are also
silenced. It is not surprising, therefore, that in dem ocratizing multiethnic societies, after
decades o f imposed historical amnesia, ethnic groups are likely to produce conflicting
interpretations about what has happened in the past. O ne ethnic group can easily become
the “demonized other”: i.e., it can be blam ed for the misfortunes experienced by another
ethnic group during the previous regime. Numerous case studies on collective identity
have recognized that those who control the images of the past shape the present. Political
and social groups self-consciously engage in the process of shaping their national pasts to
legitimate their current political views and policies.40 In such cases, mass media channels
which enable open discussion of what has happened in the past, mediation by outsiders,
international or national truth finding commissions, involving representatives from
different ethnic groups, are among the ways to reduce polarization.41

39Michael W alzer, “The Concept o f Civil Society,” in Walzer, ed., 20.
40Daniel Levy, ‘T h e Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing
Memories in Germany and Israel,” History and M em ory 38, no. 1 (February 1999), 51.
4lKlinke and Reur, 253-54. In addition, there is a body of literature on democratic
transitions. It puts forward several hypotheses on how to face the crimes of the past
regime: by creating truth commissions, by conducting trials or granting amnesty to the
collaborators with the past regime, by compensating the victims, etc. Some have argued
that these practices may help to provide social support for political democracy. See
Guillermo O ’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Dem ocracies,” in Transitional Justice: How
Emerging Democracies Reckon with the Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington.
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The goal of these practices is to build a network o f associations transgressing
ethnic divisions. However, these associations are not self-sustaining and not sufficient, in
and of themselves, to create a democratic political community. To illustrate, after the
basic interests o f the ethnic groups are satisfied, the individuals belonging to the groups
may choose to go back into their social ethnic “cages” if interethnic cooperation is not
institutionalized in the ways outlined by the individualist or pluralist approaches.
Furthermore, self-sustaining local governments do not provide a guarantee that democratic
political community will be established within a multiethnic state. Local governments can
be dominated by one ethnic group and therefore become abusive toward the members of
other ethnic groups. In such cases, the existence of a countervailing power (i.e., the
democratic state) to stop coerciveness is highly desirable.
Finally, there must be an actor capable o f providing secure spaces for different
ethnic groups to carry out their “coping with history” practices (e.g., writing their histories,
burying their dead, debating their past, and so on). In the absence of such an actor, while
trying to negotiate its relationship with a troubled past, one national or ethnic group can
initiate the policies which attem pt to take out revenge upon or even exterminate other
“guilty” ethnic groups.42 Instead o f embracing and enforcing only one account o f the past,
a democratic state opens channels for different ethnic groups to disclose their past
embitterments. This characteristic distinguishes a nationalist autocratic state from a civic

D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace, 1995), 57-64. It is not entirely clear, however, how
these practices work in m ultiethnic settings.
42For example, in 1986, the Serbian Academy o f Science prepared a Memorandum
which listed all injustices experienced by the Serbs in the past. This Memorandum
became a basis for M ilosevic’s rhetoric. Ivo Banaco, “Historiography of the Countries of
Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia,” American H istorical Review 97, no. 2 (October 1992),
1085-104.
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democracy. These observations imply that civil concord in multiethnic entities is highly
unlikely without a democratic state, which, in the words of Michael Walzer, both “frames
civil society and occupies space within it.”-*3

Toward a Synthesis o f the Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches

Synthesizing “top-dow n” and “bottom-up” approaches means conceptualizing
political community not ju st as an arena for a series of government decisions, but primarily
as a multilevel process o f interaction between the state and sub-state actors. Amitai
Etzioni's concept o f com m unity illustrates the intimate relationship between the state and
the entity beneath it within democratic regimes: “[The community] has sufficient power to
countervail the coercive m em ber of any member unit or coalition of them; it has a decision
making center that is able to affect significantly the allocation of assets throughout the
community; and it is the dom inant focus of political loyalty.”44 This concept also outlines
the relationship between political community and civil society. Political community is the
sphere in which the political process described in the first two theoretical approaches (e.g.,
voting, power negotiations, or elections) takes place. Civil society is the sphere within
which other sub-state societal links are forged. Thus societal unity is created, which is a
necessary condition for the democratic political process to be carried out. The main
difference between political community and civil society is that the former is capable of
managing political power. In a democratic regime, the institutions of political community,

43Walzer, ‘T h e Concept of Civil Society,” 23.
44Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society: A Theory o f Societal and Political Processes
(New York: Free Press, 1968), 554.
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therefore, are capable of preventing unfair “insider deals" within civil society.
In addition, creating lasting, businesslike, interest-based relationships among
individuals must be backed up by the construction o f a democratic state as a “service
station." The term “state as a service station” refers to a well functioning market
economy, capable o f fulfilling the basic needs of its citizens and non-citizen residents. To
be more specific, modem liberal democratic states are capable of providing a wide variety
of services for individuals, ranging from health care to food subsidies for the poor. Thus,
they secure a web o f trust-based business relationships among their citizens.45
Taking this interdependent relationship between political community and civil
society into account means recognizing that merely including members of ethnic
communities into the political process will not solve the problem o f polarization in
multiethnic states. The process of inclusion must be sustained by other developments
conducive to a functioning civil society, such as the establishm ent o f local governments
and the developm ent o f relationships of trust among the members o f different ethnic
groups. The three theoretical perspectives outlined in this chapter suggest four factors
which are particularly salient to political community building in a polarized multiethnic
entity:

(a) the state (or groups with political power within a state-in-the-making) makes a decision
on whether to include opposing ethnic groups into the political process on an individual or
a collective level,
(b) the process o f community building “from above" must be sustained by the following

45Bhikhu Parekh, quoted in Canovan. 84-85.
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developments within civil society (“below”):
1) the creation o f business relationships based on individual interests which involve
members of different ethnic groups. Such relationships entail construction of a democratic
state as a “service station,”
2) the creation o f functioning local governments,
3) the establishment o f dialogic ethnic relations; i.e., making sure that no ethnic group
becomes the “demonized other.”46

Considered together, these four factors indicate the ability of a multiethnic polity to
create a sustainable democratic political community. They help to hypothesize w hether a
state will be capable of overcoming ethnic polarization. A potential fifth factor is the
actions of an ethnic patron— an ethnic m inority's mother state and other international
actors.

TH E ROLE O F INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN POLITICAL COMMUNITY
BUILDING

International actors are capable of affecting the creation of political community
within a multiethnic polity both from “above” (i.e., by affecting the actions of the

46A s defined by Harold H. Saunders, “sustained dialogue,” or dialogic relations

between different ethnic groups, does not need to be as structured as negotiation or formal
mediation, yet this concept implies that trust and transparency must be established among
the ethnic groups. “Dialogic relations” mean that previously polarized interethnic
relationships are changed in fundamental ways. Thus, the foundations for an interethnic
body politic are laid. Harold H. Saunders, A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue
to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts (New York: St. M artin’s, 1999), 12-13.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

98
governments), and from “below” (i.e., by influencing the developments within civil
society). In international relations (on the state level), there are three reasons explaining
why a government obeys policies promoted by international actors: I) because it fears
punishment, 2) because it sees the rule to be in its own self-interest, and 3) because it feels
that the rule is legitimate and should be obeyed.47 Consequently, actions of international
actors aimed at changing an institutionalized state’s attitude toward its minorities are likely
to undertake one of these three forms: coercion, persuasion, or contagion.48
Theoretically, if threatened by a minority’s mother state or other international
actors, a host state can change its institutionalized attitude toward its ethnic minorities and
change the laws defining their status. However, if there are politically strong domestic
groups opposing the inclusion of m inorities into the demos or if the minorities residing
within the state oppose the existence o f the state, then even coercion exerted by
international actors may not be capable o f changing the institutionalized attitude of the
state toward its minorities. On the other hand, threatening the host state in order to make it
change its attitude toward the minority is unlikely to reduce polarization within the sub
state sphere.
Alternatively, both states can agree to solve the minority issue using international
mechanisms. This may involve negotiations through regional organizations (e.g., the CoE,
the OSCE, the Council of the Baltic States, etc.) or bilateral state-to-state agreements.
Using these approaches to address the minority issue symbolizes the second rule: both

4'Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International
Organization 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 379.
48The term “contagion” refers to the third action. For further discussion see
Dawisha and Turner, 404-5.
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states should regard the agreement about the status of minorities as falling into their sphere
of interest. Using regional organizations to help to build political community within
multiethnic states can assume a variety of forms: elaborating the rights and entitlements of
a minority, overseeing how these rights are implemented, etc. Bilateral and regional
mechanisms need not be mutually exclusive; yet the most important difference between
the two is that “regionalism” implies that dealing with the issue of minorities is not
confined to the minority’s mother state and the host state.49 One aspect of bilateral
agreements is that they are likely to enhance the self-confidence of ethnic minorities if
they feel that their mother state, with whom they identify linguistically, and, in many
cases, even politically, is championing their case.50
Third, states may choose to change the way that they treat their minorities because
they believe that an international rule is legitimate or because they believe in the
legitimacy of the international body that generated that rule.51 If a host state participates in
a multilateral organization which promotes equal access of minorities and individuals to
the political process, then it may choose to introduce changes in its own domestic
legislation regarding the rights of minorities. However, given the vagueness of the status
of minority rights in international law and international organizations, this course of action
is highly unlikely.52

49lstvan Pogany, “Bilateralism versus Regionalism in the Resolution of Minorities
Problems in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Post-Soviet States,” in Minority
Rights in the "New" Europe. ed. Peter Cumper and Steven Wheatley (Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff. 1999), 106.
50Ibid„ 110-11.
5lHurd, 387.
52T o be more specific, international law affirms the “value of cultural diversity, of
individual choice, and cultures as contexts of choice.” See Patrick Thomberry,
“Introduction: In the Strongroom of Vocabulary,” in M inority Rights in the “New"
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International actors can considerably affect political community building from
"below." but this influence is not always stabilizing. If an active minority's mother state
lends its political, cultural, and economic support to its ethnic kin, such actions, even if
they are well-intended, may complicate dialogic relations between different ethnic groups
living within a state. On the positive side, international actors could help to strengthen
civil society institutions by strengthening local governments, supporting free market
reforms, and giving financial support to active civil society groups, the members of which
include representatives from different ethnic groups.53
The importance of such activities should not be underestimated because, when
acting from “below,” international actors are likely to be sensitive to domestic interethnic
situations, which is especially important within ethnically polarized states.54 The sub-state
interactions, outlined above, are likely to involve multiple actors, and most of them are

Europe, ed. Peter Cum per and Steven W heatley (Hague: M artinus Nijhoff, 1999), 5. The
UN Declaration on Minority Rights (adopted in December 1992) recognizes the value of
collectivities, but it has retained its focus on individual rights. In 1992, the European
Council issued the European Charter for Regional or M inority Languages, which
encourages the protection of minority languages, but it has not developed institutions to
enforce this charter. The CSCE (now OSCE) has created the institution of the High
Commissioner on National M inorities, but this institution can do next to nothing to help
to protect minorities involved in ethnic conflicts. The O S C E ’s position regarding ethnic
minorities in minority host states is sometimes equated with the position of the minority’s
mother state. This makes ethnic reconciliation very difficult. Although the EU actively
promotes collective minority rights abroad, it has retained its focus on individual rights
within its member states. For a collection of documents dealing with the rights of
minorities, see M inority Rights in the “N e w ” Europe, ed. Peter Cumper and Steven
Wheatley (Hague: M artinus Nijhoff, 1999), 327-74.
53For a detailed overview of what international actors can do to help the
development o f civil society within a democratizing state, see Diamond, “Promoting
Democracy in the 1990s,” 311-70.
MIn fact, some analysts have argued that the sub-state level of interaction may be
“the most important determining factor in the ability of external actors to influence the
transformations” within dem ocratizing states. See Dawisha and Turner, 398-424.
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likely to occur on a voluntary basis.
In sum. when the fifth factor— the role of international actors— is introduced into
the set of factors which reflect the ability o f a multiethnic state to create a sustainable
democratic political community, the combination of external and internal factors affecting
the creation o f a political community within a multiethnic state is the following:

(a) Influenced by international and domestic actors, the state (or groups with political
power within a state-in-the-making) makes a decision on whether to include the opposing
ethnic groups into the political process on an individual or a collective level,
(b) this process o f com m unity building “from above” must be sustained by the previously
outlined developments within civil society (“below”).

CONCLUSION

The theoretical argument put forward in this chapter can be summarized as
follows. Examination o f the dominant approaches to political com m unity building
suggests that m ultiethnicity in and of itself does not constitute a danger, and in fact can be
helpful toward the creation o f a sustainable democratic community, especially in the
beginning stages o f democratization. By voicing their demands for cultural rights and
spaces to carry out their cultural practices, ethnic communities can form opposition to the
nondemocratic polities or help to strengthen nascent civil societies in emerging
democracies. However, ethnic polarization does present a challenge. Polarization along
ethnic lines means that ethnic identity becomes the only politically relevant identity. The

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

102
members o f ethnic groups are also divided by their threat perception.
M emories of traumatic events that happened in the past, such as ethnic
restructuring, are likely to engender polarization along ethnic lines and to become an
impetus for the creation of active ethnopolitical groups which oppose the inclusion of
“others” in the political process, and, subsequently, into the political community; or,
alternatively, to become an impetus for the creation of active ethnopolitical groups which
reject the state and oppose the dominant ethnic group.
This line o f argumentation lends support to the thesis that the experience of ethnic
restructuring significantly effects the ability of a democratizing state to successfully
consolidate its emerging democracy. Ethnically restructured states, it is hypothesized,
have an especially hard time creating inclusive democratic political communities, which is
a necessary prerequisite for a consolidated democracy.
This line o f argumentation suggests that analyses o f democratic community
building within multiethnic states should be sensitive to the historical experiences of
ethnic groups instead of relying solely on numerical ethnic variation within the state. In
other words, in order to hypothesize about the influence o f the factors which may alleviate
ethnic polarization, one needs to identify the sources of polarization. Examining the
historical background underlying the relations between different ethnic groups enables us
to make an analysis of the ways in which states try to overcome ethnic tensions— a
necessary condition for the creation of a successful democratic regime.
If previous interactions between ethnic groups have resulted in polarization, then
merely including the members from other ethnic communities in the political
process— either on an individual or group basis— is not likely to help to dissolve ethnic
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tensions. Assimilationist strategies of a centralized state, proposed by the individualist
model, are likely to engender resistance from ethnic groups which expect group-based
rights. Consociationalist power sharing agreements, suggested by pluralist models, are
also likely to disintegrate if underlying ethnic tensions are not addressed. In such cases,
the process of inclusion must be sustained by the developments conducive to a functioning
civil society, such as the establishment of functioning democratic local governments, the
development of the democratic state as a “service station,” and the building of
relationships o f trust between the members of different ethnic groups.
The three strands o f democratic theory on which this argument has been built
assume that the state— its basic research unit— is relatively free from outside influences.
Consequently, it is difficult to predict the dynamics of political community building in a
triadic “host state-minority-mother state” setting. However, it is reasonable to suggest that
the existence of a m inority's mother state is likely to render the process of community
building more complicated. This chapter hypothesizes that the most visible influence
exerted by international actors will probably be “from above,” i.e., affecting the
institutionalized attitude o f a state vis-a-vis its minority. Related questions about the
international aspects o f democratic community building, e.g., which
mechanisms— bilateral (between the host state and the m inority’s mother state) or
multilateral (involving other international actors, such as regional organizations)— are
more effective when it comes to addressing minority issues in ethnically polarized states,
will be answered in the empirical case studies that follow.
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CHAPTER V
ETHNIC RESTRUCTURING IN THE BALTIC STATES:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR THE CA SE STUDIES

The overall aim of this chapter is to undertake the first step in the case studies: to
assess the degree of the ethnic restructuring that was carried out by the Soviet Union and
to outline the response of the Baltic populations to this policy. Drawing on recently
released historical studies and declassified documents, the first part of the chapter
identifies the official goals of the ethnic restructuring that was carried out by the USSR.
The second part o f the chapter traces the process whereby this policy was implemented in
the Baltic states. The account is supplemented by material from the memoirs o f former
deportees, which helps to describe what the immediate response on behalf of the local
populations was. Since there were no reliable public opinion polls in the former Soviet
Union prior to 1988, the analysis of memoirs and letters should help to evaluate this
response and to hypothesize whether the policy induced long-lasting ethnic tension.
By drawing on recently released docum ents, the second part also assesses the
degree of ethnic restructuring that took place in the three states and constructs two tables
which capture the changes. One table presents the data— an approximate number of
people deported from the Baltic states—which became available only recently. (The
Soviet Union did not release the data on internal and external migration of its citizens.) In
addition, it sheds light on some o f the lesser known aspects of ethnic restructuring, such as
postwar population exchanges and the attitude o f the Soviet state toward non-territorial
nationalities residing in the Baltic states. The last part of the chapter traces the activity of
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groups with concrete political demands, the emergence of which was prompted by ethnic
restructuring.1

THE ETHNIC RESTRUCTURING CARRIED OUT BY THE SOVIET UNION: WHY
AND HOW

Irving L. Horowitz wrote that states pursue drastic population policies, such as
genocide, when the ruling elites decide that their survival in power is a higher goal than all
other economic and social interests of the polity. Therefore, he argued, such population
policies are a feature of totalitarian or authoritarian states.2 His insight about the nature of
drastic population policies sheds some light on the ways in which ethnic restructuring was
carried out in the Soviet Union. Most drastic population resettlements were carried out
during the totalitarian dictatorship of Stalin. The first Soviet actions against “‘enemies of
the state” (which included rebellious ethnic groups in the Caucasus) were planned and
carried out in twenties under the rule o f Lenin. Later, during the era o f Khrushchev and
Brezhnev, less violent population policies were used as a tool of political control over nonRussian republics and autonomous regions. They consisted of state-sponsored
russification and planned migration.
Despite differences in tactics, the policies of ethnic restructuring carried out by
Soviet leaders all shared one trait: the existence of politically active national (and

'The emergence of these groups is an indication of a political society, which
should not be confused with civil society. Political society, however, usually plays a
significant role during the initial stages of state building. F ora discussion of political
society, see Hann, 23.
:Kuper, 49.
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especially nationalist) groups was considered to be an unwelcome legacy of the past and
an obstacle to the survival of the Soviet state.3 Therefore, the Soviet state began to move
around huge numbers o f people within its ethnically heterogenous body, hoping to merge
societies into socialist nations, which would never come into conflict with one another,
would pursue identical political interests, and would smoothly integrate themselves into
the central state.4 Hannah Arendt aptly described this process as trying to achieve a
“heterogeneous uniformity” within the Soviet state.5
Even though Soviet nationalities policy did not have “nation-killing” as its goal, it
did try to reconstruct them. This Soviet-style constructivism consisted of two
distinguishable, but interrelated components: compulsory resettlement (deportation) and
planned migration.6 The primary goal of compulsory resettlement in the USSR was to
disperse members o f disobedient social groups. It involved a two-way population
movement: when resettling a group from one area, the Communist leaders simultaneously
repopulated that territory with an equal or even greater number of people from the other

3HeIene Carrere d ’Encausse, Decline o f an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics
in Revolt (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979), 46. She goes on to argue that the Soviets
thought that the solution to the “national problem” was the eradication of national
differences. The latter statement was effectively challenged by other scholars who argued
that the suppression o f nationalism, and not “nation-killing,” was the ultimate goal of
Soviet nationalities policy. See Yuri Slezkine, ‘T h e USSR as a Communal Apartment, or
How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” in Becoming National: A Reader,
ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 203-38.
■*This description of the socialist nations is from Simon, 6.
5Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books,
1958). 322.
°In addition, Soviet constructivism included what can be called nation-building,
especially during the twenties and the thirties. The Soviet Union created administrative
units along ethnic lines and even attempted to modernize “primitive”societies. Slezkine,
210.
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areas of the multinational state.7 Thus, the policy o f ethnic restructuring usually iesulted
in the movements o f people in two directions. On the one hand, thousands of people were
put into railway cars and deported to the underdeveloped parts of the USSR, such as
Siberia or Tajikistan. On the other hand, depopulated villages and cities were repopulated
with newcomers from other parts of the USSR. Eugene Kulischer documented this aspect
of the policy after W orld W ar II: “a flood of migrants [was] moving westward into all
marches between the Arctic and the Black Sea.”8 This flow of people coincided with
intense collectivization and industrialization which demanded cheap labor. Consequently,
the need for a mobile work force in a command economy was another reason for the mass
resettlements carried out by the Soviet Union.9
Forced resettlem ent policies were first used by the USSR to deport hundreds of
thousands of kulaks (farmers and peasants) during the period of collectivization. Some
have traced the origins o f this policy to the fifteenth century, when Russian knights in
Moscow and Novgorod practiced the principles o f Razw od, “separation.” and Wvwod.
"taking away.” to control their disobedient populations.10 In the Soviet Union, the
“extermination” o f the kulaks was over by 1933. A fter that deportations were pursued
mostly for political reasons (e.g., to punish people for collaborating with the Germans

'Andrei Lebed, “Compulsory resettlem ent,” in Institute for the Study of the
USSR, Genocide in the USSR: Studies in Group D estruction (Munich: Institute for the
Study of the USSR, 1958), 6.
8Kulischer, 300.
9Eugenijus G runskis. Lietuvos gyvenlojif irem im ai 1940-1941, 1945-1953 metais
[Deportation o f Lithuania’s Residents, I9 4 0 -I9 4 I. 1945-1953] (Vilnius: Lietuvos
Istorijos Institutas, 1996), 10.
l0Gotthold Rhode, Voelker a u f dem Wege: Verschiebungen der Bevoelkerung in
Ostdeutschland und Osteuropa seit 1917 [People on the Move: Population Changes in
Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe since 1917] (Kiel: Ferdinand Hirt, 1952), 12-13.
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during W orld W ar II or to suppress nationalism), even though the label “kulak" was still
used. This also applies to the Baltic states, occupied by the USSR in 1940 and once again
in 1944: not only farmers and peasants, but, first and foremost, those who opposed the
regime were likely to be deported.
Following the scheme devised by Pavel Polian, compulsory resettlements in the
Soviet Union were carried out according to social criteria (e.g., former members of the
nobility and kulaks), ethnicity (e.g., the “guilty nations” of Germans, Chechens, Ingush,
etc., but also Georgians, who were moved into areas formerly occupied by the Ingush, and
Ukrainians, who were moved into areas formerly occupied by the Tatars), religious and
political orientation (e.g.. former members o f non-Communist religious and political
organizations), and other criteria (e.g., the family members of persons who fell into any of
the other categories, foreigners, and prisoners of war). Non-repressive migrations were
planned migrations for industrialization, which aimed to replace those who had been
deported." In addition, since migration within the Soviet Union was strictly controlled by
a special residence permit (“propiska”) system, the state could create artificial migration
into disobedient national and ethnic areas and thus pursue a policy of gradual
denationalization.12
Although ethnic restructuring did include several cases of ethnic cleansing (i.e.,

"Pavel Polian, “Ethnische Deportation im Raum der Ehemaligen Sowjetunion”
[Ethnic D eportations in the Territory of the Former Soviet Union], in Flucht und
Vertreibung [Flight and Expulsion], ed. Robert Streibel (Vienna: Picus Verlag, 1994).
227-36.
l2Sergei Zamascikov, “Soviet M ethods and Instrumentalities of Maintaining
Control Over the Balts,” in Regional Identity Under the Soviet Rule: The Case o f the
Baltic States, ed. Andre D. Loeber, V. Stanley Vardys, and Laurence P. A. Kitching
(Hackettstown, N.J.: Institute for the Study o f Law, Politics, and Society o f Socialist
States. 1990), 95.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

109
population restructuring that is directed against an entire ethnic group), the major goal of
this policy was really social homogenization. This is because, in most cases, the Soviets
gauged the success of their policy based on whether or not it was capable of suppressing
those groups that were opposed to the Soviet state, especially those that opposed its plans
to create kolkhozes (collective farms). To illustrate, on 10 February 1948, Khrushchev,
who w as the leader o f the Ukrainian Communist party at that time, complained to the
Central Committee o f the Communist Party in Moscow that the peasants in Western
Ukraine were not willing to join kolkhozes. He suggested that more “kulaks” ought to be
deponed in order to “fix the problem.” As a result, 11,456 people were deported from the
area, and the “problem ” was solved.13 Similarly, Rezev, the M inister o f Internal Affairs
for the Estonian SSR, w-rote in a letter to Kruglov, the Minister o f Internal Affairs for the
Soviet Union, that “approximately one half of all farmsteads in Estonia were transformed
into collective farms as a result o f successful deportations carried out in 1949.” 14
In 1954, after Stalin’s death, the Soviets began to relax the policy of compulsory
resettlement. Limited mobility was granted to some who were in the places of deportation,
and children under the age of ten were removed from the lists of deported people.15 At
that time, at least 1.820,140 people, most of whom were German, were still living in
camps in the places o f deportation.16 Two years later, in 1956, during the 20th Congress of
the Communist Party, the policy o f ethnic restructuring was reevaluated for the first time.

13Zhukov, quoted by Grunskis, 126.
1JThis letter was written in April 1949. It is reproduced in Vdimatu Vaikida [It Is
Impossible to Be Silent], ed. Hilda Sabbo (Tallinn: Uhiselu, 1996), 871-79.
15Simon, 241.
“There were at least 75,024 Lithuanians, 33.102 Latvians, and 16,070 Estonians
in deportation then. Grunskis, 140.
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Khrushchev delivered a speech on Stalin's crimes, condemning the mass repressions
carried out by his predecessor. He criticized the application of collective guilt whereby
whole families o f kulaks and whole nations were punished using deportation.17 Yet, as
Nikolai F. Bougai, a Russian historian, observes, “a close examination of formerly
unavailable documents revealed that Khrushchev supported and actively participated in the
compulsory resettlement o f more than 550,000 residents of the Ukraine . . . Therefore, any
assertion that Khrushchev was sincere in his denunciation of these policies [i.e.. ethnic
restructuring] in the speech condemning his predecessor should be taken with a grain of
salt."18 The memoirs of the former deportees and other documents support his opinion:
even during the time o f the “thaw ” those who streamed back to their homes were forcibly
returned to the places of deportation.19
After Khruschev was removed from power, almost no critical articles dealing with
deportations, planned migration and other nationality-related issues appeared in the Soviet
press.20 In 1962-67, the “debates” in the journal Voprosv Istorii [The Questions about
History] and Izvesiiya [the national newspaper] on whether to speed up the “fusion” of the

17“Khruschev’s Secret Speech on Stalin’s Crimes,” in Frank Chalk and Kurt
Jonassohn, The H istory and Sociology o f Genocide (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1990), 300-22. Khruschev implied that only “military considerations” (i.e., the
beginning of W orld W ar II) could have justified mass deportations.
l8Bougai and Gonov, 9.
l9E.g., see the narratives in the collection Lietuvos naikinim as ir tautos kova 19401998 [The Destruction of Lithuania and National Resistance 1940-1998], comp. Izidorius
Ignatavicius (Vilnius: Vaga, 1999), 186. 214, 246. On 12 O ctober 1957, the Estonian
SSR adopted a law. prohibiting “persons guilty of especially serious state crimes and
former members o f bourgeois government of Estonia, leaders of nationalist political
parties and organizations . . .” to return to Estonia. Following the rulings from Moscow,
similar laws were adopted by the Latvian and Lithuanian SSRs.
:o“The Problem of Nationalism .” Radio Liberty Research Note (8 December,
1964).
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Soviet nations into the Soviet state never questioned the main tenet o f the Soviet
nationalities policy— the inviolability of the Moscow-centered Soviet “community” o f
nations, created with the help o f planned migration and russification.21
The use o f ethnic restructuring was revisited in 1982. In a speech written for the
60th anniversary o f Soviet nationalities policy, Yuri Andropov mentioned “millions o f
Germans, Poles, Koreans, Kurds, and representatives of other nationalities . . . w ho should
be viewed as full citizens of the USSR.”22 Andropov, however, soon died and no real
effort was made to address the legacy of ethnic restructuring or to rehabilitate its victims.
Five years later, on 14 November 1989, following a stormy session o f the Congress o f
People’s Deputies, an announcement was made that the “forced resettlements carried out
by the Soviet Union were illegal.”23 This was the first official statement to that effect. A
similar statement is present in the “Concept of the Nationalities Policy” of the Russian
Federation, the successor to the USSR, which was adopted on 15 June 1996.
The Russian Federation continues to exploit the issue of the resettled Russian
speakers to assert its influence in the region. Cashing in on the legacy of ethnic
restructuring, the Russian policy of diaspora instrumentalization (the “Karaganov
doctrine”) includes three com ponents. First, it encourages the Russian diaspora to stay in
the post-Soviet states so that the Russian speakers could be used as a leverage in fulfilling

2IOne group o f scholars (“internationalists”) advocated an accelerated russification
to achieve rapprochement of different national cultures in the USSR. Their opponents
(“nationalists”) argued that retaining individual nations could only enrich the “Soviet
community.” Ian Pennar, “A New Tum in the Soviet Nationalities Policy,” Radio Liberty
Research Note, a Russian edition (20 June, 1967).
::Bougai, “Postsovetskaya Rossiya” [Post Soviet Russia].
23Ibid.. For a description o f the First Congress of People’s Deputies, see The
Soviet Empire: Its N ations Speak Out. ed. Oleg Glebov and John Crowfoot (Chur, Switz.:
Harwood Academic Publishers, 1989).
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Russia's foreign policy objectives. According to the doctrine. Russia can defend its
diaspora against “discrimination” by using diplomacy and economic pressure. The
doctrine calls for closer economic links between Russia and Russian-owned enterprises in
the former Soviet republics, so that a base for Russian political influence is formed. Third,
it calls to strengthen cultural ties between Russia and minorities living in post Soviet
entities.24
Following the doctrine, in February 1994, the Russian foreign minister Kozyrev
declared the Baltic states a source of a threat and underlined the possibility of using force
to protect the Russian speaking population in Estonia and Latvia. Furthermore, in a report
issued on 24 September 1999, the Russian Foreign Policy and Defense Policy Working
Group stressed that “the Baltic states will always be included in the zone of Russia's vital
interest.” The report also denounced the “anti-Russian policy” of the Balts, which
supposedly is directed against Russia and its ethnic minorities.25
The Baltic leaders have continued to press Russia to acknowledge and apologize
for the abuses related to ethnic restructuring.26 The parliaments of the three states have

24Igor Zevelev, “Russia and Russian Diasporas,” Post Soviet Affairs 12, no. 3,
(1996): 273. Also see Heino Ainso, “Estonian Nationalism at Crossroads,” Review
Baltique 9 (1997): 15.
25“Russia Issues Report on Baltics,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline
(27 September, 1999).
26Such demands are voiced by some Russians as well. E.g., Yuri Afanasyev, the
rector of the Moscow Humanitarian University, argued that Russia should apologize to
the Baltic states. This would be a step toward a democratic federation. “Let Yeltsin
Repent Stalin’s Sins,” interview conducted by Kadri Liik, Postimees (23 August, 1999),
2. Even though in August 1994 Yeltsin said that he “condemned the Stalinist crimes
perpetrated against the Republic of Latvia,” so far, there has been no official recognition
and apology for the occupation. See “Yeltsin Condemns Stalinist Crimes Against
Latvia,” Radio Free Europe A-WIRE (1994), Open Society Archives, Budapest,
collection 300, file 80/6/15.
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adopted resolutions urging Russia to take responsibility for the Soviet past.27 During his
August 199S meeting with Valentina Matviyenko. then-Deputy Prime Minister of Russia
and Co-chairman of the Estonian-Russian Intergovernmental Committee, Estonia’s
president Lennart M en said that it was important for the development of the relations
between two countries that Russia accepts the judgement given by the democratic world to
the events of 1940 in Estonia.28
The Baltic states have used various international institutions as a forum to voice
their demands for apology. Thus, during a summer 1998 meeting of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, Tunne Kelam, a member of the Estonian delegation,
joined by the members of the Lithuanian delegation, argued that the individuals deported
from the Baltic states (who are still in Russia) should be allowed to return to their
homelands and receive compensation (from Russia). Furthermore, it was argued that the
‘’normalization” of Balto-Russian relations was impossible without an official recognition
by Russia of the crimes related to ethnic restructuring.29
Writing in the International H erald Tribune on 14 May 1999, Latvian Foreign
Minister Valdis Birkavs asked Russia to “look at itself in the mirror” and “to accept the
facts of their own history.” “An acknowledgment of Russia's role in Latvian history in this

27“Estonia and Latvia Demand Russia to Apologize for Soviet Crimes,” Baltic
News Ser\>ice (25 February, 1994). Estonia adopted such resolution in February 1994,
and Latvia in August 1996. Lithuania adopted a declaration “On the Assessment of
Communism and Form er Structures o f the Communist Occupation Regime” in December
1998. The text of this declaration, however, did not include demands for an apology from
Russia.
28Office o f the President of Estonia, Press Release (4 December 1998). Available
from http://www.president.ee; INTERNET.
29“Estonian Envoy at Council of Europe Seeks Russian Apology,” FBIS-SOV-98775 (24 June, 1998).
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century will defuse many of the sensitive problems related to naturalization o f [Russian]
non-citizens,” wrote Birkavs.30 Tracing the process whereby ethnic restructuring was
conducted in the Baltic states helps to understand why its legacy is still a raw nerve in
Russo-Baltic relations— both on the international and domestic levels.

SOVIET CONSTRUCTIVISM IN ACTION: THE BALTIC STATES

Compulsory Resettlement, or Deportations

According to the official documents, deportations in the Baltic states were not
pursued according to ethnic criteria. In 1940 and 1941, the most often cited reasons for
deportations and repressions were "activities against the revolution" and "punishment for
property owners."31 Those who were deported from the Baltic states were referred to as
"anti-Soviet, criminal, and socially dangerous elem ents.”32 Officially, the length of exile

10Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (17 May, 1999).
31According to Gabor T. Ritterspom , “Gegenrevolutionare A ktivitaC [Crimes
Against the Revolution] were the official reasoning for 33,1% of deportations to the
camps in 1940 and 28,7% in 1941. “Slrajiaten gegen Eigentum " [Punishm ent for
Property Owners] were the reasoning for 12.1% of deportations to the cam ps in 1940 and
13,5% in 1941. He based his calculations on the documents from the Russian State
Archive. Gabor T. Ritterspom, “Gab Es Etnische Sauberung in der Sow jetunion?” [Was
There an Ethnic Cleansing in the Soviet Union?], paper presented on 7 January 1999 at
Europa-Universitat-Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany.
3:See accounts o f the repressive police on the “arrest and deportation of socially
dangerous elements,” reproduced in Lietuvos Istorijos Institutas, Lietuvos gyventojtf
tremimai 1941, 1945-1952 m. [Deportations of the Lithuanian residents in 1941, 19451952] (Vilnius: Lietuvos Istorijos Institutas, 1994), 50-53. Nikolai F. Bougai classified
the deported from the Baltic states into three categories: “ 1) relocated for terms: for a
limited period of time, 2) relocated without defined terms (1945-48), and 3) relocated
forever (1949-1952).” Nikolai F. Bougai, The Deportation o f Peoples in the Soviet Union
(New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), 166.
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was limited from ten to twenty years, but beginning with 1949. the duration o f deportation
was supposed to be lifelong.'' It is not surprising, therefore, that many from the Baltic
diaspora in the places of deportation, who did not return to Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia in
the fifties after Khrushchev’s amnesty, became Russian speakers or simply perished. Only
in the mid-nineties, the Baltic governments began to reach out to the form er deportees,
still living in the far regions of the former USSR, encouraging them to come back.34
In all three states, deportations were carried out according to the same plan. As
explained by the order “On the Expulsion of Anti-Soviet Elements from Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia,” signed by Commissar Serov, the official primary goal of the Soviet
deportations in the Baltic states in 1941 was to clean out all “alien elements”— members
of non-Communist organizations, policemen, owners of plants, officers, government
employees and the members of their fam ilies.35 The other goal of planned resettlements
was to speed up transition to collective farms. To illustrate, in a letter addressed to
Zhdanov, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party,
Botschkarev, a Soviet representative to Estonia, suggested that the problem o f unequal
distribution o f land in Estonia and surrounding regions could be solved by resettling poor

33Grunskis, 11.
'4E.g., preparing for his visit to M oscow in May 1998, the Latvian President
Guntis Ulmanis, a former deportee himself, said that he would like to visit Latvians
residing in Siberia after his visit to M oscow, and called for legal and financial measures
by the parliament and the government to help them to return to Latvia. FBIS-SOV-98-145
(25 May. 1998). In his speech at the Conference “The Destruction and Defense of
Lithuania.” the Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus called for the “social
rehabilitation” o f the Lithuanians deported to Siberia who want to come back to their
homeland. Valstybes zinios, The Destruction and Defence o f Lithuania (Vilnius:
Valstybes zinios, 1998), 34.
35Lietuvos Istorijos Institutas. 14-20. The document was written not earlier than
19 May 1941.
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Russian villagers from the region of Petschory to the lands inhabited by Estonian
farmers.36
The official goal o f Soviet deportations during the period 1945-48 was to crush
Baltic resistance fighters and their supporters. This time, deportations were carried out
according to ten categories, which included German nationals, families who had arrived
from Germany during the years of occupation, and "traitors" (almost anyone could classify
as a traitor).37 The most massive deportations were carried out on 25-29 March 1949 in
Latvia (at least 41,708 people) and Estonia (at least 20,480) and on 22-27 May 1948 in
Lithuania (approximately 41,000 people, see Table 1). In 1948-49, about 200,000 people
were deported from the Baltic states.38 The last deportation took place in 1953 in
Lithuania, when families suspected of supporting the anti-Soviet resistance movement
were deported.
Despite the claims in official documents, national identity, however, did play a role
in the deportations under Stalin. In the late thirties, when Stalin became uneasy about the
possibility of another m ajor war breaking out in Europe and thought that all neighboring
countries (including Finland and the Baltic states) represented a threat to the security of
the Soviet Union, he began to draft plans of repression along "national lines." Thus, Poles,
Balts or Finns who were in the USSR became viewed as potential enemies of the state.

36A letter dated 21 O ctober 1940. Sabbo, 688-89.
37Directive No. 0165, entitled “Registration of the anti-Soviet and Contrarevolutionary elem ents,” written by J. Bartasiunas and A. Guzevicius, the directors of the
secret police in Lithuania. Reproduced in Grunskis, 59.
38Peteris Zvindrins, “Changes of Ethnic Composition in the Baltic States,”
Nationalities Papers 22, no. 2 (1994): 366.
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Table 1. Number o f People Deported from the Baltic States by the Soviet Union, 1940 to
1953 (partly estimates)*

Estonia
Population in
1934:
1.126,000

Latvia

1940-1941

1945-49

Mass deporta
tions. 1948—
49

At least 10.605
(Salo)**

1949:
20.702
(Terekhov's
report)

25-30 March
1949:
20.480
(Spasenko's
report)

16,563 (Vevers’
report)

43.904 (Vevers’
report)

25-30 March
1949:41.708
(Spasenko’s
report)

At least 60,469
(Vevers' report)

18.093 (Grunskis)
19.285 (Keruiis)**

86.654 (Grunskis)

22-27 May
1948:
41.000
(LGGRTC)

Appr. 132,000
(LGGRTC)

25—
30 March
1949:
28.656
(Spasenko’s
report)

1939-53:
128,068
(Grunskis)

1941: 5,978
(Terekhov's report)

Population in
1935:
1.905.000
Lithuania
Population in
1923:
2.620.000
1939—
41: appr.
26.000
(LGGRTC)***

Total. 1940-53
At least 40,455
(Memento

cards)****

Notes:
* “Repatriation” of Germans is not considered.
** Salo and Keruiis used the lists of deportees compiled during the German occupation, and the Nazi
authorities had forbidden mention of the deportees of Jewish descent.
*** includes the Eastern territories, formerly Poland, occupied by USSR in 1939.
**** Memento, the organization of Illegally Repressed in Estonia, has compiled 40,455 cards of deportees,
but this number is estimated to be much higher.

Sources:
Anusauskas. Arvydas. Lietuviy tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 rneiais [Devastation of the
Lithuanian Nation by the Soviets in 1940-1958]. Vilnius: Mintis. 1998.
Grunskis.
Keruiis, Leonas, quoted by Anusauskas, 12.
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Table 1 (Continued)
LGGRTC. Lietuvos gyventojtf genocido ir rezistencijos ryrimo centras [Lithuanian Genocide and Resistance
Research Center]. Data for the Museum of Genocide in Vilnius. 1999.
Oispuu, Leo, comp. Poliitilised Arreteerimised Eestis 1940-1988 [Political Arrests in Estonia. 1940-1988],
vol. 1. Tallinn: Estonian Repressed Persons Records Bureau. 1996. See page A2 for information
about the cards.
Salo. Velio. Population losses in Estonia, June 1940-August 1941. Scarborough. Canada: Maarjamaa.
1989.
Spasenko. NKVD general, a report to Ryasnoy, dated 31 March 1949. Sabbo, 886.
Terekhov, report to Mikoyan (the head of USSR Supreme Council), dated 6 March 1965. Sabbo. 1038-43.
Vevers'report. dated 7 December 1962. Currently kept in the State Archive in Riga. Latvia, collection
101-26. file 109.

In the late thirties and in 1940, many Balts who at the time resided in the territory
of the Soviet Union were deported or otherwise repressed purely on the basis of their
ethnicity.39 Feelings o f insecurity vis-a-vis Germany were the most likely cause o f these
mass resettlements as well as the ones that occurred in the Baltic states in June of 1941.
The "Memorial" historians in Russia argue that the reasoning behind this policy was the
belief that Russia was "surrounded by enemies," and that it had to remove the "enemies"
from its own territory.40

39E.g., on the certificate of rehabilitation, issued to Em a Melgal, there is a line
which indicates that the reason for repression [on 23 June 1940] was “the person is
Latvian." In 1940 Melgal resided in Kirovsk, Russia. The certificate is kept in the
Museum of Occupation in Riga. Museum of Occupation, Riga, Latvia (July 1999).
■
“N. V. Petrov, A. B. Roginsky. “ ‘Pol’skaya operatsiya’ NKVD 1937-1938 gg.”
[NKVD’s “Polish Operation” in 1937-1938], in M emorial, Istoricheskiye sbom iki
“Memoriala R epressiiprotivpolyakov i p o l ’skikh grazhdan [The “M em orial’s”
Historical Collections: Repressions against the Poles and Citizens of Poland] (Moscow:
Zvenya, 1997), 32-33.
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Nationality as a criterion for deportations within the territory of the Baltic states
was openly used only after the Second World War, in 1945, in order to "cleanse out”
Germans and everybody related to them from the Baltic states. Residents of the Baltic
states with German names found themselves being dragged out of their homes to be
deported.41 Resistance fighters, also known as "forest brothers," were referred to as
"Lithuanian- (or Latvian- or Estonian-) German nationalists" who in the eyes of the Soviet
state deserved the same fate as the G erm ans42
Not only the Germans, but also other minorities who lived in the Baltic states were
not spared from mass deportations. As early as September 1940, the Soviet state began to
“denationalize” the Baltic states by searching not only for Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian,
but also for Byelorussian, Polish, Jewish, Russian, and German members of ethnic (or, in
the Soviet jargon, nationalist) organizations.43
In general, since there were so many categories for deportation (e.g., in 1941, there
were as many as fourteen categories according to which people from the Baltic states had
been deported), people had no idea why their relatives were being taken away and loaded

■
“This is especially true in the case of the Germans from Lithuania, many of whom
returned to their country of residence in 1942-1943 after the 1941 transfer to Germany.
They were deported (by the Soviets) strictly on the basis of their nationality, which was
often determined by their last names. Nastazija Kairiukstyte, “Lietuvos
vokieciai— pirmieji pokario mettj tremtiniai” [The Lithuanian Germans— the First
Deportees of the Post-war Years], Lietuvos Istorijos M etrastis (1993): 92-105, and Patrik
von zur Muehlen, “Die Umsiedlung und Vertreibung der Deutsch-Balten 1939-1945”
[Resettlement and Expulsion of the Baltic Germans], in Flucht und Vertreibung [Flight
and Expulsion], ed. Robert Streibel (Vienna: Picus Verlag, 1994), 188-200.
42The directive to deport Germans from Lithuania was signed on 16 December
1944. This directive ordered that everybody who is related in any way to Germans must
be deported. The directive is reproduced in Lietuvos Istorijos Institutas, 95-97. F o ra
document reflecting the results the partisans’ and their fam ilies’ deportation, see ibid.,
120 - 2 1 .

43Anusauskas, 44.
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onto cattle-cars. Furthermore, there is evidence that the repressive institutions of the state
sometimes fabricated evidence about "guilt" by creating bogus resistance organizations
and accusing people of taking part in them.44 Thus, often people who had nothing to do
with the resistance and those who were even friendly to the regime were deported.
This happened as early as 1940-41, when the Soviet regime was still trying
ardently to find collaborators among the local population. This fact emerges from the
memoirs of the deportees:
"Being put onto the truck, we saw the family of Vytautas Duoba, whom we knew
very well, approaching," writes Valentinas Gustainis, the form er Director of Ella,
the Lithuanian news agency, deported in 1940. "The parents o f Duoba were poor
peasants from an old peasant commune in 2em oji Panemune. The Duobos had a
couple of hectares o f land. They lived together with their old mother, who had
never taken a bus, train, or car before in her life. Duoba had two little girls and a
pregnant wife. The women were walking barefoot, trying to save the soles on their
shoes . . . We considered the Duobas to be pro-Soviet not only because of their
[proletariat] origin, but also because of their beliefs. Vytautas Duoba had
congratulated the Soviet regime in Lithuania. He became the first leader of the
Kriukai district, and was an enthusiastic servant of the Soviet regime. And there
he was, with us! Why? W e did not know, and neither did they. Realizing that not
only the intelligentsia from the Baltic states was being deported, we began to calm
down a little bit: maybe we w on’t be shot."45
The wide scope of the deportations (see Table 1), which meant that almost anyone,
including children, could be deported, created panic and fear among the Baltic
populations, especially in June 1941. The survivors write that villagers rushed to church
to pray, believing that this was the end of the world.46 NKVD (Secret police) accounts

^During the process of rehabilitation of some victims in 1952, the NKVD
admitted that such organizations were created. Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The
Special Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection K -l. file 2-3.
45Valentinas Gustainis, Be Kaltes: 15 m elif Sibiro tremtyje ir lageriuose [Without
Any Guilt: 15 Years in Exile in Siberian and Camps] (Vilnius: M intis, 1989), 51.
JGLiudas Truska, Lietuva 1938-1953 metais [Lithuania in 1938-1953] (Kaunas:
Sviesa, 1995), 91.
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suggest that during the days o f mass deportations, such as 14 June 1941 or 25-29 March
1949, there was a widespread belief in the Baltic states that "all Estonians" (or Latvians
and Lithuanians) were going to be deported. To illustrate, in his letter to Kruglov, the
USSR Minister of Internal Affairs. Rezev wrote, "After the operation (i.e., deportation)
was finished, some residents o f Estonia were spreading a rumor that forced resettlement is
not over yet and that all Estonians must be deported."47
Similar thoughts were expressed by the survivors who remembered mass
deportations: "In 1949 there were the deportations which affected my close relatives and
neighbors. There was nervousness, that the same might happen to us. There were even
explicit threats: If you don’t join the kolkhoz, you’ll find yourself traveling towards the
white bears."48 Explicit threats are mentioned in numerous other accounts: "There [i.e., in
the place where people were being forced to sign up for kolkhoz] were files from the
Secret police containing information about everyone. Jurevicius, the Soviet collaborator,
reads [the material from the files] and then [verbally] assaults his victims. Sebecki is the
first to be [verbally] attacked. . . . Jurevicius says, ‘see, we have some data about you.’
After that, Sebecki signs up for the kolkhoz-”49
During the postw ar years and long after, the fear of deportations permeated the
interaction among those who were left behind.50 This fear was aggravated by public acts
of violence. Repressions used against the resistance fighters were especially cruel. The
dead bodies of partisans were sometimes left in the middle of the city for "recognition."

47Sabbo, 878.
48Skultans, 37.
49lgnatavicius. 163.
^Skultans, 59.
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However, even mothers o f the killed could not "recognize" their sons because this meant
deportation along with the rest of their families.51
Bitterness toward those co-ethnics who collaborated with the ruling regime is a
recurring theme in the narratives of those deported from Lithuania: "My sister and I nearly
went mad from fear [during the scene of deportation]. . . . B.Lecaite-Pozeriene, a member
of the central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, a 28-year old woman, was
calmly sitting at the table. Her son was as old as mine, and she was married to my
godfather Jurgis Pozera, but she had no pity for us. . . .

From time to tim e she gave

orders to her co-workers who were looting our house."52
"I remember so well that Lithuanian executioners (of the deportations) were much
more cruel than the Russians. The Russians told us that we will not be shot, but driven to
Siberia instead, and we will have to stay there. Therefore, we should take warm clothes
with us."53 "Two soldiers and one Lithuanian participated in the operation of the
deportation. The Lithuanian was especially cruel: he gave us (only) half an hour to get
ready. We were told not to take anything with us because we would have everything.”54
These Lithuanian narratives were probably influenced by the fact that the level of
cooperation with the Soviet regime, especially in the post-Stalinist years, was somewhat
higher than that in Latvia or Estonia. This was particularly true at the level of
nomenklatura (elites). The Communist Party in Lithuania had the greatest percentage of
indigenous population members. To illustrate, in 1970, the Latvian Communist Party

5lGaskaite, 49.
52Ignatavicius, 44.
5}Igarkos trem liniai [Deportees o f Igarka], com p. Aldona M atulkaite (Vilnius:
Atkuia, 1998), 19.
54Matulkaite, 19.
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included 40.2%, the Estonian—52.3%, and the Lithuanian—even 67.1% locals.55 In 1990,
there were 70.3% “indigenous” (Lithuanian) and 21.9% Russian party members in
Lithuania. The corresponding number for Latvia was 34.5% and 43.5%; 49.9% and 38.6%
for Estonia.56 During his 33-year rule, Antanas Snieckus, a Lithuanian-bom Soviet leader,
who was well liked by Stalin and who was able to establish friendly relations with other
Soviet leaders, surrounded himself with Lithuanian-bom nomenklatura instead of
importing helpers from Moscow. Little help was needed because Snieckus and his
Lithuanian followers were ardent supporters of deportations.57
In contrast to this, national Communists in the other two Baltic republics attempted
to resist ethnic restructuring. For example, Simson, the C hief Justice of the Estonian SSR,
and other members of the Estonian nomenklatura, wrote a letter to Moscow asking to let
the formerly deported to settle in Estonia instead of hiding in neighboring Latvia or Pskov
region. (Even though many of the formerly deported were formally "rehabilitated" at that
time, they were not allowed to go back to their homeland.58) Moscow suppressed any
resistance to ethnic restructuring by substituting the rebellious Communists with those
who were more obedient. The latter were usually implanted from other parts of the
USSR.59

55Kastytis Antanaitis, Lietuviskoji Sovietine Nomenklatura [The Soviet Lithuanian
Nomenclature] (Kaunas: Vytauto Didziojo Universiteto leidykla, 1998), 49.
56Fowkes, 212-13.
57Tininis.
5&Obyasnitel'naya zapiska [An Explanatory Note], dated 5 May 1965, asked the
central government to reverse the 12 October 1957 order which forbade some of the
formerly deported to live in their homeland. Sabbo, 1082-83.
59In 1959, the Latvian Communists, led by Eduards Berklavs, attempted to reverse
the demographic trend by resisting ethnic restructuring. A purge of 2,000 Latvian
“national Com m unists” was undertaken in July 1959. Berklavs was deported to Siberia.
Dreifelds. 45-46. Estonia experienced a similar purge in 1950-51. Also see Taagepera,
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Resistance to ethnic restructuring came not only from “above,” but also from
“below.” During the forties and fifties, many Baltic deportees wrote to numerous
institutions asking to revise their cases and to let them return to their homeland. O ut of
thousands of pleas only 278 were satisfied in 1951-52.60 However, there is evidence
suggesting that family reunions were allowed.
The letters seized by the secret police suggest that many tried to escape, especially
after the end of World W ar II: “Do not ju st wait there, wrote one deportee to those still in
Siberia, sell everything and go back to Lithuania. W hile traveling speak Russian all the
time, dress like Russians do, and nobody will ask you for documents.61
On 27 March 1953, the USSR Supreme Soviet declared amnesty for some
deportees. Between 1954 and 1958, approximately 22,200 people (mostly ethnic
Lithuanians) came back to Lithuania from the places o f deportation. Approximately
71.522 survivors were allowed to settle in Lithuania.62 In 1957, commissions for
rehabilitation were set up in the three Baltic republics, but the number of people
rehabilitated was not substantial. In L atvia’s case, approxim ately 8.5% (13,480) of all
people deported in 1949 were allowed to retu rn 63 Hom ecom ing continued until 1961.

Estonia: Return to Independence, 85.
^B ougai, The Deportation o f Peoples in the Soviet Union, 170.
61Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The Special Archive o f Lithuania], Vilnius,
collection K -l, file 10-39.
62The number for those who returned is from Lietuviai pasaulyje [Lithuanians in
the World] (Vilnius: Rosma, 1998), 13. O ther sources indicate that an approximate
number of 22,200 families o f those formerly deported have returned to Lithuania.
Nastazija Kairiukstyte, “Lietuvos gyventojij dinamika ir jos [taka gyventojij skaiciui,
tautiniam pasiskirstvmui 5-6-ajame desim tm etyje” [The Dynamics of the Lithuanian
Residents and Its Influence for the N um ber of Residents, and Their Ethnic Division in the
Fifties and Sixties], Darbai 1 (1996): 109.
63Sabbo, 1087.
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Approximately 31,000 survivors resettled to Soviet Latvia.64 Ani, the M inister o f Social
O rder in Estonian SSR, reported that 2.280 people were rehabilitated in the postw ar
years.65 From 1940 to 1989, 42,420 Estonians were repatriated from the East.66
However, permission to return home did not imply housing nor any civil rights.
The passports of the previously deported were stamped, and access to universities, trips
abroad, or certain jobs was strictly limited. T heir family members also faced sim ilar
restrictions. Lietuvos Baznycios Kronika, a publication of the Lithuanian resistance
produced in Chicago, often published the letters o f deportees.67 In 1975, K^stutis
Jokubvnas wrote: "[After deportation], I got a passport with a stamp which is used to mark
the passports of prisoners jailed for the worst crim es. It meant numerous restrictions."
Even though Jokubynas was innocent, he wrote that after deportation "a chasm was
opened in my life, and it is impossible to bridge it. . . . I became invisible, unknown,
silent."6*
This chasm— the experience of deportations— separated the deportees from the
acquiescent members o f the Baltic Soviet societies. Coupled with nationality registration
in the internal USSR passport, the experience o f deportation also opened a chasm that was

^Latvijas Okupacijas Muzejs, Latvija zem Padomju Savienibas un
nacionalsocialistiskas Vacijas varas [Latvia U nder the Soviet and National-Socialist
Rule] (Riga: Latvijas Okupacijas Muzejs, 1998), 147.
65Sabbo, 1076.
“ Juri Viikberg, “Estonians in Russia; Russians in Estonia. Some Com parisons,”
in Keele ja Kirjanduse Instituut, Oral M emory and National Identity: Papers fro m the
conference organized by the Institute o f Language and Literature o f the Estonian
Academy o f Sciences and the National Language Board o f the Republic o f Estonia in
Tallinn, 18-19 September 1993 (Tallinn: Keele ja Kiijanduse Instituut, 1994), 54-64.
Lietuvos Baznycios Kronika was a unique Lithuanian phenomenon. In Latvia,
the Lutheran Church had very few possibilities to publish, and the publications were
mostly limited to the church calendars. See Talonen, 293.
6XLietuvos Baznycios Kronika 19(1975): 184-87.
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separating the Russian speaking newcomers and noncompliant Latvians. Estonians and
Lithuanians. Those who returned to their native towns had to compete with the Russian
speaking newcomers for a place to live and other resources. From its inception, the Soviet
regime regarded the Russian speakers as its core supporters, and extended a privileged
access to scarce goods and services to many of them.69 The indigenous population
clustered in the countryside, while the capital cities became a home to numerous Russianspeakers.'0 Thus, in 1979, the “titular” (territorial) nationals constituted 88.2% of rural
population in Estonia, 73% in Latvia and 87.1% in Lithuania. They constituted only 32.2%
of Tallinn residents, 40.9% o f Riga, and 42.8% o f Vilnius.71

Migration into the Baltic Republics

Differences in m igrant flows into the Baltic republics became apparent only in
post-Stalinist years. As a m atter of fact, mass migration into the Baltic republics did not
start until the spring of 1941. In 1940, entry into the Baltic republics from other parts of
the Soviet Union was highly selective. Only members of the Communist party and other
important organs of the state were allowed to come to the Baltic republics.72

69The Soviets started the “cleansing of the cities from the unwanted” as early as
1940 by introducing passport regime. They openly identified the Russian speakers living
in Petschory region as the core basis of their new regime. Sabbo, 681-85.
70E.g., in 1989, ethnic Russians constituted 20.2% in Vilnius, 36.5% in Riga, and
41.2% in Tallinn. Georgiy I. Mirsky, On Ruins o f Empire: Ethnicity and Nationalism in
the Former Soviet Union (W estport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1997), 146.
’Boris Meissner, “The Change in the Social Structure of Estonia,” in Regional
Identity Under the Soviet Rule: The Case o f the Baltic States, ed. Andre D. Loeber. V.
Stanley Vardys, and Laurence P. A. Kitching (Hackettstown. N.J.: Institute for the Study
of Law, Politics, and Society o f Socialist States, 1990), 168.
72Liudas Truska, “Lietuvos valdzios jstaigij rusifikavimas 1940-1941” [The
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Since most of the members of the Baltic intelligentsia and most civil servants had
been deported or repressed in 1940-41. the new regime lacked people. Soviet
collaborators in Estonia sent a note to A. A. Andreyev. Secretary o f the Central Committee
o f the Soviet Communist Party, in which they wrote that "despite the fact that many young
Communists were incorporated into the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist
Party, there is a dire necessity to strengthen many aspects of the party’s activities. We ask
the Central Committee of the Communist Party to send experienced Communists of
Estonian nationality to Estonia."73 Moscow responded readily to such invitations. In
addition to the Communists of Baltic nationality, it sent numerous Russians. The most
populous inflow o f Russian speakers started in mid-1941, after the first mass deportation
of the Baltic peoples. At that time, the greatest num ber of new Russian-speaking migrants
worked for those state institutions responsible for carrying out acts of repression, such as
the militia, the Com m unist party, or the secret police.74
After World W ar II. the percentage of Russian speakers increased from 8.2%
(1934) to 30.3% (1989) in Estonia, 8.8% (1935) to 34% (1989) in Latvia and 2.5%(1923)
to 8.6% (1989) in Lithuania. At the same time, the percentage com prised by indigenous
ethnic groups declined from 88.2% (1934) to 61.5% (1989) in Estonia, 77% (1935) to 52%
(1989) in Latvia, but increased from 69.2% (1923) to 80.1% (1989) in Lithuania (Table 2).
The exact number o f Russian speakers who came to the Baltic states is still unknown, but
the peak of the influx probably occurred during the postwar years. About 400,000

Russification of the Lithuanian Political Institutions. 1940-1941], D arbai 1 (1999): 7.
7jA note dated 14 January 1941, in Sabbo, 730-32.
7JTruska, “Lietuvos valdzios jstaigij rusifikavimas 1940-1941” [The Russification
of the Lithuanian Political Institutions, 1940-1941], 7.
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Russians and 100,000 people of other nationalities immigrated into Latvia from 1945 to
1959, which was equivalent to 25% of the prewar population.'5 In comparison, at least
60.469 were deported during that time (Table 1). In 1951-90, 2, 171,033 immigrants
came to Latvia, some of whom settled for a longer period of time.76 More than 213,000
non-Estonians came to Estonia in 1945-53 (19% of prewar population),77 w hile at least
40.455 were deported. During 1945-89, 1.4 million (mostly) Russian speakers traversed
the country (not including the military personnel). From 1944 to 1959, at least 150.000
Russian speakers immigrated to Lithuania,'8 and approximately 132,000 people were
deported. These numbers suggest that Latvia has experienced the highest level o f ethnic
restructuring, and Lithuania—the lowest.
The influx o f Russian speakers bothered the indigenous populations. Reports of
the former Secret police and the intercepted letters to be sent abroad attest to the existence
of severe ethnic polarization in the Baltic states, especially until 1953. when deportations
were still being conducted.

75Romuald J. M isiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years o f
Dependence, 1940-1990 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1993), 112.
76Ausma Tabuna, “Migracija Latvija un Jedzlvotaju Attieksme pret M igration”
[Migration in Latvia and the Attitudes of the Population Tow ards the M igrants], in
Sabiedribas Pannaipas Latvija [Social Changes in Latvia], ed. Alvars Tabuns (Riga:
Jumava, 1998), 174.
7'M isiunas and Taagepera. 112. O ther sources quote more than 240,000 people
who came to Estonia in 1945-50. See Estonian Institute, Report on Ethnic Issues in
Estonia (February 2000). Available from http://www.einst.ee/sociery/ethnic_issues.htm:
INTERNET.
78Nastazija Kairiukstyte, “Lietuvos gyventoji} dinam ika ir jos jtaka gyventojq
skaiciui. tautiniam pasiskirstvmui 5-6-ajame desimtmetyje” [The Dynamics o f the
Lithuanian Residents and Its Influence for the Number of Residents, and T heir Ethnic
Division in the Fifties and Sixties], 109.
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Table 2. Change in Ethnic Composition of the Populations of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania
Pre-1940

1959 Census

1989 Census

1934
ESTONIA
Estonian
Russian
German
Jewish

1998-1999
1999

88.2%
8.2%
1.5%
0.4%

74.6%
20.1%
0.1%
0.5%

61.5%
30.3%
0.2%
0.3%

Other

1.7%

4.7%

7.7%

6.46%*

Total Population
(million)

1.1264

1.1968

1.5657

1.44558

1935
LATVIA
Latvian
Russian
Jewish
German
Other
Total Population
(million)
LITHUANIA
Lithuanian
Russian
Jewish
Polish

1999

77.0%
8.8%
4.9%
3.3%
6.0%

62.0%
26.6%
1.7%
0.1%
9.6%

52.0%
34.0%
0.9%
0.1%
9.3%

1.905

2.094

2.667

1923

65.20%
28.09%
0.09%
0.16%

1970

55.7%
32.3 %
0.4 %
0.1 %
11.5%**

2.439445
1998

83.88%
2.49%
7.58%
3.23%

80.1%
8.6%
0.8%
7.7%

79.6%
9.4%
0.3%
7.0%

Other

2.82%

2.8%

3.7%

2.53%***

Total Population
(million)

2.62

2.756
(1960)

3.675

3.653

82.26%
8.21%
0.16%
6.84%

Notes:
* Ukrainians (2.54%) constitute the second largest minority (after the Russians).
** Byelorussians (3.9%) constitute the second largest minority (after the Russians).
***Byelorussians (1.23%) constitute the third largest minority (after the Russians and the Polish).
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Table 2 (Continued)
Sources:
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia Statistical Yearbook o f Lari’ia. Riga: Central Statistical Bureau of
Latvia. 1999.
Dreifelds.
EU. Briefing 42: The Russian Minority in the Baltic States and the Enlargement o f the EU. Luxembourg:

European Parliament, 1999.
Krupavicius. Algis. ed. Seimo rinkimai'96: Treaasis atmetimas [Election to the Parliament’96: The Third
Rejection]. Vilnius: Tverme. 199S.
Raun. Toivo U. "Democratization and Political Development in Estonia. 1987-96." InThe Consolidation
o f Democracy in East-Central Europe . ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 1997.
Statistical Office of Estonia Statistical Yearbook o f Estonia. Tallinn: Statistical Office of Estonia. 1999.

E.g.. one such letter reads, "Many Lithuanians are banished to Siberia. At the
same time, bearded young Soviet specialists are coming by cars and by foot from the East.
These are our new masters, who are coming here to teach us. It is a pity, however, that
they do not do much, only talk, and nothing is coming out of this."79 Or another one: "The
Russians are deporting our people. But the time will come soon, when we will retaliate.
But we will not deport them. Instead, we will hang them."80 Competing for scarce
resources often aroused muted feelings of deprivation: "They (i.e., the state) would not
give us a flat. They didn’t give us one, the queues are long. And some of the more

,9A letter by Palukaitis. dated 11 September 1946. Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas
[The Special Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection K -l, file 10-39.
80Kostas Staniunas, quoted by General-Lieulenant Gorminski in a letter by
Palukaitis. dated 11 September 1946. Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The Special
Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection K -l, file 10-39.
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powerful queues—I'm referring to the Russians—those move more quickly, but [for]
ordinary people, the indigenous people, they do not only don't move forward but the
queue gets longer all the time. . . . [1 went to] to the executive committee and realiz[ed] I
had no rights where I stood."81
A survey of emigres from the USSR conducted in Germany in the late seventies
suggests that the influx of Russians to the Baltic states has resulted in the perceptions on
behalf of the local residents that the "native power (i.e.. the power of the local residents) is
decreasing." To cite a statement from the survey: "The power of Latvian decreases. Fewer
are bom there, more die, and if one Latvian gets into governing there are two Russians
[there] for him, the Latvian has to dance as the Russians call the tune. Voss (the Latvian
Communist leader) now does everything that Brezhnev wants."82 Similar opinions were
voiced in 1981 in Riga during interviews conducted by a Western journalist: "The
factories (built in seventies and eighties in Latvia) could be anywhere in the Soviet Union,
but they put them here to dilute our population. I tell my children to have nothing to do
with the incoming Russians. They don’t belong here." "I’ve been fighting Russians all
my life. In school we don’t m ix."8'’
Those who experienced antipathy toward the Russian speakers sometimes found
themselves distanced from other minorities residing in the Baltic states because the latter
were, by and large, absorbed by linguistic and cultural russification. Ethnic tensions were

81Skultans, 115-16.
82National Council for Soviet and East European Research, Executive Summary o f
a Research Project on Soviet Ethnic Relations (an unpublished draft, 1979), 14. The
study is currently kept in the Open Society Archives. Budapest, collection 300, file
80/1/547.
8'”Baltic States W orried About the Influx of Russians.” Radio Liberty Research
Note (14 November, 1981).

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

132
present in eastern Lithuania between the local Poles who often preferred Russian-language
schools to Lithuanian ones.
On the other hand, the attitude of most incoming Russian speakers was that they
were not minority groups outside Russia. As Nikolai Rudensky has argued, "[the Russians
outside Russia] considered themselves to be representatives of the dominant nation in the
multinational state. . . . Because of this basic attitude, most Russians felt no need to
master local languages and traditions. Many o f them, in fact, showed contempt for the
cultural patterns of their ethnic environment, which could hardly improve their relations
with native ethnic group.”84
During the postw ar years, communication (other than interaction in the public
domain) between the newcomers and the indigenous population must have been rare
because after twenty years of independent statehood (1918-39) the majority of the Balts
w ere not able to speak Russian, and vice versa.85 It took ten to twenty years for a change
to occur. In the seventies, at least one half of Baltic populations claim ed to know'
Russian.86
In addition to the influx of Russian speakers to the Baltic states, there were several
other, less visible waves of migration during the postw ar years, such as forced repatriation
from the Western territories, the return of emigrants who had gone to South America and

84Mirsky, 148.
85Despite intense russification pursued by czarist Russia in the Baltic states and
Finland in 1850-1914, building national states w'ith a Latvian (also Estonian and
Lithuanian) cultural content was a priority in 1918-19. This strengthened the knowledge
of national languages. Edward C. Thaden. Michael H. Hatzel, C. Leonard Lundin, and
Toivo Raun, Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981).
80Aleksei Repin. “ V zgl’yad so storony” [An O utsider’s View'], Raduga 10 (1988):
83.
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other non-European territories in 1955-61. and population exchanges. Another wave of
migrants came to Lithuania following the treaty between the Lithuanian SSR and Poland,
signed in September 1944. In 1944-46, a population exchange between Lithuania and
Poland took place. 171,158 people— former citizens of Poland who identified themselves
as Poles and Jews— left Lithuania, but many Poles and Byelorussians came to Lithuania
from the neighboring territories.87 The newcomers usually settled in the area around
Vilnius, which had been previously inhabited by Poles.
The second population exchange between Poland and Lithuania was, until recently,
virtually unknown. In 1956-59 about 48,600 people were repatriated from Lithuania to
Poland. Repatriation to Poland was viewed as a step toward a freer world. Having found
out about this population exchange, many deportees who were still in Siberia tried to
identify themselves as Poles in order to get away from their places of deportation. At the
same time, similarly to 1944-46, there was immigration of Poles and Byelorussians to
Lithuania. That is why, even after this population exchange, the number of Poles residing
in Lithuania did not change dramatically.88
Despite these waves of migration, Lithuania retained its ethnic homogeneity due to
two factors: the policies of Antanas Snieckus, who insisted that Lithuania remains an
agricultural republic, and fierce armed resistance. In those places where the partisan war
was very intense, the influx of Russian-speaking immigrants was lower than in

8'The Polish sources cite 197,156. Nastazija Kairiukstyte, “Vilniaus Krasto
Gvventoji} Sudeties Pokyciai” [Changes in the Population Structure in the Vilnius Region
1939-46], in Lietuvos Rytai [Lithuania’s East], ed. Kazimieras Garsva and Laima
Grumadiene (Vilnius: Valstybinis Leidybos Centras, 1993), 292.
88Nastazija Kairiukstyte," 1956-59 mety repatriacija is LSSR [ LLR” [1956-59
Repatriation from Lithuanian SSR to Polish People’s Republic], Lietuvos istorijos
metrasiis (1996): 274-91.
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acquiescent areas.89 On the other hand. Snieckus' vision of Lithuania as mostly
agricultural republic reduced the need for industrial workers. In 1953, Snieckus even
pushed out some Russian speakers who resisted Snieckus’ policies. In November 1953.
approximately 3.000 Russian speakers left the country. In 1959, the state, party, and
economic sectors of the Lithuanian SSR were 70% Lithuanian, compared to 40-50% in
1953.90 These facts do not imply, however, that Snieckus was tolerant o f any display of
Lithuanian nationalism. He ruthlessly suppressed any opposition.
W hen it came to the implementation of the regulations of Soviet nationalities
policy other than deportation or migration, such as teaching history or language policies,
the Baltic Soviet elites also complied with most of the rules, although sometimes
unwillingly. Eastern Lithuania and language politics in this region is a case in point.
Eastern Lithuania is an area around Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, and its population was
heavily restructured during the interwar period and during Soviet times.91 In 1950,
Mecislovas Gedvilas and Justas Paleckis, Lithuanian party functionaries, suggested
teaching Lithuanian instead of Polish in addition to Russian in Eastern Lithuania, arguing
that Poles in that area were in fact "polonized Lithuanians and Byelorussians," and that
teaching in Polish in those areas was the continuation o f polonization pursued by

89Nijole Gaskaite-Zemaitiene, “Lietuvos laisves kovos sqjudzio strategija” [The
Strategy o f the Lithuanian Movement for Independence], Genocidas ir Rezistencija 1, no.
5 (1999): 33.
^Tininis, 69.
91According to 1989 census, Lithuanians constituted 50.6%, Poles 18.8%,
Russians 20.2%, and other nationalities 10.4% in this region. During the interwar period.
Poland resettled 150,000 ethnic Poles to this region. Halina Turska, O proiskhozhdenii
pol'skoyazychnykh cirealov v V il’nyuskom kraye [On the Origin of Polish Speaking
Regions in the Area o f Vilnius] (Vilnius: M intis, 1995). 85.
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"bourgeois" Poland.92 Moscow disapproved, and the proposal was denounced as
nationalist. In mid-fifties, the Soviet Lithuanian intelligentsia became involved in another
campaign of promoting the Lithuanian language, arguing that after the population
exchanges with Poland the "real” Poles left and that there was no need to continue
teaching Polish in that area. T his time, local Polish leaders complained directly to
Moscow, thus putting the cam paign of lithuanization to an end.93 After the influx of
Russian speakers in the sixties and seventies, the Russian language began to slowly push
out Polish and Byelorussian languages.94 Thus, similarly to the northeastern Estonia (the
Narva region) and southeastern Latvia (Latgale), eastern Lithuania became an ethnic
enclave, heavily populated with Russian and Polish speakers.
The heavy concentration o f Russian speakers in northeastern Estonia is a result of
forced industrialization and related mass migration in the 1960s and 1970s, which, at its
height, amounted to 20,000-30,000 people per year. Three quarters of newcomers settled
in Ida-Virumaa and Narva regions, thus creating an ethnic enclave.95 Even though
Latgale, a former Polish territory, was multiethnic prior to Soviet times, its ethnic
composition was radically changed by migration during the 1960s and 1970s. In early
nineties, only 15% o f the population was Latvian. 55% was Russian, 9% Byelorussian,

92Petras Kalnius, Etniniai procesai Pietryciif Lietuvoje XX amziaus II-ojoje puseje
[Ethnic Processes in Southeastern Lithuania in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century]
(Vilnius: 2ara, 1998), 47.
9jAntanaitis, 50.
94This is a finding of a jo in t Polish Lithuanian research group. Office for
Statistical Publications. Lenkai Lietuvoje-Lietuviai Lenkijoje [Poles in Lithuania, and the
Lithuanians in Poland] (W arsaw: O ffice for Statistical Publications, 1995), 32.
95Ilga Apine, “Nationality Policy in the Baltic States,” in The Baltic States at
Historical Crossroads. ed. Talavs Jundzis (Riga: Academy of Sciences of Latvia, 1998),
363.
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and the rest were mostly Russian speakers.96
Even though mass deportations ended in 1953, relations between newcomers and
autochthonous residents were marred by memories about deportations. To make the
matters worse, during the Soviet times, open criticism of deportations in Lithuania was not
welcome and even silenced. In Latvia and Estonia, the atmosphere was somewhat more
relaxed. In 1956. Estonian Rudolf Sirge (1904-70) wrote a novel Maa ja rahvas [The
Land and the People], which although otherwise pro-Soviet, included a realistic
deportation scene and caused a sensation in Estonia. In Catholic Lithuania, embitterments
were embodied by the crosses in Kryziij kalnas [The Hill o f Crosses], Also known as the
mound o f Meskuiciai, or the Hill of Prayers, this site became a "sacred" place to which
people came to pray and to put up crosses, leave rosaries, holy pictures and statuettes
mourning those who were deported or killed. The Soviet authorities tried to destroy the
hill numerous times: The hill was bulldozed; the crosses were burnt, taken away or buried.
Despite a close watch by the authorities, new crosses kept reappearing during the night.
There were plans to flood the place, block the roads and make the Hill an inaccessible
island. It was only in 1985 that the Hill was finally left in peace by the government. In
addition to these symbolic and nonviolent acts of resistance, ethnic restructuring triggered
the emergence of politically active groups.

96IIga Apine, “T olerantnosf v M ultikul’tumom obshchestve” [Tolerance in a
Multicultural Society], in Multiculturalism Latvija: leorija un prakse [Multiculturaiism in
Latvia: Theory and Practice], ed. R. Bramane (Daugavpils, Latvia: Multinational Culture
Center, 1996), 55. The data is for 1994.
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REACTION TO ETHNIC RESTRUCTURING: THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICALLY
ACTIVE GROUPS

Based on their relationship with the Soviet state and its ethnic restructuring
policies, the groups who responded to ethnic restructuring in the Baltic states can be
classified into three broad categories. The first group, or restorationists, defined
themselves in direct opposition to the Soviet state and aimed to recreate independent
Baltic states. This was the goal of armed resistance movements in the forties and fifties,
and later this goal was embraced by dissidents. The second group, or internationalists,
expressed their full support for the Soviet state, but opposed the restorationists. Sponsored
by Moscow, this group consisted mostly of Russian speaking immigrants. It became
visible in the late eighties, after the emergence of national independence movements in the
Baltic states. Both restorationists and internationalists lived in a polarized world of “us’’
versus “them,’' and continuously asserted their identity in opposition to that of the other
group.97
The third group, or compromisers, tried to oppose ethnic restructuring within the
political limits established by the Soviet state. In fact, some of them even did not
completely reject the Soviet state. This group included activists of cultural ethnic
organizations who resisted russification, also folklore ensembles, and some church
members.
Emigration movements from the USSR were another form of resistance. After the

9'Rein Taagepera, “Estonia in September 1988: Stalinists. Centrists and
Restorationists." Journal o f Baltic Studies 20, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 177.
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anti-Jewish campaign in the USSR in 1948 and 1953, and especially in 1970s, many Baltic
Jews emigrated to Israel.9s A fter World W ar II, members o f Zionist organizations fled the
USSR via Poland." So did numerous other Balts. Many refused to return to their
occupied homelands from displaced persons' camps in Germany, Sweden, and other
western countries, resisting the attempts of the Soviets to bring them back. T he Baltic
western diaspora formed several groups with political demands resisting ethnic
restructuring in exile. Their demands were often congruent with those of the first group,
the restorationists, described in the segment that follows.

The Restorationists

Mass deportations, conducted in June 1941 and after W orld War D triggered armed
resistance among the Baltic populations. One immediate goal of the resistance fighters
was to prevent deportations and to revenge for those deported. “We warn you: do not let
yourselves to be deported: find a place to hide and stay there until freedom com es. It will
come soon,” wrote resistance fighters in their leaflets. “W e wam all those who are
organizing the deportations. There will be no pity for you!” 100

9SZvi Segal, “Jewish M inorities in the Baltic Republics in the Postwar Years,” in
Regional Identity Under the Soviet Rule: The Case o f the Baltic States, ed. A ndre D.
Loeber. V. Stanley Vardys, and Laurence P. A. Kitching (Hackettstown, N.J.: Institute for
the Studu of Law', Politics, and Society of Socialist States, 1990), 230.
"T h e attempts of the Sionist organizations to flee the Baltic states and to help
other Jews to migrate were known to the Soviet Secret police. This police killed many of
those who tried to escape. “Perepiska po planu meropriyatiya ‘Kapkan’”
[Correspondence about the Undertaking “Kapkan,” 5 June 1948— 29 July 1952],
Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The Special Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection
K -l, file 2-9.
‘"D ocum ent 40 in Partizanai apie pasaulf, polilikq ir save: 1944-1956 partizantf
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The strongest resistance movement was in Lithuania. It started as early as October
1940. when the Lithuanian National Front of Activists (LAF) was formed.101 One year
later, numerous underground organizations— the Front of Lithuanians, the Union of
Fighters for Lithuanian Freedom, the Lithuanian Army of Freedom , the Lithuanian
Nationalist Party, and the Reform M ovement of Lithuanian m ovem ent sprang, hoping to
reestablish an independent Lithuanian state.102
Having found out about the return o f the Soviets, the restorationists did not lose
hope. A more radical wing of restorationists in Lithuania, Lietuvos laisves armija, LLA
(The Lithuanian Army of Freedom) urged everyone to continue resistance. The LLA
announced that it did not expect other states to help Lithuania and encouraged the
Lithuanians to “control their own fate.” 103 In 1944-45, the LLA became the leader of
resistance. At that time (until sum m er 1945), there were approxim ately 30,000 partisans
in Lithuania, and they were able to act throughout the whole territory of Lithuania, even
though their forces were not consolidated.104 On 23 April 1946, during the first conference
of the leaders o f the Lithuanian resistance, a declaration was adopted which spelled out the
main goal of the movement— to recreate a democratic Lithuanian state.105 The same

spaudos publikacijos [The Partisans about the World, Politics, and Themselves: 19441956 Publications in the Partisan Press], comp. Nijole Gaskaite-Zemaitiene (Vilnius:
LGGRTC, 1998), 688.
101lts activities were coordinated from Berlin. The Soviet Secret police knew
about its existence, and wrote in its reports: ‘T h ere is a big organization in Lithuania
which spies for Germany. There are approximately 700 people in this organization.” A
note dated 4 May 1941. signed by Gladkov, Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The Special
Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection K -l, file 10-5.
102Valstybes zinios. 43.
l03G askaite-2em aitiene. “Lietuvos laisves kovos sqjudzio strategija” [The Strategy
o f the Lithuanian M ovement for Independence], 24.
I04lgnatavicius, 261.
l05Gaskaite-2em aitiene. “Lietuvos laisves kovos sqjudzio strategija” [The Strategy
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goal—to recreate a free Republic of Lithuania and to fight against colonization— was
reiterated by Lietuvos Laisves kovos sqjudis (the Movement for Lithuania’s Freedom),
created in 1949. Hoping to prevent the decline o f armed resistance, the leaders of the
partisans established this organization, uniting several branches of partisan movement.106
However, even these attempts did not help: after deportations and collectivization, the
partisan movement to restore Lithuania lost its momentum in the early fifties.
The Estonian metsavendlus [forest brothers] also harbored a hope to restore their
independent state. This drive became particularly strong in mid-June 1941, following a
mass deportation.107 After the return of the Soviets, the special forces (“destruction
battalions") brutally suppressed armed resistance. All the men in some Estonian villages
were killed. Local partisan groups were weakened and therefore were unable to provide
protection for the population which was driven to deportation camps. According to the
Soviet sources, 15,000 Estonian “forest brothers” were neutralized by 1947.108 Several
years later, armed resistance in Estonia was subdued.
The Latvian m eza braji [forest brothers] lasted until mid-fifties. The most intense
fighting went on in 1945.109 After cruel repressions and collectivization, the activities of
the partisans abated. Most Baltic partisans were either killed or deported.

of the Lithuanian M ovement for Independence], 28.
106Document 270 in Partizanai apie pasaulf, politiky ir save: 1944-1956 partizany
spaudos publikacijos [The Partisans about the World, Politics, and Themselves: 19441956 Publications in the Partisan Press], comp. Gaskaile-Zemaitiene, 688.
l0,Tiit Noormets, “Armed Resistance Movement and Guerilla W ar in Estonia in
1941," Genocidas ir Rezistencija 2 (1997): 53.
108Mart Laar, W ar in the Woods: Estonia's Struggle fo r Survival, 1945-1956
(Washington, D.C.: Compass, 1992), 155.
109Henrihs Strods, Latvijas NacionMo Partizanu kars 1944-1956 [Latvia's
National Partisan W ar 1944-1956] (Riga: Preses nams. 1996), 432-33.
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After the decline of the partisan movement, restorationist ideas were, by and large,
exiled from the Baltic soil— either to the Soviet deportation camps o r to the West. Based
on their own experiences and partisans' reports,110 the Baltic diaspora in the West
produced numerous political memorandums and historical works depicting the
illegitimacy o f the Soviet actions in the Baltics.111 The Baltic Information Centers in the
Scandinavian countries and diasporas in the United States and Germany were the outlets
for these works. Each year the Baltic American Freedom League and other emigre
organizations arranged demonstrations to commemorate Soviet deportations, which they
called the “Baltic Holocaust.” 112 Poetry and prose written by the displaced to the
deportation cam ps, coupled with the memories of the authors themselves became a part o f
the diaspora’s attem pts to remind the United States and its Cold W ar allies about the
“other" Europe. It became the backbone of the diaspora’s political arguments for nonrecognition o f the Baltic states as a part of the Soviet Union.
Those restorationists who were exiled to deportation camps had fewer channels to
assert their ideas. However, surviving reports of the Secret police suggest that those
opposing the Soviet state rebelled even in the places of deportation. M obilization was
especially strong during World W ar D.113 More often, however, the deportees expressed

ll0Until 1948, some partisans were able to escape to the W est and record their
experiences. Gaskaite-Zemaitiene, “Lietuvos laisves kovos sqjudzio strategija” [The
Strategy of the Lithuanian M ovement for Independence], 30.
‘"E.g., A Register o f Deported Lithuanians: Stalin's Policy o f Terror, 1940-1941,
comp. Leonas Kerulis (Chicago: Lithuanian World Archives, 1981), Lithuanians in
Siberia: Lietuviai Sibire. ed. Juozas Prunskis (Chicago: Lithuanian Library Press, 1981),
and Ants Oras. The Baltic Eclipse (London: Victor Gollanz. 1948).
"■“Baltic Holocaust Is Recalled by Those W ho Lived,” Radio Free Europe BWIRE (13 June, 1983).
"'T here are reports suggesting that in 1942 “the representatives o f the nations
fighting against the USSR were especially active.” Sabbo, 1135. Memoirs of the former
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their disappointment in their letters, m em oirs, and poems. Thus, memoirs and poems,
written on pieces o f sack material or on birch bark in the deportation camps and then
tucked away, became another form of resistance. For each poem, if caught, the deportees
were facing five more years of deportation. After Khrushchev’s amnesty, when many
former deportees became leading dissidents, their memoirs and poems, written in the
deportation camps, found their way into sam izdat (underground) publications and became
an accusation o f the Soviet system.
The analysis o f the Baltic sam izdat contents and recovered Secret police reports
suggests that the Baltic dissident m ovem ents continuously asserted their right to restore
the Baltic states."4 To illustrate, in the Program of the Democratic M ovement of the
Soviet Union, the anonymous Baltic authors asserted this right, arguing that “the road to
national liberation lies through dem ocratization of the entire Soviet society.” " 5 National
independence was deemed as the only cure for dem ographic changes inflicted on the
Baltic states by the Soviet U nion."6

deportees attest that there were numerous strikes in the camps. Juozas Krakauskas,
comp., Vorkutos politiniif kalinitj atsim inim ai [Memoirs of Political Prisoners in Vorkuta]
(Vilnius: LGGRTC, 1998), 30-38.
ll4T he m ajor goals and actions o f the Latvian dissident movement were aptly
summarized in a conversation between C alytis, a Latvian dissident, and a Secret police
agent. Calytis argued that the dissidents should try to gain trust of the intelligentsia and
use its discontent with the current situation. Furthermore, he wanted to establish links
with international organizations, such as th e United Nations, and Baltic diaspora groups.
Indulis Zallte, “Pagrindines neprievartinio pasipriesinim o formos ir slaptasis
nacionalizmas” [The Main Forms of N onviolent Resistance and Secret Nationalism],
Genocidas ir Rezistencija 2 (1997): 118.
" 5Dzintra Bungs. “Joint Political Initiatives by Estonians, Latvians, and
Lithuanians as Reflected in Samizdat m aterials— 1969-1987,” in Regional Identity Under
the Soviet Rule: The Case o f the Baltic S ta te s, ed. Andre D. Loeber, V. Stanley Vardys,
and Laurence P. A. Kitching (H ackettstow n, N.J.: Institute for the Study of Law, Politics,
and Society o f Socialist States, 1990), 430.
"°This was the position of the A ssociation of Concerned Estonians. Latvia's
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Predictably, embitterments about ethnic restructuring and russification were often
invoked in the letters written by dissidents to international organizations. For example, in
their letter addressed to the UN Secretary General w hich protested against a campaign of
russification, a group of Lithuanian dissidents w'rote: “We, Lithuanians, feel somewhat
disenchanted: why has the United Nations ignored . . . numerous injustices inflicted by the
U SSR?” 117
Naturally, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
signed on 1 August 1975, was an impulse for intensified dissident activities. Numerous
societal groups went public to record how Helsinki accords were implemented. The more
radical restorationists, such as Lietuvos Lais\>es Lyga (the Lithuanian Freedom League),
published appeals to the Russian nation, accusing the latter of genocide vis-a-vis the
Balts.118 Radical restorationists also reprimanded the Russian dissidents who were, in their
eyes, unw'illing to admit the guilt of the Russian nation vis-a-vis the Balts.119 However,
these groups were promptly stifled by the Soviet state.
The second thaw, w'hich started in 1986. instantly awakened the restorationist
movement. In 1986, a chapter of the human rights group Helsinki ’86 was formed by blue
collar workers in the city of Liepaja in Latvia. Helsinki ’86 organized a series of
demonstrations to commemorate the events of 14 June 1941 (the date of mass

Independence M ovement, and Lithuanian Freedom League. These organizations were
active during the seventies. Aina Zarips, “Dissent in the Baltic Republics: A Survey of
Grievances and Hopes.” Radio Liberty Research Note (14 December, 1976).
117Stasys Stungurys. Sauletekio linkui [Towards Sunrise] (Vilnius: Margi rastai,
1998), 80.
,182ivile Rackauskaite, “Pasipriesinimas sovietiniam rezimui Lietuvoje
asiuntajame desim im etyje” [Resistance to the Soviet Regime in Lithuania during the
Seventies]. Genocidas ir Rezistencija 2 (1999): 95.
ll9Ibid., 94.
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deportations). In addition to stirring up rebellious feelings against the Soviet state.
Helsinki ’86 pushed the Latvian Communist Party to reconsider the official interpretation
of Latvian history. On 14 June 1987 (the day of mass deportations in 1941), despite the
arrest of its leaders, Helsinki ’86 organized several thousand demonstrators to march to the
Freedom monument in Riga and lay flowers. 14 June 1987 was the largest demonstration
which sparked the following waves o f demonstrations in the Baltic states.120
On 25 March 1988, rallies were held to commemorate the mass deportations of
1949. On 22 May 1988. memorial services were held simultaneously in Vilnius, Kaunas,
and Riga to commemorate the 132,000 Lithuanians who were deported to Siberia. One
year later, on 14 June 1989, thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Cathedral in
Riga to once again commemorate the 1941 deportation. Thus, the calendars of the three
Baltic nations were marked with a new date—14 June 1941. Since then, this day became
known as the Day o f Sorrow and Remembrance.
By invoking memories about displacement and illegal occupation of the Soviet
Union, the restorationists became powerful political groups in all three Baltic states. Mass
rallies often coincided with moving public acts of commemoration, such as reburial of the
bones of compatriots. Beginning in 1988, thousands o f Lithuanians, Latvians and
Estonians went to look for the graves of relatives who had been deported to Siberia. Some
of the remains were brought back by plane. According to the Lithuanian Union of
Political Prisoners and Deportees, since 1989 the remains of approximately 10,000
deportees have been brought back to Lithuania from Siberia. Vytautas Landsbergis. the
former leader of S^judis. the Lithuanian restorationist movement, captured the mood in his

l20Karklins, 70.
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memoirs: "In the wilderness of Siberia, from the Arctic Ocean to Altay and Kazakhstan,
there are graveyards containing the remains of nothing but Lithuanians. Som e o f them
have survived. People went there, and, having found the graves of their relatives, took
care of them. Some of the remains were brought back, and re-buried in the homeland.
Many graves are unknow n."121
During the revival period, collecting the bones o f the compatriots and re-burying
them in the Baltic states becam e a symbolic act of remembrance and a powerful source of
legitimacy for the restorationist cause. Establishing a link between the arm ed resistance
movements and the restorationist movements was another source of legitimacy. Thus, the
name of Sqjudis [M ovem ent], the Lithuanian restorationist movement, stems from the
unified resistance organization active in 1949.
In addition, the restorationists began to reveal past injustices. The Estonian
Heritage Society, one o f the first civic restorationist organizations in Estonia, began by
filling in the blanks in E stonia’s history. In 1988. the Estonian historian M art Laar, the
leader of this organization, published a series of articles entitled Vremia Koshmarov [The
Time of Nightmares] about the fate of three villages in Estonia, the inhabitants of which
perished from the activity o f the "destruction battalions" during the summ er o f 1941. The
articles, based on research conducted by the Estonian Heritage Society, caused a sensation.
The next year, the historian found himself in court: both Laar and the editors of the journal
in which his articles appeared were accused of lacking evidence and of "a possible attempt
to undermine the Soviet state." Half a year later, the case was dropped because

l2lVvtautas Landsbergis. Luzis prie Baltijos [A Change at the Baltic] (Vilnius:
Vaga. 1997). 89.
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prosecutors were unable to show any "proof of m isconduct.” Several years later, Laar
became the Prime M inister of Estonia.'” Mart L aar’s transformation is an excellent
example of the entanglement between history and politics during this period.
A controversy that shook the Soviet Estonian establishment began when the
cultural weekly Sirp ja Vasar [Hammer and Sickle] published Evald Laasi’s survey o f
Estonians deported under Stalin.123 Under pressure from the Estonian people, the Supreme
Council of the Estonian SSR passed a resolution condem ning the repressions that were
carried out by the Soviet regime during 1940-53.
In Latvia, the human rights group Helsinki’86 activated the discussion of the
deportations and other repressions in media. On 25 M arch 1989, a special issue o f the
journal Literatura tin Maksla [Literature and Art] focused on the mass deportations o f 14
June 1941, and 25 M arch 1949, and outlined a project for gathering and publishing
materials and the personal testimony of the victims. Societies and clubs founded by the
victims o f Stalinist repression, the Latvian W riters Union and committees formed to
investigate the crimes committed under Stalin were proliferating.124 The demonstration on
14 June 1987, which was organized by Helsinkj’86, helped to lift the taboo from the topic
of deportations in Latvian society.125

122Toivo Kamenik, “The Estonian Practice Investigating Crimes Against
Humanity and W ar Crim es,” paper presented at the Conference “Investigation of the
Problems of Crimes Against Humanity and W ar C rim es” on 5 November 1998 in Seimas
(the parliament of Lithuania), Vilnius.
12'D zintra Bungs, “Deportations of Balts to the USSR: Still an Uncomfortable
Subject for the Soviet Authorities.” Radio Liberty Report (7 June, 1988).
l24Karlis Racevskis, “Voices from Gulag: A Review Essay,” Journal o f Baltic
Studies 24, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 299.
l25Only after the 14 June 1987 demonstration the Latvian press began to discuss
the topic freely. The ground-breaking article was written by Arturs Skuburs in the
teachers' weekly Skolotaju Avize who refuted standard interpretation of deportations by
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Another aspect of the restorationist movements was to record the names of the
deponed and otherwise repressed. This work—recording the names of the deported— was
later undertaken by the Commission for Research into Stalinist Crimes Committed in
Lithuania, a research center in Latvia and Memento, the Association of the Illegally
Repressed, in Estonia. These lists are a site of memory. Enumerating thousands of names
with similar stories, they represent the fate of family members, neighbors, or
acquaintances— those who underwent forced resettlement or who knew someone who did.
In January 1989, however, different lists began to be compiled. The Estonian
Heritage Society, which had begun by filling in the blanks in Estonia’s history, called for
the creation of a congress elected exclusively by pre-1940 citizens and their descendants.
Citizens Committees, which were widely supported by former political prisoners and
deportees, began to register the names of all citizens of the interwar republic and their
descendants. The idea of a relationship between nation and state began to crystallize. In
198S-90. the Supreme Soviets of the Baltic republics adopted laws declaring the
restoration of independence and constitutional amendments declaring Estonian, Latvian,
and Lithuanian the state languages.

The "Internationalists”

The activities of the restorationists and especially their goal to recreate independent
nation states aggravated the supporters of the Soviet stale. Together with public

historian Janis Riekstins. Dzintra Bungs, “Deportations of Balls to the USSR: Still an
Uncomfortable Subject for the Soviet Authorities.” Radio Liberty Report (7 June, 1988).
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commemorations of the formerly deported, embitterments spilled out onto the streets.
Thus a former deportee observed that he found it very vexing to hear some Russian
speakers on the streets of Riga employing the particular insult aimed at Latvians that was a
feature of the language of labor camp guards.126 On the other hand, many Russian
speakers felt threatened by the visible actions of the restorationists. In 1988,
Intennovements (social movements supported by the conservatives from M oscow) were
proclaimed in opposition to popular restorationist movements in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania. The newspapers put out by the Intermovements lam ented about
commemorations o f the Soviet deportations initiated by the restorationists. referring to the
latter as “national-socialists,” and called to build more monuments for those killed by the
“forest brothers”— i.e., mostly supporters o f the Soviet regim e.12'
The internationalists drew their support mostly from Russian speakers. A poll
taken in late 1988 in Latvia indicates that 48% of Russians in Latvia supported the
Intennovement, while only 6% of the Latvians did.128 A sim ilar poll taken in 1989 in
Estonia suggests that the Intermovement was supported only by non-Estonians (10.9% of
non-Estonian inhabitants).129 Public opinion data of 1989 from Lithuania implies that
Yedinstvo (Lithuania’s Intennovement) was supported only by non-Lithuanians (13% of
non-Lithuanian inhabitants).130
The internationalists, represented by the Intennovement and the Joint Council of

126Ibid.
12,“For Some— Memory, for Others— Forgetting?.” Vestnik ID (Estonia) (9 July.
19S9). “Who Are the Real Occupiers,” Yedinst\>o (Latvia) (9 July, 1989).
128Dreifelds, 60.
129Taagepera, Estonia: Return to Independence, 150.
1?0Vladas Gaidys and Danute Tureikyte, Nuomones 1989-1994 [Opinions 19891994] (Vilnius: Filosofijos. sociologijos ir leises institutas. 1994), 47.
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Labor Collectives (labor unions) in Estonia, Yedinstvo (“Unity”) in Lithuania, and the
Intennovement in Latvia, found most of their supporters in ethnic enclaves of the three
states. In April 1989, the Latvian Russian speakers who embraced orthodox Communist
views were demanding for a territorial autonomy in Daugavpils.131
In 1990, pro-Moscow deputies of the Estonian Supreme Council and other proSoviet organizations met in Kohtla-Jarve (northeastern Estonia) to establish the
Interregional Soviet, which conducted an unofficial referendum asking whether the
population approved o f Estonia remaining within the USSR. In Tallinn, Narva and
Kohtla-Jarve 92-96% of those voting approved o f Estonia staying within the U SSR.132 In
1989. the local government o f Vilnius region declared a territorial autonomy and
demanded to be within the Soviet U nion.133 In 1990, only 9% of Russians and 10% of
Poles in eastern Lithuania supported the independent Lithuanian state.134

I31V. Menshikov. “Sotsiologicheskiye problemy multikul’tum ogo obshchestva”
[Social problems of a M ulticultural Society], in M ulticulturalism Latvija: teorija un
prakse [Multiculturalism in Latvia: Theory and Practice], ed. R. Bramane (Daugavpils,
Latvia: Multinational Culture Center. 1996), 101.
I32Klara Hallik, “Ethnopolitical Conflict in Estonia,” in Ethnic Conflict in the
Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis, ed. Leokadia Drobizheva, Rose
Gottemoeller, Catherine M cArdle Kelleher, and Lee Walker (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.
Sharpe, 1996), 101.
'•3A. Brodavskis, “A letter to Michael Gorbachev,” in Lietuvos Rytai [Lithuania’s
East], ed. Kazimieras Garsva and Laima Grum adiene (Vilnius: Valstybinis Leidybos
Centras, 1993). 383.
,34Arunas Eigirdas, “Pietryciy Lietuvos gyventojai” [The Inhabitants of
Southeastern Lithuania], in Lietuvos Mokslo akademija, Pietrycii/ Lietuva: Socialiniai
teisiniai aspektai [Southeastern Lithuania: Social and Legal Aspects] (Vilnius: Lietuvos
Mokslo akademija, 1990). 42.
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The Compromisers

\

I

In addition to the two types of polarized political movements, there were other
groups and individuals— cultural organizations, religious groups, or folklore
ensembles— whose responses to ethnic restructuring were less noticeable, but more people
could associate themselves with such groups even during the Soviet times. Commitment to
Catholic and Lutheran religious beliefs provided the Balts w'ith strong ties to Western
Europe and the United States, which helped to sustain underground publications and,
especially in the case of Lithuania, voice protest against ethnic restructuring and other
aspects o f the Soviet nationalities policy.135
The rise o f the folklore movement started in the sixties: students and intelligentsia
gathered in small groups to leam folk songs, study history, and pagan religion.136 This
movement continued until mid-eighties. Folklore groups were proliferating. To illustrate,
in Lithuania, the number of such groups increased from 5,000 in 1964 to 64,000 in
1 9 7 7 157

l35V. Stanley Vardys, ‘T h e Role of the Churches in the Maintenance of Regional
and National Identity in the Baltic Republics,” in Regional Identity Under the Soviet
Rule: The Case o f the Baltic States, ed. Andre D. Loeber, V. Stanley Vardys, and
Laurence P. A. Kitching (Hackettstown, N.J.: Institute for the Study of Law, Politics, and
Society o f Socialist States, 1990), 152.
I36Romualdas Apanavicius, “Sovietizmas ir lietuviij etnine kultura” [The Soviet
Times and Lithuanian Ethnic Culture], in Pasaulio Lituanistij bendrija, Priklausomybes
met if (1940-1990) lietuvit/ visuomene: pasipriesinim as ir/ar prisitaikymas [The
Lithuanian Society During the Years of Dependence (1940-1990): Resistance and/or
Adaptation] (Vilnius: Pasaulio Lituanistij bendrija, 1996).
l3/Jonas Trinkunas, “Autentiskos liaudies kulturos paieskos 7-8 desimtmetyje”
[Looking for Authentic Folk Culture in 7-8th Decades], in Pasaulio Lituanistij bendrija,
Priklausomybes met if (1940-1990) lietuvit/ visuomene: pasipriesinimas ir/ar
prisitaikymas [The Lithuanian Society During the Years of Dependence (1940-1990):
Resistance and/or Adaptation] (Vilnius: Pasaulio Lituanistij bendrija. 1996). 64.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

151
Cultural activities were especially important for the non-territorial minorities living
in the Baltic states. Their communities were severely affected by deportations. Those who
survived had even fewer cultural rights than Lithuanians, Latvians or Estonians. Only a
large Polish minority in Lithuania managed to acquire some rights: in mid-fifties, as many
as 263 Polish schools were opened plus 82 schools in which Polish was taught.138
However, the Poles in the other Baltic republics and other minorities did not have the
same rights. For example, only in the late fifties were the Baltic Jewish com m unities
allowed to engage in a very limited number o f cultural activities, such as dram a groups
and choirs.139 The Polish minority in Latvia, unlike the one in Lithuania, did not have
newspapers nor schools. Only in seventies was it allowed to renew one cultural
association. 1 4 0
When the power of the Soviet state began to decline, non-territorial ethnic
communities were the first actors to establish active organizations.141 Even prior to the
consolidation o f popular national movements within the Baltic states, multiple cultural
minority associations were created. In 1988. the Lithuanian Jewish community renewed
its activity. By then, out o f a vibrant com munity of 200,000 Litvaks, only several
thousand Jews were left in Lithuania, and they were contemplating moving to Israel. Many
did so. Several organizations—Tkuma. a Sionist association, and a chapter of Sochnut, the

l?8Tom asz Piesakowski. The Fate o f Poles in the USSR 1939-1989 (London: Gryf,
1990), 254.
139Segal, 226.
l4,)Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Latvia, National and Ethnic Groups in
Latvia: Informative Material (Riga: M inistry of Justice of the Republic o f Latvia, 1996),
16.
|4|Algis Krupavicius. Lietuva kelyje / demokratijq [Lithuania on Its W ay to
Democracy] (Kaunas: Technologija. 1992).
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World Jewish organization—were created in Lithuania to coordinate the Jewish emigration
to Israel.u: Prompted by the activists of the tiny Lithuanian Jewish community of fewer
than 4.000 members, Lithuania became the first post-communist state (or, at that time, the
first post-communist entity) to adopt a law to ensure that the graves and cemeteries of
Jews would be taken care of.
At the same time, the Latvian Jews and Poles recreated their cultural associations.
Sim ilar phenomena were taking place in Estonia. The Ukrainians, Jews, Armenians, and
other non-territorial ethnic groups began to organize their com munities and even created a
unified Forum of National Minorities which included more than twenty ethnic groups.143
The Program o f the Forum asked for Cultural Autonomy for non-territorial nationalities
living in Estonia.144 In Lithuania, the Jewish community lobbied other minority groups to
support the adoption of a law on national minorities, which allocated some state support
for a Jewish cultural association. The Estonian and Latvian republics also adopted the
laws supporting the rights of minorities. W elcoming these laws on minority rights, the
non-territorial minorities supported the re-establishment of independence and were willing
to get engaged in the political processes within the dem ocratizing Baltic polities.

l42SoIomonas Atamukas. Lietuvos zydtfkelias [A History of Lithuanian Jews]
(Vilnius: Alma Littera, 1998), 357-69.
14'By 1992, there were no fewer than 65 ethnic clubs and societies in Estonia.
Rein Ruutsoo, “T h e Emergence of Civil Society in Estonia 1987-1994,” in Between Plan
and Market: Social Change in the Baltic States and Russia, ed. Raimo Blom, Hari Melin.
and Jouko Nikula (Berlin: W aller de Gruyter, 1996), 115.
l44Forum of Estonia’s National M inorities, “Estijos tautybiy forumo nuostatai”
[The Program of the Forum of Estonia’s National M inorities], in Persitvarkyrno
Pabaltijyje m otyvai [The Aspects o f Changes in the Baltics], comp. Aleksandras
Krasnovas. Uldis Nuorietis. and Endelis Pilau (Vilnius: Vaga. 1989). 75-76.
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CONCLUSION

Tracing the process whereby ethnic restructuring was conducted in the Baltic states
points to two mechanisms at work. First, forced resettlements spurred armed resistance
movements and incurred long lasting polarization within societies. By and large (with a
partial exception o f Lithuania), this polarization occurred along ethnic lines: i.e., the
Russian speaking newcomers versus the autochthonous residents. It is not surprising,
therefore, that resistance movements in the three states had a nationalist flavor: they
embraced the goal o f eventually restoring the nation state.
By producing underground publications and transmitting information to the West,
the restorationist movements strived not only to invoke, but also to preserve historical
memory about deportations and other repressions conducted by the Soviet state. Adhering
to historical memory about ethnic restructuring helped the restorationists to legitimate
their activities and to gain overwhelming public support during the initial stage of
democratization. Supported by autochthonous ethnic groups, the restorationists
constituted the backbone of future political comm unities in the three polities. Yet their
reliance on historical memory also suggested a possibility that some groups may be
excluded from em erging political com m unities. Especially those social and political
groups who were associated with the former perpetrators became likely to be excluded.
Second, not only did ethnic restructuring prompt polarization between the older
residents and the newcomers, it also sharpened ethnic consciousness o f smaller (non
territorial) minorities. Even though the latter did not form strong movements during the
Soviet times, they became very active— by asking for cultural rights and recounting past
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injustices— during the initial stage of democratization. Yet instead of joining Moscowsupported Intennovements. most non-territorial minorities supported the emerging nation
states. Thus, the existence of numerous ethnic groups did not impede the process of
democratization. On the contrary, by voicing their demands to protect what was left from
their communities after deportations and russification, the non-territorial ethnic
communities helped to strengthen nascent civil societies within the Baltic polities.
In sum, having experienced five decades of ethnic restructuring, the democratizing
entities were faced with a serious obstacle to successful political community building.
There were political groups, supported by Moscow and numerous local Russian speakers
and, in the case of Lithuania, the Poles, who contested the existence of independent nation
states. On the other hand, the radical wing of restorationist movements resisted inclusion
of the “others”— i.e., political and social groups, associated with the former perpetrators
from the Soviet regime— into the emerging polities.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

155
CHAPTER VI
PO LITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING IN ESTONIA

The goal o f this chapter is to trace the approaches that the Estonian state used to
reduce polarization and thus to legitimatize its power toward minorities opposed to the
state. This case study consists of four parts. First, it traces the attitudes o f Estonia’s
minorities towards the state during the initial stage of political com m unity building and
documents the presence of polarized ethnopolitical groups. Second, this chapter traces
political com m unity building “from above.” This means that the chapter discusses the
policies that were adopted by the Estonian state toward its minorities. Third, the chapter
traces political com m unity building “from below.” It examines ethnic relations at the level
of local governments, exploring whether Estonia’s Russians were allowed to use the state
as a “service station” (i.e., whether they received full economic and social rights as
permanent residents o f Estonia), and looks at the ways that the two com m unities handled
their different historical memories. This chapter concludes by exploring the level of
polarization in Estonia in the late nineties and analyzing which of the approaches used by
the Estonian state were most successful at reducing polarization.

ETHNOPOLITICAL ACTORS AND POLARIZATION DURING T H E INITIAL STAGE
OF COMMUNITY BUILDING (1989-95)

In the context o f regaining the past and commemorating it (as described in the
previous chapter), Estonia declared itself independent in 1991. The newly restored polity
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found itself filled with people for whom the years 1940—41 and 1945—53 had different
meanings. As sociological studies conducted during the early stages o f community
building suggested, the attitudes o f Estonians and Russians toward history and the
influence o f the Soviet Union were, by and large, diametrically opposed. Estonians held
negative opinions about the increasing percentage of non-Estonians living in their state1
and were concerned about the geographical proximity of Russia. Estonia’s Russians
thought that the fact that their "mother" state was nearby was a positive factor.2
As Table 3 shows, in 1988, approximately half of ethnic Russians held a negative
attitude toward the Estonian state and citizenship. In 1990, the majority o f the Russians
living in Estonia preferred only partial independence for Estonia. Approximately one half
of the respondents thought that Estonia should stay within the reformed Soviet Union. On
the other hand, an absolute majority (96%) o f Estonians supported independence.3
Similarly to divisions along ethnic lines within society, Russian and Estonian political
forces held radically different opinions about the existence of an independent Estonian
state.
There were three major clusters. The first one, the restorationists (the right),
focused on bringing about the "decolonization" of Estonia. This goal was especially
pronounced during the first stage (1991—95) of community building.

'O f the 602,380 non-Estonians living in Estonia in 1989, only 38,174 were either
bom in Estonia before 1940 or descended from someone bom in Estonia before 1940.
Statistical Office of Estonia. 33.
:Michael Geistlinger and Aksel Kirch. Estonia—A New Framework fo r the
Estonian M ajority and the Russian M inority (Vienna: Braumiiller, 1995), 43.
3Ibid., 44—45.
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Table 3. Attitudes of Estonia’s Russians Towards the Estonian Nation and the Estonian
State. 19S9-99*
Attitude toward
Estonians

Attitude
toward
citizenship

Sept.
1989

Sept.
1990

April
1992

Feb.
1993

June
1993

Mar.
1996

Nov.
1999**

positive

positive

9

17

10

18

30

55

55 (positive)

neutral

positive

—

13

29

42

23

24

21 (ready to
engage into
politics)

neutral

neutral

7

40

30

15

21

7

-

neutral

negative

37

21

11

17

19

9

-

negative

negative or
neutral

47

9

20

8

7

5

3 (for
emigration)

Notes:
* Data for 1989-96 is from Aksel Kirch’s studies. In 1989. the questionnaire for Russian speakers included
four answers to the question on their preferences concerning the future political status of Estonia. The first
was "the maintenance of the present status," the second. "Estonia must stay in reformed Soviet Union
(confederation)." the third. "Estonia as an absolutely independent state." and the fourth was "cannot
answer." The first answer is put into the fifth row of this table (neutral/negative attitude). The second is put
into the sixth row (negative/negative or neutral). The third is deemed to correspond with the second row
(positive/positive), and the fourth is equated with the fourth row (neutral/neutral).
** Data for 1999 summarizes the findings of the Institute of the Open Estonian Society, published in the
Postimees (5 November. 1999): 7. Approximately one fifth of non-Estonians held a highly positive attitude

towards developments in the country. 55*%
- opposed emigration from Estonia. (In this graph, the attitude is
marked as "positive.") The institute study included a rating of five potential strategies. The options were:
to leave Estonia for the ethnic country of origin, to fight with the Estonians for political power, to learn the
state language, to attempt to influence developments and to help the Estonians to build a better country.
The "emigration" option was the least desirable. The option of participation in the political process had
21% support. The remaining three strategies had roughly 42% support.

Sources:
Geistlinger and Kirch.
Kirch. Marika, and Aksel Kirch. "Identity Changes and the Emergence of a New Integration Paradigm.” In
The Integration o f Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History. Problems, and Trends, ed. Aksel
Kirch. Tallinn: Estonian Academy Publishers, 1997.
Ott. Attiat F.. Axel Kirch, and Marika Kirch. "Ethnic Anxiety: A Case Study of Resident Aliens in Estonia
(1990-92)." Journal o f Baltic Studies 27. no. 1 (Spring 1996): 21-45. Includes a description of
the methodology used in their study.
Postimees (5 November. 1999). 5.
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Their political discourse was based on the state-bearing nation’s claim to its
historical homeland.4 The second cluster included extreme left wing parties, the most
radical o f which (e.g., the Coordinating Committee for the Autonomy o f Northeastern
Estonia) had their origins in the Iniemiovement. They were directly opposed to the
restorationists’ case. The third cluster consisted of compromisers, most notably the Center
party (a product of the national revival movement), which tried to live up to the demands
of both Estonians and non-Estonians.5
At first, the restorationist cause was most intensively championed by the Estonian
Congress, which was established in 1989 by Estonian nationalists and the Estonian
National Independence Party.6 After the restoration o f statehood in 1991 and the
emergence of a multiparty system, this cause was most strongly supported by the Pro
Patria party.7 This party opposed liberalization of the citizenship law and the easing of

4Graham Smith et al„ Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands, 96.
5For a comprehensive description o f the evolution of the Estonian party system,
see Pettai and Kreuzer, 148-89.
6During 3 January-24 February 1990 the Estonian Congress set up an alternative
(to Soviet Estonia) election procedure, which excluded all post-1940 immigrants. The
Estonian National Front decided to support this movement and to participate in these
elections. The electoral districts corresponded to the administrative boundaries of
counties and municipalities in Estonia in 1940. The Estonian Congress wanted to
become a legislative institution, and, as time went on, it demanded more power. In
August 1991, after the restoration of independence, both the Supreme Council of the
Estonian SSR and the Estonian Congress agreed to work on a Constitution.
'This Party was extremely successful in the first elections to the Estonian
parliament, winning 22% of the vote in 1992. It won 7.9% of the vote during the second
election (1995) and 15.98% of the vote (the second largest share after the Centrists) in
March 1999. After the local and parliamentary elections of 1999, Pro Patria Union held a
leading position in the Estonian parliament and in the Tallinn city government. “The
Chickens of Pro Patria Union Are the Fattest,” Eesti Paevaleht (29 November, 1999), 2.
Its supporters are mostly Estonian (11.6% of the electorate), although non-Estonians
(0.7% of the electorate) support this party as well. In 1998 it received 9.7% of the vote.
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language requirements for non-citizens. In the words o f Mart Laar. E stonia's Prime
M inister, the position of Pro Patria could be summarized as follows: "Pro Patria Union
does not oppose the idea o f integrating non-Estonians [into the political community], but
they must learn the language first. The government should improve its language teaching
policies instead of making concessions to Russia.”8 This party's position regarding the
citizenship law and language policies remained consistent throughout the later stages of
political community building, despite occasional criticism of these policies by some party
members (e.g.. Minister Juris Mois).9
Other political parties, such as the Right-wingers or the People’s Party, have
em braced positions similar to those o f Pro Patria Union, but Pro Patria has exercised the
most political influence.10 Furthermore, Memento (the Union of the Formerly Repressed)
also supports the cause of the restorationists.11 It is a social movement that has significant
moral authority.
At the other end o f the spectrum, in the late eighties and the early nineties the
restorationist cause was opposed by the Interregional Soviet, a M oscow-supported
organization, and the Coordinating Comm ittee for the Autonomy of Northeastern Estonia

8“Ex-PM Slams Government’s Leniency W ith Non-Citizens,” ETA News Release,
(9 December, 1997).
’Writing in Eesti Paevaleht in April 1999, Juri M ois argued that Estonian
citizenship policy has been too inflexible and that the state “should be braver in making
exceptions in the granting of citizenship.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline
(10 April, 1999). "
l0Since 7 March 1999, the Pro Patria Union has been in alliance with the Reform
Party and the Moderates. These parties have formed a government.
11Memento claims that their goal is to preserve the memory of those who have
suffered. According to their statement o f purpose the “ [com pilation o f the register [of
those were deported or otherwise repressed]” and the “perpetuation of the collected
information on [Soviet] genocide policy and its results will help to direct Estonia’s
domestic and foreign policy.” Oispuu, A6.
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(CCANE), which called for political and territorial autonomy for regions of Estonia with a
Russian-speaking m ajority.12 The political rhetoric o f the CCANE. which was especially
active in 1992-93. described the independent Estonian state as a threat to Russians living
in Estonia.
With the exception of the CCANE, Estonia’s Russians were relatively unorganized
during the first stage o f community building. The first political parties began to emerge
only in the mid-nineties (see the following section o f this chapter). The first large-scale
protest took place on 21 March 1992. when approximately 8—10.000 Russians
dem onstrated in Tallinn. They demanded that the governm ent freeze prices and guarantee
food for the poor. Organized by the former hard-line Com m unist faction of the Estonian
parliament, this group also demanded that Gorbachev be put on trial for dismantling the
Soviet U nion.13
In addition to these diametrically opposed ethnopolitical movements, there was a
weak movement that allegedly tried to look for com prom ises between the two
communities. This movement considered itself to be the successor of the Estonian
National Front which tried to build bridges between the two communities. This
movement, the "compromisers," was led by the C enter party and Edgar Savisaar, former
leader o f the Estonian National Front. Savisaar has frequently argued that the existence of
many people without citizenship "may cause the creation o f closed communities which
could be dangerous to the Estonian state."14 Often the goal of such discourse, however.
12John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, Ethnopolitics in the New Europe
(Boulder. Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 98.
13SauIius G im ius, “Russians Demonstrate in Tallinn,” Radio Liberty Report (23
March, 1992).
l4“Center Party Leader Demands Simpler Requirements in Granting Citizenship,”
ETA New s Release (24 August, 1997).
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has been to gain political capital and to remain in power.15
This analysis of the domestic actors and their platforms suggests that during the
first stage of community building in Estonia, there were no domestic actors genuinely
interested in building an inclusive political community in Estonia. The actors that were
interested in achieving this goal were, by and large, international institutions and Western
governments, especially those of the Nordic states. These actors were fearful that any
dispute between Russians and Estonians in Estonia could escalate into violence
threatening European security. Tracing the strategies used by the Estonian state from
above illustrates the influence of these actors.

TRACING TH E PROCESS O F COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM "ABOVE"

19S9-95: Defining the Borders o f Political Community

In an interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestiya, Estonian president Lennart
Meri thus explained the rationale behind the 1992 citizenship law, which granted
citizenship only to those who held Estonian citizenship before 16 June 1940 and their
descendants: "W e [i.e., the policymakers] were faced with a problem: How could the
rights and interests of the citizens of prewar Estonia and their descendants, who had no say
in becoming Soviet citizens, be maintained? . . . After independence was restored, we
chose the option o f the continuity of Estonian citizenship. There was no other way for

l5It won 14.2% of the vote in 1995 parliament elections and 23.6% in 1999. The
support for the Centrists grew mainly due to the backing of the non-Estonian voters.
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us."16 M en acknowledged that when state creation was in its early stages, memory of past
wrongs and especially a yearning for restitution became a constitutive elem ent of political
community building in Estonia.17 A closer analysis of the arguments put forward by the
political actors identified above should help to explain why many Estonians, especially the
restorationists, believed that "there was no other way for us" other than to accept such a
citizenship law.
Remembering the deportations and other forms of repression that were carried out
during Soviet times became a part of the debate on citizenship. Those who argued for
restrictive citizenship laws (first and foremost, the restorationists, some of whom were the
victims of Soviet repression) noted that the Baltic states fall under provisions o f the Fourth
Geneva Convention o f 1949, which prohibits the deportation or transfer of members of an
occupying pow er's population into territory it occupies during war. Thus, they argued,
Estonia should be perm itted to "decolonize" its territory.18 For some, "decolonization”
implied disenfranchisem ent and for some even resettlement of Estonia’s Russians. Such
opinions, em phasizing the link between m em ories of past wrongs and deciding who will
be "one of us," were captured in the writings o f Rein Taagepera:
If you were to subtract deportees’ children and their relatives few Estonians would
I6“Not the Right o f the Strong but the Right of the Equal,” Izvestiva (2 April,
1999). Available from http://www.president.ee; INTERNET.
17During his interview with the Ljubljana Delo in Slovenia, M en acknowledged
that "it is no secret that we wanted to continue our political path where it had been
stopped by the agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939, that is, in
1940. That was not very realistic.” "Estonian President Interviewed on NATO, EU
Membership,” FB1S-SOV-97-142 (22 May, 1997).
I8CSCE, Human Rights and Democratization in Estonia (W ashington, D.C.:
CSCE. 1993), 8. In 1993, Jiiri Estam, a m em ber of the Congress of Estonia, established a
Decolonization Foundation. The goal of this foundation was to pursue the process of
"decolonization." which for some radical restitutionists meant the expulsion o f Estonia’s
Russians.
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be left. And this [the deportations] was done to Estonians by Russians, not by
some faceless "Soviets"— unless, of course, one is also willing to claim that the
Jewish Holocaust was Nazi and therefore not German. Russian colonists took the
place o f Estonians who either fled or were deported. Forgive? Yes. Forget? No.
Accept colonial settlers who refuse to leam Estonian as substitutes for those
Estonians who were killed and those who. as a result, were never bom ? Take a
guess at the answer.19
During the intensive discussions that took place in the Estonian parliam ent on the
laws of citizenship (September and October o f 1991), the following opinion was voiced by
Johannes Kass, one of the more radical members of parliament: "In an indirect way, you
[i.e., ethnic Russians living in Estonia], as citizens of the Soviet Union, are guilty for what
that slate did to the Republic o f Estonia in 1939."20 Others feared that the existence of the
Estonian state and nation would be threatened if the Russians (the "latecomers") were
granted citizenship.
The opponents (the "compromisers," most of whom were members o f the Estonian
Popular Front and former Communists) based their arguments on the fact that the
application o f any requirements for citizenship in a retroactive order was "illegitimate,
illegal, and undemocratic" (Pavel Panfilov, Enn Leisson), that the alienation o f Estonia’s
Russians was "not in our national interest" (Rein Veidemann), and that the restoration of
the citizenship law of 1938 would be criticized by the W est (Peet Kask).21 International
conventions on the reduction o f statelessness were cited.
These arguments, however, were undermined by the results of a poll taken by the
Interregional Soviet (an organization closely related to the Intennovement), which asked

19Taagepera, Estonia: Return to Independence, 218. 1 would like to thank the
author for his permission to use this quote.
:oPeet Kask, “National Radicalization in Estonia: Legislation on Citizenship and
Related Issues,” Nationalities Papers 22, no. 2 (1994): 382.
:iKask, 382-83.
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the people of Estonia if they would like to remain within the Soviet Union. In Tallinn,
Narva, and Kohtla-Jarve (areas with large numbers of Russians), 92—96% of the
approximately 330.000 people who participated in the vote said "yes" to staying in the
USSR.22 This enabled the restorationists, such as Andres Tarand, to argue that many
Russians "have been loudly bellicose against the Estonian state. And now those people
only remember their rights."23
In addition to reviving memories of the deportations and the subsequent influx of
Russian settlers, the arguments o f the restorationists were strengthened by the fact that
until August 1991, the Interregional Soviet (which was supported by Moscow and some
Russians, especially in Northeastern Estonia) possessed all the attributes of state power: a
government, armed forces, control of the economy, and its own radio station.24 This state
like entity became a source o f anxiety among Estonians. Thus, eventually, the
Interregional Soviet added political capital to the restorationist cause. The restorationist
version of the citizenship law, which granted Estonian citizenship only to those who held
Estonian citizenship before 16 June 1940 and to their descendants, was accepted in
February 1992. Furthermore, the Estonian Citizen Party, Pro Patria, the Moderates, and
the Estonian National Independence Party—parties that supported the restorationist
cause—were elected to parliament in September 1992.
The initial version o f the Estonian law on aliens (adopted on 21 June 1993) and the
introduction of temporary travel documents were also partly intended to make the
Russians leave. In accordance with the law on aliens, most residents who had settled in

"H allik, “Elhnopolitical Conflict in Estonia,” 101.
23Kask, 383.
24HalIik, “Ethnopolitical Conflict in Estonia.” 101.
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Estonia prior to 1 July 1990 were initially given only temporary residence permits valid
for two years.2-'' 8.238 Russians left Estonia in 1991. Then their number increased to
25.892 in 1992. 10.983 left Estonia the following year. 6.421 Russians left Estonia in
1994. and 6.525 in 1995. The out-migration of Russians began to decline in 1996, when
4.844 Russians left the country. In 1998, only 1,401 Russians decided to leave.26
The law on aliens, adopted in 1993, caused the most upheaval, both nationally and
internationally. Years 1992 and 1993 marked the beginning of the "internationalization"
of community building in Estonia. Among the numerous governmental and non
governmental actors that got involved in political com munity building in Estonia, the
CSCE (OSCE since February 1993), its High Com m issioner for Minorities, and, to a
lesser extent, the Council o f Europe were the most visible and vociferous.27 In July 1992,
at the summit of the CSCE, a High Commissioner on National Minorities—a post "on"
minorities rather than "for" minorities—was created.28 This post was created with Russia's

25Bungs. The Baltic States, 79. The CSCE High Commissioner began to push for
residence and work permits. He argued that “the best course of action would be to allow
those who were permanent residents during Soviet times, and those who continue to
reside in Estonia, to become Estonian residents without a three year waiting period."
Estonian Review (16—22 May, 1994). It was not until 1997 that a significant number of
Russians were finally granted permanent residence permits.
26Statistical Office o f Estonia, 54. In 1993, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe urged Russia to draft legislation for ethnic Russians wishing to return
to Russia from the Baltic states, arguing that repatriation was not the result of national
discrimination, but of a “loss o f privileges.” Radio Liberty Report (8 February, 1993).
27Hanne-Margret Birckenbach, “Preventive Diplomacy: Conclusions from
International Intervention into the Estonian and Latvian Conflicts Over Citizenship,”
Schleswig-Holstein Institute f o r Peace Research Paper No. 44 (1997), 9. Also see ‘T he
Baltic Revolution: Sea of Dream s.” Economist (18 April, 1998): 50—52.
2s“On minorities” m eans that the High Com m issioner’s mandate prevents him
from seeking to resolve conflicts that already have erupted. It is not a vehicle through
which the violations of human rights can be addressed. Jane Wright, “The OSCE and the
Protection of Minority Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 18. no. 1 (February 1996): 200.
Also see “Max van der Stoel. Minority M an,” Economist (11 September, 1999): 60.
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support and with the Russians in Estonia in mind. Beginning in Decem ber 1992, the
CSCE and its High Com m issioner became heavily involved in community building in
Estonia. They tried to help Estonia by offering their comments on the law on aliens.
When addressing the question of Estonia’s Russians, the Nordic states often
referred to the statements o f CSCE/OSCE High Com m issioner M ax van der Stoel.29 The
European Union and NATO also played significant roles in the process of political
community building in Estonia.
After 1993, Russia began to link the issue o f its "compatriots" with other issues in
its negotiations with the Estonian government. These included a border accord and the
issue o f troop withdrawal.30 Numerous threats w ere made to the Estonian government,
especially in 1992-95. These included Yeltsin’s infamous warning to remember "certain
geopolitical and demographic realities."31 Statements about the "plight" of Russians in
Estonia by Russian leaders were often meant for domestic consumption, especially to
please the Duma which was dominated by the Com munists until the end of 1999.32 On the
other hand, Russia’s endless com plaints to the international community about alleged
human rights violations in the Baltic states were an attempt to assert its influence in the
29Martti Ahtisaari, “The Position of Finland and Estonia in Today’s Europe,”
speech in Tallinn, 12 November 1998. Available from http://www.president.ee:
INTERNET.
30“Estonia: Russia’s Baburin Links Border Accord With O ther Issues,” FBISSOV-96-247 (21 December, 1996). Sergey Baburin, the Deputy Speaker of the Russian
Duma, said that “any agreement concluded with Estonia” would be linked to the
problems of Russians living in Estonia.
3l“StiIl on the Prowl,” Economist (28 August, 1993). In addition, Russia has
linked the issue o f the border agreem ent with the “problems of Russian speaking
residents.” “Yeltsin Puts Condition on Estonia, Latvia Border Treaties,” FBIS-SOV-97336 (2 December, 1997).
32An example of such a statem ent is: “A m ajor objective of foreign policy is to
protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population living abroad.” Boris Yeltsin, Sixth
Annual Report to the Federal Assembly and State Duma, 30 March 1999.
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territory o f the former USSR.33
Given this enormous international pressure. E stonia's laws and policies of
community building had to be constantly revised. Initially, in the words of Andres Kollisl
(the author o f the law on aliens), this notorious law was intended to "regulate the relations
with those [aliens] who already live here; to document and somehow classify them."34
Reportedly, Kollist wanted to make those Russians who ignored the calls for registration
apply for residency and job permits. However, this did not happen. Instead, many
Russians, especially those in Northeastern Estonia and in Russia, characterized this
attempt as "ethnic cleansing."35 The Russians in Northeastern Estonia held a referendum
on regional autonomy. Russian Foreign M inister Andrei Kozyrev threatened to "halt all
oil and gas deliveries to the county [Estonia] if it did not change course."36 These
developments attracted international attention. International institutions and Western
governments were worried that the goal of the law was not only to regulate the status of
non-citizens, but also, in the words of Joanne Skolnick, to "make them feel unwelcome in
the hope that they would leave."37
The Council o f Europe—the international institution that Estonia hoped to join at
that time—announced that the law contained inconsistencies with the norms of public

33Zevelev, 276.
34“Red Passports Out of Use for Good,” an interview with Andres Kollist, ETA
Insight (16—22 May, 1997).
35Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, Russians
the New M inority (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1996), 102.
36Ott, Kirch, and Kirch, 22.
37Joanne Skolnick, “Grappling with the Legacy o f the Soviet Rule: Citizenship
and Human Rights in the Baltic States,” University o f Toronto Faculty Law Review 54,
no. 2 (Spring 1996). Available from http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/law-review;
INTERNET. I am indebted to the OSCE mission in Tallinn for referring me to this
source.
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international law, and with European law in particular. This was a change com pared to the
previous position of the Council of Europe regarding Estonia’s minorities, which can be
summarized using the words of Catherine Lalumire. the Council of Europe’s SecretaryGeneral in 1992: "giving the right to vote to all Russian people living in Estonia could
jeopardize Estonia’s identity."38
The CSCE High Commissioner expressed concern that the vague wording of the
law would, in effect, put a lot of power in the hands of Estonian government officials.39
The CSCE criticized the requirement that "permanent residents" would have to repeat the
registration process every five years.40 The Committee of Senior Officials o f the CSCE
was so concerned with the Estonian case that it became the topic of discussion during their
17th, 18th, and 19th meetings between November 1992 and February 1993.41 In response
to this enormous pressure, President Meri asked the parliament to amend the law. He
refused to sign it until it was endorsed by the CSCE and the Council of Europe.
Amended because of international pressure, the final version of the law on aliens
guaranteed residency and work permits to those who settled in the country prior to 1 July
1990. Those who were denied residency permits had the right to appeal this decision.
During the same year (1993), the President’s Roundtable was created to establish
institutional contact between Estonia’s Russians and the state. The Roundtable, supported
by a number of foreign embassies in Tallinn, became a forum in which the representatives
of Estonia’s minorities held monthly discussions with the representatives of the Estonian
38Riina Kionka, “Lalumire: Estonia Does Right By Minorities,” Radio Liberty
Report (20 February, 1992).
39SkoInick.
40CSCE, Human Rights and Democratization in Estonia, 15-16.
4lFalk Lange, ‘T he Baltic States and the CSCE.” Journal o f Baltic Studies 25. no.
3 (Fall 1994): 248.
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parliament on issues that concerned them and came up with recommendations for the
lawmakers.42 In addition, a law governing local elections was passed, which permitted
permanent residents and citizens of other countries who had lived in Estonia for five years
to participate in local elections (see Table 4). Under the pressure o f the Council of
Europe, the organization which Estonia was hoping to join, the citizenship law was
amended to add those whose maternal ancestors were pre-1940 citizens (see Table 4).43
Furthermore, the Estonian Constitution, adopted in 1992, guaranteed non-citizens
equal civil rights to those of citizens.44 The Constitution gave numerous rights, such as
freedom o f expression, access to the courts and limited participation in the political
process to all residents o f the state. The adoption o f the Dwelling Privatization Act gave
everybody, regardless of citizenship, the right to acquire their present apartment in
exchange for vouchers given to them by the government.45
Estonia’s willingness to guarantee these rights to non-citizens was duly noted by
the Council of Europe. Thus, in 1993, over the protests of the Russian delegation, Estonia
was admitted to the Council of Europe.

4:Office o f the President o f Estonia, “A New Cycle of the President’s
Roundtable,” Press Release (15 January 1996). Available from http://www.presideni.ee:
INTERNET. In 1995, the Roundtable included five members of the Estonian parliament,
five members of the Association of Estonia’s Nationalities, and five members from the
Russian Representative Assembly.
43Lowell W. Barrington. ‘T h e Making of Citizenship Policy in the Baltic States,”
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 13. no. 159 (1999): 193. The previous law
included only those whose paternal ancestors were pre-1940 citizens.
44SkoInick.
45Vouchers were given to all residents of Estonia for the years that that resident
worked in Estonia. Non-citizens got the right to own apartments and real estate virtually
at no cost to them. Ainso, 19. Others have argued, however, that Estonians received
proportionally greater compensation than Russians for illegally expropriated property.
Erik A. Andersen, “The Legal Status o f Russians in Estonian Privatization Legislation
1989-95,” Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 2 (1997): 305.
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Table 4. Estonian Legislation: Citizenship Laws, the Law on Aliens, the Language Law,
and the Local Election Law
DATE

LEGISLATION

Feb. 1992

The citizenship law of 1938 (ins sanguinis) is re-established.*
Automatic citizenship granted to those who held Estonian citizenship before 16 June
1940 and their descendants (Art. 3)
The naturalization process for other residents included:
- residence in the territory of Estonia for at least the last two years and a one year
waiting
period (residence census "2+1 ”),
- proficiency in the Estonian language.
- an oath of loyalty to the state: "In applying for Estonian citizenship, I swear to be loyal
to the constitutional state system of Estonia."

Feb.-March
1993

The citizenship law is amended.
Citizenship is offered to those who have registered for citizenship prior to the elections
to the Congress of Estonia (February-March 1990);**
Citizenship is offered to those whose maternal ancestors held Estonian citizenship
before 1940.

July 1993

A revised version of the law on aliens is adopted. (It was first adopted on 21 June
1993.) This version
- classifies all non-citizens as aliens and requires them to apply for residency and work
permits within two years (and not five, as in the previous version) if they wish to remain
in the country;
- establishes that non-citizens must apply for Estonian. Russian, or other citizenship or
an alien's passport if they want to travel abroad.

May 1993

The local election law is passed. It permits the permanent residents and citizens of other
countries who have lived in Estonia for five years to participate in local elections.***

Jan.1995

The citizenship law is amended. The amendments include:
- residence in Estonia on the basis of a residence permit issued at least five years prior
to the date of written application for Estonian citizenship and at least one year after the
registration of the written application (residence census "5+1"),
- plus: knowledge of the Constitution and the citizenship law (20 questions on the
Constitution and the law, 16 of which must be answered correctly.)

Feb.1995

A new language law is passed. It includes the following:
- the Estonian language is the only official state language,
- the use of minority languages is allowed in areas of minority concentration.
- unlike the 1989 law, this version does not oblige state officials to use Russian when
interacting with Russian speakers.

Sept. 1997

The aliens law is amended. Those who applied for temporary residence permits before
July 12. 1995 become eligible for permanent residence permits starting 12 July 1998.

Dec. 1998

The citizenship law is amended. Children under the age of 15 who were bom in Estonia
after independence and who do not have the citizenship of any state become eligible for
Estonian citizenship through naturalization.
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Table 4 (Continued)
Notes:
* Article 2 of the law on citizenship states that Estonian citizenship:
1) shall be acquired by birth:
2) shall be received by naturalization:
3) shall be restored to any person who has lost Estonian citizenship as a minor:
4) shall be lost through release form or revocation of Estonian citizenship or upon acceptance of the
citizenship of another state.
** In February 1993. approximately 20.000 non-Estonians were granted citizenship by the Estonian
Citizens' Committee for having supported Estonian independence in 1990.
***According to the Estonian Constitution (adopted in 1992). Estonia's non-citizens have the right to use
the courts, to exercise freedom of expression, and to vote in municipal elections. The latter right was
approved by the law on elections to local government councils in 1996.

Sources:
The Estonian Constitution [Russian Version]. Tallinn: Ilo, 1998.

Estonian Parliament. Law on Citizenship (8 December 1998). Available from the Embassy of the Republic
of Estonia in London.

This event was one of Estonia’s greatest foreign policy successes.46 Intense
international involvement in political community building did not go unnoticed by the
domestic actors. At first the widespread international criticism of the laws which
attempted to regulate the borders of the community (e.g., the law on Aliens and the
Citizenship law) was interpreted by the restorationists as a result of the Russian
"propaganda campaign."
The Foreign Ministry was reprimanded by for low efficiency in mounting a

46Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania: Country Studies, ed. W alter R. Iwaskiw
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 73.
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counter-campaign.47 Later, many complained about the "double standards" applied by the
international institutions to the small versus big states and the pressure exerted on Estonia
to "give a definite answer to the classic tension between group rights and individual
rights."4'5
Yet in spite o f the worries by the international actors and Russia’s threats about the
restrictiveness of the citizenship law and the law on aliens,49 some Russians were
applying for (and receiving) the Estonian citizenship. Thus, as illustrated by Table 5, the
number of Russians who chose Estonian citizenship increased from 16% of those residing
in Estonia in 1993 to 35% in 1994. It became approximately 30% in 1995.
When Russian citizenship became available in 1993 to the Russians living in
Estonia, some of them opted for both Russian and Estonian citizenship. (The Russian
citizenship law allows double citizenship.)

47Kask, 385.
48Peter Vares, “Estonia Returns to the International Community: History Repeats
Itself.” Journal o f Baltic Studies 25, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 122. In this article, the rights
of the Estonians to recreate their nationstate are referred to as the "group rights,” and the
rights of the Russians to obtain citizenship are understood as individual rights. The
comment about double standards relates to the fact that unlike Estonia and Latvia, Russia
has not invited the international com m unity to comment on its citizenship law. Erika B.
Schlager. “The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship in Newly Independent OSCE
countries,” Helsinki M onitor 8, no. 1 (1997). Available from
lutp://www.fsk.ethz.ch/osce/h_moni/\ INTERNET.
49Russia attempted to link troop withdrawal to the “human rights abuses” of the
Russian speakers in Estonia, but. under the pressure of the CSCE and other international
actors, it finally withdrew its troops from Estonia in August 1994. Renatas Norkus,
“Preventing Conflict in the Baltic states: A Success Story That Will Hold?,” in
Preventing Violent Conflict, ed. Gianni Bonvicini (Baden-Baden. Germany: Nomos
Verlagsgessellschaft, 1998), 141—42.
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The Response o f Estonia's Russians to the Laws and Policies

In 1993-94. the Russians living in Estonia were becoming a highly differentiated
ethnic group. The ones with a higher social status (i.e., a higher educational and job
status) were usually the ones who had lived in Estonia for a longer period of time and thus
had a better knowledge of Estonian. The Russians from a lower social stratum were likely
to have a negative or neutral attitude vis-a-vis the Estonian state.50 As shown by Table 3,
in July 1993. approximately 30% o f the Russians held a positive attitude toward the
Estonians and the state, while all the rest were either neutral or negative.
The restorationists were concerned about the last category o f the Russians (see
Table 3) who tended to hold a negative attitude toward the Estonian state. They becam e
especially alarmed when Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a Russian ultra-nationalist arguing for the
reintegration o f the Baltic states into Russia, began garnering considerable support am ong
Narva’s Russian citizens.51

50This differentiation was shown by the Identity Structure Analysis (a survey
method), conducted in Estonia in 1993 and 1995. The data showed that in four Estonian
cities Russians identified themselves more with Estonian-Russians than with Russians in
the Russian Federation. Marika Kirch, “Integration Processes in Estonia, 1993-96,” in
The Integration o f Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History, Problems, and Trends,
ed. Aksel Kirch (Tallinn: Estonian Academy Publishers, 1997), 37—41.
5l“Estonia in 1993: A Y ear o f Challenges,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Research Report (21 December, 1993). Those Russians in Estonia who took part in A pril
1993 Russia’s presidential referendum voted overwhelmingly (over 70%) against Yeltsin.
Most of the votes cast in December 1993 were for V ladim ir Zhironovsky (49%). Ain
Haas. “Non-Violence in Ethnic Relations in Estonia,” Journal o f Baltic Studies 27, no. 1
(Spring 1997): 70.
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Table 5. Russians by Estonian or Russian Citizenship (estimates)
Citizens of Estonia

Citizens of the Russian
Federation

April 1992

2%(Kirch)

-

February 1993

167c (Kirch)

10% (Kirch)

December 1994

35% (Kirch)

8% (Kirch)

May 1995

30% (Kirch)

12% (Kirch)

June 1996

29% (Kirch)

18% (Kirch)

February 1997

32.71% (ETA)*

26.65% (ETA)

August 1999

March 1999: appr. 20%—
30%
(RFE/RL)**

appr. 20%*** (ETA)

Notes:
*According to 18 February 1997 ETA announcement, out of predominantly Russian-speaking aliens living
in Estonia. 135.000 are Estonian citizens; 110.000 have taken Russian citizenship and 177,000 do not have
citizenship. According to another source in January 1997. 119.752 people living in Estonia were the
citizens of Russia. FBIS-SOV-97-007 (10 January. 1997). According to the Estonian Statistical office, in
1997. there were 412.628 Russians who were the permanent residents of Estonia.
**According to a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report, between 100.000 and 150.000 of Russian
speakers in Estonia hold Estonian citizenship, which makes them one fifth of the electorate. There were
approximately 500.000 Russian speakers in Estonia in 1999.
***The data for 1999 was received by ETA from the Russian Embassy. On 6 August 1999. nearly 100.000
Russian citizens were registered in Estonia. This represented a drop in approximately 24.000 cases since 1
August 1997. The percentage of the Russians holding the Russian citizenship has been calculated using
1998 data for the total number of Russian residents (409, 111).

Sources:
ETA. Estonian News Agency.
"Ethnic Russian Voters in Estonia Could Play a Key Role in Sunday's Parliamentary Elections.”Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Report (5 March. 1999).
Kirch. Aksel, ed. The Integration o f Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History, Problems, and Trends.
Tallinn: Estonian Academy Publishers. 1997.
Statistical Office of Estonia Statistical Yearbook o f Estonia 1999. Tallinn: Statistical Office of Estonia.
1999.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

175
Partially in response to these activities, but partially hoping to push out the
"colonists." in February 1993. Jiiri Estam. an Estonian-American politician, established
the Decolonization Fund and the electoral bloc Parem Estii [Better Estonia], which openly
sought an "Estonia for the Estonians."5' Such radical restorationist views were not widely
supported by the Estonian public. However, in 1993, a substantial minority (27%) of
Estonians continued to think that the danger of their ethnic extinction was growing.53
Responding to such fears, in February 1995, the restorationists passed a new language law
which reiterated Estonian status as the state language (see Table 5). This law reflected a
new ethnopolitical balance of power, since it no longer obliged state officials to use
Russian when interacting with Russian speakers, as the language law adopted in 1989
did.54 One goal o f this new language law was to strengthen the position of the Estonian
language because Russian was claimed as the first language by 83% of the residents of
Estonia, and Estonian—only by 77%.55
In addition, in January 1995 the citizenship law was made even stricter (see Table
4). The residency requirement for those who entered Estonia after 1992 was changed from
two to five years. For those applying for the citizenship the requirement to know the
Constitution and citizenship law was spelled out, and the language requirement was
tightened.56
5:David J. Smith, “Russia, Estonia and the Search for a Stable Ethno-politics,”
Journal o f Baltic Studies 29, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 7. In 1995 parliament elections, the
Better Estonia received only 3.6% of the popular vote.
53Haas, 72.
54Vello Pettai, “Estonia’s Controversial Language Policies,” Transition (29
November, 1996): 22.
55“Use o f Language in Central European Countries.” Central and Eastern
Eurobarometer (March 1996), Annex Figure 44.
56In February 1992. the language requirement for citizenship was defined at a
fairly liberal level. It was equivalent to the active knowledge of about 1,500 words of
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The European Union did not approve of these changes in legislation. A
conservative politician Mart Nutt, one of the authors of the citizenship law and one of the
founders of Pro Patria party, confronted this criticism by saying that "considering the
present situation in Estonia, it is not possible to follow these suggestions [of the European
Union]."57 Nutt went on to say that even though Estonia asked the EU experts to give their
opinion about the law, this does not give them [the EU experts] the right to demand
changes.58
In 1995, the controversies about the citizenship and language laws abated and were
not rekindled until several years later. However, during this period, several Russian
political parties (most notably, the Russian Party and the United People’s party) came into
being.59 The Russian party, led by Nikolai M aspanov, has represented the Russians with
an Eastem-orientation (i.e., those mostly supporting Moscow). Maspanov summarized his
party's platform by saying that "the society of Estonia will be stable only when the
Russian language is declared the second official language” (which is unacceptable to most
Estonians and especially the restorationists).60 Even though in 1995 this party joined the
Estonian. The idea was to accelerate the process o f integration (understood as learning
the language) by offering “a carrot”— the citizenship. See Pettai, “Estonia’s
Controversial Language Policies,” 22. Following the 1995 law, the language ability exam
tests listening and reading comprehension, writing and speaking ability. Each part is
completed when approximately 60% of the answers are correct. Listening comprehension
includes official statements and announcements, news, description o f events and
explanations. Conversation includes expressing opinions.
57“Estonian Parliament Adopts New Citizenship Law,” ETA News Release (19
January, 1995).
58Ibid.
59During 1995 elections to the Estonian parliament, these two Russian parties
together with the Russian People’s Party of Estonia formed an electoral coalition “Our
Home is Estonia” and received 5.9% of the vote. The alliance disintegrated. In 1999
elections, the United People’s Party won 6.13% o f the vote. Its supporters included 7.4%
non-Estonians and 0.3% Estonians, or 1.6% of the vote.
‘"interview with Nikolai Maspanov, Postimees (27 February, 1998), 2. The
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electoral bloc "O ur Home is Estonia!" with the United People’s Party led by V iktor
Andreyev, the alliance was short lived. Consequently, the two most influential Russian
parties—the Russian party and the United People’s Party—have remained two separate
actors.
According to Viktor Andreyev, the chairman of the United People’s Party (the
second Russian party), the goal o f his party is "to liquidate national segregation [because]
the Estonian parties just do not notice that."61 A ndreyev’s organization does not support
isolation of the Russians and promotes integration based on equal rights.62 The platform
of the party states that equality (between different ethnic groups) can be achieved by
liberalizing the existing law of citizenship. Automatic citizenship should be given to all
those who were bom in Estonia and live in the country at the time of such a new law.63
The party claim s that it does not contest the Estonian language law per se, but it disagrees
with "the law ’s discriminating nature." The party has opposed the principle of collective
guilt [they see it in the application o f exclusive citizenship law] and has argued that all
sections of the population should be equal before the state.64 The party says that it does
not have official relations with the Russian government, but representatives of the party
often travel to Russia to establish trade links and even to soothe Estonian-Russian
relations, when needed.65 One o f the main interests of the party is to help to maintain
Russian party’s supporters include 14.6% non-Estonians (2.6% of the vote).
6lInterview with Viktor Andreyev, Postimees (1 March, 1999), 2.
62“Russian-Speaking Party Holds Congress, Re-elects Chairman,” FBIS-SOV-97025 (1 February, 1997).
6?Klara Hallik, “From M inority Consciousness to Nation-statehood: Estonian
Political Parties on Ethnic Policy,” Revue Baltique no. 7 (1997): 12.
“ Ibid.
65Sanita Upleia, “Levye Latvii i Estonii aklivno obrashchayutsya s M oskvoi” [The
Leftists of Latvia and Estonia Actively Communicate with Moscow], Diena (12 April.
1999), 3.
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stable relations between Russia and Estonia. Predictably, the party has opposed the
prospect of Estonia's membership in NATO.66

1995-Present: Defending the Borders o f Political Community

After introduction of more restrictive language and citizenship laws, ethnic
differentiation which was present during the first stage of political community building
continued to take place.67 Estonia was still a two-society state, in which the Russian and
the Estonian communities had little in common other than using the state as a "service
station." Social differentiation was taking place among the Russian Estonians as well. In
1995, by no means were they a united disenfranchised group as portrayed (and
instrumentalized) by Russia. W ithin the Estonian Russian community, the length of their
stay in Estonia remained the dividing line between those who supported the state and those
who opposed it.68
At the same time, Russia continued to complain about the rights of Russians living
in Estonia. According to Vladimir Parshikov o f the Russian M inistry’s International and

“ During the Latvian-Russian crisis in March 1998, triggered by the protests of the
Russian speaking pensioners, the United People’s Party of Estonia, fearful of a potential
spillover of the conflict to Estonia, called for the normalization of economic ties between
the two countries. See the interview with Aleksandr Glukhov, the Russian Ambassador
to Estonia, in Postimees (26 M arch, 1998), 2. After the US-Baltic Partnership Charter
was signed, this party urged Estonia to sign a sim ilar agreement with Russia. “Russian
Party Calls for Partnership,” Baltic Times (5 February, 1998), 4.
6,For a description of this process, see Aksel Kirch, “Social Integration of Loyal
Non-Estonians in Estonia,” in P ilsoniskaApzipa [Civic Consciousness], ed. Elmars
Vebers (Riga: MacTbu apgads, 1998), 204—7.
“ Ariadna Elango and V iktor Denks, “Estonskiye Russkiye: Prishla Pora
Obustravivat’sva” [Estonia’s Russians: The Tim e Has Come to Settle], M olodezh' Estonii
(10 January, 1996). 2.
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Human Rights Department, a member o f a Russian "fact-finding mission" in Estonia, "the
key problem [in Estonia] is that tens of thousands of people simply cannot get citizenship
of the country in which they live."69 To solve the problem. Russia wanted to create a joint
Russian-Estonian group to reconstruct the Estonian legislation. Such a group was
unacceptable to the Estonians, who argued that would be an outright interference into the
state’s internal affairs.
Responding to Russia’s pressure, the Estonian government did not prevent and
even encouraged international observers to investigate the situation o f human rights and
Russians in particular in their state. In January 1997, the Council o f Europe decided that
Estonia no longer needed to be specially monitored by this human rights organization.
Rudolf Binding, the chief Council of Europe rapporteur, told the Council o f Europe’s
Parliamentary Assembly (CEPA) that "many accusations against Estonia, also in the
Western press, are very much exaggerated and unfair to Estonia."70 Having experienced
pressure from the Russian deputies, who managed to gam er support from some Moldovan
and Ukrainian deputies, the CEPA did pass a resolution requiring the Estonian
government to ensure state support for Russian language schools.71 In addition, Estonia
was asked to improve teaching Estonian to the Russians and to offer free or reduced rate
courses to applicants of citizenship. Helped by the United Nations Development Program

69Tarmu Tammerk, “W rangle O ver Rights Continues,” Baltic Times (2 January,
1997), 1.
70Tarmu Tammerk, “Council of Europe Ends Estonia M onitoring,” Baltic Times
(6 February, 1997), 1.
7lIbid. There are Russian schools supported by the Estonian state. Recently,
during a public discussion, there was a suggestion to establish centers for developing
Estonian culture and to give Estonian citizenship to Russian secondary school graduates.
“Scientists Recommend that Russian School-Leavers Should Be Granted Citizenship.”
Eesti Pdevaleht (14 June, 1999), 3.
0
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(UNDP) and Nordic countries, the Estonian government tried to comply with these
II

recommendations.7"
The Council of Europe decision was criticized by M oscow, who complained that
Tallinn now can use the Council of Europe decision to counter M oscow ’s claims about the
minority situation in Estonia.73 Furthermore, this Council o f Europe’s decision stirred a
debate in the Russian Estonian daily Estoniya, which, basing its report on the Russian
Information Agency, wrote that van der Stoel. OSCE High Com m issioner, found
"systematic prosecution" o f Russians in Estonia, and this finding supposedly contradicted
with the Council o f Europe’s decision. Van der Stoel responded to Estoniya by saying
that since 1993 he "found no evidence of systematic persecution o f national minorities or
of systematic violation o f human rights in Estonia."7-1 Furthermore, he praised Estonia for
a larger num ber of Russian citizenship applicants. Indeed, in 1997, the rate of
naturalization increased: in 1997, 32.7% of all Russian speakers had Estonian citizenship
compared to 29% last year (Table 5). Helped by the OSCE, Estonia was issuing aliens’
passports to those Russians who did not want or could not get Estonian citizenship.75

72Since May 1997, E stonia’s attempts to speed up the process o f integration
included the creation of a new minister without portfolio with responsibility for
integration issues, formation o f the policy proposal for integration, and the formation of
the Non-Estonians Integration Fund. The project together with the UNDP and the Nordic
governments will continue into the year 2001 and will attract approximately $1.3 million
to provide funds for teaching the Estonian language to Russian children, training of
Estonian in Russian language schools, and regional developm ent in ethnic enclaves.
Denise Albrighton, “UNDP, Nordics Lend a Hand for Integration,” Baltic Times (17
September, 1998). 9.
liOM RI Daily Digest (5 February, 1997).
74Kristopher Rikken, “OSCE Chief Denies Estoniya Report,” Baltic Times (6
February, 1997), 1.
75“Mission to Estonia Notes Positive Developments in Citizenship Issues.” OSCE
Newsletter I February 1997).
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Estonia’s willingness to follow the recommendations of the international institutions were
promoted by Goran Persson, then Swedish Prime Minister, who argued that Estonia’s
Russian speakers, even those living in the ethnic enclave in Northeastern Estonia, no
longer constitute a hurdle for Estonia to be admitted into the European Union.76
These developments probably helped Estonia (prior to Latvia and Lithuania)
receive a recommendation by the EU Commission in July 1997 to be invited for starting
accession negotiations. Estonia’s success in the transition to a market economy and its
willingness to accommodate the non-citizens were among the reasons why Estonia was
singled out o f the three Baltic states.77 However, a visit by Jom Donner, a rapporteur from
the EU Parliament, in August of the same year, re-politicized the ethnic divisions within
the Estonian state. In his interview with Eesti Ekspress, Donner suggested that Estonia
declared itself bilingual, i.e., that Russian would be declared the second official language
of the state and loosened the citizenship requirements. He drew parallels with the position
o f the Swedes in Finland.78
D onner’s comments prompted polarization in Estonian society. Donner was
harshly criticized by the Estonian language press and Estonian politicians, while the
Russian press applauded his comments. The Estonians saw Donner’s suggestions going
"further than those in Moscow'." Kristiina Ojuland, one o f the leading Estonian
politicians, argued that D onner’s suggestions contradicted Estonia’s integration policy
76“Estonia Has Found Good Solution to Non-Citizens Problems in North-East
Estonia.” ETA News Release (15 April, 1997).
"T he other reasons probably were the willingness o f the Commission to signal
that the EU was ready for the members from the former area of the USSR, but, at the
same time, the institution did not want to stress its institutional capacity for enlargement.
Bungs, The Baltic States, 26.
,8“Daily Comments on Donner’s Advice to Estonia.” FBIS-WEU-97-241 (12
August, 1997).
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which has been geared to integrate the Russians through learning the language.79 Donner
was seen as hampering Estonia’s border agreement with Russia, since his statement, along
w ith the criticism by the Baltic Sea States’ Council’s Human Rights Commissioner Ole
Espersen, was later (in November 1997) instrumentalized by Russia’s Primakov during the
border negotiations with Estonia.80 When the EU Parliament decided to include the
w'ording of Kirsi Piha, the chairman of the Estonian group in the EU Parliament, praising
the integration o f non-Estonians instead of Donner’s opinion, into its statement, this move
w as hailed as "Estonia’s victory" by the Estonian press.81
Eventually, however, the recommendation of the European Commission to start the
negotiations temporarily helped to improve the Estonian-Russian relations. When Estonia
received an invitation to start the talks, the Russian Council for Foreign and Defense
policy suggested that Russia instrumentalized the Estonian Russians not as "a fifth
column," but as a "weighty instrument of political and economic rapprochement of
peoples [i.e., the Russians in Russia proper and Estonians]."82 Furthermore, in October
1997, Russia changed its "steel" ambassador, Alexander Trofimov with a "softer" Alexei
Glukhov. It silenced its rhetoric about the "abuses of the human rights" in Estonia, and
appointed Ludvig Chizhov (instead of Vassili Svirin) as the head of Estonian-Russian

?9“Estonian Press Reacts to Proposal on Bilingualism,” FBIS-WEU-97-240 (9
August, 1997).
80Aivar Jam e, “Prim akov’s Whip,” Posiimees (6 December, 1997), 7.
81Paavo Palk, “EU Enlargement Is Still Unclear,” Posiimees (5 December, 1997),
9.
82Paul Goble, “An Experts’ Report Defines a Novel Policy,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report (7 November, 1997). In this report, a group of
senior Russian experts on foreign policy encouraged the Russian government and Russian
businesses to spend more money on Estonian Russians to make relations between the two
nations better. Also see “Russians Prefer Baltic EU Membership to NATO,” FBIS-WEU97-100(6 May, 1997).
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border negotiation team, which made the border negotiation process somewhat smoother.85
Hoping for further improvement in Russian-Estonian relations through EU
membership, the Estonian government decided to submit legislation which grants
citizenship to children bom in Estonia to non-citizen parents to the Estonian parliament.
This move was made strategically on 16 December 1997, ju st days ahead of a key EU
summ it in Luxembourg which identified the states for the first round of enlargement. This
decision was welcomed by the United States, who said that "Estonia now has acted on all
thirty recommendations made by Max van der Stoel in 1994," van der Stoel himself, and
the EU.84
On the dom estic front, the decision was assaulted by restorationist Mart Laar who
argued that it contradicts with Estonia’s national interests. Laar argued that the simplified
order of giving citizenship would slow down the integration o f non-Estonians into the
Estonian society because there "will be no incentive for non-Estonians to learn to speak
Estonian." Laar went on to say that the government should aim to improve its language
teaching policies instead of making concessions to Russia.85 Jiiri Adams, a m em ber of the
committee supervising the draft law on the citizenship from L aar’s party (Pro Patria
Union) was alarmed about the possibility that the government was trying to "gradually
introduce the ‘zero option’ o f citizenship" which was rejected by the Estonian voters in
1992. Pro Patria Union warned that this amendment could launch the disintegration of the
83After spring 1998, Russian-Estonian border negotiations intensified. They were
completed on 29 March 1999. The next step would be to sign and ratify the agreements.
Estonian Foreign Ministry, “Border Negotiations Completed,” Press Release (29 March
1999).
W“U.S. Applauds Estonia’s Citizenship Policies,” ETA New s Release (9
December, 1997).
85“Ex-PM Slams Governm ent’s Leniency with Non-Citizens.” ETA News Release
(9 December, 1997).
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Estonian state.86 The ruling Coalition Party was reminded about its 1993 program which
mentioned that "Estonia cannot afford an explosive and uncontrolled increase in the
number of citizens."87 "Neither domestic political documents nor politicians have ever
mentioned that the principle o f ius soli should be introduced together with ius sanguini,"
argued the restorationists, fearful about the changes to the citizenship law which, they
thought, should remain fixed to the 1992 version.88
On 18 December 1997, two days after the draft law was submitted to the
parliament, four Russian Estonian parliamentarians submitted an amendment of their own,
suggesting liberalizing the law o f citizenship even further. They offered to extend
Estonian citizenship to all stateless children under 18.89 In a backlash, the Right wing
parties of Estonia released a statement, addressed to the president, the parliament, and the
government, which argued that "the Republic of Estonia, restored under the principle of
legal continuity, should not retreat from nationstate politics of citizenship, language, and
aliens. Language and citizenship policies and complicated demographic issues resulting
from genocide carried out during the Soviet occupation (i.e., deportations and repressions)
should not be solved at the expense of the interest of the nation."90 Similarly to the first
stage of community building, historical memory about the past ethnic restructuring once
again entered political discourse.
Trying to alleviate the fears of the restorationists and at the same time reiterating
86Aivars Jame, “Estonian Citizenship Law Under Siege,” Posiimees (12 January,
1998). 9.
8'Allan Alaktila, “Citizenship Together with Birthplace,” Sdnumileht (10
December. 1997), 6.
88Ibid.
89Aivars Jame, “Estonian Citizenship Law Under Siege.” Posiimees (12 January,
1998). 9.
‘^“Russia’s Policies Slam m ed.” Baltic News Service (5 February. 1998).
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its willingness to adjust to the democratic norms of inclusiveness, on 10 February 1998,
the Estonian government, which in 1998 was dominated by the compromisers, adopted the
Estonian national integration policy. The policy included, among other things, a statement
underlining the importance o f "the serious effort [by the non-Estonians] to study the
Estonian language" and a goal to foster regional development in the ethnic enclave in
Northeastern Estonia.91 The essence of this policy, however, was the continuation of the
previous integration attempts, which was based on the idea that the integration of Russians
into the Estonian state should proceed through language.
The restorationists supported this policy (adopted by the Estonian parliament in
June 1998), but they continued to resist any changes in the citizenship policy, arguing that
citizenship should not be changed without a public discussion.92 On the contrary, the
President’s Roundtable of Ethnic Minorities, led by non-Estonians (with the exception of
two members), supported the move to extend Estonian citizenship to all stateless children
by arguing that it would not significantly alter the existing citizenship law but criticized
the integration policy for lacking a focus.93 Finally, in March 1998, the bill offering
Estonian citizenship to children under 15 passed the first reading in the parliament.
9lAndra Veidemann (a form er Minister of Ethnic Affairs), “Perspectives of
Estonia’s National Integration Policy,” speech at the conference ‘Tow ards a Civil
Society,” Riga, 11-12 June 1998. A copy of her presentation was given to me by the
Naturalization Board of Latvia on 7 July 1998.
92“We Should Start with a Discussion,” Postimees (11 M arch, 1998), 8.
930ffice o f the President of Estonia, “Resolution of the President’s Roundtable of
Ethnic Minorities on the Citizenship Act” (10 March 1998). Available from
hnp.V/www.president.ee: INTERNET. Vladimir V el’man, one of the members o f the
Roundtable, criticized the program by saying that it does not identify the main goal. “It is
no clear,” he argued, “whether the Estonian state is trying to create a multicultural
society, assimilate the Russians, or pursue integration on the individual level.”
“Razrabatyvayets’a programma integratsii nekorennogo pokoleniya” [Creating a Program
of Integration o f non-Autochthonous Population], M olodezh' Estonii Subbota (13
November, 1999), 5.
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However, the parliament rejected a similar draft law submitted by the Russian deputies.
A similar amendment to the citizenship law passed by the parliament of the
neighboring Latvia under pressure from international actors reactivated the debate about
citizenship in Estonia. The amendment offering citizenship to the stateless children was
passionately promoted by Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik lives and the committee on
the foreign affairs of the parliament who argued that Estonia had to change the law if it
w ants to join the EU. The restorationists continued to view the amendment as "letting in
the Trojan horse" (i.e.. allowing the "aliens" trespass the borders o f the Estonian political
community).94 They also argued that by giving in to the pressure o f the OSCE, Estonia, in
fact, is "giving in to Russia," since Russia is using the OSCE to pursue its own interests.
Should Estonia accept the proposed amendments, the argument went, there will be new
ones. Finally, by using the international institutions, Russia will get what it wants.95
To keep the passions down, the parliament delayed the second reading of the bill
until September. The same month, Robin Cook, the British Foreign Secretary, remarked
that "the way Estonia tackles the issue of protecting the rights of minorities is the key to its
accession to the EU." He continued by saying that he hopes that Estonia will soon
implement Max van der Stoel’s recommendations.96 Cook’s "encouragement" was
reiterated by Max van der Stoel, w-ho expressed a wish that "Estonia will follow Latvia in
adopting the amendments to its citizenship law."97 The Estonians heard the same
"recommendation" for the third time during the negotiations with the EU which started on
94Enn Tarto, “Should the Citizenship Law Be Alleviated?,” Eesti Pdevaleht (20
June. 1998), 2.
9SVahur Made, “Estonia’s Foreign Policy is Changing,” Posiimees (26 June,
1998), 9.
96Baltic Times (3 September, 1998). 3.
9/“OSCE Shifts Attention to Estonia.” Baltic Times (8 October. 1998), 3.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

187
10 November 1998.98 Responding to this pressure, Tune Kelam, the chairman of the
committee in charge o f bringing the Estonian laws in compliance with EU standards,
argued that even though the government of Estonia supports the amendment proposed by
the international actors and Moscow, "we [Estonia and international institutions] must
make it absolutely clear where the end [to these amendments] will be. This should be the
last demand for Estonia or any Baltic state."99
In order to persuade the lawmakers to adopt the bill. President Lennart Meri asked
them to overcome the "political passions."100 Raul Malk, Estonia’s Foreign M inister,
argued that the amendments are crucial for Estonia’s future in international arena, and that
failure to pass the amendment would "baffle" the international community. The
restorationists still tried to protest by arguing that citizenship should be used as a reward
for those who have already integrated instead of being utilized as an impetus for
integration.101 The Estonian Freedom Fighters Union (an organization tracing itself to the
resistance fighters o f the postwar years) gathered in front of the parliament building on the
day of the vote to protest what they thought was "russification through the European
Union."102
In spite o f these protests, the amendment offering citizenship to the children bom
in Estonia to stateless parents after 26 February 1992, was passed by a vote of 55 to 20 by

98Rebecca Santana, “Estonia M oving Steadily Toward EU ,” Baltic Times (12
November, 1998), 8.
"Ibid.
l00Jean Cleave, “Averting ‘One State-Two Societies’ in Estonia,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Endnote (18 November, 1998).
10lRebecca Santana, “Citizenship Amendments Clear A nother Hurdle,” Baltic
Times (26 November, 1998), 4.
l02“Protesters G ather Outside the Parliament,” Baltic Times (10 December, 1999).
4.
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the parliament. Yet many members o f the parliament still held reservations about such
intense outside intervention to promote inclusiveness, and admitted that their vote was
crucially affected by Estonia’s need to get into the EU .103
Having amended its citizenship law under external pressure, the Estonian state has
been very reluctant to make its language laws more liberal. In Decem ber 1998 (the same
month when the citizenship law was amended), the Estonian parliament adopted a draft
law which would require the members of the parliament and elected officials in local
governments to be fluent in the Estonian language. The proponents o f the law knew that it
was naive to hope that these language requirements would increase the willingness o f the
aliens to study the language, yet, they professed, [the law] "had a symbolic meaning [to
them] nevertheless."104
This time, despite the criticism by Max van der Stoel, President Meri promulgated
the amendment, even though he had declined to do so in 1996 and in 1997.105 In his
interview to Eesti Paehvaleht, Max van der Stoel criticized the law by saying that he
thought that it should be "up to the voters" to decide whether to elect someone who does
not speak the official language.106 Predictably, van der Stoel was criticized by the
Estonian restitutionists who argued that even though "many people indeed hoped that after
the liberalization of the citizenship law, the High Com missioner and Russia would not

l03Rebecca Santana, “Estonia Amends Citizenship Law,” Baltic Times (10
December, 1998), 1.
l04“Language Rung in the C areer Ladder.” Posiimees (16 December, 1998), 8.
I05Refusing to promulgate this amendment to the language law in 1996 and in
1997, Meri argued that this piece of legislation would “upset the constitutional balance of
power because it would allow the government to evaluate and determine the level of
proficiency of parliamentary deputies and local government officials.” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (6 February, 1998).
l06“Stoel Attacks Language Requirements,” Eesti Pdevaleht (8 January, 1999), 3.
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advance any new claims, it did not happen so."107
Responding to M eri’s decision to promulgate the law, four Russian members of the
President’s Roundtable on Ethnic Minorities resigned, arguing that the lawmakers have
ignored their opinion on the language law and thus making this multiethnic institution
useless.108 The United People’s Party, defending the interests of Russian Estonians,
appealed to the EU "to force the Estonian authorities to cancel the amendments."109
Several months later, in April and June 1999, Max van der Stoel once again criticized the
amendment to the Estonian language law (the one requiring the members of the parliament
and elected officials in local governments to be fluent in Estonian and also establishing
requirements concerning the minimum level of Estonian for public servants, employees
and individual entrepreneurs) as too intrusive.110 His visit to Estonia in June was protested
by the M emento organization, uniting the victims of the previous regime.111
This time, even the Estonian compromisers did not share van der Stoel’s views.
Arnold Ruiitel, a former leader o f the Estonian Popular Front and a member o f the Rural
Union (in 1999), argued that "it is not correct [to amend the language law according to the
recommendations of van der Stoel because] this means that we should rely on interpreters
in the parliament and elsewhere. . . . I think that our Constitution and all other laws
[already] correspond with the modem (i.e., the Western) requirements." Another
moderate—Andra Veidemann, a form er minister o f ethnic relations— argued that even

l0,Aivar Jame, “Max van der Stoel Makes Language Policy.” Postimees (30
December, 1998), 6.
'“ “Language Made the Roundtable Split Up,” Postimees (20 February, 1999). 10.
‘“ “Estonia Tightens Up Language Law,” Baltic Times (18 February, 1999), 4.
"°“OSCE Again Points to ‘Deficiencies’ in Estonian Language Law,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (27 April, 1999).
" ' “Van der Stoel Makes Concessions in Estonia,” Baltic Times (17 June, 1999), 2.
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though the Estonian citizens should not be differentiated by their ethnic origin (as the law
may potentially do). Estonia is in a unique [demographic] situation and therefore should
"find a solution when formal legal truths do not conflict with our interests."112
When this amendment to the language law was once again criticized by the OSCE,
disapproved by the EU Commission in its second annual report on Estonia’s progress
released in October 1999, and recommended being revoked ("harmonized with EU
norms") by Martti Ahtisaari, the Finnish President, some prepared to defend them by
saying that the EU criticism concerns just "one legal act," and this criticism can be
addressed by merely changing the text, but not the essence o f the law.113 The Commission
on the European Affairs within the Estonian parliament has reacted to the EU Commission
report by remarking that the "Russian problem" has been mostly "imposed [on Estonia]
from above." Instead, the Estonian parliamentary commission suggested that the EU
should focus its attention on other problems in Estonia, such as agricultural issues or
economic difficulties instead o f dwelling on the ethnic issues.114
So far, there has been little domestic support for changing the am ended language
law, which went into effect in July 1999, as previously planned. This unwillingness to
give in to the external pressure regarding the language law, as well as the previous
II2Answers to the question “Should the Language Law Be Amended According to
the Recommendations of M ax van der Stoel?,” Eesli Pdevaleht (27 April, 1999), 2.
113For OSCE criticism, see “OSCE Official Lauds Estonian Integration Efforts,”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (21 October, 1999). For a summ ary of the
European Com m ission’s position on the Estonian language law, see Donald Brooke, “An
A for Effort, an F in Languages,” Baltic Times (21 October, 1999), 3. For Finnish
President Ahtisaari’s “encouragement” (in the second half o f 1999, Finland held the
rotating presidency of the EU). see “Ahtisaari Discusses Estonian Language Law,” Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (8 November, 1999). For a response to these
criticisms, see Harri Tiido, “Reading Between the Lines of the Euro-report,” Eesti
Pdevaleht (15 October. 1999), 2.
UiM olodezh’ Estonii (11 November, 1999), 1.
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resistance to changing the citizenship law suggests that in spite of intense international
involvement, the restorationist idea o f political community as "a post factum kind of
affirmative action, com m emorating past persecutions""3 has not been abandoned yet.

Response o f the Russians

The Russians within Estonia have tended to support Estonia’s membership in the
EU much more passionately than E stonians.116 Encouraged by a positive EU attitude
toward the Estonian state and hoping for the future Estonia’s membership within the EU,
many of them decided to go through the process of naturalization in 1997. In 1996,
Estonia granted citizenship to only approximately 3,000 people. In 1997, this number was
8,132. The num ber of people who received Estonian citizenship in 1998 was even
larger—9,969."'
However, this "rush" for citizenship abated in 1998. The adoption of the
amendment further liberalizing the law in 1998 did not significantly alter the pace of
naturalization. Even though approximately 7,000 new citizens were expected, the non-

I!5This phrase has been used by W illiam Safran to describe Israel’s political
community. W illiam Safran, “Citizenship and Nationality in Democratic Systems:
Approaches to Defining and Acquiring M embership in the Political Community,”
International Political Science Review 18, no. 3 (July 1997): 327.
" 6In Novem ber 1997, 35% o f those questioned (Estonians and non-Estonians)
were in favor of EU membership. A year later, 25% of Estonians and 37% non-Estonians
were in favor. In O ctober 1999, 36% o f Estonians and 48% of non-Estonians held such
views. EU, Briefing 41: Public Opinion on Enlargement in the EU M ember States and
Applicant Countries (Luxembourg: European Parliament, 1999).
"'M ati Heidmets, “Integration: W hat and How?” paper presented at the
conference “M ulticultural Estonia” on 26 December 1998 in Helsinki, and Bungs, The
Baltic Slates, 66.
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citizen did not hurry to apply for Estonian citizenship for their children.118 As of 5 March
1999. approximately 220.000 residents of Estonia (about 17%) reportedly were still
"stateless." or undecided, which citizenship (Russian or Estonian) to apply for.119 The
language requirement established by the Estonian state on one hand and poor knowledge
of Estonian by the Russian speakers on the other were some o f the reasons why many
Russians could not opt for the Estonian citizenship.120
At the same time, the attitude of the Russians toward the state has been gradually
improving (Table 3). In fact, in 1995-96, the Russians began to actively discuss their role
in the restored state.121 One group, led by the Estonian United People’s Party, argued that
the Russian Estonians should seek integration into the Estonian state. Another group, led
by the Russian Party o f Estonia, supported consolidation o f all movements and parties of
Estonian Russians to be able to voice their own, yet specifically "Russian," demands to the
Estonian state.122 These debates signal that many Russians began to foresee their political
activities within the Estonian state.123 Tracing community building processes at the sub-

ll8“Tim e to Make Choices” Eesli Paehvaleht (29 July, 1999), 6.
ll9Anthony Georgieff, “Ethnic Russian Voters May Play a Key Role,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Endnote (5 March, 1999).
120According to the Septem ber 1999 data, approximately 72% of non-citizens
(356.000 people) are only now acquiring the skills of Estonian language. Iris Pettai,
“Info-isolation o f non-Estonians,” Postimees (3 September, 1999), 9.
121Lembit Annus, “Tanets vokrug passportov” [A Dance Around the Passports],
M E Russkiy Telegraf (16 January, 1996), 2. A widespread wish among the Russian
speakers has been to “adapt to the local conditions, but preserve the culture.” See
“ Russkaya m olodezh’ istorii ne skovyvayet” [The Russian Youth Is Not Overwhelmed by
History], Narvskaya Gazeta (8 M arch, 1997), 4.
I22Valentin Strukhov, “Grazhdanskoye obshchestvo vse eshsche tol’ko tsel’”
[Civil Society Is Still Only a Goal], M E Russkiy Telegraf (16 January, 1996), 3.
123This statement is supported by Saar Poll studies, conducted in April 1997 and
in November 1996. The poll conducted in 1997 suggested that 53% o f Estonia’s non
citizen population wanted to become Estonian citizens. The study conducted in 1996
revealed that 79% of non-citizens wanted their children to have Estonian citizenship.
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state level helps to understand this change better.

COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM "BELOW"

Local Governments

Even though the Estonian language law pronounced Estonian as the only state
language, it has permitted the use of minority languages in the areas of minority
concentration.124 Furthermore, all residents of Estonia, regardless o f their citizenship, have
been allowed to vote in the local elections, even though non-citizen cannot be elected to an
office.125 In practice, this meant that multiethnic localities with a large percentage of
Russians (i.e., Tallinn and Narva) were endowed with a significant degree of selfgovernance and even cultural autonomy. Estonia’s non-citizen were eager to use these
rights: their participation in local elections has been quite intense. To illustrate, in 1996.
85% of aliens and only 49.7% o f Estonian citizens voted in local elections.126 Three years
later, the majority o f the non-citizen still considered it worthwhile to cast their vote.127
“Over a H alf o f Estonia’s Non-Citizens Would Like to Be Citizens,” ETA News Release
(3 April, 1997).
124Vello Pettai,“Estonia’s Controversial Language Policies,” Transition (29
November, 1996): 22.
125The right to vote in the local elections is extended to “all residents over 18 years
old, regardless o f citizenship, who reside permanently on the territory of the local
government; for non-citizen: if s/he has resided legally in the territory o f the
corresponding local government for at least five years by 1 January o f the election year.”
Estonian National Election Committee, Fact Sheet (October 1999). Available from
h tip:/Avww. vm. ee/eng/local. el. 99: ENTER NET.
126M erike I^ees, “Leftists Win in Ida-Virumaa,” Luup (4 October, 1999). The
turnout in local elections was 52.3% in 1993, 52.5% in 1996, and less than 50% in 1999.
127“Tum out High in Early Voting for Estonian Local Elections,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (15 October, 1999).
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The state decided to tolerate a high degree of self-governance after a strike at the
two plants near Narva and simultaneous attempts by the Russian secessionist
organizations to collect the signatures for a referendum on the future of Narva in 1992. (In
Narva, at least 96% of the population is Russian, and out of 74.000 inhabitants
approximately 55% hold the Russian citizenship, and approximately 80% of the residents
do not speak any Estonian.)128 However, the right to vote in local elections extended to
non-citizen by the Estonian state did not prevent secessionist groups from organizing a
referendum on Narva’s regional autonomy in July 1993, in which the majority of
participants voted in favor o f establishing an autonomous territory. The Supreme Court
declared the referendum unconstitutional, but it did not revoke the right o f the non-citizen
to vote in local elections.
As the time went on, the popularity of the conservative Russian secessionist
leaders am ong the Narvans declined.129 Three months later, in October 1993, the voters of
Narva elected to power the leftist but not secessionist parties—the Trade Union Center, the
Dem ocratic Labor Party, and the Estonian Society—to the local government.130 During the
next round o f elections in 1996, three representatives of the Estonian "compromisers"—the

I28Sergei Gorokhov, “Integration in Practice: The Case of Narva,” in The
Integration o f Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History, Problems, and Trends, ed.
Aksel Kirch (Tallinn: Estonian Academy Publishers, 1997), 131, 134. Gorokhov gives
the follow ing figures on citizenship (1996): 27% of the population are the citizens of
Estonia, 55% o f Russia, and 18% are without citizenship. Another estimate is that 27%
of Narvans hold the Russian citizenship. Denise Albrighton, “Estonia’s Little Russia,”
Baltic Tim es (17 June, 1999), 16.
l29Gorokhov, 128. In 1999, electoral district of Ida-Virumaa was home to 74,263
aliens and 66,113 citizens.
l30“Posmotrite, kto prishel” [Look W ho Is Here], Nar\>skaya Gazeta (12 February,
1997), 2. Trade Union party won 11 seats, the Democratic Labor Party— 13, and the
Estonian society— 7 seats.
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Estonian Center Party—was elected to the local government.131 In 1999, the Center party
won the local election.132 During 1989-99. mostly Russians who hold Estonian
citizenship were elected to the local government (see Table 6).
By and large, the voters in Narva take the local elections quite seriously. For
example, while complaining that the parliamentarians are not responsible to the non
citizen, even when the policies which directly affect the life of the latter are adopted, the
Ncin’skaya Gazeta (the local newspaper) wrote that "the matters are quite different on the
local level [than on the national]. Everybody is electing [those who hold power]. In this
case [local elections], not only can we expect and even demand that our problems are
solved, but we can anticipate that our way of thinking will be taken into account as well.
For the local population [i.e., in Narva], an increase in the prices of utilities is more
important than European integration."133
During October 1999 local elections, readiness to cater for these elementary
interests of regional com m unities and to fight corruption in the local city administration
which grew under the Center party (the compromisers) became a stimulus for power
sharing of several diam etrically opposed ethnic parties.

I31Ibid. The electoral union “Narva” won 12 seats, the Democratic Labor Party
won 8 seats, the United People’s Party won 6 seats, and “My Home Is Narva” won 2
seats.
l32The Center party won 14 seats, the Social Democratic Labor party won 3 seats,
the electoral union “U nity and Trust” (includes the Russian party of Estonia) won 7 seats.
“Narva-21" won 4 seats, “N arva’s People’s Trust”won 2 seats, and an electoral union
“Arukus” won I seat. Narvskaya Gazeta (26 October, 1999), 1.
13jN. Dmitriyev, “Narod bezmolstvuyet, no mneniye imeyet” [People Are Quiet.
But They Have Opinions], Narvskaya Gazeta (3 June, 1997), 2.
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Table 6. Ethnic Identification of the Deputies Elected to the Local Government in Narva
Identification

1989

1991

1993

1996

1999

Russian

40

20

15

16

29 (nonEstonian)

(80%)

(77%)

(48.4%)

(51.6%)

(93.5%)

4

3

14

9

2

(8%)

(11.5%)

(45.2%-)

(29%)

(6%)

6

3

2

6

n/a

(12%)

(11.5%)

(6.4%)

(19.4%)

Estonian

Other

Source:
N'a n'skaya Gazeta (12 February, 1997): 2. and (26 October. 1999): 1.

In Tallinn City Council, the ruling coalition of Pro Patria (the arch restorationist
party), the Reform party and the Moderates, signed an agreement with the People’s Trust,
an electoral union o f ethnic Russian organizations.134 The October elections were different
from the previous ones because only one electoral union—the Joint Russian List—based its
election strategy on ethnic issues while campaigning in multiethnic areas. Yet this
strategy failed.135 In order to form a city government that is capable of catering to all
residents of the city, it became necessary for the restorationists to seek allies from the
electoral list which included Yevgeni Kogan, one of the most ardent enemies of Estonia’s

l34“Russian Party Ensures Ruling Estonian Coalition Local Victory,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (25 October, 1999).
135II’ya Nikiforov, “Who Is Behind Yevgenii Kogan,” Eesti Pdehvaleht (21
October. 1999), 2.
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independence and the former leader of the Intem iovem ent -136 Welcoming the prospect of
cooperation between the arch enemies on the local level and referring to Kogan, Prime
M inister Mart Laar. the former leader of the restorationist movement, said that "we will
not attach any mythological features to one or another person."13' Kogan asserted his
willingness to cooperate by saying that "there is no more Popular Front and there is no
more Intemiovement. Popular Front or Intermovement is of no importance in the
discussions on road repairs or water pipes."138 However, Kogan's presence was unwanted
by the other members of the right-wing coalition. To help the right-wingers and the
coalition of Russian parties reach an agreement, Kogan gave up the seat he won on
T allinn’s City C ouncil.139
Everyday needs of local communities have been an important issue not only during
the local elections. As a matter of fact, the Estonian central government has paid a lot of
attention to regional economic development and the effectiveness of local governments.
Attempting to curb unemployment in Northeastern Estonia, the state set up a free
economic zone in the town of Sillamae.140 (The town, as well as the whole northeastern
region, was strongly affected by the Russian financial crisis and the demise of massive
Soviet-style energy industries.) Furthermore, helped by the EU, OSCE, Open Society
Foundation, the Nordic governments and other international actors, the state has funded
the so-called "integration projects," pursued on the community level, which have included

1‘6“Let Us Avoid Conflicts.” Postimees (22 October. 1999), 6.
13,“The Post-Election M iracles,” Postim ees (20 October, 1999), 6.
ll&Eesti Pdevaleht (19 October, 1999), 1.
139”Anti-Independence Activist Rejects Tallinn City Council Seat,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (22 October, 1999).
U0”Free Economic Zone Created in E stonia’s Northeast.” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (13 January, 1999).

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

198
language courses, seminars for teachers, and training centers.141 International gatherings
have been organized in Narva to promote regional development and to sell the area to the
potential investors as "a port of transit."142 These strategies of functional integration have
been geared toward sustaining a good level of economic well-being within the region and
toward enabling the non-citizen to "use the state as a service station.”

Using the State as a Service Station: The Development o f Civil Society

Many Russians, especially those living in the ethnic enclaves of Northeastern
Estonia were previously employed in large industries sponsored by Moscow. Sudden loss
of employment has been one of the most serious issues that they have faced.143 Although
ethnic affiliation does not present an insurmountable hurdle for economic success, the
Russians were found to be somewhat more vulnerable to unemployment than Estonians,144
often due to their poor Estonian and the lack of Estonian citizenship. Consequently, the

141Denise Albrighton, “Reform ers Focus on Social Issues,” Baltic Times (8 April,
1999), 4.
142In M ay 1997, an international conference “Narva-Transit ’97” was held in
Narva. The local newspaper evaluated this developm ent by saying that “transit [to
Russia] is key to self-governance o f the region.” “Vse dorogi vedut v Narvu” [All Routes
go to Narva], Narvskaya Gazeta (24 January, 1997), 1. The goal of the conferences and
exhibitions held in Narva is to “mark Narva on the map of Europe.” See “O boznachif
Narvu na karte Evropy” [Marking Narva on the M ap of Europe], Narvskaya Gazeta (6
May, 1997), 1.
U3M ikk Titm a. Nancy Brandon Tuma. and Brian D. Silver, “Winners and Losers
in the Postcommunist Transition: New Evidence from Estonia.” Post Soviet Affairs 14,
no. 2 (1998): 134. The authors argue that the Russians were especially hard hit by
transitional changes.
144Aadne Aasland, “Ethnicity and Unemployment in the Baltic States,”
International Politics 35 (September 1998): 353—70. This article summarizes the results
of the NORBALT living conditions survey, conducted in 1994.
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purchasing power of non-Estonians has been growing slower than that of the Estonians.145
It is not surprising, therefore, that civic activity of non-Estonians began in
associations that deal with economic issues—i.e.. economic interest groups, trade unions
and, to a lesser degree, in professional associations.146 Recently, the share of people active
in trade unions and professional associations has increased. To illustrate, in 1996, the
share o f Russians active in trade unions was almost twice as high (34%) when compared
to 1993 (18%).147 The leaders of the trade unions, especially in Estonia’s northeast, have
been quite vociferous in demanding to make the implementation of the law on language
or on education more lenient.148
Some concerns, such as crime control or care of residence facilities, prompted the
development of the organizations involving both Russians, Estonians, and other residents
o f the Estonian state. An example o f such organizations is the apartment-owners'
associations, which constitute approximately a half of 10,000 nonprofit organizations
registered in Estonia.149
Ethnic cleavages, however, are still discernible. As Aksel Kirch has argued, the
li5ETA Insight (12-18 November, 1999).
146Ruutsoo, 119.
l47Aksel Kirch, “Russians in Contemporary Estonia: Different Strategies of
Integration into the Nation-State,” in The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads, ed.
Talavs Jundzis (Riga: Academy of Sciences of Latvia, 1998), 591.
148On 7 December 1999, a group of trade union leaders from Estonia’s northeast
wrote an open letter “Zashchitim russkuyu shkolu” [We Will Defend the Russian School]
to President Meri, in which they asked to refrain from making abrupt changes to the
current Estonia’s language policy. They were worried about the implementation of the
language law in the Russian schools. The teachers of those schools were asked to leam
Estonian. Molodezh' Estonii (7 December, 1999), 1.
l49Tricia Cornell, “Civil Society at the Crossroads,” Baltic Times (2-9 December,
1999). According to the United Nations, there are at least 4,000 societies, associations,
and foundations in that country. UN, Estonian Human Development Report 1998:
Integrating into Europe and the World. Available from http://www.undp.org:
INTERNET.
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emerging structures of civil society among the Estonians are rooted in their historical
memory (e.g.. the prewar Republic, folklore activities during the occupation, organizations
of formerly deported, etc.)150 Historical memory, however, separates these Estonians and
some Russians from the Russian speaking "latecomers." Therefore, m any sub-state
associations only underline the bifurcation of the Estonian society.

Different Perceptions o f the Past: An Insurmountable Obstacle?

In ethnically divided societies, commemorations often incite ethnic hatred or even
prompt violence. This has not been the case in Estonia, even though Estonians and
Russians commemorate different days. Most Russians (especially the older "latecomers")
devotedly celebrate M ay 9—the Victory day, or the day when the Russian army captured
Berlin after World W ar II. Gatherings to celebrate this day has become a tradition among
Russian war veterans.151 M any Estonians, however, associate the end o f World W ar II
with the return of the Soviets and deportations. Instead, they tend to celebrate Estonia’s
independence day and June 14, the Day of Mourning and the day o f one of the greatest
deportations.
The official rhetoric o f commemoration during the Day of M ourning has often
tried to downplay different historical experiences of Estonia’s current residents:
"The word ‘deportation,’ remarked Lennart Meri, the President o f Estonia, in his
mourning day address on 14 June 1998, turned overnight into a term of equal
abhorrence as ‘genocide,’ ‘holocaust,’ marking the crimes against humanity that
were committed on the Estonian territory by foreign invaders. . . . As we mourn
l50Kirch and Kirch, 590.
I5IAivar Jam e, “The Riga Incident Is a Lesson for Estonia,” Postimees (10 March,
1999), 9.
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our com patriots today, we also moum all the victims of Stalinism and Nazism,
regardless o f their nationality, religion or land o f residence."15'
Furtherm ore, to confront the legacy of the past, the government initiated an intense
search for the individuals guilty of deportations. Thus, in January 1999, an Estonian court
convicted Johannes Klaassepp, a former Soviet security official who was involved in the
deportations that occurred in 1949. Mikhail Neverovski, another person in charge of
deportations, was convicted in August 1999.153 The state’s decision to initiate the search
for the "guilty" did not prompt ethnic tensions.154
Neither commemorations nor trials turned out to be the most challenging
outgrowths o f different historical experiences of the autochthonous residents o f Estonia
and the "latecomers." However, conflicting historical memories have translated into
different perceptions o f threat.
Since the reestablishment of the independent state, the Estonians and the Russians
have had different attitudes on Russia as a source of threat. To illustrate, in 1994, 84% of
the Estonians thought that Russia presented a threat to the Estonian state, but only 12% of
the Russians shared their view.155 In 1996, 79% o f the Estonians and 14% o f the Russians
thought that Russia still presented a threat to the independence of Estonia.156 In 1999,
l52Lennart M eri, ‘T h e Mourning Day Address,” Tallinn, 14 June 1998. Available
from http://www.president.ee\ INTERNET.
153Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (2 November, 1999).
154Toivo Kamenik (Special Police Unit researching the war crimes), interview by
author, 6 N ovem ber 1998, Vilnius.
l55Richard Rose and William Maley, “Conflict or Compromise in the Baltic
States? W hat Do the Peoples There Think?” Studies in Public Policy No. 231 (Glasgow:
University of Strathclyde, 1994), 43. 38% of the Estonians thought that the Russian state
definitely is a threat to “peace and security in this country.” and 46% thought that this is
possibly the case. 3% of the Russians thought that Russia definitely presents a threat to
Estonia, and 9% thought that this is possibly the case.
l56Kirch and Kirch, 154. 43% of the Estonians thought that Russia “definitely”
presents a danger to the independence of Estonia, and 36% thought that Russia
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ethnic restructuring which took place in Kosovo and in Chechnya were interpreted
differently by the Estonians and the Russians. In the words of Andrei Hvostov, these
events underscored "the line between 'us' and ‘them .’ ”157 Most Estonians sympathized
with the Albanians and the Chechnyans, but most Russians living in Estonia sympathized
with the Serbs and the Russians. Protesting against NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo
conflict, in March 1999 a group of the Russian youths even staged a protest in front o f the
American em bassy.158 During the same month, more than 1,000 Russian citizens who live
in Narva have signed a plea against NATO air strikes in Kosovo. Yuri Mishin, the leader
of the association o f Russian citizens in Estonia, threatened that Northeastern Estonia may
follow the example o f Kosovo,159 but this threat remained hollow.
Predictably, the majority of Estonians and the Russians have disagreed on
Estonia’s membership in NATO. The majority o f the Russian Estonians have been either
against or undecided about Estonia’s NATO membership, but all Russian parties have
been strongly against.160 Realizing that the majority of the Russians do not share their
ideas about the membership in NATO, in mid-1999, two thirds of Estonians still felt that
the Russians pose a threat to the survival of the Estonian nation and were opposed to

“probably” presents a danger to the independence of Estonia. 4% of the Russians fell into
the first category and 10% into the second.
157Andrei Hvostov, “Harmonization of the Youth,” Eesti Pdevaleht (16
November, 1999), 2.
158Ivi Proos, “Crisis of the Status of the Russian Youth,” Postimees (7 April,
1999), 7.
159“Russian Citizens in Estonia Collect Signatures Against NATO Air Strikes,”
£TA News Release (29 March, 1999).
160In 1998, 29% of non-Estonians were against Estonia’s NATO membership. In
May 1999. 53% non-Estonians were against NATO membership. This num ber dropped
to 43% in October 1999. The corresponding percentages for Estonians were 10%, 20%,
and 15%. Postimees (26 November, 1999), 2. Also see ‘T h e Russians of Estonia: On the
Other Side of the Front Line,” Eesti Pdevaleht (3 April, 1999), 2.
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automatic integration.161 These developments prompted some to argue that political
community building in Estonia is far from complete because different perceptions of threat
have been more difficult if not impossible to negotiate, even when compared to the
citizenship or language policy.'62 Consequently, there has been considerable support
"from below" (i.e., on behalf of the Estonian electorate) for the restorationist idea of
political community which deters the "latecomers" from making decisions about security
arrangements for the state.

TOWARD A STABLE DEMOCRATIC COMM UNITY IN ESTONIA? ATTITUDES
AND POLARIZATION IN LATE NINETIES

The examination of the actions of the actors involved in political community
building together with the circumstances surrounding this process suggests a conclusion
that one of the most influential explanatory factors regarding the state’s attitude vis-a-vis
non-Estonians has been the salience o f historical memory, especially among the Estonians
living in Estonia. This is the reason why the restorationist approach to political
community building has prevailed and has been regarded as more legitimate compared to
the one suggested by the compromisers. The restorationists have aimed to forge a
"historic” state, or the "community o f fate," the membership in which is limited to the
residents of pre-1940 Estonia and their descendants.
Overall. Estonia’s approach to political community has reflected a tension between
I6lIris Pettai, “Info-isolation of Non-Estonians,” Postimees (3 September, 1999),
9.
l62Aleksandr Shegedin, “W hat Keeps Estonians and Russians Apart?” Eesti
Pcievaleht (18 November, 1999), 2.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

204
the restorationist orientation and external pressures, pushing Estonia to introduce the
elements o f ius soli and thus create a more inclusive political com m unity. The attempts of
the international actors to expand the membership within the restorationist political
community have been energetically opposed. As a m atter of fact, a strong push for
inclusive state policies vis-a-vis its minorities from “above” has even intensified the
activity of extreme political parties, capable of invoking the yesterday’s embitterments of
both Russians and Estonians.
Estonia’s dependence on the international actors for its security requires the
government to maintain an im age o f a modem democratic state. Therefore, unwillingly,
the state decided to liberalize its citizenship law. Nevertheless, it refused to liberalize its
language law, which implies that the state is not ready to challenge the prevalent
restorationist orientation.
Even though most international actors interested in fostering integration in Estonia,
regarded the isolation of the groups with different sets o f historical memory as a threat to a
functioning democratic state, this separation has been a part of solution and a reason why
Estonia managed to maintain a relatively stable political community. The consequences of
forced "integration" o f Russian speakers into the Estonian community, especially if
"integration" had involved strict implementation of the language law and imposition of
Estonian commemorative practices, would have been grave, especially in the ethnic
enclave of Ida-Virumaa. Instead, the state has tolerated a virtual cultural autonomy in the
ethnic enclave and has extended a high degree of self-governance for local communities.
The arrangements adopted by the Estonian slate—a fairly liberal law on local
elections and allowing minorities to speak their language in the areas of
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concentration—even prompted cooperation of the form er enemies on the local levei (i.e., in
Tallinn during 1999 October local elections). Together with the rights to use the state as a
"service station" (i.e., social and economic benefits and the ability to be a full-fledged
m em ber o f civil society), these arrangements have probably contributed to the growing
acceptance of the Estonian state by the Russians.
Since 1993, the attitudes of the non-citizens vis-a-vis the state have been warming
up. In 1999, the political preferences of the Russians (both citizens and non-citizens) were
divided between different parties. During the local elections, some Russians supported
even the right wing Estonian nationalist parties.163 The existence o f these trends (see
Table 3) was also identified by the findings of other opinion polls.164
Unfortunately, different perceptions of threat embraced by the autochthonous
residents of the state and the "latecomers" are an obstacle to replicate such pluralistic
arrangements linking the communities with different historical memories on the national
level. Theoretically, a bilateral agreement with the m inorities’ "mother state," involving
reconciliation and transparent communication between the m inority’s host state and the
m inority’s "mother" state, also between the minority and m inority’s "mother" state, would

163Prior to O ctober 1999 local elections, a telephone poll was carried out by the
Estonian Centre for Sociological Research. The greatest percentage of the non-citizens
supported the Center party (the compromisers). A large number of the non-citizens
supported the right wing Pro Patria (12%) and the right center Reform party (12%). Siije
Kiin, “Non-Estonians Turned to Estonian Parties,” Eesti Pdehvaleht (28 October, 1999),
2.
164This does not mean that the non-Estonians regard themselves as “Estonians”
nor do they completely identify with the state. See Titm a, Tuma, and Silver. Their article
includes the results o f a longitudinal survey of one generation in Estonia. Also see Rose
and Maley. For a survey of different public opinion polls in the Baltic states, see
Jekaterina Dorodnova, “Identity Formation of the Russian Speakers in Estonia and
Latvia.” in Diasporas and Migrants in 20th Century Europe, ed. Rainer Miinz, Rainer
Ohliger. and William Safran (Newbury Park, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, forthcoming).
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be one way to alleviate such fears. However, given the domestic instability of Russia,
such an agreement is unlikely.
Consequently, the Estonian state and especially the domestic actors embracing
restorationist views are likely to remain quite cautious in extending membership within the
Estonian political community. The influence of the restorationists is likely to be
moderated by Estonia’s membership in the Western community of democratic states,
which will help to sustain the Estonian state as an effective "service station" and thus
encourage the multiplication o f sub-state mechanisms linking the two communities on the
grassroots level.
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CHAPTER VD
POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING IN LATVIA

This chapter presents a case study of political community building in Latvia. Its
goal is to analyze the approaches employed by the Latvian state to legitimatize its power
vis-a-vis ethnic minority groups who initially opposed the existence of an independent
Latvian state. In addition, this chapter will assess the influence of international actors who
affected Latvia's decisions regarding its minorities.
To achieve this goal, the chapter will undertake three steps. First, it will evidence
the existence of polarization between the state and the ethnopolitical groups who opposed
the state and who claimed to represent Latvia’s Soviet-era im m igrants (i.e., Russians,
Byelorussians, Ukrainians, etc.) during the initial stage of political community building.
To do that, the first part of the case study will outline the platforms of these ethnopolitical
movements. As Chapter V has shown, the emergence of these diametrically opposed
ethnopolitical movements (restorationists and internationalists) was prompted by the
ethnic restructuring carried out by the Soviet Union. In addition, this part will examine the
attitude of the minorities toward these ethnopolitical movements and their attitudes toward
the independent Latvian state during that time.
Second, the chapter will trace the process o f political com m unity building “from
above” and “from below” under the circumstances (i.e., polarization) described in the first
part. The second part of the case study focuses on the approaches undertaken by the
Latvian state “from above.” It exam ines the following: Why did the state make a decision
to exclude a significant number o f residents (mostly non-Latvians) from the political
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process by disenfranchisement? To answer this question, the chapter will explore the
circumstances surrounding the adoption o f the law on citizenship and other laws affecting
the status of minorities. The third part o f the chapter focuses on developments within civil
society (i.e., “below”)— the creation of local governments, the ability o f the minorities to
use the state as a service station and the impact of different historical experiences on
ethnic relations.
The chapter will conclude by assessing the effectiveness of the approaches
employed by the Latvian state. To do that, the concluding part of the chapter will trace the
changes in the attitudes o f minorities and ethnopolitical actors vis-a-vis the state.

ETHNOPOLITICAL ACTORS AND POLARIZATION DURING TH E INITIAL STAGE
OF COMMUNITY BUILDING (1990-94)

In 1990-91 many Russians had high hopes, thinking that their life in the newly
restored Latvian state would be better than in the Soviet Union (see Table 7). Yet their
support for the Latvian state during the initial stage of state building should not be
overestimated. According to a survey conducted by SM-Segodnya (one o f the most
popular Russian language newspapers in Latvia) in April 1990, 71% o f non-Latvians
thought that if Latvia became an independent state there would be mass unemployment,
and 62% thought that there would be discrimination against non-Latvians.1

'V ladim ir Bespalko, “Ugol zreniya: pochemy my takiye?” [A Point of View: Why
Are We the Way We Are?], SM-Segodnya (6 January, 1993), 3.
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Table 7. Support among non-Latvians for an Independent Latvian State, 1989-97*
June
1989

June 1990

October
1990

1991

1994

1997**

9%

269c

26%

35%

53%

56%

Notes:
*The data for June 1989, June 1990 and October 1990 is from Latvian Social Research Center. This is a
response to the question “Should Latvia become an independent state outside the USSR?” In Dorodnova.
"Identity Formation Among Russian Speakers in Latvia and Estonia.”
**The data for 1991, 1994. and 1997 was compiled by the Baltic Data House. This is a response to the
question “Do you support Latvia as an independent state?” Baltijas datu nams. Na puti k grazhdanskomu
obschesn'u: Ctchet po rezul’tatam dvukh etapov [Toward a Civil Society: Results of Two Stages] (Riga:
Baltijas datu nams, 1998). 22.

Sources:
Baltijas datu nams. Na puti k grazhdanskomu obschestvu: Otchet po rezul'tatam dvukh etapov [Toward a
Civil Society: Results of Two Stages]. Riga: Baltijas datu nams. 1998.
Dorodnova. “Identity Formation Among Russian Speakers in Latvia and Estonia.”

Such opinions became even more pronounced after the Supreme Council decision
about restrictive citizenship which was adopted on 15 October 1991. The Soviet-loyalist
Intermovement ( Yedinstvo) was the first political actor in Latvia to disagree with Latvia’s
nationalist leaders and voice its disapproval of an emerging independent Latvian slate in
ethnic terms. Prior to 1991, the leaders of Intermovement were active participants in and
organizers of conservative pro-Soviet rallies, such as the “Solidarity march” organized by
the Supreme Council of the USSR and the weekly Literatumaya Rossiya [Literary'
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Russia]. The goal o f this march was to show the support of the “Soviet nation” for
Russians residing in the Baltic states.2
In spring 1991. Intermovemeni publications began to promote the “Russian idea”
instead o f Communism as a new platform for their movement.3 By presenting itself as the
guardian o f Russian interests Iniemiovement was trying to increase its political capital.
Consequently, it got a lot of support from those Russians who had a hard time dealing with
the resurgence of Latvian nationalism.4 In addition, Intemiovement tried to cash in on the
differing interpretations o f history held by Latvia’s Russian residents and by Latvia’s nonRussian residents.5
Despite these attempts to cash in on ethnic ideas, Intermovement could not regain
its supporters after its involvement in the events of January 1991, when the Soviet army
attacked neighboring Vilnius and Riga. It was banned in August 1991 by the Latvian
government for backing the coup attempt that month in Moscow. In 1992, a weakened
Intennovement merged with other pro-Soviet/anti-Latvian organizations, such as the

:Arkhipov. “V bede rossiyan ne ostavim” [We Will Not Leave Our Russian
Compatriots in Trouble], Molodaya Gvardiya (27 January, 1990): 156-59. This article
describes the “solidarity” march of Russians from Moscow through Narva, Tallinn, and
Riga.
'Pal Kolsto, Russians in the F om ier Soviet Republics (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1995), 115.
4E.g.. Galina Tkachenko, who decided to leave Latvia, thus described the
atmosphere in Latvia during the beginning stages of community building: ‘T h e more
Latvian I understood, the more difficult it was to live there. It was difficult to tolerate
everyday nationalism. One type of ethnic relations was prevalent in the workplace, but
another one (i.e.. unfriendly) in the street.” “Pochemy ya pokinula Pribaltiku: Ispoved’ v
puti" [Why I Left the Baltics: Confession On My Way Out], Sovetskaya Latviya (25
November, 1989), 3.
5E.g.. a newsletter published by Yedinstvo argued that the Soviet-Nazi pact signed
in 1939 was legitimate. I. Ivanov, “Litso istinnych okkupantov” [Who Are the Real
Occupants]. Yedinst\>o (9 July, 1989).
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organization of Soviet military veterans, the Council of W ar and Labor Veterans, the
Latvian Communist Party Operative Center and the Association of Russian Citizens.6
Reportedly, the latter had close contacts with representatives of the Northwestern Group of
Forces still stationed in Latvia (they left in 1994) and extremist organizations in Russia,
such as the National Salvation Front.' On 23 May 1992, during a m eeting in Liepaja (a
town with a considerable Russian population) the Association of Russian Citizens
distributed leaflets encouraging Russians to oppose the Latvian state and even to initiate a
struggle against it.8 In December, several organizations representing Soviet war veterans.
Russian citizens, and civilian employees of the Northwestern Group o f Forces picketed in
front of the Latvian Suprem e Council in Riga, expressing support for the USSR and
demanding equal rights for both citizens and non-citizens in Latvia.9
The same year, the Latvian Foreign Ministry called the activities o f these
associations “unacceptable” and a threat to Latvia’s sovereignty. This declaration
triggered a passionate response from several deputies of the Ravnopraviye (Equal Rights)
faction within the Latvian Supreme Council who admitted to having contacts with these
pro-Soviet organizations, arguing that they “had to maintain contacts with their voters.” 10
In October 1993, the Latvian government banned the activities of the Association of

6“ Anti-independence Forces in Latvia,” Radio Liberty Report (20 February, 1992).
'“Latvians Protest Soviet Veterans’ Organizations,” Radio Liberty Report (30
November, 1992).
8Tatyana Kolgushkina, “Kak MVD Latvii zashchishchalo chest’ Y el’tsina ot
kritiki russkoyazychnogo naseleniya respubliki” [How Latvian Ministry o f Internal
Affairs Defended the H onor of Yeltsin Against the Criticism of the Russians], SMSegodnya (19 June, 1992), 1.
‘'“Russians Rally in Latvia, Estonia,” Radio Liberty Report (2 December, 1992).
10“Ravnopraviye Deputies Deny Cooperation,” Radio Liberty Report (9 October.
1992 ) .
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Russian Citizens, the Union for the Protection of V eterans’ Rights, and the Latvian Union
of Com m unists, arguing that these groups supported the restoration of the Communist
regime in Latvia. Predictably, this move provoked protests from the members of these
organizations who argued that they were “the champions o f the interests o f Russianspeakers in Latvia.” 11
W ithin the emerging political system, the interests of the Russians were
represented by several ethnopolitical parties: Ravnopraviye (the Equal Rights movement),
Harmony for Latvia, and Rebirth for the Economy. The Equal Rights movement became
active during the initial stage of political community building. It consisted mostly of
Russians. Initially, this movement supported the idea that Latvia should remain a part of
the Soviet Union. In 1991, it severely criticized the Latvian Supreme Council decision of
October 15 which outlined the principles of granting citizenship. According to this
decision citizenship would be granted only to those who had been citizens o f the interwar
Latvian republic and their descendants, arguing that this decision will “bring apartheid to
Latvia.” 12 In 1993. during the first postcom munist parliamentary election, this excommunist ethnopolitical movement managed to gam er 5.8% of the vote and won seven
seats (7%) in the first parliam ent.13 According to Aleksandrs Bartashevitch, an
"ethnocratic Latvian state [was] absolutely unacceptable to us.” u As the title of the

"O leg Kapranov, the leader o f the Association of Russian citizens, quoted by the
Baltic N ew s Service (11 October, 1993).
l2“Criticism of the Latvian Citizenship Legislation,” Radio Liberty Report (17
October, 1991).
I3Pettai and Kreuzer, 155.
"A leksandrs Bartashevitsch. “Ravnopraviye-levaya partiya” [Equal Rights— the
Party of the Left], Panorama Latvii (27 December, 1996), 4. In 1996, the Equal Rights
movement began calling itself a political party. Even though they refer to themselves as a
“Leftist political party.” they oppose the increase of the role of the state in economics.
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movement suggests, Ravnopraviye (the Equal Rights movement) opposes the Latvian
state's laws regulating membership in the political community (see Table 8 for an outline
of these laws). It has fought for a more inclusive approach to citizenship, which would
include most Russians currently residing in Latvia.
Harmony for Latvia is another Russian-based ethnopolitical party which was active
during the initial stage o f political community building. In 1993, it formed an alliance
with Rebirth for the Economy. Together they received 12% of the vote and 13 seats (13%)
in the 1993 parliamentary election. That year also saw the birth of a new party devoted to
the interests of Latvia’s Russians, aptly called the Russian party. Led by Andrei
Vorontsov, it also intended to defend the interests of “all non-Latvians who consider
Latvia to be their homeland.” 15 The views o f these Russian-based ethnopolitical
movements and parties on the laws regulating membership in the demos were, by and
large, similar to those o f the Equal Rights movement. The enthusiastic support that
Russians (both citizens and non-citizens)16 have given to the Equal Rights movement and
to Harmony—clearly ethnopolitical parties— was probably caused by their disappointment
with the Latvian National Front— the compromisers. The compromisers tried to forge
multiethnic unions (see Chapter V).

thus trying to gain support from the Russian speaking businessmen in Latvia.
1JAndrei Vorontsov (the Founder of the Russian Party), “O b”yedinyennaya
Baltiya-v ob”vedinnenoi Evrope” [A United Baltic States In a United Europe], Ekspress
(5-11 December, 1992), 4.
l6In 1993, approximately 25% of Latvia’s citizens were non-Latvian. CSCE,
Implementation o f the Helsinki Accords: Human Rights and Democratization in Latvia
(Washington. D.C.: CSCE, 1993), 5.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r re p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

214
Table 8. Latvian Legislation on Citizenship and Minorities
DATE

LEGISLATION

March
1991

The Latvian parliament passed legislation on the free development 3nd the right to cultural
autonomy of nationalities and ethnic groups.
This law included:
- a guarantee that all permanent residents have equal rights with respect to employment;
- activities that promote national hatreds or discrimination are banned;
- a guarantee for national minorities to set up their own educational institutions, to create
their own outlets of mass communication, and to use the mass media of the state;
- a guarantee that the Latvian government promotes these activities and supports them
materially;
- calls for the creation of a Consultative Nationalities Council.

Oct.
1991

The Latvian parliament passed a resolution restoring Latvian citizenship for those who held
Latvian citizenship before June 17, 1940 and their descendants.
Naturalization process for the other residents included:
- residence in the Latvian territory for 16 years
- proficiency in the Latvian language at the conversational level, confirmed by examination
- an oath of loyalty to the state.
Approximately 600.000 out of approximately 906,780 (1989 data) Russian speakers are
denied citizenship.

Apr.
1995

Latvia adopts a law on the Status of Former Soviet Citizens Who Are Not Citizens of
Latvia or Any Other State (the “illegals").
The Citizenship and Immigration Department is entrusted with preparation of new travel
documents verifying the rights of approximately 700.000 noncitizen residents to reside in.
leave, and return to Latvia. Those who have a residency permit with no time restriction are
considered as permanently resident.
Permanent residents are allowed to:
- free choice of residence in Latvia;
- freedom to leave and return to Latvia;
- the right to a family reunion;
- protection against expulsion;
- preservation of native language and culture;
- assistance by an interpreter in court;
- the right to choose the language of communication with state authorities and
administrative institutions.
The amended law allows the “illegals” to register as non-citizens of Latvia.

1996

A Presidential Consultative Council on Nationality Issues is established. It is geared to
strengthen government-minority dialogue and minority participation in public life, is
established.

June
1998

The Citizenship Law is amended. It is promulgated by the State President and afterwards
confirmed in the Referendum.
Several amendments to the Citizenship law:
- the “window" system is abolished.
- the language test simplified for most categories of applicants.
- stateless children bom in Latvia after 21 August 1991 are entitled to the Latvian
citizenship.
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Table S (Continued)
Dec.
1999

The Parliament passes the new language law. which is later confirmed by the President.
The law regulates language usage in the public sector as well as in private sector, first aid
and public safety.

Notes:
* 16 March 1995 and on 6 February 1997 the law was slightly amended, but these changes did not affect the
majority of non-citizens.
** The "windows system" means that the older a person was. the longer s/he would have to wait to apply.
This system was seen by many as an attempt to punish those who had been in the first wave of Stalin’s drive
to russify Latvia.

Sources:
Bungs. Dzintra. Saulius Gimius. and Riina Kionka. “Citizenship Legislation in the Baltic States.” Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report (18 December, 1992).
Latvian Center for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies. Human Rights in Latvia in 1998. Riga: Latvian
Center for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, 1998.
CSCE. Implementation o f the Helsinki Accords: Human Rights and Democratization in Latvia.
Washington, D.C.: CSCE. 1993.
Latvian parliament. The Law o f the Republic o f Latvia on the Citizenship o f the Republic o f Latvia (22 June
1998). Available from the OSCE Mission in Latvia.
US Department of State. Lan-ia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996. Washington, D.C.:
US Department of State, 1997.

During the period of national revival, the leaders o f the Latvian National Front
promised that “free individual choice” would be the basis for deciding who would be
granted citizenship in the Latvian state-in-the-making.17 This was an attempt to gain the

l7ln the March 1990 elections for the Supreme Soviet (when Latvia was still a part
of the USSR), all adult residents, including Soviet soldiers stationed in the republic, were
allowed to vote. However, on 5 and 6 June 1993 (during the first post-communist
election), only citizens o f the pre-1940 Latvian republic and their descendants, who were
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support of the Russians. This promise, however, was not fulfilled: many non-Latvian
“newcomers” were not allowed to vote in the 1993 parliamentary election.
Right-wing nationalist organizations and ethnopolitical parties— the National
Independence Movement, the Homeland and Freedom Group, the Popular Front, the
National Soldiers Association, the Immigration Council, the Politically Repressed
Persons’ Association, and the Livs’ Association to name but a few— were among those
w ho strongly opposed the inclusion of the “latecomers” into the emerging demos. As a
matter of fact, inclusive citizenship policies have been vehemently resisted by the victims
of the former regime. They voiced their protest through the Politically Repressed Persons'
Association and the Congress o f Latvian C itizens.18 The latter organization was set up in
1989 as “an alternative parliament of Latvian citizens”— alternative, that is, to the
Supreme Council o f Latvian SSR, which included many Russians. The raison d'etre of
this organization, whose political influence is rather substantial, was to restore the pre1940 Latvian political community by extending citizenship exclusively to pre-1940
Latvian citizens and their descendants.
In 1993, these ethnopolitical groups consolidated their power in the Association of
Latvia’s National Forces in order to promote the restrictive citizenship bills sponsored by
the For Fatherland and Freedom and the National Independence Movement factions— the
right-wing groups elected to the first postcommunist Latvian parliament.19 For Fatherland

mostly Latvians, were eligible for vote. The inclusive version of the citizenship bill was
championed by Juris Boyars, a leader of the National Front.
l8“Latvian President Downs Referendum for Citizenship Law,” Baltic News
Seri’ice (26 November, 1993), and “According to the Congress of Latvian Citizens.
Latvia’s Parliament Has No Right to Conduct a Referendum on Citizenship,” Interfax (29
November, 1993).
‘"'“Latvia’s National Radicals to Promote Citizenship Bills,” Baltic New s Sendee
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and Freedom received 5.4% o f the vote (6 out of 100 seats), and the National
Independence Movement received 13.4% of the vote (15 out of 100 seats).20 Even though
these two ethnopolitical parties were surpassed by a more moderate center-right force
called Latvia’s Way in the 1993 elections, their moral and political influence was quite
substantial during the initial stage of political community building in Latvia.21
In sum, the analysis above suggests that during the beginning stage of political
community building the Latvian political landscape was characterized by polarized
ethnopolitical groups. The ethnopolitical parties of the Right, led by For Fatherland and
Freedom, refused to include the “latecomers” in the political process. The Russian-based
ethnopolitical parties and m ovements, on the other hand, were repelled by the nationcentered idea of political com m unity that was promoted by parties of the Right. The
following sections trace the steps undertaken by the Latvian state geared to forge a
functioning political com m unity and at the same time to legitimatize its power vis-a-vis
the non-Latvian minorities under these initially unfavorable conditions.

POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM “ABOVE”

Negotiating the Law on Citizenship, 1991-95

According to theorists of democratization and international analysts who have

(22 November. 1993).
20Pettai and Kreuzer, 155.
21During the next parliamentary election in October 1995, For Fatherland and
Freedom won 11.9% (14 seats) of the vote. It was assigned the task of forming a
government.
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written on political community building in the Baltic states, the optimal solution for
sustainable community building in Latvia would have been the suspension o f a 1991
parliamentary resolution restoring citizenship to prewar citizens and the adoption of a
more inclusive approach to citizenship which would guarantee the right to vote to all
residents o f Latvia.22 The analysis that follows traces the process whereby Latvian policy
makers decided upon the laws regulating the status o f the “latecomers” (mostly ethnic
Russians). It also assesses the effects that these decisions had on the polarization
described in the previous section.
Unlike Estonia, which adopted its citizenship law in 1992, Latvia refused to adopt
its law until 1994, waiting for the retreat o f the Russian army (see Table 8).23 The essence
of the Latvian citizenship problem during the first stage o f community building can be
summarized as follows: Russian residents, backed by Russia, demanded that their Soviet
citizenship automatically translate into Latvian citizenship (zero option), but the Latvian
government was unwilling to grant automatic citizenship. International organizations (the
European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Com mission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) ) tried to convince the Latvian government to liberalize its citizenship
policies. Like in Estonia, the memory of the deportations carried out under Stalin became
a part of the debates on citizenship.
In February 1993, Georg Andreyevs, Latvia’s Foreign Minister, attributed his
country’s demographic situation (more than a third of its residents are Russians) to large

"E .g ., see Skolnick. John T. Ishivama and M arijke Breuning have argued that,
given disenfranchisement in Latvia, one should expect mobilization of the Russians and
possibly even their reliance on Moscow. Ishiyama and Breuning, 105.
:?This position was forcefully (and successfully) pushed forward by the
representatives of For Fatherland and Freedom.
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scale population transfers and called for “affirmative action for Latvians to compensate
them for the discrimination they have experienced in their own country.” He went on to
say that “we will not sacrifice our country for the democratic rules of the Western world
which are currently simply not suitable for our situation.”24 Juris Bojars, who drafted the
citizenship law, argued that “unfortunately, the [citizenship] Law of 1994 gave no decisive
priorities to applicants of indigenous ethnic groups— Latvians and Livs— who suffered the
most from Stalinist reprisals in the Soviet Union.” He suggested liberalizing the
requirements for Latvian citizenship for applicants of Lithuanian, Estonian or Polish origin
who were residents of Latvia and who decided to settle in Latvia because they were
prevented by the Soviet government from returning to their homelands after their
deportation time was over.25
Predictably, most Russian-speakers believed that anyone who is a resident of
Latvia should receive automatic citizenship. The citizenship bill submitted by the
Ravnopraviye (Equal Rights Movement) to the Latvian Saeima suggested that Latvian
citizenship should be granted to all foreigners and stateless people who have resided in the
Latvian state for five years.26 At the same time, many Russians wanted to have dual
citizenship— Russian and Latvian, which would have made travel to Russia and back
easier.2'

24CSCE, Implementation o f the Helsinki Accords, 8.
25Juris Bojars, “The Citizenship Regulation of the Republic of Latvia.”
Humanities and Social Sciences Latvia 1, no. 6 (1995): 26.
26“Equality Movement Wants Lithuanian-like Citizenship Law in Latvia,” Interfax
(28 September, 1993).
27Dzintra Bungs, Saulius Gimius, and Riina Kionka. “Citizenship Legislation in
the Baltic States.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Libertv Research Report (18 December,
1992).
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This triggered a response from right-wing political activists who argued that the
Russians were not loyal to the Latvian state, could vote for return to the USSR and
therefore should not be given Latvian citizenship. For example, in an interview with SMSegodnya, Juris Dobelis, a member of the right wing National Independence Movement,
after having asserted that he had “fought against the Soviet regime during all of his life,”
openly argued that “the Latvian nation should be the master in its land [because] very
many of non-Latvians feel absolutely no moral responsibility (i.e., loyalty) toward the
Latvian state.” He went on to say that even the Russians who are economically successful
in Latvia (i.e., the “newly rich,” or businessmen) think, first and foremost, only about
themselves and not about the Latvian state.”28
The members of more radical Latvian nationalist groups made no secret of the fact
that they would like to see Latvia’s Russians leave.29 Thus, in their letter to Max van der
Stoel, High Com m issioner of the CSCE, the members of the For Fatherland and Freedom
party asked van der Stoel to “use his influence to get the CSC E’s backing for Latvia’s
intention to repatriate Soviet-era immigrants.”30 Even more moderate politicians, such as
Valdis Birkavs, who was Latvia’s Prime Minister in 1993, thought that the solution to the

28Juris Dobelis, “V Latvii tol’ko odin chozvain-Latyshskiy narod” [There Is Only
One Boss in Latvia— the Latvian Nation], ” SM-Segodnva (17 October, 1992), 1. Also
see Ian Black, “Latvia Looks at Giving Russians Vote,” Guardian (9 July, 1994).
29E.g., see Ritvars Eglas “The Ethnic Situation in Riga and How It Must Be
Solved” (translated from Latvian by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute),
Laivijas Jaunalne (7 August, 1993), 2. Eglas writes that “ [forced] migration could be one
of the main means for achieving a Latvian majority in Riga. Unfortunately, the colonists
[i.e.. Latvia’s Soviet-era immigrants] are taking root in Riga: they are allowed to
participate in privatization and receive certificates. This does not promote
decolonization.”
^ “Latvian Saeima Faction Denies Existence of Minorities’ Problem in Latvia.”
Baltic News Sendee (6 January, 1994).

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

221
“Russian problem ” could be found not only through naturalization, but also by
“encouraging voluntary repatriation and emigration to third countries.”31 Latvia’s
President, Guntis Ulmanis, promised that the Latvian state would not engage in the
forceful repatriation of Russians, and that repatriation would be “peaceful and
voluntary.”32 At one point (in February 1993), voluntary repatriation of Russians from
Latvia was contemplated by the parliamentary assembly o f the Council of Europe which
urged Russia to draft legislation for ethnic Russians wishing to return to Russia from the
Baltic states, arguing that repatriation (i.e., out-migration) is not the result of national
discrimination, but of the process of a “loss o f privileges” by Latvia’s Russians.33
In the heat of this debate about the future of the Russians in the emerging political
community, the out-migration of Russians, which had already begun in 1989-90, received
the official backing of the Latvian government.34 In 1991, 5,394 Russians left Latvia. In
1992, 27,332 Russians left. 17,762 followed the next year.35 Emigration peaked in 1992,
but began to decline in 1994. In 1995, 8.395 Russians left Latvia. In 1998, their number
declined to 3 ,4 4 2 /6
In 1992-93, Russia began to politicize this return migration by launching an active

3l“Euro Parliament’s Deputies to Consult Latvia on Citizenship,” Baltic N ew s
S en ’ice (24 November. 1993).
3"“Latvian President Receives Euro Parliament’s Delegation,” Baltic N ew s Service
(25 November, 1993).
33Saulius Gimius, “Council of Europe Recognizes Baltics as ‘Occupied,’ ” Radio
Liberty Report (8 February, 1993).
^Financial support was offered to Soviet-era settlers. Since the mid-nineties,
official support for repatriation has declined. Repatriation is still a sensitive issue and
politicians are reluctant to talk about it. See “Latvia’s Forgotten Few,” Baltic Times
(22-28 July, 1999), 7.
35Gunlars Stamers, Latvia Today I Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs,
1995), 13-14.
36Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. 73.
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campaign in international institutions to allegedly “protect the rights of Russians” in
Latvia.37 Furthermore, Russia kept referring to the “threats to ethnic Russians” in Latvia
as an excuse to keep its troops in the country.38 Andrei Kozyrev, who was R ussia’s
Foreign M inister at that lime, referred to the out-migration o f Russians from Latvia as
"ethnic cleansing” and accused the Latvians o f trying to “deport thousands o f people to
Russia.”39 Russian representatives began raising the issue o f the rights of Russians in
Latvia during CSCE meetings. Meetings between delegations representing Latvia and
Russia in international organizations, such as the CSCE or the Council of Europe, became
forums in which the representatives of the two delegations exchanged insults.40
Som etim es Russian laments about their compatriots were supported by the
representatives o f Western states. For exam ple, during a CSCE meeting on April 10, 1992
in Helsinki, Russian demands for the Baltic states “to do something” about the rights of
Russians were supported by the American and many other W estern delegations.41 One
year later, in September 1993, the CSCE issued appeals to Latvia to “adopt a fair law on
citizenship” which, in their opinion, was necessary for the internal stability o f Latvia as

37For examples of such opinions, see O leg Meshkov, “Desyataya kategoriya” [The
Tenth Category], Trud (3 November, 1993), 5.
38“CSCE Urges Fair Law For Russian M inority in Latvia,” Radio Free Europe BWIRE (15 September, 1993).
39“Kozyrev Accuses Baltics of Ethnic Cleansing,” Radio Free Europe B-W IRE (7
February, 1994).
"^Another example: on 29 September 1992, Russia’s delegation to the UN General
Assembly warned Latvia against pursuing a policy of “ethnic cleansing.” From that time
on. Russia pledged to conduct its policy vis-a-vis the Baltic states “in light o f their
success in finding solutions to their ‘human rights problem s.’” Riina Kionka and Dzintra
Bungs, “Russia Warns Baits Against ‘Ethnic Cleansing.’” Radio Liberty Report (30
September, 1992).
4UT h e Rights of M inorities Are Being Discussed In the Forum of C SC E in
Helsinki.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty M edia News and Feature Digest (10 April.
1992).
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well as for good relations with its neighbors (i.e.. Russia).42 In a meeting with Latvian
legislators. Max van der Stoel argued that while deciding on its citizenship law, Latvia
should “take into consideration Russia’s possible negative reaction to the law”— a
“negative reaction” that could be prompted by Latvia’s annual naturalization quotas.43
These suggestions elicited an agitated response from Latvian policy
makers— especially from those on the Right who interpreted these comments as a breach
of Latvia’s sovereignty. Thus, after a meeting with Max van der Stoel, Georg Andreyevs,
who was Latvia’s Foreign M inister at that time, argued that the C SC E’s recommendations
on the citizenship law were “unacceptable” to the sovereign Latvian state and that the aims
o f van der Stoel’s visit to Latvia “remained unclear to him” (suggesting that the C SC E was
merely Russia’s instrument to assert its influence in the near-abroad).44 The right-wingers
criticized both the Council of Europe and the CSCE for failing to press for the withdrawal
of Russian troops from Latvia. They suggested that the only thing that one could expect
from the two organizations was “advice on how to create a citizenship bill.”45
The stalemate surrounding Latvia’s citizenship bill— Russia linking the withdrawal
of their forces to a “fair” treatment of the Russians in Latvia and Latvia’s influential right
wingers refusing to consider the citizenship bill until the Russian army left Latvian

42“CSCE Urges Fair Law For Russian Minority in Latvia,” Radio Liberty Report
(15 September, 1993).
43“Van der Stoel Visiting Latvia,” Interfax (6 January. 1994). Also see “CSCE
Commissioner. Latvian MPs M eet On Citizenship,” Baltic New s Service (6 January,
1994).
■
“ “CSCE High Commissioner on Ethnic Minorities Discusses His Previous
Recommendations On Citizenship with Latvian Foreign M inister,” Interfax (14
September, 1993).
45Alexander Kirsteins, a representative of the National Independence M ovement
(LNNK) faction, quoted by the Baltic News Service (27 November, 1993).
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soil— was finally broken in March 1994, when Germany reiterated its desire to see the
European Union expanded to include the Baltic states and insisted that Russia should meet
its agreement to withdraw troops from Latvia by the end of August. At the same time,
during the meeting between Klaus Kinkel, then Germany’s Foreign M inister, and his
Baltic counterparts, Germany made it clear that there was “no alternative to the integration
of Russians” into the Latvian political community. Kinkel urged the Latvians to listen to
the CSCE’s suggestions.46 The CSCE has been calling for a more liberal version of the
citizenship law, which would grant citizenship to those permanent residents who have a
conversational knowledge o f Latvian, are familiar with Latvia’s Constitution, and are
ready to give an oath of loyalty to the Latvian state. Van der Stoel also suggested getting
rid of the quota system, which would have allowed only a limited number o f non-citizens
to be naturalized every year.4'
In addition, hoping for membership in the Council of Europe, Latvia had to take
the suggestions of this institution into account. These included criticism of the quota
system and giving stateless people priority in the naturalization process.48 The Council of
Europe told Latvia that it wanted to accept Latvia before Russia, which gave Latvian
policy makers a strong incentive to push for a citizenship law which incorporated the
Council of Europe’s recommendations.49 Under this pressure and after Clinton’s visit to

46Kinkel, Klaus. “Eingangserklarung des Bundesministers des Auswartigen Dr.
Klaus Kinkel” [Klaus Kinkel’s Opening Remarks], Bonn (9 March 1994).
47“Van der Stoel Advises Latvia to Adopt Liberal Citizenship Law ''B a ltic News
S e n ’ice (8 February, 1994).
48Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia, On Naturalization in Latvia
(Riga: Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia, 1997), 64.
49“The Council o f Europe Advises Latvia to Temporize With Citizenship Law.”
Baltic News Service (16 June, 1994).
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Riga, the President of Latvia urged the members of Latvia’s parliam ent to adopt the
suggested changes. According to his staff, however, this move “went against his ‘Latvian
instinct.” '50 Predictably, the citizenship bill (which had been m odified to please foreign
critics) triggered large protests from the right-wingers who accused the ruling coalition of
center-right parties o f an “inability to explain the real [demographic] situation in Latvia
and the status o f its residents [i.e., Russian residents] to international institutions.”51
During the debate over the ruling coalition’s citizenship bill protesters marched in front of
the parliament, demanding that the “Soviet colonists” be repatriated.52
Despite these protests, and after years of delay, a citizenship bill incorporating the
suggestions of international institutions was passed by the Latvian parliam ent on 22 July
1994. The law still tried to restore the pre-1940 citizenship body, but it included a
schedule for the naturalization o f non-citizens and eased the requirem ents for
naturalization (see Table 9). One year later, the Latvian state decided to adopt a law on the
Status of Former Soviet Citizens W ho Are Not Citizens of Latvia o r Any O ther State (i.e.,
“illegals”). Approximately 700,000 non-citizen residents were given permission to reside
in, to leave, and to return to Latvia (see Table 9).
Ethnic Latvian voters, however, were upset by the continuing international scrutiny
of their political community. Consequently, they voted for right-wing radical nationalist
forces led by the Movement for Latvian National Independence. T his ethnopolitical party

50Quoted in Mark Frankland, “War of Russian Pride and Baltic Swank,” Obser\>er
(7 August, 1994). During his visit, Clinton warned Latvians that the rights of Latvia’s
Russians had to be protected.
5l“Latvian Faction to G ather Signatures Under Alternative Citizenship Law,”
Baltic News Service (15 June, 1994).
5:“Homeland and Freedom Supporters Picket at Latvian Saeim a,” Baltic News
Service (9 June, 1994).
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won an overwhelming victory in the local elections held on 26 May 1994 (i.e., during the
time that the citizenship bill was being discussed in parliament).53 Latvia's Way— the
center-right party that had a controlling majority in parliament when the citizenship law
was adopted— did not do well in the local elections.54 Latvia’s non-citizens were not
happy with the outcome o f this election. According to Boris Tsilevitch, the Chairman of
the League of Non-citizens in Latvia, many Russians began to fear that in Riga the newly
elected local government w ould try to push out the nonnative population from the city.55
One year later (in 1995), parties on the Right won the parliamentary election.56
Consequently, the im m ediate by-product of international intervention into political
community building was to increase the polarization between ethnopolitical parties and
movements in Latvia. The following section examines the response of Latvia’s minorities
to the adoption of the citizenship law and their participation in the debates about the
emerging political com m unity in Latvia.

53“Right-W ing Radicals Score Electoral Success in Latvia,” Interfax (6 June,
1994). Unlike in Estonia, only citizens could vote in local elections. Approximately one
third of citizens at that tim e were non-Latvians.
54Dzintra Bungs, ’’Local Elections in Latvia: The Opposition Wins,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty D raft Research Paper (7 July, 1994).
^ “Nationalists Win Elections in Latvia,” Interfax (30 May, 1994).
56For Fatherland and Freedom won 11.9% of the vote (14 out of 100 seats). It
formed a coalition with the National Conservative Party of Latvia. Other right-wing
parties, such as For Latvia (the Siegerists) and the National Conservative Party of Latvia,
also won a considerable portion of the vote. In addition, in 1995, the country’s major
bank suddenly collapsed, which contributed to the failure of the leading coalition. Pettai
and Kreuzer. 156.
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The Response o f L atvia's Minorities to the Adoption o f the Law on Citizenship

Ethnic relations remained relatively calm on the individual level, even though in
1995 only 2% o f Latvians and 4% of non-Latvians thought that they were completely
without any problems (see Table 9). At the same time, Latvia’s minorities were
developing a feeling o f being “second class residents” in Latvia. According to the Latvian
sociologist Brigita Zepa, in 1994. Russians in Latvia began to develop “an imposed
negative collective identity.” This means that most Russians in Latvia began to see
themselves as belonging to a separate social and political group (i.e., one that did not
belong to the Latvian political community), but one that had nonetheless chosen to reside
in the Latvian state.57
An analysis o f the actions of the Russians and their debates in the mass media
during that period suggest a similar conclusion. The leaders of Latvia’s Russian
community could not imagine cooperating with right-wing politicians who sometimes
assigned guilt for past wrongs collectively on an entire ethnic group. Consequently, some
of them concluded that the main problem facing Russians and Latvians was to find ways
of dealing with conflicting historical memories. Thus, Vladlen Dozortsev, a former
deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia, argued that community building in Latvia must
involve the suppression of historical memories about deportations.58 Until that happened,
Latvia would remain a two-community state.

5/Dorodnova, "Identity Formation Among Russian Speakers in Latvia and
Estonia," 9.
58Vladlen Dozortsev, interviewed on “Sootechestvenniki” [Compatriots], a
Russian TV program, broadcast 11 February 1993. A transcript of this program is kept in
the Open Society Archives, Budapest, collection 205, file 14/0/257.
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After the adoption of the 1991 and 1994 Citizenship laws, the members of the
Russian elite who had initially supported the Latvian National Front began to feel
alienated from the state. Vladimir Stashenko. a former Director of the Departm ent on
National Questions in Latvia, is a case in point: “I had to ask myself w ho 1 was first and
foremost— the representative o f a national minority or the representative of a state. I
realized that I was first and foremost the representative of a national minority. Given the
“nationalization” o f the emerging state and its institutions, I could not defend the interests
of Russians anymore. That is why I had to leave my position [as the D irector of the
Department on National Questions].”59
Stashenko’s resentment toward the emerging Latvian state was shared by many of
Latvia’s 800,000 ethnic Russians, who despised the idea o f pending naturalization and
their status as non-citizens.60 Many thought that “the best that we [Russians] can expect is
a round stamp in our passports and perm anent residence in Latvia.”61

59Vladimir Stashenko, interviewed on “Com patriots,” a Russian TV program,
broadcast 10 February 1993. A transcript of this program is kept in the Open Society
Archives. Budapest, collection 205, file 14/0/257.
“ E.g., see Sergei Zaletayev’s open letter to the President of Latvia (“I s mneniyem
otverzhyennych neobkhodim o schitat’sya” [The Opinion o f Those Rejected Must Be
Taken Into Account], Panorama Latvii (23 November, 1993), I). Zaletayev, a political
analyst of Panorama Latvii, presented him self as the voice of Russian public opinion in
Latvia. Similar opinions were voiced by Russians living in Latvia in interviews with
Russian journalists. Oleg Meshkov, “Desyataya kategoriya” [The Tenth Category], Trad
(3 November, 1993), 5, and Juri Lepski, “Apatridy” [The “Apatrids”].. Trad (20 July,
1993), 2.
61Vladimir Buzaev, the co-president of the Latvian Committee on Human Rights,
referred to this situation as a “genocide.” See “W elcome to the State of Apartheid.” SMSegodnya, reprinted in Human Rights in the Countries o f the Former Soviet Union (2
August. 1994), 15—16. Predictably, such opinions were not shared by those Russians who
were citizens of the interwar republic of Latvia (and their descendants) who formed their
ow n organization, led by Vladimir Sorokin. The goal of this organization, according to
Sorokin, was “to make sure that people distinguish between the Russians in this
organization and those who belong to the Intennovem ent and other organizations

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

229
Even though this resentment did not spill into ethnic relations, in 1993, only 1% of
Latvians and 3% of non-Latvians described ethnic relations in Latvia as “without any
problems" (see Table 9). Taking into account the results of the 1993 survey conducted by
Rose and Maley, the essence o f ethnic tension in Latvia can be described as follows: a
majority of Latvians thought that Latvia’s Russians were treated fairly, but a majority o f
Russians thought that they were treated unfairly, especially when it came to the right to
vote. Furthermore, attitudes toward Russia were a dividing line between the two ethnic
groups. Unlike Latvia’s Russians, 73% of Latvians saw Russia as a threat to their
security.62
In 1994, non-citizens (approximately 34% o f Latvia’s permanent residents at that
time) began to unite into the League o f Aliens. Led by Boris Tsilevitch, this organization
claimed to represent the interests of non-citizens to Latvian authorities and international
organizations and to provide legal assistance to non-citizens when dealing with the state.63
This was a change in the behavior of non-citizens, especially when compared to the early
nineties. Until 1994, there was no coherent Russian organization to defend the interests of
Russians in Latvia. Furthermore, in 1993-94, Latvia’s Russians began to spell out their
needs and fears to international actors, such as then-U.S. Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, the Council o f Europe, and the CSCE, more actively.64

opposing Latvia’s independence.” “Latvia’s Russians Organize,” Radio Liberty Report
(26 February, 1992).
62Rose and Maley, 10.
63“Non-citizens Unite in Latvia,” Interfax (3 May, 1994). Many Russians need
legal assistance when dealing with the Department o f Citizenship and Migration.
wE.g.. see Nigel Stephenson, “Latvia’s Non-Citizens Seek C linton’s Support,”
Reuters (5 July. 1994). “Latvia Restricts Rights of Russians, says Spokesman,” Baltic
News Sen ’ice (27 October, 1993), or “Council of Europe’s Experts Continue to Exam ine
Drafts of Law on Latvian Citizenship,” Baltic News Service (14 September, 1993).
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Table 9. Ethnic Relations in Latvia
How Would You Describe the Relations Between the National and Ethnic Groups in
Latvia? (%)
September-October
1993
Latvians
Others
No problems

November 1996

April 1995
Latvians

Others

Latvians Others

1

3

2

4

2

4

All right, we can handle
whatever problems arise

61

59

62

68

72

72

Not so good, difficulties

21

19

30

23

22

21

1

3

2

1

3

2

Bad

Source:
UN. Lat\’ici Human Development Report 1997. Available from http://www.undp.org-. INTERNET.

In sum, after the adoption of the laws approved by international organizations
which defined the status of non-Latvians within the emerging political community, the
polarization which was present within Latvian political community in 1990—93 did not
abate. Non-Latvians began to develop social and political identities separate from the
state. Furthermore, the pressure exerted by international actors to liberalize the law on
citizenship triggered a backlash from ethnic Latvians who became increasingly supportive
of right-wing ethnopolitical parties.

Revising llte Law on Citizenship, Looking fo r Alternative Solutions (1996-99)

To relieve the polarization present in the Latvian state, Guntis Ulmanis, the
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President of Latvia, decided to create a Minorities Advisory Council. The Council was
expected to promote govemment-minority dialogue and to encourage the participation of
minorities in political life.65 Despite its promising beginning in 1996 (the Council
managed to pull in the political leaders of Latvia’s Russian community, such as Vladlen
Dozortsev), this institution proved to be incapable of sustaining govemment-minority
dialogue: radically different opinions regarding the citizenship law simply made dialogue
impossible. The leaders of Latvia’s Russian community continued to argue for the
elimination of quotas on the num ber of non-citizen residents who could be naturalized as
established by the 1994 law on Citizenship, but the ruling political parties refused to do
so.66 Meanwhile, the num ber o f ethnic Russians who became Latvian citizens stayed
almost the same as in 1994, when the Citizenship law was adopted (see Table 10).
Despite the impotence o f the Council, President Ulmanis continued to push for equal
social and economic rights for all segments o f the population— citizens, foreigners, and
non-citizens, as suggested by the Council o f Europe.67 To implement equal rights between
citizens and non-citizens, a parliamentary human rights committee was established.

65Prior to 1996, the Section on National Affairs within the Latvian government
had performed this function. It focused on cooperating with minority cultural societies,
especially the Latvian Association of National Cultural Societies, which united nineteen
different organizations. Since downsizing in the mid-nineties, the function o f the Section
has been the distribution o f state subsidies for minority cultural affairs. UN, Latvia
Human Development Report 1997, 54.
“ “Vladlen Dozortsev: Neobkhodimo razbiokirovat’ zakon o grazhdanstve” fit Is
Necessary to Lift the Blockade O ff of the Law on Citizenship], SM -Segodnya (13
December, 1996). This article argues that the Council on National Minorities did not
address any specific problems.
67“Guntis Ulmanis: Ya ushyel ot populizma” [I Moved Away from Populism],
SM-Segodnya (8 August. 1996). The Council of Europe’s suggestions are covered by
“Experts from Council of Europe to Examine All Drafts of Law on Latvian Citizenship
Before Discussion in Latvian Parliament,” Baltic News Sendee (16 September, 1993).
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Table 10. Population of Latvia by Citizenship

Citizens of Latvia

Citizens of the Russian
Federation

1996

71.85%

0.15%

1997

72.33%

0.33%

1998

72.729c

0.50%

1999

13.34%

0.71%

Source:
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. Statistical Yearbook o f Latvia. Riga: Central Statistical Bureau of
Latvia. 1999.

The latter institution had the power to dismiss the employees of the citizenship and
immigration department who had refused registration to several thousand Russians who
had the right to permanent residence. In addition, a National Human Rights Office
(funded by the state) became an outlet for minorities to voice their needs.68 De facto
discrimination against non-citizens in the economic sphere ended in 1998, when non
citizens no longer had to demonstrate a knowledge of Latvian to get unemployment
benefits.

68One of the functions of this office was to identify which rights of non-citizens
were in contradiction to Latvia’s international obligations. Prodded by Boris Tsilevich, a
member of the Latvian parliament and an active minority leader, this office also pushed
policy makers to broaden the rights of non-citizens. Natalya Lebedeva, “ ‘Spisok byuro’
kak razvitiye ‘spiska Tsilevicha” [List of Office as the Extension of the List of Tsilevich],
SM-Segodnya (18 December, 1996).

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

233
Furthermore, the President expressed support for a revision of the citizenship law
to grant citizenship to all children bom in Latvia after the country regained its
independence.69 These actions won him trust and respect among the Russians. When
experiencing problems that they believed to be ethnic discrimination, many Russians and
other minorities went directly to the President for support.70 Since then, Latvia’s
minorities have viewed the Presidency as an institution capable o f defending their
interests.
In spite o f the stabilizing role of the President, polarization between ethnic
Latvians and ethnic Russians re-emerged in August 1996 when the Latvian parliament
adopted a declaration denouncing the occupation of Latvia by the USSR as illegal. This
document, which was strongly supported by the right-wing parties in the parliament,
argued that “the tim e has come to find out whether the Geneva convention of 1949
[forbidding forceful population transfers in occupied territories] applied to Latvia.”71
Some ardent proponents of the declaration believed that if the convention is applicable to
Latvia, then “decolonization” (possibly including the resettlement o f Latvia’s Russians)
should be feasible as well. Latvia’s Russian com munity protested. The Russian Duma in
Moscow echoed this protest, and in September 1996 the Russian Federation imposed
tariffs on transit from Latvia.72

69“Latvia’s President Backs Premier O ver Naturalization,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (3 February, 1998).
70Dmitri Nikolayev, “Jusu Ekselence, Podderzhite Natsional’niye M ens’shistva"
[Dear President, Support the National M inorities], Diena (16 June, 1999), 2.
7lJuris Sinka, a Deputy in the Latvian Parliament, quoted in Leonid Fedoseyev.
“Deklaratsiya na gvozdike” [Declaration of a Nail], SM-Segodnya (2 September, 1996).
72Sergei Jushenkov. “Deklaratsiya ob okkupatsii-bol’shaya glupost’” [Declaration
of Occupation— a Big Stupidity], SM-Segodnya (18 September, 1996).
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Russia imposed more economic sanctions on Latvia after a protest by some 1,000
elderly Russians in Riga in March 1998 against a recent increase in utility rates.73 This
demonstration, which was broken up by the Latvian police, was an international scandal.
Moscow accused Latvia o f a “blatant violation of elementary human rights” and threatened
to "demand that all discriminatory measures against Russians be removed.”74
Furthermore, Russia linked its signing of a treaty delineating the border between Latvia
and Russia with the status of Russians living in Latvia.75 (Latvia needs this treaty to get
into the European Union.) According to Moscow, removal of those “discriminatory
measures” meant accepting the revisions to the law on citizenship proposed by the OSCE.
OSCE suggestions regarding the law on citizenship— to make it easier for stateless
children bom in Latvia after the country regained its independence in 1991 to obtain
citizenship and to abolish the “windows” system allowing only a limited number of
applicants per year— were forcefully advocated by Sweden and Finland and the rest o f the
EU.76
Responding to international pressure and trying to prevent other expressions of
protest from Latvia’s Russians, Latvia immediately extended the validity of Soviet-era
passports for thousands o f Russians. Furthermore, urged by Max van der Stoel of the
OSCE and Ole Espersen of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Latvian government

7?This protest was instigated by an article in the newspaper Panorama Lati’ii.
which called upon Russian pensioners to gather in front of Riga’s city hall.
74The first quote is from Paul Goble. “Playing the Ethnic Card,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Endnote (10 March, 1998). The second quote is from a speech
given by Yevgeniy Primakov, then Russia’s Foreign Minister, at a session of the Council
of Europe in Strasbourg, as reported by Interfax (4 May, 1998).
75Moskovskiye Rossiyskiye Vesti (18 February, 1998), 2.
7o“Swedish. Finnish Leaders Back Latvia,” FBIS-WEU-98-134 (12 May, 1998).
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decided to try to persuade the parliament to amend the citizenship law. Yet, according to
Ulmanis, the greatest problem was that “it became clear [to us] that we had to amend our
citizenship law under pressure from the East [i.e., Russia] and not on our own will.”77
Many ethnic Latvians perceived this pressure as a violation of the sovereignty of their
state. Consequently, Latvia’s parliamentarians were very unwilling to give in to the
pressure “from above.”
In the midst o f the debate on whether to am end the citizenship law, the EU issued a
statement reminding Latvia that it “had earlier raised the issue in the context of Latvia’s
bid to join the European Union,” and hoped that “the Latvian parliament will take early
action to adopt the government’s decisions.”78 After prolonged inter-party debates and
active lobbying by Foreign M inister Valdis Birkavs, Latvian lawmakers finally approved
amendments to the citizenship law on June 22 whereby citizenship was granted to all
children bom to non-citizens residing in Latvia after August 1991.
However, similarly to the first stage of com m unity building, there was a backlash
from ethnic Latvians who had opposed any changes to the law of citizenship. The rightwing For Fatherland and Freedom party managed to collect the required number of
signatures to hold a referendum on the law. According to Guntars Krasts, Latvia’s Prime
M inister and a m em ber of the For Fatherland and Freedom Party, “if we make one

77Quoted in Sergei Zaletayev, “Zamenit’ by populizm ” [How to Get Away from
Populism], Panorama Latvii (17 April, 1998), 2.
78“EU Wants Riga to Act Quickly on Citizenship Law,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Newsline (20 April, 1998). Prior to this statement, Italian Foreign Minister
Lamberto Dini said during a joint press conference with Russian Foreign Minister
Yevgenyi Primakov that “recent problems [i.e., the march] with Latvia’s ethnic Russian
community will not help Latvia’s case for EU membership,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Newsline (8 April, 1998).
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concession [to the Russians], then they will dem and more and more until we are once
again controlled by them.”79 The President, the other major political parties, the leading
national newspaper and numerous international actors opposed the right-wingers. The
opponents o f the right-wingers managed to convince 53% of the electorate to vote to
liberalize the law. The right-wingers managed to get approximately 45% of the vote in
support of their law on citizenship.80 Many ethnic Latvians who voted against the right
wingers were under the impression that their vote would put an end to OSCE intervention
into political community building in Latvia and that a stricter language law (then under
debate in the parliament) would ensure their survival as an ethnic group.81
Even though the law on citizenship was liberalized, the referendum did little to
reduce ethnic division in Latvia. This division became apparent in December 1999, when
Latvia's Russians protested against the law on Latvian language which had already been
watered down under pressure from the OSCE and the EU.82 The m ajor parties voted for
the bill, but For Human Rights in a United Latvia, an ethnopolitical party which claim s to
protect the interests of Russians in Latvia, voted against it. This party, which enjoys the
support of a substantial num ber o f ethnic Russians, also opposed the new education law
(which had received the “approval” of international organizations) that will require high

79Quoted by Milka H ellsten, “Russia’s Thirst for Power Is Frightening the
Latvians,” FBIS-W EU-98-203 (17 June, 1998).
S0Karlis Streips, “Latvian Voters Open the Door to Citizenship— a Little,”
Transition 27, no. 2 (June 1999).
8|lT h e Legacy of Fifty Years of Russification is Still Here,” an open letter by the
members of the Commission on the Latvian Language, Panorama Latvii (29 November,
1999), 2.
82The Law on Language represents a com promise between OSCE experts and
those interested in protecting the Latvian language. The OSCE pushed Latvia to prevent
state intervention into the private sphere. “Saeim a Passes State Language Law,” LETA
(Latvian News Agency) (9 Decem ber, 1999).
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schools to use Latvian as the language of instruction by 2004. These fundamental
differences on language and education have prevented ethnopolitical parties from
cooperating in the implementation of the National Programme on the Integration of
Society in Latvia adopted in 1999.83

The Response o f Latvia's M inorities to Changes in the Law on Citizenship

Despite the liberalization o f the law on citizenship, the num ber of Russians who
have received Latvian citizenship has remained low (see Table 10). In 1999, 58.9% of the
Russians living in Latvia were non-citizens, and only 39.7% were Latvian citizens, an
increase o f only 3.7% since 1994, when the first law on citizenship was adopted. The
slow speed of naturalization (an increase of only 1.49% in the body of citizens since 1996)
came as a surprise to all involved parties, including international organizations (see Table
10).84 One of the major reasons for slow naturalization is a lack of proficiency in the
Latvian language, especially among older Russian residents of Latvia. In workplaces
where the majority of workers are Russian there is no incentive to leam Latvian.85 In

83The Programme defines integration as “achieving mutual understanding and
cooperation among different social groups and individuals in one state.” The essence of
the Programme is to foster “loyalty to the Latvian slate” by teaching the Latvian language,
by making changes in the education system, by encouraging dialogue between the
Russian and Latvian mass media, etc. Preses Nams, Integratsiya obshchestva v Latvii:
proyekt [Integration o f Society in Latvia: A Draft] (Riga: Preses Nams, 1999). The
Programme is opposed by sixteen non-governmental organizations of Russians in Latvia.
wAina Antane and Boris Tsilevich, “Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in
Latvia,” in Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies, ed. Pal
Kolsto (Boulder, Colo.: W estview, 1999), 93.
83Ibid., 118. Antane and Tsilevich also compare the results from the 1989 census
and a 1995 survey which showed an increase in proficiency in the Latvian language
(55.8%, up from 22.3%) among Latvia’s Russians. However, the data from the survey
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addition, an unwillingness to serve in the army, passivity, and dissociation from political
life are often cited as other potential reasons.86 According to a survey conducted by the
Naturalization Board, the main reason why young non-citizens are not willing to acquire
Latvian citizenship is because they “do not see any reason for it.”87 This may be because
permanent residents in Latvia enjoy rights which are alm ost the same as those enjoyed by
citizens. A survey done according to region of attitudes toward the state suggests that in
regions with a predominantly Russian population, such as Daugavpils, people tended to be
more interested in local issues than in citizenship.88
Despite the slow speed of naturalization, the attitude of the majority of nonLatvians toward Latvia as an independent state has been improving (see Table 7).
Furthermore, the percentage of non-Latvians who thought that both Latvians and nonLatvians were capable o f “handling whatever problems might arise” was also on the rise
(see Table 9). Consequently, even though the Russians living in Latvia have developed an
identity separate from the state, the survey data suggests that they have not rejected the
state (i.e., they have continued to use it as a “service station”) and have even gotten used to
their status as non-citizen residents within the Latvian political community. An
investigation of sub-state developments sheds more light on the reasons why such attitudes
became widespread among Russians living in Latvia.

and the census are not directly com patible, and the increased figure probably shows
changes in the self-perception of those who were interviewed.
86The Programme cites the following reasons: a lack of information, the
inefficiency of state institutions responsible for naturalization, belonging to ethnopolitical
groups opposed to the Latvian state, and poor knowledge o f the Latvian language. Preses
Nams, 9-10. Antane and Tsilevich argue that the main reason is that the tests for
citizenship are loo stringent. Antane and Tsilevich, 94.
87Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia, 29.
88Baltijas datu nams. 13.
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POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM “BELOW "

Local Governments

Unlike Estonia. Latvia decided to bar non-citizens from voting in local elections.
In 1994. the Latvian parliament did not even consider the possibility that non-citizens
could participate in local elections, arguing that “the issue should be considered only after
the adoption of the law on citizenship."”'9 The 1994 local elections were won by parties
that were not willing to represent the interests of Latvia’s Russians. In five of the seven
cities in Latvia the majority of the city council seats were filled by members o f right-ofcenter. pro-Latvian rights political parties and organizations. In the regions, for every four
right-wing representatives elected, there was only one left-wing representative.90 The lowlevel of minority representation in local governments did not help to build an inclusive
political community. It probably contributed to alienation am ong Russians in 1994—95
who complained that the nationalist parties were interested solely in reducing the number
of schools in which the Russian language was taught and w ere not doing much to alleviate
the plight o f the needy.91
There was a slight change during the next local elections, which took place in

89“Latvian Lawmakers Adopt Law on Local Elections." Baltic News Service (IS
January. 1994).
rT>zintra Bungs, “Local Elections in Latvia: the O pposition Wins." Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Draft Research Paper (7 July. 1994).
9iE.g.. see Konstantin Kazakov. “Rizhskaya Duma—Mini Seim" [The Council of
Riga Is a Mini Parliament] Bizness i Baltiya (14 February. 1997). In 1990—95. the
number of students in Russian language schools dropped from approximately 150.000 to
125.000. Antane and Tsilevich. 122.
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March 1997. Even though right-wing parties got most of the votes, the level of minority
representation actually increased in some areas. These were areas with large
concentrations of Russians. There was a threefold increase in the num ber of non-Latvian
deputies in the Riga City Council.92 In Daugavpils, another city with a large Russian
population, the extreme left Social Democratic Party, which championed the interests of
Latvia's Russians, won 13 out of 15 seats.93
Latvia’s Russian parties— the National Harmony Party, the Socialist Party, and the
Unity Party— have been trying to convince the Latvian government to give Russians the
right to elect or be elected to local government, regardless o f their citizenship. Such
demands have sometimes translated into street protests.94 The Latvian parliamentarians
who have refused to grant this right argue that only those who are fluent in Latvian should
be able to participate in local elections and to be elected. Others have argued that
extending such a right would be only a halfway measure in the process of integration.
Instead, they argue, Latvia should focus on political community building “from
above”— i.e., finding incentives for Russians to learn Latvian and apply for Latvian
citizenship.95

92UN. Latvia Human Development Report 1997, 54.
93Saulius Gim ius, “Latvian Local Election Update,” OMRI Daily Digest (11
March, 1997).
94For example, this happened in Daugavpils in 1997. The Russian community
wanted to keep Aleksey Vidavskiy, a popular city mayor, in power. However, the law
governing local elections did not allow him to be a candidate for the city council because
he had not resigned from the Communist party. Aleksandr Shinkin, “Second Class
Citizens in Latvia Have Something in Common: They Are All Russian,” FBIS-SOV-97015 (18 January, 1997).
95Galina Pommere, “I mestnaya vlast’ tol’ko iz 'ariytsev'” [Local Power Is in the
Hands of the Aryans As W ell], SM -Segodnva (10 October, 1996).
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Using the Stale as a Service Station

Even though the majority of Russians living in Latvia could not or were not willing
to become citizens, they became full-fledged members of Latvia’s civil society. Both
Latvians and non-Latvians were fully entitled to use the Latvian state as “a service
station.” First, both citizens and non-citizens were included in the process of privatization.
All residents o f Latvia received vouchers to privatize their apartments, land, and
enterprises. When the city council of Riga tried to limit the rights of non-citizens to
privatize their apartments by asking for supplemental documents from the Citizenship and
Migration Board showing their (non-citizen) status, Anatol Gorbunov, the Minister of
Regional Development, stepped in and vetoed this decision, thus defending the rights of
non-citizens.96 Second, both citizens and non-citizens could participate in the conduct of
business. Consequently, there have been no distinct differences between the income of
citizens and non-citizens.97 Even though, as non-citizens (until 1998), many Russians had
fewer rights to pensions and jobs in the public sector, many of them became active
members o f a vibrant business community in Latvia.98
As a matter of fact, there is evidence to suggest that Latvia’s Russians, especially
those with contacts in the industry and the transport sectors, were better able to adapt to a

" “Gorbunov Protiv Rizhskoy Dumy” [Gorbunovs Against the Council of Riga],
Bizness i Baltija (20 September, 1996).
9/Baltijas datu nams, 22.
98W illiam E. Schmidt, “Latvia’s Worry: What to Do With All Its Russians,” Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty B-WIRE (1 March. 1994). Furthermore, a study of living
conditions in the Baltic region (conducted by NORBALT in autumn 1994) found that, all
other things being equal, Russian men are no more likely to be unemployed than men of
Latvian ethnicity. Unemployment among Russian women, however, was found to be
greater than unemployment among Latvian women. Aasland, 353-70.
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market economy than those ethnic Latvians w ho had been engaged in agriculture." Some
o f the Russians who belong to this socioeconomic group joined an organization called
Russkiye Zapada [The Western Russians] and tried to persuade the Latvian government to
let them act as a liaison between Russia and Latvia in order to further the economic
interests of Latvia.100 It is not surprising, therefore, that the civic activity of non-Latvians
has been most intense in interest groups dealing with economic issues— business
associations and trade unions.101
Similarly to Estonia, the attitudes o f Russians with a high level of income toward
the state tended to be more positive than o f those with a low level o f income.102 On the
other hand, older Russians (e.g., retired Soviet m ilitary officers and workers sent to Latvia
in 1950s and 1960s) were more likely to be incapable of leading an active life in the
business community and therefore to be opposed to the Latvian state.103

Different Perceptions o f the Past: An Insurmountable Obstacle?

In Latvia, similarly to Estonia, Russians and Latvians commemorate different days.

"N ils M uiznieks, quoted in Antane and Tsilevich, 133. However, there is no data
to substantiate the popular belief in Latvia that the majority of Latvian capital belongs to
non-Latvians.
100Dmitri Nikolayev (President of the “W estern Russians”), “Vostrebovannosf
russkikh” [The Needs of the Russians], Diena (19 April, 1999), 2.
101Trade unions are the most popular civic organizations in Latvia. 12% of all
citizens and 5% o f non-citizens are members o f such unions. Overall, however, non
citizens were found to be less active than citizens. Approximately 90% of non-citizens
have not joined any organizations. Baltijas datu nams, 27.
102Non-citizens with a low level of incom e were more interested in leaving Latvia
than those with a higher level o f income. Baltijas datu nams, 22.
103William E. Schmidt, “Latvia’s Worry: W hat to Do With All Its Russians,”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty B-W IRE (1 M arch, 1994).
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Most Russians (especially the older generation) commemorate May 9, Victory Day (the
day when the Russians captured Berlin in 1945). while the Latvians associate this day with
the return of the Soviets and deportations. Instead, Latvians com m em orate March 25 and
June 14, the days when mass deportations were carried out in 1941 and 1949, as days o f
national mourning.
To confront the legacy of the past, the Latvian government initiated an intense
search for those guilty of deportations. The first case was initiated in 1995 against Alfons
Noviks. a former KGB general. He was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. In
1998. a case was initiated against Vasily Kononov, who, together with eighteen other proSoviet partisans (dressed up in German uniforms) had committed atrocities in a Latvian
village in 1944. Yuri Luzhkov, the m ayor of Moscow, criticized Latvia for “harassing war
veterans.’*and the Russian Duma passed a resolution in favor of Vasily Kononov. The
trial w as vehemently opposed by Latvia’s Russian com m unity.104 On 27 September 1999 a
Riga regional court found Mikhail Farbukh, an 83-year-old former KGB agent, guilty of
signing the deportation orders.105
Even though it is too early to hypothesize about the long term im pact of these trials
on the bifurcation o f Latvian society, it is probably safe to say that they have become a
forum in which form er victims can voice their memories. “Taboo” topics are openly
discussed. During this process, survivors and other members of society agree on what is
“real history” and what is myth. This helps to reduce polarization.

,04Uldis Strelis, “The Latvian Practice Investigating the Crimes o f Totalitarian
Regimes.” paper presented at the conference “Investigation of the Problem s of Crimes
Against Humanity and W ar Crimes” on 5 November 1998 in Vilnius, Lithuania.
105Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (28 September, 1999).
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Post-independence commemorations have played a similar function. For example,
on 25 March 1999, the day on which Latvians remember the mass deportations of 1941. a
special exhibition was opened in the Museum of Occupation in Riga. Henrihs Strods, the
head of the Museum’s research program, reformulated the question o f guilt by revealing
that even though the deportations had been orchestrated by officers from other parts of the
USSR, many Latvians had, in fact, been involved as well. Local score-settling and greed
among neighbors were the partial reasons why many Latvian names appeared on the
deportation lists.106 Although it is probably too early to speak about complete
reconciliation between Latvians and Russians, the establishment of functioning state
institutions (specifically, courts and museums) helped to place the experiences of the past
into history books and to record them as crimes.

TOW ARD A STABLE POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN LATVIA? ATTITUDES AND
POLARIZATION IN TH E LATE NINETIES

In the late nineties, the polarization that was present in Latvia during the initial
stage of community building decreased. According to data for the years 1997-98, around
80% of Latvia’s non-citizens (mostly Russians) felt “close connected” to Latvia, and
around 90% had made a decision to stay in Latvia.107 There was no revival of the

106“Remembering a Legacy of Terror,” Baltic Times (1-7 April, 1999), 17.
l0'Baltijas datu nams. 22. Some of those who have decided to stay, however, may
have done so because they lacked the funds to emigrate to Russia. According to the Riga
office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), approximately 10% of the
70,000 ethnic Russians living in Latvia would like to emigrate to Russia. The reliability
of this data, however, is questionable, since the IOM did not conduct an official survey.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (9 December. 1999).
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Intennovement. The political parties representing the interests of Latvia’s Russians— the
Russian party, Harmony for Latvia, the Party of Latvia’s Russian Citizens, the Movement
for Social Justice and Equal Rights in Latvia, the Latvian Socialist party, and For Human
Rights in a United Latvia— were all willing to compete for power in parliamentary and
local elections.108 Furthermore, the number of ethnic Russians elected to the Latvian
parliament has been increasing. In 1993, only 6 of the 100 deputies were ethnic Russians.
By 1998, this had increased to 10.109 These facts indicate that the two communities are
willing to play the democratic game.
The decrease in polarization, however, does not imply that the Russians have been
assimilated into the Latvian political community. A series o f interviews with the leaders
of Latvia’s Russian community revealed a strong resistance to “assimilation” (understood
as forceful linguistic integration into the nation state). Many argued for even more
autonomy within the Latvian state. This was understood to be a condition under which
Latvia’s minorities felt “secure being Russians. Byelorussians, or Ukrainians.” 110 Similar
opinions were expressed during a series of debates in April and May 1999 involving the
leaders of Latvia’s Russian community, the representatives o f the Latvian Migration and
Naturalization Board, and representatives from various international organizations.
Furthermore, conservative representatives of Russkaya obschina Latvii [the Russian

i08This information is from the list of political parties and organizations registered
by the Latvian M inistry of Justice (as of 1 May 1999). In 1998, Russian ethnopolitica!
parties failed to win any seats in parliament.
109There was also a parliamentary election in 1995. Candidates nominated for
parliament, however, did not have to indicate their ethnic origin. Latvian Parliament,
“History and Legislature o f the Republic of Latvia.” Available from
hap:IIwww.saeima.lanel.lv/LapasEnglish/Hislory_saiurs.htm-, INTERNET.
ll0Baltijas datu nams. 28.
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Community o f Latvia] rejected the possibility that Latvia could ever create an inclusive
political community if it stuck to its current interpretation of the Soviet past. Mikhail
Gavrilov, the leader o f the Latvian Association of Russian Communities, argued that if
Latvia really wanted to build an inclusive community, it should have suppressed “the
whole issue of occupation” because “it is a source of passions” and interethnic tensions.111
Understandably, such approaches to community building are absolutely
unacceptable to ethnic Latvians, many of whom see themselves as victims of the former
regime and are interested in recording the crimes of the previous regim e.112 So far, the
Latvian state has been sympathetic to such requests.113 Taking the interests of the two
ethnic groups into account, the cultural autonomy of Latvia’s Russians (i.e., letting them
speak their own language and have their own schools) was probably the optimal approach
to community building in Latvia. This approach was condoned by influential groups in
Latvia’s Russian com m unity.114 Consequently, the state has not tried to regulate the
activities of political and social groups representing Latvia’s Russians and has tolerated
their links with Russia.115

11‘Vladislav Sorokin, “Integration Involves All Residents of Latvia,” Diena (3
May, 1999), 3.
112Groups representing the form er victims have opposed what they call “twocommunity” approach in Latvia, arguing for stronger policies of assimilation. Mara
Grinberga, “Zakon yazyka razdelil D augavpil’skoye obschestvo” [The Language Law
Has Divided the Community in Daugavpils], Diena (24 April, 1999), 1.
113The state has incorporated the stories of former victims into official history
books: it has financed a Museum of Occupation in Riga, has offered compensation to
victims or their descendants, and has conducted trials o f those responsible for crimes
committed during Soviet times.
114Dmitri Nikolayev, “N atsional’nyi protektsionizm i konkurentosposobnost’
russkikh v Latvii” [National Protectionism and Competitiveness of the Russians in
Latvia], Diena (29 April, 1999), 2.
115The Equal Rights party, for exam ple, has close links with M oscow and the
Russian parliament. Sanita Upleia. “Leviye Latvii i Estonii aktivno obraschavutsa s
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However, one repercussion of this approach is that the state is currently incapable
o f promoting the Latvian language among Latvia's Russians (e.g., by teaching some
subjects only in Latvian). Policies that encourage Latvia’s Russians to leam Latvian are
supported by the European Union and other international organizations.116 Latvia’s
Russians, however, have stubbornly resisted these policies. Members of the conservative
Russian Community of Latvia and Russian ethnopolitical parties have actively resisted the
law on education. They have also disapproved of the language law because it regulates the
use of language, not only in the public sector (in areas such as first aid and public safety),
but in the private sector as well.117 Thus, the Russian enthnopolitical party For Human
Rights in a United Latvia voted against the State Language Law in December 1999.118
Furthermore, conservative groups of Russians have resisted the state language
implementation policies pursued by Dzintra Hirsa, director of the State Language
Inspection Center (the institution responsible for overseeing the implementation of the
Language Law).119 These policies have included requiring medical doctors and lawyers to

M oskvoi” [Left-wing Parties in Latvia and Estonia Have Active Communication with
Moscow], Diena (12 April, 1999), 3.
116The National Programme for Language Training, which is designed to prepare
teachers to teach Latvian as a second language to the 150,000 students in Latvia’s
Russian language schools, is supported by Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands,
and other states. It is also supported by the UN Development Program ($3.2 million for
the first two years and $4.7 million for the next two) and the EU. Katya Cengel, “No
More Emotional Gibberish,” Baltic Times (14 January, 1999), 9.
“ 'According to the law on education, most o f the secondary schools in which
instruction is currently conducted in Russian will be required to switch to Latvian by
2004. The Latvian language law passed on 9 December 1999. was praised by the EU, the
OSCE, and the Council of Europe, but criticized by Russia and by the conservative
Russians living in Latvia. Hoping for membership in the EU, Latvia listened to OSCE
recommendations (e.g., less state intervention in the private sphere) and watered down its
language law.
118“Saeima Passes State Language Law,” LETA (9 December, 1999).
119Andrev Vorontsov. “Oko za oko: nash otvet Dzintre Hirshe” [Eye for an Eye:
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pass a language test in order to keep their licenses.
The most successful community building approach employed by the Latvian state
has been to extend to Latvia’s Russians the full rights of membership in the civil society.
That is, even though Latvia’s Russians could not vote, they were able to participate in the
business community and to conduct business with Russia with very little state
intervention. This helped to legitimatize the power of the state in the eyes o f those
Russians who were successful in Latvia’s emerging market economy. On the negative
side, this may have reduced the need of Russians to apply for Latvian citizenship (or any
other citizenship, for that matter). In 1998, approximately 26.5% of the people living in
Latvia were still stateless.120 Since 1998, the number of applications for naturalization has
been rising, but slowly.121 Naturalization is generally viewed by Latvia’s Russians as an
unnecessary and humiliating process because it involves demonstrating knowledge of the
Latvian language, Latvian history, and the Constitution, and because of the fee.122
Finally, a closer look at the circumstances surrounding the adoption and revision
of the law on citizenship suggests a conclusion about the role of international actors in
political community building in Latvia. Intense international pressure affected the policies

Our Answer to Dzintra Hirsa], SM-Segodnya (11—17 November, 1997), “Sed’moye
Nebo” [The Seventh Sky] section.
i20UNDP, Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Naturalization Board, Human
Rights and Social Integration in Latvia: A General Survey (Riga: Latvian M inistry of
Foreign Affairs, 1998), 10.
121In 1995, there 4,543 applications for citizenship were submitted to the
Naturalization Board. In 1996, this number was 2,627; in 1997—3,075. In 1998, 5,608
applications were accepted. This number increased (6,507) in 1999. Republic of Latvia
Naturalization Board, Fact Sheet: Naturalization Process in Latvia (Riga: Naturalization
Board, 1999).
i2248% of non-citizens think that the language test is too difficult. 56% of non
citizens think that the test on Latvian history is too difficult. Baltijas datu nams, 24.
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of the state towards its minorities: Latvia agreed to liberalize its law on citizenship.
However, a by-product of this international action has been to induce more polarization
within Latvian society. In addition, this pressure gave more legitimacy to more radical
ethnopolitical parties. Consequently, the sustainability of a functioning political
community in Latvia in the future depends not on further liberalization of laws on
citizenship and m inorities, but on the ability of the state to remain a functioning
decentralized “service station.” willing to preserve the de facto cultural autonomy o f its
Russian community. EU membership, which has been promised to Latvia, should help to
achieve this goal.
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CHAPTER V m
POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING IN LITHUANIA

This chapter is a case study o f political com m unity building in Lithuania.
Similarly to the previous two chapters, the goal o f this case study is to analyze the
approaches that were employed by the Lithuanian state to legitimatize its power vis-a-vis
ethnic minority groups that were initially opposed to the existence of an independent
Lithuanian state. There was much less international involvement in Lithuania than in
Latvia and Estonia. However, consistently with the research design, this chapter considers
this variable and assesses its impact on Lithuania’s decisions regarding its ethnic
minorities.
To analyze the approaches used by the Lithuanian state, the chapter will undertake
three steps. First, it will evidence the existence o f polarization between the state and
ethnopolitical groups that opposed the existence o f an independent state and that claimed
to represent Lithuania’s Slavic ethnic groups (Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and
ethnic Poles) during the initial stage of political com m unity building. To do that, the first
part of the case study will analyze the results of public opinion surveys done during that
period. The surveys reflect the attitude of minorities toward the independent Lithuanian
state. In addition, this part will outline the platform s o f these ethnopolitical movements.
As Chapter IV has shown, the emergence of these diametrically opposed ethnopolitical
movements (restorationists and internationalists) was prompted by the ethnic restructuring
that was conducted by the Soviet U nion.1

‘Lithuanian-Polish relations, however, are a bit more complicated. In addition to
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Second, the chapter will trace the process of political community building “from
above” and “from below” under the circumstances (i.e., polarization) described in the first
part. The second part of the case study focuses on the approaches used by the Lithuanian
state “from above.” It examines the following: Why (unlike Latvia and Estonia) did the
state make a decision to include all residents of Lithuania into the political process? How
did this move affect the attitudes o f ethnic minorities toward the state? To answer these
questions, this chapter will explore the circumstances surrounding the adoption o f the law
on citizenship and other laws affecting the status of minorities. It will also document the
response of Lithuania’s ethnic minorities and their “mother states” (i.e., Russia and
Poland) to these policies.
The third part o f the chapter focuses on developments within civil society (i.e.,
“below” )— the creation of local governments, the ability of Lithuania’s minorities to use
the state as a service station and the impact of different historical experiences on inter
ethnic relations. The chapter will conclude by assessing the effectiveness of the
approaches employed by the Lithuanian state. To do that, the concluding part of the
chapter will trace the changes in the attitudes of Lithuania’s minorities and ethnopolitical
actors vis-a-vis the state.

the policy of ethnic restructuring pursued by the USSR, the historical memory of the
interwar period (1919-39) plays a significant role. In 1919, Poland seized eastern
Lithuania militarily and kept it until 1939.
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ETHNOPOLITICAL ACTORS AND POLARIZATION DURING T H E INITIAL STAGE
OF COMMUNITY BUILDING (1988-91)

As in the other two Baltic states, the attitude of the Poles and other Slavic ethnic
groups living in Lithuania toward Lithuanian independence was reserved or even hostile.
The prospect of an independent nation state provoked nervousness among the Russian and
the Polish populations in Lithuania. A sizable number of Poles and other Slavs living in
eastern Lithuania— one of the most ethnically restructured areas in the country— opposed
the establishment of an independent state. As Table 11 shows, only the Lithuanians living
in that area welcomed the prospect o f independence.

Table 11. Support for an Independent Lithuanian State in Eastern Lithuania by
Nationality, 1990 and 1994
Nationality

Support.
1990

Support,
late 1994

Lithuanian

86%

65%

Russian

38%

46%

Polish

35%

Other
nationalities

41%

Doubt.
1990
9%

Doubt.
late
1994

Does not
Support.
1990

Does not Support,
late 1994

23%

3%

9%

35%

29%

13%

16%

40%

35%

34%

19%

19%

48%

38%

29%

12%

12%

Source:
Grigas. Romualdas. "Socialines Itampos laukai” [The Fields of Social Tension). In Lietuvos Filosofijos ir
Sociologijos Institutas. Paribio Lietuva [Lithuania On the BorderJ. Vilnius: Lietuvos Filosofijos ir
Sociologijos Institutas. 1996.
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In contrast, in March 1990 (shortly before Lithuania declared itself independent
from the USSR), approximately one third of all residents in Snieckus (a town heavily
populated with ethnic Russians) wanted to remain citizens of the USSR. Every fifth
resident said that s/he would consider leaving Lithuania if it became de facto independent
from the USSR. Percentages were similar in other parts of Lithuania. In April 1990 (after
Lithuania had declared itself independent), only 18% of non-Lithuanians said that they
supported the existence of an independent Lithuanian state. Several months later, in
August 1990, only 8% o f ethnic Russians and 17% of ethnic Poles said that they supported
Lithuania’s independence.2
Yedinstvo (Unity or Intermovement), the movement that opposed Lithuania’s
independence and tried to keep the USSR intact, received most o f its support from nonLithuanians. In O ctober 1989, 13% of non-Lithuanians supported Yedinstvo and even
45% supported the Soviet Com munist party.3 The Unity m ovement was especially
influential in eastern Lithuania, w here it was promoted by the local authorities. In eastern
Lithuania, ethnic identity was the m ost important factor when it came to the affiliation of
individuals with political parties and political movements.
Thus, in 1990, in the region o f Vilnius, 47% of non-Lithuanians supported the proSoviet Communist party and 12% o f the residents expressed their support for the Unity
movement. In 1989, in the region o f Svencioniy, 64% of non-Lithuanians supported the

:Krukauskiene, Eugenija, “Nepriklausomybes samprata kitatauciy symoneje”
[What Do non-Lithuanians Think About Lithuania’s Independence], in Tautines
mazumos [Ethnic M inorities], ed. Vida Kasparaviciene (Vilnius: Filosofijos, Sociologijos
ir teises institutas, 1992), 16-17.
3Vladas Gaidys, “Political Party Preferences and Political Identities in Lithuania.”
in Changes o f Identity in M odem Lithuania, ed. Meilute Taljunaite (Vilnius: Institute of
Philosophy and Sociology, 1996), 77.
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pro-Soviet Com m unist party. In contrast, only 8% o f Lithuanians living in the same
regions supported the pro-Soviet Communist party and only 2% (Vilnius) and 1%
(Svencioniq) supported the Unity movement.4
Aware o f the widespread support that the pro-Soviet Communist party enjoyed
among non-Lithuanians living in eastern part of the country, A. Brodavski, one of the
leaders of the anti-independence movement, decided to gain some political capital by
finding allies in M oscow. Thus, in May 1990, Brodavski wrote a letter to Mikhail
Gorbachev telling him that his region was loyal to the USSR and had declared territorial
autonomy within the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.5 Knowing Gorbachev’s desire
to keep the Soviet Union intact, Brodavski was trying to push for a “Polish territorial unit”
within the USSR in which he would continue to hold a position o f power.
He was not alone. Jan Ciechanowicz, a deputy of the Soviet Supreme Council
from Lithuania, also argued that creation of “real equality for ethnic Poles [when
compared to other ethnic groups] in the USSR will be achieved when there are autonomies
in Lithuania. Latvia, Byelorussia, and other parts o f the form er USSR.”6
To achieve this goal, Ciechanowicz proposed the establishment of an “Eastern
Polish Republic” as a constituent part of the Soviet Union on the basis of the territories
joined to the Soviet Union as a result of M olotov-Ribbentrop Pact. His proposal appeared
in Nasza Gazeta, a newspaper published by the Union o f Poles in Lithuania. According to

4Arvydas M atulionis, “Politines orientacijos” [Political Belief Systems], in
Lietuvos Mokslo akademija, Pietryciy Lietuva: Socialiniai teisiniai aspeklai
[Southeastern Lithuania: Social and Legal Features] (Vilnius: Lietuvos Mokslo
akademija, 1990), 46-47.
5Garsva and Grumadiene, 383.
6M. Botyan and V. Zarovski, “Anatomiya A vtonom ii” [An Anatomy of the
Autonomy], Kom som ol'skaya Pravda, (25 November. 1989), 2—3.
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this proposal, the first step in the process of creating an Eastern Polish Republic within the
Soviet Union would be the formation of Polish autonomous regions within already
existing republics, such as Lithuania.' In October 1990, representatives from local
governments in eastern Lithuania met in the town o f Eisiskes and announced their plan to
create a “Polish National Territorial Unit” in the territory of Lithuania. Predictably, this
announcement prompted a wave of dissatisfaction among ethnic Lithuanians.8
Brodavski and his followers were supported by approximately 28% of the residents
in eastern Lithuania.9 This group actively supported the Soviet Union, which was strongly
opposed to Lithuania’s independence. They tended to associate the prospect of an
independent Lithuania with economic hardship, and were ready to continue to support the
Lithuanian SSR as a part o f the USSR if this preserved the economic status quo. It is not
surprising, therefore, that in 1989, 76% of the residents of the Vilnius and Salcininkai
regions (located in eastern Lithuania) revealed that material well-being was more
important to them than the type of political unit in which they would live.10 Furthermore,
in 1990, Sqjudis (Lithuania’s pro-independence movement) had the lowest support in
eastern Lithuania. Its supporters were spread throughout all regions in Lithuania except
eastern Lithuania.11

'Roman Solchanyk, “A Sixteenth Soviet Republic,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Research Report (22 June, 1990).
8Lashkevich, “V Litve - avtonomniy pol’skiy kray?” [An Autonomous Polish
Region in Lithuania?], Izvestiya (8 October, 1990), 1.
tig ir d a s , “Pietryciq Lietuvos gyventojai” [The Inhabitants of Southeastern
Lithuania], 36.
l0Krukauskiene, “ Nepriklausomybes samprata kitatauciy sqmoneje” [What Do
non-Lithuanians Think About Lithuania’s Independence], 17.
“ Rasa Labulyte, “ ‘Politiniai’ regionai Lietuvoje” [“Political” Regions in
Lithuania], in Seimo rinkim ai’96: Treciasis atmetimas [Parliamentary Election 1996: The
Third Rejection], ed. Algis Kxupavicius (Vilnius: Tverme. 1998), 274—75.
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Brodavski’s anti-independence movement was looking for allies in M oscow.
Brodavski attended the IVth Conference of Soviet Deputies in M oscow, during which he
argued that “the current Lithuanian government is not willing to take the interests o f Polish
speakers into account” and that only the USSR could help the non-Lithuanian residents of
the Vilnius region to be granted territorial autonom y.12 Polish political activists in eastern
Lithuania were also looking for allies in Warsaw. They managed to find some support in
Poland, even though the majority of Polish political parties, numerous non-govemmental
organizations, and Poland’s Senate all expressed support for an independent Lithuanian
state. To illustrate, in 1990, a group of Polish activists who supported their com patriots in
Lithuania complained to the President of Poland about the alleged mistreatment o f Poles
living in Lithuania.13 These problems included the “lithuanization” of Polish names (i.e.,
having to choose Lithuanian substitutes for letters that occur only in Polish),14 historical
accounts of the interw ar period that condemned the actions of Poland in eastern Lithuania,
the decreasing num ber of Polish-language schools in Lithuania, and the incorporation of
areas with a large num ber of ethnic Poles into the city of Vilnius.
In 1991, the W arsaw-based Citizens Committee for the Defense of Poles in the
Vilnius region was formed. This Committee, led by Bronislav Geremek, pushed for more
autonomy in the Vilnius region, more cultural rights for ethnic Poles, and a revision o f the
laws governing restitution to allow people who were not Lithuanian citizens to participate
in the restitution process (e.g., Polish citizens who owned, or whose ancestors owned, land

12Garsva and Grumadiene, 395-7.
13Lietuvos M okslo akademija, 126-38.
I4Elvyra Baltutyte (Deputy Director of the Lithuanian Human Rights Center),
interview by author, 22 June 1999. Vilnius.
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in the area of Vilnius when that area was occupied by Poland during the interwar period
would be eligible to get it back).15 The Committee managed to convince the Polish
Foreign Ministry to support the first two demands at the international level. Consequently,
these demands translated into cool Polish-Lithuanian relations in the early nineties.
Despite the support it gave to Lithuania’s Poles and their demands for cultural
autonomy, Poland warned them that their “mother state” would not support the pro-Soviet
Unity movement. This warning coincided with a fall in Unity’s popularity and a rise in the
popularity of the Union of Poles among ethnic Poles in Lithuania. The Union proclaimed
itself the major representative of Polish interests in Lithuania. These interests included
minority rights, a variety o f cultural concessions for all m inority groups in Lithuania, and
political representation. Cultural issues, such as the fact that Lithuania’s Catholic bishop
refused to allow a Polish-language mass once a week in V ilnius’ reopened Cathedral,
became a source o f bitterness among Poles living in Lithuania.
Thus, in the early stages of political community building in Lithuania, there were
two major organizations— the Unity movement and the Union o f Poles— who claimed to
represent the interests o f non-Lithuanians.16 The Unity movem ent was pro-Soviet and
fiercely anti-independence, while the Union of Poles claimed that its main goal was to
fight for minority rights. According to Jan Sienkiewicz. leader o f the Union of Poles, the
primary goal o f this organization was “to Find a political voice for themselves” as
Lithuania tried to get out of the Soviet Union.17 Ethnic Poles became the most active

l5Arunas Bubnys, an article in Vomta (10 June, 1992). 7.
16“The Polish Political Activism,” RFE Report (7 September, 1990).
l7John Daniszewski, “Cut off by Post-war Borders. Poles Seek Place in New
Lithuania.” Radio Free Europe B-Wire (19 March, 1990).
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minority group. Other minorities were less active.
The creation of the Unity movement and the Union of Poles became a source of
concern for some Lithuanians. A non-govemmental union— Vilnija (the area around
Vilnius)— consisting of ethnic Lithuanians was founded in 1988 to counteract the
perceived threat o f growing Polish influence in eastern Lithuania. It still exists today. The
main goal of Vilnija is to “lithuanize” the eastern part of Lithuania by “getting rid o f alien
(i.e.. Polish or Russian) textbooks, school teachers, symbols and other aspects of foreign
states.” 18
The union is supported by the victims of the Soviet regime and ethnic Lithuanians
who suffered under the policies of Poland in occupied eastern Lithuania in 1919-39.
Vilnija's drive to make eastern Lithuania more “Lithuanian” was defended by Zigmas
Zinkevicius. a leading expert on the Lithuanian language.19 Consequently, Vilnija has had
a considerable influence on Lithuanian politics.
Predictably, there has been little dialogue between Vilnija and organizations
uniting non-Lithuanians. Even though Vilnija is not a political party, it has attracted the
support of right-wing political parties, such as Naujoji Lietuva [New Lithuania], and some
radical members of Krikscionys Demokratai [the Christian Democrats] and Sqjudis.

'*Vornta (2 January, 1992), 2.
l9Zigmas Zinkevicius, Rytif Lietuva praeityje ir dabar [Eastern Lithuania: Past
and Present] (Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijq leidykla, 1993).
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POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM “ABOVE”

Negotiating M inorities’ Rights, 1989—94

Even prior to declaring independence in March 1990, Lithuania’s political leaders
(at that time still members of the Lithuanian Soviet establishment) adopted the law on
language, which made Lithuanian the official language of the state. The goal of the law
was to address the consequences of russification. In 1989 (the year when the Law was
adopted, see Table 12), most business in state-owned enterprises was conducted in
Russian. Consequently, the requirement to switch to Lithuanian was met with outrage,
especially in the Russian and Polish dom inated parts of Lithuania. In eastern Lithuania,
for instance, it was more common to hear Russian and a dialect of Polish (po prostu) than
Lithuanian.20 Many ethnic Poles, Russians and ethnic Byelorussians did not know the
state language.
Even though the law assured ethnic minorities residing in Lithuania that their
constitutional rights would not be abridged and promised state support for the teaching o f
minority languages (see Table 12), it prompted some anxiety among Lithuania’s ethnic
minorities. Brodavski, Ciechanowicz and other politicians from the region decided to

:oEugenija Krukauskiene, “Pietryciq Lietuvos kalbine ir kulturine charakteristika”
[The Linguistic and Cultural Characteristics of Eastern Lithuania] in Lietuvos Mokslo
akademija, Pietry a if Lietuva: Socialiniai Teisiniai Aspektai [Southeastern Lithuania:
Social and Legal Features] (Vilnius: M okslo Akademija, 1990), 52. Also see Zofia
Kurzowa. “Die polnische Minderheit in Litauen am Ende der achtziger Jahre”
[Lithuania’s Polish Minority During the Late Eighties] in Der “Ring urn die
H aptstadi”— die polnische Minderheit in Litauen 1989-1993 [A Circle Around the
Capital: Lithuania’s Polish Minority, 1989-93], ed. Hans-W em er Rautenberg (Marburg
an der Lahn. Germany: Herder-Institut, 1994), 29-71.
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make political capital from this fear by promoting the idea of the “Polish National
Territorial Unit” described in the first part of this chapter. Local Communist leaders in
eastern Lithuania supported the idea because they argued that there was “a lack of teachers
capable of teaching Lithuanian and communication [in eastern Lithuania] took place in
Russian, not Lithuanian.”21 Ethnic Poles showed little enthusiasm for learning Lithuanian.
To illustrate, in 1990, in the whole region of Salcininkai only 40 people (out o f 40,000)
took courses in the Lithuanian language.22 Several groups of ethnic Lithuanians (e.g., the
representatives of right-wing parties such as Jaunoji Lietuva [Young Lithuania] and the
Democratic Party) interpreted this willingness to create an autonomous pro-Soviet
territorial unit in Lithuania as disloyalty toward the emerging state and argued that only
pre-1940 residents of Lithuania and their descendants should be entitled to citizenship.
The arguments m ade by such groups were sim ilar those made by the
restorationists in Latvia and Estonia. It was argued that the Baltic states fell under the
provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which prohibited the transfer or settlement
of members of an occupying pow er's population into territories it occupied. Thus,
“colonists” would not be eligible to become citizens in the restored state. Otherwise,
Lithuania would be im plicitly recognizing its own occupation by the Soviet Union. Such
opinions were rejected by Vytautas Landsbergis, the leader of Sqjudis, who argued that
Lithuania should follow the inclusive traditions of the Lithuanian medieval kingdom and
be magnanimous to its ethnic minorities.

2IEdislav Palevitch, a Com munist youth leader from Salcininkai, cited by M.
Botvan in “Anatomiya A vtonom ii” [Anatomy of Autonomy], Komsomolskaya Pravda
(25 November, 1989), 3.
"Zinkevicius, 293.
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Table 12. The Lithuanian Legislation on Minorities
DATE

LEGISLATION

Jan.
1989

Law on language was adopted.
- The Lithuanian language was declared as the official state language;
- Enterprises, institutions, and organizations whose internal business was conducted in
Russian were required to make the transition to Lithuanian in 2 years (Article 2; In 1991.
the deadline was extended to 1995.);
- Non-Lithuanians were to be provided with appropriate facilities for organizing education
and conducting cultural activities in their own language (Article 7).

Nov.
1989

Law on Citizenship was adopted. The Lithuanian citizenship was extended to:

- all persons who were bom in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania;
- who were citizens prior to 1940; as well as to their children and grandchildren (Article 1).
All permanent residents were eligible for Lithuanian citizenship.
The deadline for their decision on citizenship was 3 November 1991.
In order to qualify for naturalization, an applicant had to:
- pass a Lithuanian language examination:
- have been a resident in Lithuania for the last 10 years;
- have a permanent job or source of income.
- renounce his current citizenship (Article 15).

Nov.
1989

Law on ethnic minorities was adopted. It guarantees, extended to all ethnic minorities
residing in Lithuania, include:
- the right to freely develop their culture:
- the right to obtain aid from the state to develop their culture and education;
- depending on demand and (economic) capacity. Lithuanian institutions of higher learning
shall train specialists to respond to needs of ethnic cultures;
- signs used in public areas can be in the Lithuanian language and in the language used by
that minority (Article 5).

Jan.
1991

Law on ethnic minorities was amended. Extra rights guaranteed to ethnic minorities include:
- to have schooling in one's native language (Article 2);
- to use the language spoken by ethnic minority in offices and organizations located in areas
serving substantial numbers of a minority with different language (Article 3).

Dec.
1991

The law on citizenship was amended.
Citizenship was granted to:
- those who became citizens under 1989 Law;
- those who have lived in the territory o f Lithuania since 9 January 1919 until 15 June 1940
and their descendants if they were the residents o f Lithuania on 1 December 1991 and did
not have a citizenship o f another stale (Article 1)

The 1991 Lithuanian-Russian agreement offered citizenship to Russian residents who had
taken up residence in Lithuania as of the date of the agreement.
Dec.
1993 and
Feb.
1996

The citizenship law was amended.
Citizenship restoration for citizens of the pre-World War II Lithuania and their descendants
is simplified.
The right to citizenship was retained for an indefinite period for:
1) persons who were citizens of the Republic of Lithuania prior to 15 June 1940 and their
children .. . who are residing in other states and
2) persons of Lithuanian origin residing in other states (amended on 6 February 1996).
(Article 17)
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Table 12 (Continued)
DATE

LEGISLATION

Jan. 1995

The law on language was amended.
Language requirements for local governments were added. They included:
- a requirement for the representatives of local institutions to know the state language
according to the language categories established by the Lithuanian government (Article 6);
- all secondary schools were required to teach the state language “in the manner prescribed
by the state” (Article 12):
- the State Lithuanian Language Commission was established to “protect the state language
and approve linguistic norms” (Article 20).

Sources:
Lithuanian Parliament. Law on Citizenship As Amended by 2 July 1997, No. V lll-391. Available from the
Lithuanian parliament or fromhttp://www.lrs.lt,; INTERNET.
. Law on the State Language. Available from the Lithuanian parliament or from http://www.lrs.lt ;
INTERNET.
. Lithuania's Law on Citizenship. Available from the Lithuanian parliament or from http://www.lrs.lr,
INTERNET.
Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. Law on Citizenship. Available from the
Lithuanian parliament or fromhttp://www.lrs.lv, INTERNET.

Thus, in contrast to Latvia and Estonia, the demographic situation never became a
part of the debates about citizenship. The law adopted on 3 November 1989 extended
citizenship to all people bom in Lithuania and to all permanent residents of Lithuania (see
Table 12). Furthermore, the act restoring Lithuania’s independence on 11 March 1990,
included a guarantee that ethnic minorities would have the same constitutional rights as
those enjoyed by citizens.23
The day after Lithuania declared its independence, the Lithuanian government
2-’Jovita Litvaitiene (a lawyer from the Lithuanian parliament), interview by
author. 10 June 1999, Vilnius.
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addressed the ethnic communities of Lithuania, promising them cultural rights and a voice
in the political and economic decisions of the state. The same rights— the right to freely
develop their culture, state support for the cultural activities and organizations of ethnic
minorities, a promise to provide money for schools to teach the official language of the
state— had already been included in the law on ethnic minorities adopted in November
1989.
However, these laws did little to increase the popularity of and support for the
Lithuanian state in eastern Lithuania. Local governments in eastern Lithuania denounced
the laws issued by the politicians in Vilnius and continued to express their support for the
Soviet Union. Thus, in May 1990 local government in the Vilnius region voiced their
disapproval of the “restoration of the bourgeois system” and proclaimed their support for
Moscow.24 At the same time, the Moscow-supported Unity movement increased its
activities in eastern Lithuania. The Unity movement helped the USSR and local
authorities to draft residents into the army of the USSR (while the rest o f the state
boycotted the draft) and refused to adopt the symbols of the recreated state.
Trying to reduce polarization, on 29 January 1991, the Lithuanian government
amended the law on ethnic minorities and extended more rights to Lithuania’s ethnic
minorities. This included schooling in their native language and the right to use non-state
languages in offices and organizations (including in the official institutions o f the state)
that were located in areas serving substantial numbers of an ethnic m inority (see Table 12).
The goal o f this amendment was to show the willingness of the state to listen to the

24Roman Solchanyk, “A Sixteenth Soviet Republic?,” Radio Liberty Research
Report (18 June, 1990), 24.
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demands of its ethnic minorities. Praised by international institutions, this law, however,
was fiercely criticized by som e ethnic Lithuanians.
But even this legal m easure did not work. In 1991, the Unity movement was as
strong as ever. The Lithuanian government began to receive complaints from residents in
eastern Lithuania that those with positions in local governments who supported
Lithuania's independence were losing their jobs.25 When, in August 1991, the
representatives of the local governments backed an attempt by hardcore Communists to
overthrow Gorbachev, the Lithuanian government changed its compromising stand and
imposed “direct rule” upon the disobedient territory. This meant that the powers of the
local governments were restricted. Two pro-Moscow regional councils in predominantly
Polish parts of Lithuania were dissolved.
Thus, September 1991— the month when the Lithuanian parliament passed a
resolution reaffirming its decision to remove the pro-Moscow chairmen from their seats on
the regional councils in eastern Lithuania— marked a change in Lithuania’s policy towards
the disobedient ethnic enclave. The government took a firmer stand. The parliament also
suspended (on the same grounds) a council in Snieckus (now Visaginas), a predominantly
Russian region. In addition, the liberal law on citizenship was amended. It was decided to
include a clause extending Lithuanian citizenship to those “who lived in eastern Lithuania
from 9 January 1919 until 15 June 1940 [i.e., during the time when Poland occupied
eastern Lithuania] and their descendants if they . . . did not hold the citizenship of another

25The local governm ent in Vilnius region introduced a payment for job placement
and registration. Arunas Eigirdas, “Migracija ir visuomenines politines nuostatos”
[Migration and Public Opinion on Politics], in Lietuvos Rytai, ed. Kazimieras Garsva and
Laima Grumadiene (Vilnius: Valstybinis Leidybos Centras, 1993), 328.
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state" (Table 12). By including this "if,” the Lithuanian government was trying to make
sure that people who were citizens of Poland during the interwar period would not be
eligible for the privatization o f land in eastern Lithuania. This amendment was adopted in
order to assuage the fears of those who feared yet another "polonization” of eastern
Lithuania.
This decision prompted protests from the ethnic Poles, Poland and from the
disintegrating USSR.26 In Lithuania, these protests translated into demonstrations by
ethnic Poles in front of the Lithuanian parliament followed by public statements by the
leaders of the Polish community. Thus, Ryszard Maciejkianiec. the leader o f the Polish
faction in the Lithuanian parliament, remarked that some ethnic Poles “felt threatened by
Lithuanian independence.” M ichail Trescinsky, a member of one of the dissolved
councils, complained that the dissolution of the councils was “unjust because they [the
councils] were fairly elected.”27 The decision made by the Lithuanian government to
disband the councils was criticized by the Polish government, the U.S. embassy, and the
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. Lech Walesa wrote a letter to Vytautas
Landsbergis arguing that if individual deputies of regional councils breached the law, then
they should be individually punished. The decision to disband whole councils involves
application of collective guilt toward the Polish community.28
Other international actors— the Polish parliament, the Helsinki Foundation, and the

26E.g„ see Nikolai Lashkevich, “Zakon dlya pol’skoi avtonomii?” [A Law of
Polish Autonomy?], Izvestiya (28 December, 1990), 2.
27These leaders were quoted by Reuters (11 September, 1991).
2KLech W alesa, Letter to Vytautas Landsbergis (15 September 1991), in Lietuvos
ir Lenkijos santykiai 1917-1994: Dokumenitf rinkinys [Lithuanian-Polish Relations, 19171994. A Collection o f Documents], comp. Vytautas Pleckaitis and Janas Widackis
(Vilnius: Vaistvbes zinios, 1998), 188-89.
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US embassy in Lithuania— put forward similar arguments. They claimed that if elected
officials had taken part in illegal activities against the state, then local elections should
have been held to replace them. Poland’s Foreign Minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski,
decided to postpone a planned visit to Lithuania until an “acceptable” agreement between
the Lithuanian government and Lithuania’s ethnic Poles were reached.29
The official response o f the Lithuanian stale was that “the councils were disbanded
because they supported the coup attempt” and that the question o f eastern Lithuania was
“not a question of nationality but a question o f loyalty [to the state].”30 Yet, responding to
international pressure, the Lithuanian government promised to hold local elections by
March 1992.
Despite this attempt to reach a compromise, interstate relations between Poland
and Lithuania began to deteriorate. During a press conference on 26 March 1992,
Krzysztof Skubiszewski expressed concern about the state of Lithuanian-Polish relations,
arguing that “mistreatment o f ethnic Poles in eastern Lithuania has a negative effect on
interstate relations.”31 His opinion was echoed by the W arsaw-based Citizens Committee
for the Defense o f Poles in the Vilnius region. Vilnija reacted to these announcements by
referring to the mistreatment o f Lithuanians during the interwar period and calling for
power sharing arrangements in eastern Lithuania. According to Vilnija, which claimed to
speak for ethnic Lithuanians living in eastern Lithuania, the local governments in the
region should include representatives from all ethnic groups living in the region instead of

29Saulius Gimius, “Lithuanian Conflict with Poles,” Radio Liberty Report (16
September, 1991).
?(JAudrius Azubalis, a spokesperson for the Lithuanian parliament, quoted by
Reuters (11 September, 1991).
3iArunas Bubnys, article in Voruta (10 June, 1992), 7.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

267
being dom inated by representatives from the Polish Union and the Unity m ovem ent.
There was no political opposition to Polish ethnopolitical parties in the ethnic enclaves of
eastern Lithuania. Consequently. Vilnija argued that elections to the local governm ent in
this region should be postponed.32
A fter prolonged political battles at the national and international level, direct rule
of the region was lifted and local elections finally took place in December 1992.
However, only 34% o f the residents in Vilnius region and 45% in Salcininkai region
participated in local elections.33 Voter turnout was too low, and new elections had to be
held in early 1993. However, even after a third attempt to hold local elections in April
1993 not a single deputy was elected to the local councils. This was because o f voting
irregularities. To solve this problem, Snieckus (Visaginas) was put under the authority of
an ethnic Russian adm inistrator appointed by the central government in Vilnius. This
reduced the anxiety o f ethnic Russians living in eastern Lithuania. Eventually, in eastern
Lithuania, after several rounds of elections, local deputies (mostly from the Union of
Poles) finally formed a government.
In addition, to reduce polarization, in 1992 the Lithuanian parliament adopted the
Law on Election to the Parliament. This law gave special treatment to ethnopolitical
parties. This treatment lowered the barrier for ethnopolitical parties, thus hoping to
involve those parties in the political process. T he Union of Poles, the strongest social
movement in the ethnic enclave, consolidated into an ethnopolitical party in 1994 and won

32Resolution by Sqjudis' and Sandrauga’s candidates to local governments of
Vilnius region (22 N ovem ber 1992), Vornta (25 November, 1992), 1.
33“Rinkimai Vilniaus ir Salcininkq rajonuose” [Elections in Vilnius and
Salcininkai regions], Vornta (2 December, 1992), 1.
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2% of the vote. Following the special treatment given to ethnopolitical parties by the Law
on Election to the Parliament it received two seats (taken by Jan M inciewicz and Artur
Ploksto) in the Lithuanian parliament.
These two concessions paid off. Gradually, the negative attitude which ethnic
Poles had toward the Lithuanian slate began to change. New leaders, such as Czeslaw
Okinczyc and Zygmund Balcziewicz, emerged in the Polish community. They began
building bridges between ethnic Lithuanians and ethnic Poles. This was done by
publishing a state-friendly newspaper, Kurier Wilenski (edited by Balcierowicz) and by
establishing a dialogue with the government (Czeslaw Okinczyc). The Union of Poles,
whose position had been similar to that of the Unity movement during 1988-90, began to
warm up to the Lithuanian state and to separate itself from pro-Soviet leaders.
Furthermore, Russia’s position regarding the Russian ethnic minority in Lithuania
in the early nineties was much warmer than their position toward their co-ethnics in Latvia
and Estonia. According to Nikolai Obertyshev. Russia’s ambassador to Lithuania, Russia
“took into account” the fact that Lithuania’s law on citizenship was more liberal than in
the other two states.34 Russia was satisfied with the agreement that it had signed with
Lithuania in 1991 (see Table 12). This agreement allowed the naturalization of Russians
who came to Lithuania after the 1989 citizenship law was adopted. However, one of the
major disappointments expressed by Lithuania’s Russians regarding the law on citizenship
was that this law, especially after its December 1993 amendments (see Table 12), did not
allow dual citizenship for Soviet-era immigrants. Lithuania’s Russian community
complained that it was still possible for ethnic Lithuanians living abroad to obtain dual

yiITAR-TASS (9 February. 1993).
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citizenship, while they were prevented from doing that.35
At the same time, despite the liberal citizenship law, by 1993, approximately
12,000 of the approximately 304,800 Russians living in Lithuania had acquired Russian
citizenship. This meant that the voters had Russian citizenship. Furthermore, despite the
liberal citizenship and language laws, Russians were leaving Lithuania. 10,409 ethnic
Russians left in 1991. Their num ber increased to 16,380 the following year. It began to
decline in 1993. 9,423 ethnic Russians left that year; 2,145 during the following year.
This number declined to 827 in 1998.36 Unemployment and “returning to one’s roots”
(i.e., to the ethnic motherland) were among the major reasons for these flows o f out
migration. The presence of relatives abroad (i.e., in Russia), the difficulty of learning
Lithuanian and an unsatisfactory financial status were other motives for leaving.37
Unlike Lithuania’s ethnic Poles, the ethnic Russians who stayed in Lithuania did
not mobilize themselves into a politically influential force. According to a survey
conducted in 1994 among ethnic Russians and other non-Lithuanians in Klaipeda (a city
whose population is 28.2% ethnic Russian), 83.4% said that they were not interested in
and did not participate in the activities of national organizations and political parties.38

35Vesna Popovski, “Pilietybes klausimai Lietuvoje: [statymai ir kaip jie
traktuojami” [The Issues of Citizenship in Lithuania and Their Interpretation],
Politologija 5 (1994): 58-62.
36Statistical Department, Demographic Yearbook o f Lithuania (Vilnius: Statistical
Department, 1999), 112.
3,These reasons were indicated by the respondents to the survey in the city of
Klaipeda. The survey was conducted by the Klaipeda University Sociological Service at
the request of the State Nationalities Department. “Russians in Lithuania Feel OK.
Survey Says,” Baltic News Service (19 January, 1994).
38Juriy Stroganov, “Grazhdanstvo razreshit’. No o rodine zabyt’” [The Issues of
Citizenship Are Resolved. But W e Must Forget About Our Homeland.], Rossiyskaya
Gazeta (15 January, 1994), 6.
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Russian language publications from that time show a sim ilar attitude: political leaders had
a very difficult time organizing ethnic Russians— even into folklore groups or cultural
organizations.39
At the same time, the attitude o f Lithuania's Russians toward the independent
Lithuanian state improved. 78.9% o f those polled in Klaipeda said that they did not
experience any discrimination in public places and only 3.1% indicated that they “felt
segregated.” Only 2 out of 450 respondents said that they considered their relations with
Lithuanians to be bad.40 Ethnic Russians living in eastern Lithuania expressed similar
views (see Table 11). The number o f those who expressed support for an independent
Lithuanian state increased from 38% in 1990 to 46% in late 1994. The number of ethnic
Poles who expressed support for an independent Lithuanian state also showed a slight
improvement (from 35% in 1990 to 40% in 1994).
However, according to the same survey, the percentage of ethnic Lithuanians who
supported an independent Lithuanian state in eastern Lithuania dropped from 86% in 1990
to 65% in 1994 (see Table 11). This group felt betrayed by the Lithuanian state which,
they thought, was making too many concessions to ethnic Poles and to Poland.
Furthermore, the num ber of Russians living in eastern Lithuania who did not support an
independent Lithuanian state increased from 13% to 16%. They probably also felt that the
Lithuanian state was giving too many special privileges to the ethnic Polish minority.
These data suggest that polarization between different ethnic groups living in eastern

39Petr Frolov. “Pora Zayavit’ o sebe” [It Is Time to Announce about Ourselves],
Ekho L in y (24 February, 1994), 5. Petr Frolov. “Realniy Vykhod iz tupika” [A Realistic
Solution to Our Problems], Ekho L in y (25 June. 1994), 4.
40“Russians in Lithuania Feel OK. Survey Says,” Baltic New s Service (19 January,
1994 ) .
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Lithuania remained even during the second stage of community building.

Attempting to Solve the Remaining Issues, 1994—present

Polish-Lithuanian Treaty. Even though Lithuania adopted a liberal citizenship law
and extended numerous cultural rights to its ethnic minorities (a decision that was praised
by the Council of Europe and other international actors),41 a number of issues, such as the
demand for the establishment of a Polish university in Vilnius, the interpretation o f the
events of 1919-39 in eastern Lithuania and the proposed redrawing o f regional boundaries
to expand the region which includes Vilnius (which is perceived by some ethnic Poles as
an attempt to upset the “ethnic balance” in eastern Lithuania), were causing tension at the
domestic and international levels. These questions were addressed during negotiations
between Poland and Lithuania, both of whom wanted to join NATO and were aware o f the
fact that NATO did not want to “im port” ethnic tensions from its prospective members.
Yet evaluations o f the past (the annexation of eastern Lithuania by Poland during the
interwar period) and the rights o f ethnic minorities (ethnic Poles in Lithuania and
Lithuanians in Poland) became m ajor stumbling blocs during the process of negotiating
the friendship treaty required for entry into NATO.
The prospect o f a Treaty prompted protests and the gathering of signatures against
the treaty in Vilnius. Vilnija and other right wing organizations w'ere especially opposed

41E.g., in 1994, Miguel M artinez, the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe, expressed his satisfaction with Lithuania’s policy toward ethnic
minorities. “Martinez Praises Lithuania’s Care for Ethnic M inorities,” Baltic News
Serxhce (14 April, 1994).
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to the legalization of the A nnia Krajowa Club (the Polish W ar Veterans’ Club) in Vilnius
and a treaty that did not condemn the interwar period in eastern Lithuania.42 Opponents of
the treaty argued that the Union of Poles was uniting with the (at that time still illegal)
Polish War Veteran Club and that this consolidated bloc could become another source of
demands for territorial autonomy.43 The Lithuanian government tried to relieve these
tensions by organizing a Commission of historians to evaluate the legacy of A nnia
Krajowa. Initially, the Commission wanted to sell to the public a “historical
rehabilitation” report to the public, but this report was received with outrage. Under
pressure, five o f the seven members on the Commission decided to change their
conclusions.
Furthermore, many Vilnija activists thought that the signing of the Treaty with
Poland would open the way to another polonization of eastern Lithuania. After the Treaty,
it was argued, the Poles would be interested in teaching their language in eastern
Lithuania, which would eventually lead to “re-polonization.”44 Opponents of the treaty
urged the Lithuanian government to demand that Lithuanians living in Poland be
guaranteed the same minority rights as Poles living in Lithuania.
Passions were running equally high in Poland. In January 1994, 72 Polish
lawmakers wrote an open letter to the Polish President in which they expressed concern
about the status o f ethnic Poles in Lithuania. In it they demanded that cultural autonomy

42Antanas Valionis, Evaldas Ignatavicius. and Izolda Brickovskiene, “From
Solidarity to Partnership: Lithuanian-Polish Relations, 1988-1998,” Lithuanian Foreign
Policy Review 2 (1998): 15-16.
43Vornta (13-19 January, 1994), 6.
44Petras Averka, “Lietuvos Rytai-misijy krastas” [Eastern Lithuania is the Land of
Missionaries], Voruta (21-31 December, 1994), 1-2.
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be granted to the predominantly Polish Vilnius and Salcininkai regions (i.e., eastern
Lithuania), that nationalized property be returned to Polish organizations, that the
evaluation o f the interwar period be excluded from the agreement with Lithuania, and that
a Polish university be given the right to function in Vilnius.45
The letter appeared in the Lithuanian press, creating some tension between ethnic
Poles and ethnic Lithuanians. This polarization did not disappear even after the Good
Neighborhood Treaty was finally signed by Poland and Lithuania in April 1994, after
successful lobbying by Jan Widacki, Poland’s Ambassador to Lithuania, and a series o f
articles by prominent public figures, such as Czeslaw M ilosz, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Adam
Michnik, and Tomas Venclova. Finally, both sides agreed to make concessions. The
Treaty stated that ethnic Poles living in Lithuania and ethnic Lithuanians living in Poland
had the right to “freely develop their own culture and preserve their traditions.” According
to the Treaty, membership in an ethnic group is a matter of individual choice and should
not be a source of discrimination.46
Yet this was not enough for ethnopolitical activists. Some Polish activists in
Lithuania denounced the Treaty and claimed that Poland had “left them at the mercy o f the
Lithuanian governm ent.”47 Ryszard Maciejkianec, one of the leaders o f the Union of Poles
in Lithuania, went as far as to compare the Treaty with the M olotov-Ribbentrov Pact.
(The M olotov-Ribbentrop Pact divided Eastern Europe into German and Russian spheres
of influence in 1939.) Jan Minciewicz, chairman of the Union of Poles, argued that [after

45Tim Snyder, “National Myths and International Relations: Poland and Lithuania.
1989—1994,” East European Politics and Societies 9, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 333.
46Stephen R. Burant, “Overcoming the Past: Polish-Lithuanian Relations, 19901995.” Journal o f Baltic Studies 27. no. 4 (W inter 1996): 320-24.
47Ibid„ 334.
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the Treaty] “the situation of the local Poles worsened in all spheres.”48 Such positions
were echoed in Poland by the Civic Committee for the Defense of Poles in the Vilnius
region which reprimanded the Polish government for “betraying” its co-ethnics. This
discontent was fueled by the decision of the Lithuanian state to continue its investigation,
begun in November 1993, of so-called “Polish autonom ists” (i.e., those who supported the
idea of autonomy in 1989-91) who were charged with anti-state activities. However, most
of the “autonomists” refused to adopt Lithuanian citizenship and thus managed to
tem porarily avoid punishment.
Attempts to Solve Problems in International Institutions. The unresolved issues
raised by ethnic Poles— the expansion of the boundaries of the city o f Vilnius, the creation
o f a Polish university in Vilnius, instruction in Polish, and the representation of ethnic
m inorities in national power structures— became topics of discussion during regular
meetings between the two states. By 1997, Poland and Lithuania had created numerous
intergovernmental institutions, such as the Parliamentary Assembly o f Lithuania and
Poland, the Governm ent Cooperation Council o f Lithuania and Poland, and the Advisory
Com m ittee o f the Presidents of Lithuania and Poland.
Intergovernmental attempts to solve these problems, however, still did not satisfy
som e ethnic Poles residing in Lithuania. They argued that in eastern Lithuania the pace of
privatization was slow er than in the rest of Lithuania. Furthermore, they complained that
the amount of land returned to previous owners in eastern Lithuania was two times less
than in the other parts o f Lithuania. According to Eugenijus Petrovas, a representative

J8“The Polish Union Sees Inferiority of Lithuania’s Poles,” Baltic News Service
(19 February, 1994).
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from the Lithuanian Department for Regional Problems and National Minority Affairs,
there is currently very little that the Lithuanian government can do to speed up the process.
This is because of a lack of docum ents and because of the intricacies of land ownership
dating back to the interwar period.49
Although more than 180 legal acts and laws were adopted by the Lithuanian state50
to address the problems of Lithuania’s Poles they were still not satisfied. They decided to
complain about their status to the European Council. The Council sent a delegation to
Lithuania led by George Frunda. This delegation wrote the scandalous “Frunda report" in
which Lithuania was charged with breaching international law, refusing to allow the
creation of a Polish university in Vilnius, and discriminating against its Polish m inority in
education.
This report generated a wave o f protests in Lithuania. The Lithuanian government
expressed its objections to the report by complaining that the report was opinionated and
“lacked credibility.”51 In Poland, on the other hand, the report was supported by some
Polish senators (e.g., Senator Alicja Grzeskowiak). Nasza Gazeta, the Polish newspaper
in Lithuania, suggested that the organizations of ethnic Poles living in Lithuania should
use this document as a guide for political action.
After complaints from the Lithuanian government, the Parliamentary Assembly of

49Eugenijus Petrovas, interview by author, 23 June 1999, Vilnius.
50The laws were counted by Severinas Vaitiekus in his study “Asmentj,
priklausanciij tautinems, etninems, religinems ir kalbinems mazumoms, teises, tautines
diskriminacijos draudimas ir prevencija” [The Rights of Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic
Minorities: Fighting with Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and O ther Forms
of Intolerance] (1998), 13. Available from the Lithuanian Centre for Human Rights in
Vilnius.
5lElvyra Baltutyte, interview by author, 22 June 1999, Vilnius.
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the European Council decided to review the “Frunda report” and to send another
delegation to Lithuania.52 This time, the delegation came up with a report that was
favorable to Lithuania. The fact that a group of ethnic Poles had complained to the
European Council about their status, however, irritated some ethnic Lithuanians, especially
the members of right-wing organizations and Vilnija. The members o f Vilnija intensified
their demands that ethnic Lithuanians living in Poland be granted the same minority rights
as ethnic Poles living in Lithuania.
Furthermore, Vilnija and its sister organizations were especially offended by the
decision of the Brazauskas government to officially recognize the Polish W ar Veterans
Club (A nnia Krajowa) in February 1995.53 This decision did improve relations between
Lithuania and Poland. At the same time, however, it strengthened the anti-Polish stance of
some Lithuanian activists. Thus, the members of the Former Political Prisoners and
Deportees party decided to initiate a protest against President Brazauskas, accusing him of
bad policies toward eastern Lithuania. This protest was supported by Vilnija, the
Homeland Union, and other organizations who were worried about the emergence o f a
secessionist movement in eastern Lithuania and thought that the government was not
doing enough to prevent this from happening.54
Yet the voice of the protesters was heard. In 1996, in an attempt to prevent the
formation of politically influential ethnopolitical parties capable of leading a secessionist
movement in eastern Lithuania, the Lithuanian parliament amended the Law on Elections.

52“Strasburo tribunoje— parlamentanj is Lenkijos ir Estijos politiniai akibrokstai”
[In Strasbour, the Polish and Estonian Parliamentarians Surprise the Lithuanians”]
Lietuvos Rytas (27 June, 1996), 3.
53Valionis, Ignatavicius, and Brickovskiene. 21.
54Vornta (16—22 December, 1995), 1. and Vornta (12 October 1995), 5.
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Special provisions which made the entry of ethnopolitical parties into the parliament easier
were eliminated. The parliamentarians (the majority of whom belonged to left-wing
parties at that time) hoped that ethnic Poles would begin voting for other parties, such as
the Democratic Labor Party led by Algirdas Brazauskas or other leftist parties. This
decision, however, did not help to strengthen the trust of ethnic Poles in the parliament and
other state institutions. The trust of Lithuania’s Poles in state institutions remained very
low.55
Numerous Polish-Lithuanian intergovernmental institutions, although quite
successful in building trust between Poland and Lithuania at the interstate level, could do
little to address the concerns o f ethnic Poles living in Lithuania and ethnic Lithuanians
living in Poland. The treatment o f ethnic minorities is constantly raised by politicians on
both sides, but so far no solution has been found for some contentious issues, such as the
Polish university in Lithuania, the speed of privatization in eastern Lithuania, or demands
for more cultural rights by ethnic Lithuanians living in Poland.56 In the words o f Jerzy
Buzek, Poland’s Prime Minister, despite good interstate relations, “the problems [related
to] ethnic minorities still remain a cause of tension and doubt.”57 According to Eugenijus
Petrovas, a specialist on the issues o f ethnic minorities in Lithuania, the solutions to ethnic

55Only 5% o f ethnic Poles said that they were willing to entrust their problems to a
member of parliament. Friedrich-Naumann Fund and International Relations and
Political Science Institute at Vilnius University, “Political Culture as an Essential
Prerequisite to Civil Society,” public opinion survey, Vilnius, 1994.
56Jakub Karpinski, “Poland and Lithuania Look Toward a Common Future.”
Transition (4 April, 1997), 15. Also see “Lithuania, Poland Fail to Solve M inority
Issues,” New Europe (12-20 July, 1999), 8.
5'Vytautas Bruveris, “Lenkija ir Lietuva: strategine partneryste ir tautines
mazumos” [Poland and Lithuania: A Strategic Partnership and Ethnic M inorities],
Lietitvos Aidas (19 June, 1999). 2.
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issues in Lithuania must be found at the local level.58 Consequently, the following section
examines community building from below.

COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM “BELOW”

Local Governments

During the first stage of community building (1988-94). the Lithuanian
government decided to move toward the decentralization of state power. It planned to give
more rights to local political bodies. However, the secessionist movement that started in
eastern Lithuania in the late eighties made the government rethink its plan to decentralize
its power in eastern Lithuania. In response to this movement, the state decided to
temporarily limit the power of local governments. Consequently, Lithuania has been much
slower to create functioning local governments than Estonia or Latvia.
Like the ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia, local issues were of extreme
importance to Lithuania’s minorities. In 1994, trying to quickly resolve the problem
related to local elections, the Lithuanian parliament debated a law that would limit
participation in local elections to political parties. Lithuania’s ethnic minorities,
represented by the Union of Poles, the Russian Society, the Byelorussian Language
Society and the Foundation of Russian Culture (all of which were social organizations and
therefore would not be able to participate in local elections if the bill passed) staged

58Eugenijus Petrovas, interview by author, 23 June 1999. Vilnius.
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meetings in front of the Lithuanian parliament to protest against the proposed law.56
Despite these protests, the law limiting participation in local elections to political
parties was adopted. Responding to this decision, the Union of Poles quickly created a
new political party, Election Action for Lithuanian Poles. Its platform was a list of all the
issues causing tensions between Poles and Lithuanians. Election Action promised to fight
for more rights for the “illegal” Polish university, for the restitution of prewar property to
Poles, and for more language rights. Some ethnic Lithuanians were deeply worried by the
promise made by Election Action to create “one political Polish unit” out of the Vilnius
and Salcininkai regions. To some, this promise was reminiscient of calls for a “Polish
national-territorial unit” dating back to the late eighties.60 Consequently, Election Action
became viewed as a potential secessionist movement.
The government’s decision to limit participation in local elections to political
parties was strongly criticized by pro-Lithuanian Polish activists, such as Czeslaw
Okynczyc who argued that the emergence of Election Action was a direct result of the
adoption of this law. Clearly, argued Okynczyc, this party was not capable of representing
the interests of more moderate Poles. Moderate Poles, however, were not willing to
support Lithuanian parties because the majority of those parties had made anti-Polish
statements in the past.61 Consequently, the votes of moderates Poles would go to Election

“ “Brazauskas Promises Careful Consideration of Local Elections Law,” Baltic
News Service (26 May, 1994).
“ “Regarding the Declaration made by the Election Action,” Voruta (18-24
March, 1995), 3.
61Furthermore, some of the parties (e.g., Tautininkai) allowed only Lithuanians to
join the party. Other parties (e.g., the Center party), included openly anti-Polish leaders
such as Romualdas Ozolas. Ceslovas Okincicas, “Lietuvos lenkai didziajame valstybes
eksperimente” [Lithuanian Poles in the Great Experiment of the State], Lietuvos Rytas (8
March, 1995), 4.
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Action, which would make this anti-Lithuanian party stronger. This party would be likely
to dom inate local politics, which would lead to the politization of numerous issues, such
as education and territorial reform. This would become a source of ethnic tensions in
eastern Lithuania. This scenario, however, could have been prevented if social
organizations and individuals had been allowed to participate in local elections.
O kynczyc’s prediction turned out to be true. In the 1995 elections, Election Action
scored significant victories in eastern Lithuania.62 Even the representatives o f the party
were surprised by their success at the ballot box. As a consequence, since 1995, local
politics in eastern Lithuania has been a constant fight between the representatives of the
central governm ent and local non-Lithuanian officials.
Since 1996, when the law on elections to the Lithuanian parliament was amended
(it introduced a 5% threshold, effectively preventing ethnopolitical parties from getting
into the parliament), non-Lithuanian officials have tried to gain more power at the local
level. Education, territorial reform, privatization, and even the expansion of the borders of
Vilnius all became hotly debated issues. To illustrate, politicians in eastern Lithuania
complained that their constituency was the least educated. The state, they argued, should
pay for a Polish university.63 The Lithuanian central government responded that the Poles

“ Election Action won significant victories in Vilnius and Salcininkai, the two
major regions in eastern Lithuania. It won 13 and 19 seats. It also won four seats (13%)
in Klaipeda, which has only 1,107 (0.5%) Polish residents. The electoral success of
Election Action in Klaipeda can be explained by the fact that it received the support of
other non-Lithuanians besides Poles. These “others” were protesting against the
prevalence of Lithuanian parlies in politics. Artasesas Gazarianas, “ 1995 m. rinkimq \
savivaldybes rezultatai ir demokratijos perspektyvos Lietuvoje” [1995 Local Election
Results and the Prospects of Democracy in Lithuania], Poliiologija 1 (1995): 134—49.
63There is some truth to this claim. According to 1992 data, for every 1,000 Poles
only 50 have a university degree. This compares to 109 Lithuanians, 172 Russians and
385 Jews in Lithuania. Severinas Vaitiekus, Lietuvos lenkai [Lithuania’s Poles] (Vilnius:
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and the representatives of other national minorities from eastern Lithuania already had the
right to enter Lithuanian universities. Besides, ethnic Poles were eligible to study in
Poland. Furthermore, the government argued that it lacked the money to establish a
Polish university.64
As Okynczyc had predicted, Lithuanian language schools became another hotly
contested issue between the central government and local authorities. Ethnic minorities in
eastern Lithuania had the right to get an education in their native language as well as in the
state language. However, the schools with the Lithuanian language of instruction
complained that they did not get enough support from the local governments.65
Responding to these complaints, in June 1998, the central government in Vilnius adopted
a law on education that transferred responsibilities related to education to the district (i.e.,
to the central government). Jan Minciewicz, the Polish parliamentarian in Lithuania,
argued that this law limited the power of the local governments.66 This decision was met
with protests from Polish political leaders who in December 1997 proposed the
establishment of two state languages— Polish and Lithuanian— in eastern Lithuania.67
Two other sensitive issues were adm inistrative territorial reform and privatization.

Valstybinis nacionaliniij tyrirmj centras, 1994), 33.
MIn addition, some parliamentarians argued that the university (which is currently
known as the “illegal” university) should be banned. See Seimo Kronika (The Parliament
Chronicle), No. 3 (9—22 October, 1995), 8, 15.
65Thus, according to Evaldas Geciauskas of Vilnija. local governments refused to
support Lithuanian schools in 1996. Voruta (15-21 February 1997), 2.
“ Quoted in Vaitiekus, “Asmenvj, priklausanciij tauiinems, etninems, religinems ir
kalbinems mazumoms, teises. tautines diskriminacijos draudimas ir prevencija” [The
Rights of Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic M inorities; Fighting with Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Other Forms o f Intolerance], 18.
67This decision was related to Lithuania’s presidential elections. One candidate
(Arturas Paulauskas) tried to gain political capital by promising to recognize two state
languages in eastern Lithuania.
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The complaint o f ethnic Poles was that the Lithuanian government did not allow local
governments to participate in privatization. In addition, there was a latent fear among
ethnic minorities that the state would change the boundaries of territorial units, thus
diluting ethnic proportions. To address these fears, in 1994, the state passed a law
promising that the territories of local governments would not be altered. In addition, in
January 1999, President Adamkus pledged his personal support to the needs of ethnic
Poles. He promised to include the representatives of ethnic minorities whenever decisions
about eastern Lithuania would be made.68 President Adamkus argued that the first priority
of the state should be to create functioning local governments capable of addressing
privatization issues. His statement was passionately supported by Election Action which
wants more power at the local level.69

Using the State as a “Service Station ”

Eastern Lithuania— the area troubled by ethnic tensions— is also one of the poorest
regions of the country. After Lithuania regained its independence, the economic
conditions in eastern Lithuania became worse. In late 1994, 30% o f the Poles in eastern
Lithuania perceived themselves as being worse off than others in that region (compared to
17% of the Lithuanians and 19% of the Russians). Furthermore, compared to Lithuanians
and Russians living in that region, Poles were the most dissatisfied with their quality of

68An interview with Vladas Adamkus conducted by Barbara Machnicka, reprinted
from Kurier Poranny by Vornta (30 January, 1999), 5.
69Vladimir Tomasevski, the chairman of Election Action. “O reforme
administrativno-teritorial’noi i samoupravlenii” [A Statement on Territorial
Administrative Reform and Local Governments], Druzhba (1-7 July, 1999), 4.
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life (the figures are 23% of Poles; 13% of Lithuanians and 18% of Russians).70 The
economic situation in Poland, the “mother state" of Lithuania's Poles, has been better than
that in eastern Lithuania. When comparing themselves to their co-ethnics living across the
border, Lithuania's Poles probably feel economically deprived. It is not surprising,
therefore, that 68% of the Poles in eastern Lithuania think that life during Soviet times was
better than in independent Lithuania. 56% of the Russians and 32% of Lithuanians living
in that region held similar views.71
To lessen the economic woes of eastern Lithuania, the state decided to allow its
ethnic minorities to receive help from their mother states. The Poles living in eastern
Lithuania received some help from Wspolnota Polska (an organization sponsored by the
Polish parliament to support Poles living outside of Poland). Recently, instead of simply
giving aid to their co-ethnics, Polish activists have tried to encourage Lithuania’s Poles to
learn Lithuanian and to integrate themselves into the Lithuanian state.72
In 1996, the Lithuanian state adopted a program designed to develop Eastern
Lithuania. So far, however, this program has not produced any tangible results. The speed
of privatization in the region remains slow: as o f January 1999, only 18% of the land has
been returned to its previous owners. In the words of President Adamkus, privatization
has been a “bureaucratic disaster.”7"

70Vytautas Slapkauskas, “Paribio gyventojij socialiniij poziurit} ypatumai” [The
Characteristics o f Social Attitudes of Residents in Eastern Lithuania], in Lietuvos
Filosofijos ir Sociologijos Institutas, Paribio Lietuva [Border Lithuania] (Vilnius:
Lietuvos Filosofijos ir Sociologijos Institutas, 1996), 127.
71Ibid., 129.
72E.g., this is the opinion of Andrzej Zaksewski, chairman of the Polish
Department for Communication with Poles Living Abroad. Vornta (5 December, 1998),
11.
'“''Voruta (30 January, 1999). 5.
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These factors explain why support for Lithuania's independence am ong ethnic
Poles has not increased significantly since 1990 (see Table 11). Data collected by
Lithuanian sociologists shows that the anti-Lithuanian party Election Action gets most of
its support from the poorest residents o f Lithuania.74 As long as this party is supported by
a large num ber of disgruntled Poles, its popularity is unlikely to decline in the near future.
At the same time, ethnic tensions stem m ing from language issues and education are likely
to remain there as well.

The Role o f Different Perceptions o f the Past

Even though the Poles living in eastern Lithuania suffered considerably under the
Soviet regime, surveys of public opinion show that they tend to have a more positive view
of the Soviet past than Lithuanians living in the same region. At the same time, the
Lithuanian state has not forgotten that in the early nineties this region was the main
stronghold of Soviet power. Consequently, in 1999, in an attempt to discourage
secessionist attempts in the future, the Lithuanian state began to try Soviet-era local
council members who had opposed Lithuanian independence. In April 1999, after a twoyear process, a Lithuanian court found five people, mostly ethnic Poles, guilty of setting up
anti-state organizations during the initial stage of state building.75 The secessionists
received penalties ranging from tw o years to six months in prison.

74VILMORUS data, January 1999 (Vilnius: VILM ORUS, 1999).
75lngrida Vegelyte, “Paskelbtos bausmes Salcininkq rajono teritorines autonomijos
organizatoriams” [Penalties Announced for the Organizers o f Autonomy in Salcininkai
Region], Lietuvos Aidas (3 April, 1999), 2.
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This decision elicited protests from Jan Sienkiewicz, a m em ber of the Lithuanian
parliament, and numerous Polish senators who argued that trial and punishment would
stifle the civic activities of ethnic Poles.76 Former Senate chairman Andrzej
Stelmachowski, who now heads Wspolnota Polska, a society for relations with Poles
abroad, said that the trial was “purely political” and therefore “we [i.e., Poles] should take
political [protest] actions in Poland.”77 Some members of the Russian Duma, along with
R ussia's representatives in Lithuania, also protested.
So far, the trials have not had a significant impact on Polish-Lithuanian or RussianLithuanian relations. The reaction to the trials in eastern Lithuania has been muted. This is
a reflection of the low level of political involvement in the region. It is unlikely, however,
that these trials will increase the support for the Lithuanian state among ethnic Poles living
in that area.

ATTITUDES AND POLARIZATION IN THE LATE NINETIES

In the late nineties, the polarization that was present in Lithuania in the late
eighties decreased. There is no serious threat of a secessionist movement emerging in
eastern Lithuania because the Lithuanian state is currently strong enough to suppress such
a movement. In addition, after the G ood Neighbor Treaty signed by Poland and Lithuania,
Poland is unlikely to support any attem pts by Lithuania's Poles to secede from Lithuania.

76Linas Jonusas, “Lenkij senatorial' bando teisinti Salcininkij autonomininkus”
[Polish Senators Are Trying to M ake the Secessionists Look Innocent], Lietuvos Aidas
(26 June. 1999), 2.
nRadio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (18 August, 1999).
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However, there were a considerable num ber of people in eastern Lithuania whose
approval of an independent Lithuanian state decreased during the second stage of political
community building. The num ber o f those who felt disappointed with the independent
Lithuanian state in this region was 2.5 times higher than the rest of Lithuania. According
to 1997 data, the loyalty o f ethnic Poles toward Lithuania, their state o f residence, has not
increased since 1988.78 Content analysis of the newspapers that are published by the
ethnic minorities living in this region suggests a similar conclusion.79
Given the large number and the liberal nature of the minority laws that Lithuania
has adopted, this would seem to be a surprising development. The lack of funds at the
local government level and the intervention of the central government in local politics are
probably the major causes for this discontent. Local governments are still heavily
dependent on subsidies from the central government.80 Furthermore, in eastern Lithuania,
the local governments are dom inated by the anti-Lithuanian members of Election Action.
This situation is a direct result of 1994 law on local elections. This law has prevented
broad representation of both political and social movements at the local level.
Consequently, the domination of local politics by this ethnopolitical party alienates the

78Jurgis Krikoniskis, “Paribio Lietuva” [Border Lithuania], Vornta (1-10 January
1997), 15.
79For example, Drnzhba, a newspaper published by a group o f anti-Lithuanian
Russians and Poles, complains that the state program to develop eastern Lithuania has
been forgotten by Lithuania’s politicians, and that the expansion of Vilnius is a “political
decision” designed to dilute this ethnic enclave. In addition, this newspaper has
complained about the lack o f attention that eastern Lithuania has received from the
central government.
80In February 2000, 27 of 46 Lithuania’s local governments still lacked approved
budgets for 2000. They objected to cuts planned by the central government. On the other
hand, given a difficult economic situation, the central government is not able to allocate
subsidies to local governments. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (28
February, 2000).
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ethnic minorities— Lithuanians, Byelorussians, and Russians— that live in that region.
These minorities feel that the state gave into international pressure and has been favoring
one ethnic group. As a consequence, the lack of “ethnic" balance at the local level is
likely to foster further ethnic tensions over issues such as language, education, and
privatization.
Lithuania’s central government, as well as the ethnic Poles, Lithuanians and other
minorities living in eastern Lithuania, hope that the Nemunas Euroregion which will unite
this part of Lithuania with part o f Poland will help to reduce poverty in that area. This
endeavor is expected to encourage the free movement of people and goods across the
Polish-Lithuanian border, thus enhancing the well-being o f this poverty-stricken
Lithuanian region.
Furthermore, in 1999 the Lithuanian parliament ratified the European Local
Governance Chapter. By signing this document, Lithuania has promised to speed up
decentralization and local government reform. With the help o f the European Union,
Lithuania will probably be able to create functioning, self-sustaining local governments.
This will help Lithuania to become a functioning “service station” in the future. This is
exactly what the ethnic minorities in eastern Lithuania are w aiting for.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS: REFINING T H E THEORY OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY

The goal o f this concluding chapter is to relate the findings of the case studies to
the on-going debate on democracy building in multiethnic areas (which was outlined in the
introduction). The first part puts forward a theory of political community, which
conceptualizes the demos as an entity with two dim ensions.1
The second part of this chapter applies the two dimensional model to ethnically
restructured states. By doing that, the chapter exposes the importance of the horizontal
dimension for successful political com m unity building. This dimension is sometimes
referred to as “the missing thread in democratic thought.”2 Drawing on empirical evidence
from the case studies, the second part identifies ways in which democratizing states can
promote the peaceful co-habitation of several national groups with different historical
memories, or, in the words of Charles Taylor, what can be done to learn to “share identity
space.”3 In addition, it theorizes about the impact of historical memory on the dynamics of
community building. This variable is often omitted in the analyses of political scientists
dealing with ethnopolitics and stale building in multiethnic areas.

'A similar theory was put forward by Alan C. Cairns, who argued that citizenship
has both a vertical and a horizontal dim ension. See Alan C. Cairns, “Introduction,” in
Citizenship, Diversity, and Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Alan
C. Caims. John C. Courtney, Peter M acKinnon, Hans J. Michelmann, and David E. Smith
(Montreal: M cGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 4. The major difference between
Caim s’ theory and this dissertation is that the latter conceptualizes community as a space
inhabited by actors with different historical memories. In addition, the theory is applied
to ethnically restructured states inhabited by more than one major nation.
2Saunders, 55.
^Taylor, 281.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

289
The third part of this chapter focuses on the international dimension of community
building. Drawing on the case studies, it theorizes about the roles that are played by those
international actors who are interested in encouraging democracy in ethnically polarized
states. It identifies several “by-products,” such as the intensification o f activities by
extremist political groups, that are prompted by international involvement in community
building. By doing that, this part contributes to the ongoing debate about invoking
political conditionality in democratizing states (e.g., exerting pressure for political reforms
in return for financial aid and membership in the European Union).
The chapter concludes by summarizing lessons to be learned from the Baltic
experience. Furthermore, it hypothesizes about the future re-application of the community
building strategies that were employed by the Baltic states in states with similar
conditions. The findings from the case studies are integrated into the wider debate on
democracy building in multiethnic areas.

A

THEORY OF POLITICAL COM M UNITY BUILDING

A democratic community can be understood as a political space inhabited by
numerous actors. These actors— political parties, leaders, minority groups— create state
institutions, write rules of engagement, get engaged in conflict or cooperate within that
space. The interests of these actors are shaped by their previous experiences or, in other
words, their historical memory. That is, the actors remember what has happened to them
in the past and act accordingly. Historical memory affects their present actions. That is
why history plays an important role in this political space. In fact, it is why political

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

290
community can also be referred to as a “historical construct.”
Such a conceptualization o f political community is based on the belief that it is not
a power-free social medium, as conceived by the liberal institutionalist accounts of
political community. Social and political power play important roles within that space.
Some groups of actors are more visible and more influential in the political space than
others. For example, actors who can stir up the accumulated historical memories and
remembered grievances of a larger group of people are more powerful than those who
can’t. Former victims whose experiences were shared by a large number of people have
enormous moral power.4 An ethnic minority group with a strong and vocal “m other state”
is another example of a powerful actor. It is likely to be taken more seriously by other
actors in the political community than a minority group that lacks a powerful foreign
champion. To illustrate, the status of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states— a minority
group with a mother state— is closely followed by international actors. In contrast, little is
known about the status of Roma in the Baltic states.
This political space has a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The vertical
dimension refers to the basis of legitimacy for state power. The legitimacy of this power is
based on an on-going association o f people loyal to the state who possess the citizenship
of the state.5 This on-going association implies a common history, shared historical
memory and a common identity. In most nation states, these three aspects are the basis of

^These experiences are also passed from one generation to another. Sometimes
this may lead to the exaggeration of ethnic group identity. For further discussion, see
Vamik D. Volkan, Cyprus— War and Adaptation (Charlottesville: University of Virginia,
1979), 90.
^ h e description that follows refers, first and foremost, to democracies. In
dictatorships, decisions regarding ethnic minorities and citizenship are made by a small
group of people.
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a common identity that keeps the nation state together. Consequently, the question of the
relationship between the vertical and the horizontal axes is the question o f nation building
and the attitude of the nation state toward its immigrants and ethnic m inorities.6
The citizens, or the members of this on-going association, are the decision makers
in the political community. Decision making includes creating the rules, policies and
regulations related to ethnic minorities, immigrants, or foreigners who may not have a
voice in the decision making process within that community. In this dissertation, the
vertical dimension is referred to as “political community building from above.”
The horizontal dimension refers to political com m unity building from below. It
captures developments within civil society, such as building associations among people
living in the same state.7 W ithin this layer of community, some residents do not have the
citizenship o f the state in which they live. The horizontal dimension refers to sub-state
relationships (i.e.. business, trade, or cultural associations) that citizens and non-citizens
establish. The existence o f the horizontal dimension is a necessary condition for
democratic regimes because it is a source of an alternative foci of pow er to that of the
state. Furthermore, this is the space within which the learning of dem ocratic norms and

bLately democratic and democratizing states have been increasingly wary about
extending citizenship to the immigrants. Even cultural minority rights have become an
object of heated debates. Behind this unwillingness to change the borders o f political
community is the fear of losing social cohesion, which, many believe, would weaken the
vertical axis. Alternative approaches to integration of non-citizens include “democratic
obligation” to protect the rights of disadvantaged groups and mutual recognition.
Anthony H. Birch, “Reflections on Ethnic Politics,” in Citizenship, Diversity, and
Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Alan C. Cairns, John C.
Courtney, Peter MacKinnon, Hans J. Michelmann, and David E. Smith (Montreal:
M cGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 64.
'Some members o f the civil society are engaged in relationships that transcend the
borders of the state. This is especially the case for diasporas, who have a “host” state
(i.e.. the state o f their residence) and a “mother” state (i.e., the state o f their origin).
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principles takes place, as it is being passed on from one generation to the next.
Democratic states that want to integrate large immigrant populations or minority
groups into their body politic usually start from “below.” They usually give social and
economic rights to their immigrant populations, but are reluctant to extend the right of
citizenship to them. For example, Turkish Gastarbeiter in Germany are entitled to a
variety of social and economic rights (that is, they are entitled to use the state as a “service
station”), even though many do not have citizenship. In most nation states, Gastarbeiter,
immigrants, and ethnic minorities either by choice or by law are not a part of the vertical
axis (the ongoing association of citizens). At the same time, they are excluded or they
choose to exclude themselves from the official history and national memory embraced by
the major national group or groups.8
Liberal theorists, including Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan and Will Kymlicka, have
argued for more lenient approaches to citizenship and minority rights, whereby anyone
willing to abide by the laws of the state and pay taxes would be awarded membership in
the political community.9 Consistent with the orthodox liberal paradigm, OSCE and EU
policy recommendations to the Baltic states (and to other states in East Central Europe)
have focused on the vertical dimension, calling for the immediate incorporation of ethnic
minorities into the political community.
The major problem with the liberal view of political community is that it
conceptualizes political community as a power-free social medium, within which actors

8Girard Noriel, “Immigration: Amnesia and Memory,” French Historical Studies
19. no. 2 (1995): 367-98.
9Linz and Stepan, Kymlicka.
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exist regardless o f historical circumstance.10 According to the orthodox liberal view,
national integration can be achieved by extending the rights of citizenship and minority
rights to the “have-nots” (i.e., immigrants and ethnic minorities). This would also help to
address the legacy o f ethnic restructuring. Such arguments do not take into account the
crucial role played by historical memory during the process of community building.
Very few would disagree with the argument that has been put forward by liberal
scholars and embraced by international institutions: that basic democratic rights such as
the right to participation or basic human rights should be applicable to the members of all
ethnicities. However, given the presence of actors with political power and different
historical memories, there are different ways to implement democratic governance. In
other words, there are different ways to build and balance the two axes, the backbone of
democratic communities. This is especially true in ethnically polarized states. The
application of the theory to the post-Soviet Baltic experience illustrates this point.

l0Peggy W atson refers to such political space as a “curved” space. Drawing on the
Einsteinian understanding that “there is no absolute space” (i.e., power relations are
present in all social media). Watson argues that social sciences should discard the idea of
an absolute (“power-free” ) social space, often assumed by liberal theories. Understood as
a "power-free” space, political community is viewed as “a level playing field set aside for
the pursuit of individual or group interests,” without taking prior history nor already
existing power relations into account. See Peggy Watson, “Civil Society and the Politics
of Difference in Eastern Europe,” in Transitions, Environments, Translations: Feminisms
in International Politics. ed. Joan W. Scott. Cora Kaplan, and Debra Keates (New York:
Routledge, 1997). 24.
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APPLYING THE THEORY TO TH E POST-SOVIET EXPERIENCE

The Two Axes and Political Systems

In dictatorships, the pow er within both dimensions o f the political space is
monopolized by the state. U nder such conditions, the state “bends” the space in any way
that it considers necessary. Its main goal is to control the vertical dimension— the “on
going association” of people sharing one history. The state puts a lot o f emphasis on the
vertical dimension. It allows very little or no activity in the horizontal layer.
In order to insure its m onopoly on the vertical axis, the state can deport or
eliminate those sub-state actors who pose a threat (whether real or imagined) to the major
supporters of the state. Therefore, theoretically, it is in the best interests of a nondemocratic state to pursue a policy of social homogenization. This means that the state
tries to obliterate, or at least to control, the ethnic, political o r social differences in its
population. By pursuing a policy of social homogenization, the state ensures that there are
no alternative centers of power and, therefore, that no group is capable of challenging its
power. In other words, there is one vertical axis.
Under such conditions, the “horizontal” dimension of political community (civil
society) is a sum of “atomized” households, in which people associate only with their
family members and friends. These individuals are, by and large, incapable of mobilizing
for political action." The goal o f the deportations and resettlements carried out by Stalin

"In the former Communist bloc, there were small groups of dissidents. However,
such “civil societies” were dependent on the existence of a hostile state. These groups
defined themselves in opposition to that state. See Aleksander Smolar. “From Opposition
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was to create such a space, thus preventing potential mobilization.
Furthermore, to reduce the power of on-going associations among the so-called
“titular” nations (i.e., Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, etc.), the state decided to
transform the vertical axes of titular nations with planned injections o f other nationalities,
mostly ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians. The Soviet approach to
nationalities after Stalin consisted o f three stages. These were rastsvet (flourishing, or
allowing the “equal” development o f socialist nations within the USSR), sblizheniye
(rapprochement, o r a movement away from rastsvet towards an eventual unity), and
sliyaniye (assimilation, amalgamation, or the final process after the stage o f unity).12
Sliyaniye, or the third stage, envisioned the creation of a Soviet nation around the Russian
nation and its language. In other words, the ultimate goal of the Soviet approach to
community building after Stalin was to create one strong vertical “Soviet” axis and to
eliminate the horizontal dimension.
In the late eighties, when it became impossible for the authorities in M oscow to
continue “bending” the political space, new actors emerged in that space. These actors
included nationalist movements— movements that have often been m istakenly viewed as
representatives of the horizontal dimension (i.e., civil society).13 Many o f these
movements were in fact representatives of the previous “vertical” axes that the Soviet state
wanted to subdue. That is especially true in the case of the restorationist m ovem ents in the

to Atomization,” in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond,
Marc F. Planner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1997), 268.
l2“The Code Words and Catchwords of Brezhnev’s Nationality Policy,” Radio
Liberty Research Report (29 June, 1976).
l3“The myth o f civil society as united, anti-political, and supportive o f radical
reform was one of the first casualties of the postcommunist era,” writes Sm olar. 268.
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Baltic states. These movements openly proclaimed themselves the heirs o f the
independent Baltic states that existed prior to 1940.
This “return of the repressed” was the first stage of democratic community
building in post-Soviet era. Its major goal was to re-create the vertical axis of
communities. During this stage, there were widespread demands that the experiences of
ethnic restructuring, deportation, and forced migration (i.e., the amalgamation methods
used by the Soviet Union) be officially recognized by the democratizing polities as
genocide. Such demands became a powerful source for mobilization and the recreation of
the vertical axis. However, one other legacy of the ethnic restructuring carried out by the
Soviet Union was the presence of ethnic groups opposed to the emerging nationalist
movements in the territory of the emerging political communities.
During the process of mobilization, the previous experiences of displacement
played a major role. It is probably not a coincidence that many Baltic politicians had a
personal experience of displacement.14 This experience helped them to become effective
“entrepreneurs of memory” (in Maurice H albwach’s terminology),15 capable of stimulating
personal memories in Baltic societies. This, in tum , created a sense of unity and became a
basis for social cohesion among ethnic Balts, which was a necessary condition for nation
building, and, at the same time, a sustainable vertical axis. Mobilization defined the

14E.g., Vaira Vike-Freiberga and Valdas Adamkus, the presidents of Latvia and
Lithuania, have experienced displacement to the West as their families were fleeing the
Soviet onslaught. Vilis Kristopans, a form er Prime-Minister o f Latvia, was bom in
Siberia. Guntis Ulmanis, the former president of Latvia, was deported to Siberia in his
youth. This fact softened the opposition of radical nationalists and the Independence
movement to his candidacy as a president. Lennart Men, the president of Estonia, and his
family were exiled to Russia during W orld W ar II.
15Maurice Halbwachs. The Collective Memory (New York: Harper and Row,
1980).
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boundaries of the emerging political communities. The experiences of deportation became
a dividing line between the autochthonous residents of the Baltic polities on the one hand
and the “newcomers” on the other. Even in the case of Lithuania, which decided to adopt
the most liberal laws on citizenship, the memory of ethnic restructuring played a major
role. It became a dividing line between ethnic Lithuanians on the one hand and ethnic
Russians, Poles, and other minorities on the other. It became a source of polarization,
insecurity, and fear that the emerging state would lose territory to the “m other states.”
During the second stage of political community building the vertical axes in all
three Baltic states were restored. Since then, the major remaining problem facing these
states has been to address another aspect of the Soviet legacy— the recreation o f the
horizontal axis. Developing a functioning civil society (i.e., restoring the horizontal axis)
offers one way to integrate disappointed and alienated minorities who are incapable or
unwilling to merge into the vertical axis. This would prevent the minorities from
consolidation into their own vertical axis within the same state.
The following section examines the dominant features o f different arrangements
that helped to reduce polarization and to insure peaceful coexistence among different
ethnic groups in the three states. In addition, it seeks to explain why and how these
arrangements were accepted and experienced by ethnic minorities. The analysis is
organized around two aspects of the regimes— political power and the economic
dimension.
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Balancing the Vertical and the Horizontal: Peacefid Coexistance in Ethnically
Restructured Slates

In previous works on ethnic relations, toleration (or coexistance) has been viewed
as the product o f an unequal relationship— a relationship in which the “tolerated” group
(an ethnic minority) is in an inferior position when com pared to the dom inant ethnic
group. The dom inant ethnic group decides whether it will tolerate the minority and under
what conditions. The minority decides whether to accept the diktat o f the dominant ethnic
group. Ideally, in consolidated democracies, all involved parties should be willing to go
beyond such arrangements and try to base their strategies on mutual respect.16
Polarization along ethnic lines refers to the absence of toleration. If ethnically
polarized states are unwilling to take action to deal with this condition, then, as was argued
in Chapter m , the state is unlikely to develop a sustainable democratic regim e.17 One of
the most important findings of the three case studies is that the shape o f political
communities and the political arrangements devised to accommodate ethnic differences
were conditioned by the historical memory of previous deportations, displacement and
forced population transfers. A closer look at the pow er dimension of the institutions
adopted by ethnically restructured states illustrates this point.

16For a further discussion of toleration as a relationship of inequality, see Michael
Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven: Yale University, 1997), 52.
‘'For a detailed discussion of polarization along ethnic lines, see Pal Kolsto,
“Bipolar Societies?” in Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies:
An Investigation o f Lan’ia and Kazakstan, ed. Pal Kolsto (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,
1999). 15-43. Kolsto and his co-authors applied H orow itz’s thesis about the difficulties
related to com m unity building in multiethnic states to the cases of Latvia and Kazakstan.
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Establishing the Legitimacy o f Power: The Political Dimension

The three states chose to legitimatize their power by giving citizenship only to pre1940 inhabitants and their descendants. By doing that, the authorities took into account
the historical memories o f the Soviet occupation that were rekindled by individual scholars
and political groups during the period of national revival in the three states. Thus, many
individuals, especially those belonging to the autochthonous ethnic groups, could relate
their individual experiences with those legitimatized by the state. Consequently, in the
three states, the atrocities committed by the previous regime, including deportations and
forced resettlements, becam e the central com ponent of legitimacy within the emerging
communities. Especially during the initial stage of community building, historical
legitimization of citizenship laws (referring to the pre-World W ar II states and the
illegitimacy of the Soviet republics) was perceived as indispensable by the leaders of the
national revival m ovem ents.18
In the cases of Latvia and Estonia, membership in the recreated communities
favored ethnic Latvians and Estonians. In all three states, the members of diasporic
communities were given preferential treatment when it came to citizenship.19 In this
respect, membership in the Baltic communities is curiously similar to the Law o f Return in
Israel that grants citizenship to ethnic Jews and constitutes a post factum kind of

l8For a similar discussion about the role of historical images on nation-building,
see Peter Thaler, “National History— National Imagery: The Role of History in Postwar
Austrian Nation-Building,” Central European History 32, no. 3 (1999): 277—309.
l9In Lithuania, this treatment was institutionalized by 1996 Amendment to the
Citizenship Law.
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affirmative action by commemorating past persecutions.20
The remembrance o f the past during the debates on citizenship in Estonia and
Latvia (Chapters VI and VII) explains why the more radical, exclusionist version o f
citizenship gained legitimacy vis-a-vis the more moderate approaches to political
community building. Historical memory, and not the suggestions of outside actors, was
the determining factor in the shaping of the political community in these two countries.
Legitimatizing the citizenship laws by remembering the past resulted in powerful
arguments for defining the borders of political communities to exclude Soviet-era
immigrants. This action won the approval of the autochthonous residents of the state and,
interestingly, silenced potential opposition among ethnic Russians. With the exception of
the Russians living in the Northeast, the response of most Russians in Estonia to the
exclusivist nature of the citizenship laws was muted. They decided either to leave the
country or to retreat into the private sphere (or just focus on making money). Mobilization
of ethnic Russians living in Estonia has remained low. The reaction to the development of
ethnic democracy in Latvia was similar among Russians living in Latvia (see Chapter VO).
Those who stayed in Latvia began to develop a sense of being second class citizens— but
they did not rebel.
In Lithuania, despite its inclusive citizenship law and numerous laws promoting
the rights of ethnic minorities, the level of mobilization by ethnic Poles living in
southeastern Lithuania has been much higher than that of the Russians living in Latvia and
Estonia. Ethnic Polish political entrepreneurs who emerged from the ranks of local Soviet
leaders have been rather successful in exploiting the feelings of relative economic

20Safran, 325-27.
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deprivation (when compared to other regions in Lithuania) and resistance to the Lithuanian
language among ethnic Poles and other ethnic Slavs living in Northeastern Lithuania (see
Chapter VIII).
To legitimatize their power vis-a-vis minorities living in ethnic enclaves and to
reduce polarization, the Lithuanian and the Estonian governments chose to grant a high
level of autonomy to the inhabitants of those regions. In Lithuania, this decision was met
with resistance from organizations that united former victims o f the Polish and Russian
occupations. These organizations continued to press the central government for more
schools in the Lithuanian language in the region and for more attention to the rights of
ethnic Lithuanians living in this ethnic enclave. Extending partial autonomy to ethnic
Poles in Eastern Lithuania helped to relieve tensions during the first stage o f community
building. However, because of a dearth of state funds, the economic backwardness of the
region, and only half-hearted attempts at reform by the local government, tensions have reemerged. Ethnic Poles living in the region continue to view themselves as an
underprivileged minority and continue to press for more funds from the central
government. On the other hand, support for the restored state among ethnic Lithuanians
living in the enclave has declined sharply. M any think that they are treated unfairly by the
local government (see Chapter VUI). As the literature on autonomy in multiethnic areas
suggests, this happens frequently in multiethnic areas in which the dominant ethnic group
is granted self-governance.21
The Estonian decision to extend the right to vote in local elections to all residents

2lE.g., see Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts
(Washington. D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 193, 198.
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was more successful than the attempts of the Lithuanian government to balance the
demands of ethnic Poles for more autonomy against the dem ands of ethnic Lithuanians to
“re-lithuanize” Southeastern Lithuania. As the analysis o f the arrangement in Chapter VI
shows. Estonia’s Russians were very active at the local level. Furthermore, they were
interested in having a say in the issues discussed at the local government level. Including
the Russians in decision making at the local level helped to prevent ethnic Russian
political leaders from exploiting feelings of perceived hum iliation and ethnic deprivation
among Estonia’s Russian population.22 On the other hand, ethnic Estonians did not view
this arrangement as a threat to their national identity. Consequently, even nationalist
parties eventually decided to cooperate with Russian parties at the local government level.
The Estonian case clearly shows that the most successful strategies to reduce
polarization were implemented at the local level, or “below .” These strategies— extending
full social and economic rights to all residents o f the state and extending the right to vote
in local elections— were sensitive to the historical sensitivities of ethnic Estonians on the
one hand and to the need of the Russians to have a say in comm unity building and
everyday affairs on the other. The successful implementation o f these strategies was the
reason why the Estonian state managed to gain legitimacy in the eyes of Estonia’s Russian
community.
The other two states also extended full social and economic rights— the right to use
the state as a “service station” and a full membership in civil society— to their ethnic
minorities. As the analysis conducted in Chapter VII shows, the approach used by Latvia
to reduce polarization, in which full rights of membership in civil society were extended to

:2Such a scenario was described by Laitin, Identity in Formation, 327.
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Latvia’s Russians, was the most successful approach. As a consequence, Latvia’s
Russians are perceived (both by themselves and by ethnic Latvians) as the richest ethnic
group in Latvia.23
Lithuania extended full political, social and economic rights to its minorities.
However, as Chapter VUI shows, this nation state was not entirely successful in reducing
ethnic tension in the Eastern part o f the country. It failed to create representative local
governments and to increase the level o f economic development in that area. Unlike the
Russians in Latvia and Estonia, ethnic Poles in Eastern Lithuania continue to view
themselves as the worst educated, poorest and most politically underprivileged group in
the country. The case of Lithuania’s Poles points to the importance of the economic
dimension in legitimatizing the state in the eyes of its ethnic minorities.

Sustaining the Legitimacy o f Power: The Economic Dimension

As the three states strengthened their market economies, different non-state actors,
such as labor unions or business associations, slowly began to assert themselves. Even
though it is too early to assess the importance of these associations in building bridges
between different ethnic groups, it is probably fair to suggest that the emergence of these
organizations provides channels for voicing the grievances of ethnic minorities in the three

23Given the scarcity of data on real wages, it is difficult to determine whether this
stereotype correspond to the actual distribution of wealth in Latvian society. However, it
is important that Latvia’s Russians do not consider themselves to be an underprivileged
ethnic group. For sociological data from the mid-nineties, see Irina Maikova, Pal Kolsto,
and Hans Olav M elberg, “Attitudinal and Linguistic Integration in Kazakstan and Latvia.”
in Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An Investigation o f
Latvia and Kazakstan, ed. Pal Kolsto (Boulder, Colo.: W estview, 1999), 235.
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states.
O f the three Baltic states. Estonia is usually considered to be the most successful in
the economic sphere. It was the only state to receive an early invitation to start accession
talks with the European Union (in 1997). In the words of EU Commissioner Erki Likanen,
Estonia was singled out because “of its functioning market economy and free trade.”24 In
addition to its liberal trade policy and market economy, Estonia established a stable
currency prior to the other two Baltic states. Furthermore, it received a lot o f assistance
from Finland and other Nordic states— both at the national and local levels.25 Good
economic performance enabled the state to establish functioning local governments and
thus make their state a functioning “service station” at the local level.
Good economic performance was another reason (in addition to the integration
policy at the local level) why the Estonian state managed to win loyalty among its citizens
and noncitizen residents. According to opinion polls conducted in 1997, the percentage of
people who are disloyal to the stale is far less in Estonia than in Lithuania and Latvia: only
10% of those polled in Estonia would like to see the old Soviet order restored.26 In Latvia,
approximately 26% of citizens thought that “due to the help of the nations o f the Soviet
Union, Soviet Latvia reached a high level of economic and cultural development.” 58% of

24Quoted in Bungs, The Baltic States, 26. On 6 April 2000, Estonia finished 12 of
the 25 chapters that have been opened for talks with the EU. Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Newsline (7 April, 2000).
25More than 65% of Estonia’s trade is with the EU. Trade with Sweden and
Finland alone accounts for 50% of all trade. Estonia managed to establish an exportoriented economy, supported by substantial investment by foreign companies, such as
Nokia of Finland and Tolaram of Singapore. It also has developed a very successful
banking sector. Bruce Barnard, ‘T h e Baltics: Seven Years A fter the Breakup of the
Soviet Union, the Baltic Countries Are on the Economic Fast Track,” Europe (October
1999): 23.
26UN, Estonian Human Development Report 1998, 45.
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non-citizens embraced this opinion. In 1998, the number of those who thought positively
about Soviet times increased compared to 1994.27 According to 1995 data, Lithuania’s
residents have the most positive evaluation o f the Soviet past, and Estonia’s residents the
worst.28 According to the World Bank Lithuania has the worst overall econom ic situation
of the Baltic states.
At the same time, a functioning market economy made it possible for Estonia to
provide the necessary funds with which to investigate the crimes of the past. In the early
nineties, Estonia created a special police department to conduct historical research and to
search for the perpetrators of crimes com m itted during Soviet times. It played the role o f a
historical truth com m ission.29 Similar commissions were established in the other two
slates. Furthermore, the establishment of functioning state institutions in the Baltic area
helped to put the experiences of displacement and deportation in the history books and to
record them as crimes. Displacement and deportations were revisited by public debates,
trials, and public commemorations. Consequently, even though only a few conscious
efforts at reconciliation were made by the representatives o f the different ethnic groups,
historical memories were not transformed into a desire for revenge. Instead, these
memories are becoming a learned history. As the second-generation permanent residents
and citizens of the three states learn this history, they become part of the vertical axis.

2/Baltijas datu nams, 84.
28Gaidys, 87. Gaidys refers to the study conducted by the centers for market and
public opinion research in the Baltic states and the Centre for the Study o f Public Policy,
University o f Strathclyde.
29Toivo Kamenik (Special Police Unit researching the war crimes), interview by
author. 6 Novem ber 1998, Vilnius.
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THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

As the case studies (Chapters VI-VIII) indicate, a large number o f international
actors were involved in community building in the Baltics. This is especially true in the
cases of Latvia and Estonia.30 The dissertation focused on the most prominent
organizations— the European Union, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and, in the case of
Lithuania. Polish-Lithuanian institutional arrangements— and the minority’s mother states,
Russia and Poland. After the Baltic states joined the Council o f Europe, the influence of
this organization on the decision making processes within those countries was reduced.
After that, the EU and Western governments directly affected decisions on citizenship and
minority laws in the three states.
The actions of these international actors, and Western international institutions in
particular, were representative of a larger trend in postcommunist politics during the postCold war era. Numerous international actors, such as governments, international
organizations, and non-govemmental bodies, did not hesitate when it came to intervening
in the domestic politics of nation states in East Central Europe.31 The official goal of these
interventions, especially those conducted by Western international organizations, was
certainly noble: to promote human rights, minority rights, and democratic government.
Previous research on the impact o f international institutions on community
building in the Baltic states has tended to hail the political conditionality exercised by

^F o r a list of international institutions active in the Baltic region, see “The Baltic
Revolution: Sea of Dreams,” Economist (18 April, 1998): 50-52.
3,Michae! Pinto-Duschinsky, ‘T h e Rise of ‘Political Aid’,” in Consolidating the
Third Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond. Marc F. Planner, Yun-han Chu, and Hungm aoTien (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 295-324.
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international institutions as “successful preventive diplomacy” or as a necessary step to
promote democracy in “an inclusive mode.”32 Indeed, it would not be fair to ignore the
positive influence that international institutions and international actors have had on the
Baltic states. If it were not for American and EU pressure, then the withdrawal of the
Russian military would have been much slower. Furthermore, foreign investment, military
cooperation, and financial help received from the West played a positive role during the
initial stages of democratization. These actions by international institutions helped to
strengthen the institutions of the states, to increase the welfare of their citizens, and,
consequently, to legitimatize the states in the eyes of their ethnic minorities.
Recently, however, some students of democratization have begun to question the
effectiveness of political conditionality in promoting human rights and minority rights in
states undergoing the transition to democracy.33 So far, however, little is known about the
effect that political conditionality (as exercised by international organizations) has had on
ethnic relations in the Baltic states.34 The case studies of this dissertation trace the process
of community building in detail and help to fill in this gap in knowledge.

32E.g., see Birckenbach.
33E.g., see Pinto-Duschinsky, 302-4. Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton
argue that efforts to influence policy reforms should be tailored to individual country
positions. Joel D. Barkan suggests that international actors may be helpful during the
first stage of democratization, but can do little in order to consolidate democratic regimes.
Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton, “Encouraging Democracy: What Role for
Conditioned Aid?” Policy Essay No. 4 (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development
Council, 1992) and Joel D. Barkan, “Can Established Democracies Nurture Democracy
Abroad?” in Democracy’s Victory and Crisis, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), 371^103.
3JVamik D. Volkan has conducted focus group studies in Latvia and Estonia. One
of his conclusions is that despite Latvia’s willingness to join international organizations,
by 1995. the “emotional fragmentation among Latvians remained, and the psychological
border between Latvians and Russians living in Latvia seemed even more rigid.” See
Volkan. Bloodlines, 145.
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The basic requirements adopted by the EU Councils at Copenhagen and Essen for
those states interested in joining the EU stated that the “applicant must be a stable pluralist
democracy.” This meant that a prospective m em ber must have, among other things,
independent political parties, regular elections, be committed to the rule of law, respect
human rights and protect its m inorities.35 These basic requirem ents are very broad.
Furthermore, the fact that there is widespread disagreement am ong international
organizations and specialists in international law on what in fact constitutes a “minority”
and whether non-citizen residents should be entitled to collective cultural rights, has
complicated the process. To illustrate, during the 1993 summ it of the Council of Europe
in Vienna, its members pledged to protect the rights of their countries’ minorities, but they
failed to agree on what a m inority is.36 In the cases of Latvia and Estonia, the initial
versions of their citizenship laws were at first approved by the Council of Europe, the
OSCE, and other international organizations as being in accordance with international
la w /7 However, as the case studies show, several years later the international actors
changed their position and began exerting pressure on these states to change their
citizenship laws, hoping that this would make the creation o f political communities easier.
The concessions made by Estonia and Latvia— revising their citizenship laws
several times, in the case o f Latvia watering down its language law (see Chapters VI and
VII)— were agreed upon for a very simple reason: the desire o f the Baltic states to join the

35For further discussion, see Marie Lavigne. “Conditions for accession to the EU,”
Comparative Economic Studies (Fall 1998); PROQUEST.
36George Jahn, “European Summit Ends Short on R esults.” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty B-W IRE (9 October, 1993).
37Jekaterina Dorodnova, “EU Involvement With M inority Issues in Estonia and
Latvia: Considerations of Democracy and Human Rights.” an unpublished manuscript.
Riga (April 2000).
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European Union and NATO. These international organizations, which offered implicit
and explicit security guarantees to their members, were the only ones capable of providing
for the national security of the Baltic states. Latvia and Estonia made concessions related
to the citizenship laws and the rights of minorities only when they became convinced that
these concessions would directly affect their chances for membership in these
organizations.
The greatest problem related to the political conditionality exerted by Western
states is. as Chapters VI and VO show, the fact that Russia has used the “human rights”
and the “rights of com patriots” rhetoric to assert its influence in Latvia and Estonia.
Russia is perfectly aware o f the fact that the European Union is “conditioning their [the
Baltic states] further integration on improving their relations with Russia and . . . the rights
of their Russian-speaking populations.”38 Consequently, “human rights” rhetoric has been
a powerful tool in the hands of Russia. The M arch 1998 crisis in Russian-Latvian
relations is a case in point. Russian officials and the Russian mass media drew
international attention to the dispersion of a crowd o f protesting Russian pensioners by the
Latvian police by describing this action as a violation of human rights and implementing
economic sanctions against Latvia. Shortly afterward, the OSCE High Commissioner,
with the support of the European Union, began exerting pressure on the Latvian
government to revise its citizenship law. The law was amended in April of 1998 (see
Chapter VII).
Ethnic Latvians perceived this pressure to liberalize the law on citizenship to be the

38Igor Yurgens, m em ber of the Russian Council for Foreign and Defense Policy,
quoted by ITAR/TASS (24 September. 1999).
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direct result of Russian influence. Thus, one unintended consequence of political
conditionality in Latvia (and also in Estonia) was that the OSCE High Com m issioner for
minorities became perceived by both ethnic Russians and ethnic Balts as the “defender" of
the ethnic Russians living in those countries.39 Van der Stoel’s visits to Latvia and Estonia
were met with protests by the former victims of the Soviet regime and by former partisans,
thus adding to ethnic polarization within those two states.
It is, therefore, not surprising that many ethnic Estonians and ethnic Latvians
perceived EU and OSCE pressure to amend their citizenship laws to be something that
would benefit only Russia and ethnic Russians. Very few viewed the liberalization of laws
on language and citizenship as something that would help them to build bridges between
the two communities. Having made all the required concessions on its law on citizenship,
Estonia refused to water down its language law. Under international pressure, Latvia
agreed to liberalize its language law by agreeing not to monitor the use of language in the
private sphere. However, the Latvian government has not abandoned its willingness to
make the position of the Latvian language stronger. Its new Law on Education envisions
switching to Latvian in all state-run schools by 2004. The EU has not yet objected to this
law, even though it is frowned upon by Russian ethnopolitical groups.40
Another unintended consequence of international intervention into political

39Malkova, Kolsto, and Melberg found that in Latvia Max van der Stoel is widely
seen as a champion o f the interests of non-Latvians. Maikova, Kolsto, and M elberg, 231.
■^The intention to sw-itch to Latvian was also included in the document outlining
Latvia’s strategy for integration into the EU. The plan to switch to Latvian as the sole
language of instruction in public schools was attacked by Russian political groups an hour
and a half prior to the visits by Romano Prodi, head o f the European Commission in
2000, and Guenther Verheugen, EU Commissioner, to Riga’s parliament. “Latvia
Approves Strategy o f Integration into the EU,” ITAR/TASS (15 February, 2000).
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community building in Latvia and Estonia was an increase in feelings of victimhood
among ethnic Balts: a feeling that they were not the “masters of their own fate.” Such
perceptions can easily be exploited by nationalist parties who often argue against
international influence and call for ways to “strengthen the nation.” As the case study of
political community building in Latvia (Chapter VII) shows, the swing to more radical
ethnopolitical parties in Latvia’s local elections was the direct result of international
pressure to amend the law on citizenship. Thus, during the initial stage of political
community building in Latvia and Estonia (1990 to the mid-nineties) political
conditionality exerted by international actors helped right wing political parties to make
some gains and thus strengthened those groups.
As the case study on Lithuania (Chapter VIII) shows, this country received less
international scrutiny than Latvia and Estonia. However, similarly to the previous two
cases, attempts by Poland to monitor the status of ethnic Poles in eastern Lithuania
prompted widespread resistance among right wing activists. Such groups argued that
Lithuania and Poland should establish “ethnic minority parity” : that is, any rights that are
granted to Lithuania’s Poles, should be also granted to Poland’s Lithuanians. Even though
the two states have developed a variety of intergovernmental institutions, these bodies
have failed to alter the attitudes of ethnic Poles and their perceptions of the Lithuanian
state.
In sum, the case studies show' that attempts by international actors to change
political communities from above (that is, attempts to restructure the vertical axis) are
likely to have som e negative consequences, such as intensifying the activities of nationalist
groups and prompting searches for new ways to preserve what is perceived as an
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endangered ethnic identity. Such by-products of political conditionality hinder the
creation o f the tolerant political culture that is necessary for democratic consolidation in
multiethnic areas tom by different historical memories.
This is not to say, however, that international institutions should not intervene into
political community building in multiethnic states. The most successful programs
launched by international actors interested in helping to reduce ethnic polarization were
long term multilateral projects with little visibility in the political arena. For example, the
EU has given financial support for the National Program for Training in the Latvian
Language which aims to promote the Latvian language am ong Latvia’s Russians. A
similar language training project— Individual and Constant Language Teaching of Russian
Children in Estonian Fam ilies— that aimed to place Russian children in Estonian families
was supported by the Open Society Foundation. The European Council supported
Slenkstis [Threshold], a program for teaching Lithuanian to non-Lithuanians interested in
learning the state language.
These programs helped to de-politicize the language issue in the Baltic states
because they were conducted by “third parties” (i.e., neither by the nation states nor by
minority mother states). They were consistent with international laws, such as the Council
of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection o f National M inorities, that prohibit
national assimilation, but encourage minorities to leam the official language of the state in
which they live.41 In contrast, the programs geared to help Lithuania’s Poles that were
organized by Wspolnota Polska, a Polish organization interested in helping ethnic Poles

4lIneta Ziemele, “The Role o f State Continuity and Human Rights in Matters of
Nationality of the Baltic States,” in The Baltic Stales at Historical Crossroads, ed. Talavs
Jundzis (Riga: Academy Sciences o f Latvia. 1998). 265.
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living abroad, usually aroused the suspicions of ethnopolitical groups interested in the “relilhuanization” o f Eastern Lithuania.
The international attention given to the economic condition in the ethnic enclave in
Northeastern Estonia is another example of successful international intervention in
community building. Ethnic Russians living in that area got used to on-going international
attention. Visits by the representatives of Western governments or Western businesses
became so commonplace that they barely even made it into the local news. To illustrate,
in 1999, reporting on a visit by representatives of the Swedish government interested in
helping Narvans to deal with unemployment and Estonian language education, the local
newspaper wrote, “there was a visit from our regular guests, the Swedish government.”42
EU help for the strengthening o f local governments in the region coupled with the help of
Scandinavian governments at the local level helped to relieve the grievances of Russians
living in that area and to focus their attention on local projects. Thus, in 1999, Narvskaya
Gazeia (Narva’s local newspaper) wrote, “We must try to gain respect from the W est
instead of looking to the East. . . . Our local government is working on the projects that
may get attention and money from the West.”43 The Latgale region in Latvia and
Southeastern Lithuania would probably benefit from similar endeavors.
These strategies by international actors were carried out within the “horizontal”
area of communities. Their components were multilateralism (that is, numerous state and
non-state actors were involved) and not top-down pressure and long term commitment.
Such programs, directed at com m unity building efforts at the horizontal level and

i2Narvskaya Gazeta (22 January, 1999), 1.
i2Nar\’skaya Gazeta (19 January, 1999), 1.
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consistent with the major policies of the states, are likely to help states to legitimatize their
power in the long run.

REVISITING THE DEBATE ON MULTIETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM THE BALTIC EXPERIENCE

The tension between the need for some form of state-wide community cohesion
and recognition of the needs and histories embraced by different ethnic groups is going to
remain a sensitive issue in world politics. Contemporary nation states, either established
democracies or states undergoing transition, have become increasingly ethnically
heterogenous. They have become home to ethnic groups with different historical
memories, different mother states,.and different political interests. Ethnic heterogeneity
has become a normal characteristic of a nationstate.
At the same time, ethnic conflict has become more dangerous. In the post-Cold
War era. civil wars and ethnic conflicts have become more prevalent than interstate wars.
Consequently, understanding why a group o f people gets mobilized to address past wrongs
and knowing what can be done to reduce ethnic polarization are of tremendous importance
to those interested in creating sustainable, consolidated democracies capable of tolerating
difference.
The huge body o f literature on identity construction and mobilization, reviewed in
Chapter m , has produced rich case studies on the intersection of identity and democracy
and a list of ways to promote democracies in multiethnic areas. A large num ber of
scholars agree that in order to achieve democratic consolidation in multiethnic areas,
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governments and international actors must create an inclusive political process that
includes ethnic minorities. This belief translated into policies promoted by international
institutions such as the EU or the OSCE and their use of political conditionality in the
Baltic states. The orthodox liberal idea— integration and democratic consolidation
through dem ocratic citizenship rights and minority rights— has become the basis o f the
external aspects o f democratization in the Baltic states and elsewhere. It is widely
believed that rights in and of themselves constitute the basis of legitimacy for state power
in democratizing states.
The research contained in this dissertation challenges this consensus. It shows that
orthodox liberal approaches have ignored the crucial role that historical memory plays
during the processes o f community building. Historical memory and official history are
probably one o f the most powerful ways that emerging states legitimate the social order
and their power. Alternatively, actors who are capable of stirring up historical memory
have the pow er to demonstrate that the existing political order is illegitimate.-14 This was
the role played by the nationalist movements in the Baltic states during the initial stage of
political com m unity building.
Logically and historically, the existence of political actors with a sense of
cohesiveness is prior to the rights and laws. The rights and laws must be written by
someone. Furthermore, there must be ways to enforce the laws. In democratic
communities, citizens must feel that they are the authors of the laws and that they have the
power to change the laws if they want. Often, historical memory and official history

^K ristian G em er makes a sim ilar point about historiography. Kristian G em er, “A
Moveable Place with a Moveable Past: Perspectives on Central Europe,” Australian
Journal o f Politics and History 45, no. 1 (March 1999); INFOTRAC.
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become the basis of cohesiveness uniting the members of one national group. However,
by establishing functioning state institutions and inclusive local governments an ethnically
heterogenous state may be able to achieve peaceful co-habitation between ethnic groups
with different historical memories.
These observations suggest two questions crucial for the debate on the relationship
between multiethnicity and democracy. First, how do we explain the movement from the
multitude o f diverse individual historical perspectives to the collective “we”? Second,
what can be done to prevent the group’s “we-ness” from becoming exclusionary and even
deadly? Stirring up memories of past wrongs may lead to calls for revenge. In such cases,
the same variable that is necessary for the establishment o f a functioning democratic
regime may become deadly for the m embers o f other ethnic groups. Ethnic conflicts and
genocide are often at least partially provoked by competing mobilized memories about
past abuses and past experiences of genocide and ethnic conflict.45
These two questions include clum sy variables such as historical memory and ethnic
hatred that have been traditionally treated with scepticism by political scientists. This
probably explains why the orthodox liberal perspective has been much better received in
political science and international relations than historical approaches. Norms, laws,
rights, or institutions are easier to explore than the role of history. Meanwhile, other
disciplines, such as history, anthropology or even psychiatry, have been much more open
to studies o f historical memory. In order to successfully integrate such insights into the

45For the role o f the memory o f the genocide of Serbs during the W orld War II in
the outbreak of ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia, see W olfgang Hoepken, “War, Memory,
and Education in a Fragmented Society: The Case of Yugoslavia,” East European
Politics and Societies 13, no. 1 (1999): 190—227. For a discussion of the relationship
between historical memory and ethnic conflict in the Caucasus, see Tishkov, 155—206.
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debate on democracy and multiethnicity, political actors must be conceptualized, in the
words o f John Ruggie, “as not only strategically but also discursively competent.”46 That
is. one must acknowledge that actors have rational egoistic interests, but at the same time,
one must take into account their discourse and their memories.
The concept of political community as a two-dimensional space with actors who
bend this space is one o f the first steps in this direction. Such conceptualization
encourages us to take the previous experiences of the actors into account in order to
understand how they have become powerful. Thus, the first question about the movement
from the multitude perspectives to the collective “we” is addressed. In the Baltic case, the
m ajor forces behind this movement were public commemorations, some of which were
preserved even during the times of dictatorship (see Chapter V). Furthermore, many of the
former victims and former deportees became “entrepreneurs” capable of stirring up
historical memories for political goals and thus constructing the “vertical” axis.
A close examination of the constitutive elements of the vertical axis reveals that
historical memory became the basis o f political community and cohesiveness in all three
Baltic states. The fact that they ended up with similar citizenship laws and that the
political activity o f minorities became limited to the horizontal axis is a case in point.
Exploring the relationship between the vertical and horizontal axes helps to answer the
second question: W hat did the states do to reduce ethnic polarization? The case studies
suggest that the most successful arrangements— inclusiveness at the local level in Estonia,
the extension of social and economic rights in Latvia, and balancing between the demands
o f the minority and the majority’s sensitivities in Lithuania— took historical sensitivities

40Ruggie, 869.
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and ethnic fears into account (see table 13).
If this is the case, then it follows logically that there is no one universal way to
reduce ethnic polarization and to consolidate democracies. Ethnic arrangements must be
context-specific. Reducing ethnic polarization is a long, painstaking process that involves
many actors at both the state and sub-state level. At the state level, economic strength may
aid in the development of institutions to deal with different memories. It may also foster a
generation of historians who are willing to discover and publicly discuss painful aspects of
the past, thus distinguishing between memory and history.
The most successful approaches to reduce polarization, however, are likely to be
exercised at the “horizontal level.” As the Estonian case suggests, a state that is doing
well economically and is willing to foster strong local governments may eventually be
rew arded with fledgling ethnic coalitions at the local level. The Latvian and Lithuanian
cases suggest that economic grievances may be very easily transformed into ethnic
tensions and complicate the reduction of ethnic polarization.
Consequently, international actors (that is, international actors other than a
minority’s “mother state”) are extremely helpful in fostering the horizontal sphere— by
extending economic help, smoothing relations between the multiethnic state and the
“mother state” or, as in the case o f Lithuanian-Polish relations, integrating the triadic stateminority-mother state relationship into larger and more attractive international structures.
Political conditionality while attempting to transform the vertical axis should be exercised
w ith a great caution.
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Table 13. Differences Between Orthodox Liberal and Process-Oriented Approaches*

THEORY

EVIDENCE
FROM THE
CASE
STUDIES

ORTHODOX LIBERAL
APPROACHES

PROCESS-ORIENTED APPROACHES

Focus on the Vertical Axis

Focus on the Horizontal Axis

Outcome-Oriented

Process-Oriented

Means to Reduce Polarization:
- Focus on prescribed liberal democratic
norms, rights, institutions and policies

Means to Reduce Polarization:
- Flexible forms of political institutions;
- Decentralization;
- Dialogic communities
- Socioeconomic communities

The Role of International Actors:
- Generally approve of political
conditionality:
- The outsiders are seen as experts in
democratization.

The Role of International Actors:
- Suspicious of political conditionality;
- The outsiders work with the insiders.

Ways to Strengthen the Vertical Axis:
- Mobilize historical memory (all
cases);
- Establish historical continuity of the
state (all cases);
- Political disenfranchisement of large
segments ethnic minorities (Latvia and
Estonia in particular).

Ways to Strengthen the Horizontal Axis:
- Give full social and economic rights to
non-members living in the state; let them
use the state as a “service station” (all
cases);
- Give cultural autonomy to the interested
ethnic groups (all cases);
- Establish functioning local governments
(Estonia).

The Role of International Organizations:
- Pivotal role in liberalization of the
Citizenship laws (Estonia and Latvia);
- Provoked ethnic polarization (Estonia
and Latvia).

The Role of International Organizations:
- Relieve ethnic anxiety of autochthonous
groups by promoting national language
among ethnic minorities (all cases):
- Help in establishing functioning local
governments (the Narva region in Estonia).

Note:
'liana Shapiro refers to these two schools of thought as “Modernization" and “Conflict Resolution.” She
traces the philosophical roots of the first school to “positivist objective truth.” The roots of the second
school are described as “constructivist multiple truths.”

Source:
Shapiro. liana. “Beyond Modernization: Conflict Resolution in Eastern and Central Europe.” Annals o f the
American Academy o f Political and Social Science 552 (July 1997): 26.
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In sum, the Baltic experiences suggest that in territories inhabited by ethnic groups
with different and recently activated historical memories, process-oriented approaches to
community building should be preferred to outcome-oriented, or orthodox liberal
approaches. The goal of process-oriented approaches to political community building is to
create interdependent relationships between different ethnic groups instead of trying to
create one cohesive “integrated” democratic state. Process-oriented approaches adm it that
the integration o f different ethnic groups into one cohesive unit in ethnically restructured
and other history-sensitive regions is not possible. After the vertical axis has been re
established, one should aim for co-habitation. Flexible forms o f political organization
capable of addressing the historical sensitivities o f different ethnic groups and capable of
building a strong civil society are the means to achieve this goal.
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